Suico Industrial Corp. vs. Hon. Marilyn Lagura-Yap

Failure to file a pre-trial brief within the period prescribed by the Rules of Court is a sufficient ground for dismissal of the action, and the negligence of counsel in failing to file it binds the client. Corollarily, the "fresh period rule" announced in Neypes vs. Court of Appeals — allowing fifteen days from receipt of the order denying a motion for reconsideration within which to file a notice of appeal — is procedural and applies retroactively to actions pending at the time of its promulgation.

Suico Industrial Corporation and the spouses Esmeraldo and Elizabeth Suico were the borrowers and mortgagors of two real estate properties in Mandaue City, while Private Development Corporation of the Philippines (PDCP Bank, later renamed First E-Bank and now Prime Media Holdings, Inc.) was the secured creditor and mortgagee; Antonio Agro Development Corporation (AADC) subsequently acquired the foreclosed properties from PDCP Bank. The enforcement of the mortgage and the purchaser's entitlement to possession at a foreclosure sale are governed by Act No. 3135, as amended, and by Section 35 of Rule 39, which recognize the purchaser's right to possession upon conveyance of title. A prior decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 123050 (1999) had already passed upon the parties' rights over the same foreclosed properties.

In 1987 and 1991, Suico Industrial Corporation obtained two secured loans from Private Development Corporation of the Philippines (PDCP Bank), secured by a mortgage constituted on two real estate properties in Mandaue City owned by the corporation and by the mortgagor-spouses Esmeraldo and Elizabeth Suico. When the corporation failed to pay the balance of the loans, PDCP Bank foreclosed the mortgage in 1993 and emerged as the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, as evidenced by a Certificate of Sale dated February 29, 1993 issued by the Sheriff of Mandaue City. The mortgagors' failure to redeem within the period allowed by law resulted in the consolidation of ownership in the bank's favor and the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 34987 and 34988 in its name.

PDCP Bank then obtained a writ of possession from the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28. Its enforcement was, however, enjoined by an injunctive writ issued on January 17, 1995 by RTC Branch 56, before which the petitioners had filed on December 9, 1994 an action for specific performance, injunction and damages to prevent the bank from selling and taking possession of the foreclosed properties. According to the petitioners, they had an agreement with PDCP Bank to intentionally default in their payments so that the mortgaged properties could be foreclosed and purchased at public auction by the bank, after which the bank would allow them to purchase the properties for ₱5,000,000.00 through a recommended buyer; the bank allegedly raised the selling price, thereby preventing their recommended buyers from purchasing the properties. PDCP Bank questioned the injunctive writ before the Court of Appeals, which declared that RTC Branch 56 had exceeded its jurisdiction because it interfered with the proceedings of a court of concurrent jurisdiction, RTC Branch 28. That ruling was affirmed in 1999 by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 123050, which held that PDCP Bank's right to possess the property was clear and based on its right of ownership as purchaser at the foreclosure sale, and that the petitioners had taken a procedural misstep in filing a suit for specific performance, injunction and damages instead of a petition to set aside the sale and cancel the writ of possession under Section 8 of Act No. 3135.

Notwithstanding that ruling, the proceedings in Civil Case No. MAN-2321 before RTC Branch 56 continued. AADC, which had in the meantime purchased the foreclosed properties from PDCP Bank, filed a motion to intervene and an answer-in-intervention. Presiding Judge Augustine Vestil later voluntarily inhibited himself, and the case was re-raffled to RTC Branch 55. When PDCP Bank failed to file its answer within the reglementary period, the petitioners moved that the bank be declared in default and that AADC's answer-in-intervention be stricken from the records. In an Order dated August 3, 2001, Judge Ulric R. Cañete of RTC Branch 55 nevertheless gave the defendants time to file their written oppositions, observing that the case had been pending since 1994 without an answer from the defendant and that the motion for intervention had earlier been denied despite which an answer-in-intervention had been filed. On October 23, 2001, the RTC denied the motion to declare PDCP Bank in default, and admitted both PDCP Bank's answer filed on August 24, 2001 and AADC's answer-in-intervention. When Judge Cañete likewise inhibited from further hearing the case, it was transferred to Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap of RTC Branch 28.

At the scheduled pre-trial conference on September 6, 2002, the petitioners' counsel asked for a resetting to allow him more time to prepare the required pre-trial brief. PDCP Bank and AADC opposed the request and moved for the dismissal of the case, which Judge Yap granted in an order noting that although plaintiff Elizabeth Suico was in court, no pre-trial brief had been submitted, and that under Section 6, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court failure to file a pre-trial brief has the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial. The petitioners' motion for reconsideration, to which a pre-trial brief was attached, was denied in an Order dated February 21, 2003, a copy of which was received by their counsel on March 21, 2003. The petitioners filed their notice of appeal on April 4, 2003, but the RTC refused to give it due course in an Order dated May 15, 2003, finding that only one day remained from their receipt of the order denying reconsideration and that the notice had been filed thirteen days late. The petitioners went directly to the Court of Appeals by petition for certiorari, which dismissed the petition for lack of merit on January 16, 2006 and denied reconsideration on April 11, 2007.

The trial court found that the notice of pre-trial conference had been issued as early as July 29, 2002 and that the return showed petitioners' counsel had been furnished a copy on August 21, 2002, yet no motion to reset the conference was filed, and that the notice expressly warned that failure to file a pre-trial brief could be given the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial. The trial court likewise found that the alleged agreement between PDCP Bank and the petitioners for the purchase of the foreclosed properties by the latter's recommended buyers at a specified amount was unsupported by sufficient proof and was vehemently denied by the bank, and that what the records adequately established was the petitioners' failure to satisfy their obligation, the resulting foreclosure, the sale of the properties, and their failure to make a timely redemption.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion in the Dismissal: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals committed grave reversible error in not ruling that the respondent judge of RTC Branch 28 committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring them non-suited and dismissing the case on the ground of failure to file a pre-trial brief, and they invoked a liberal interpretation of the rules.
• Timeliness of the Notice of Appeal: Petitioners maintained that the Court of Appeals committed grave reversible error in ruling that their notice of appeal, filed on the fourteenth day after receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration, was filed out of time.
• Relief Sought: Petitioners prayed that the Court of Appeals' rulings be reversed and that the RTC's Order dated September 6, 2002 dismissing their action for specific performance, injunction and damages, and the Order dated February 21, 2003 denying their motion for reconsideration, be annulled and set aside.
• Efforts to Negotiate; Suspension Instead of Dismissal: Through new counsel in their reply, petitioners raised their desire and efforts to negotiate during the pre-trial conference and argued that the case should have been suspended instead of dismissed.

• Timeliness of the Appeal: Whether the notice of appeal filed on the fourteenth day after receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration was filed out of time.
• Dismissal for Failure to File a Pre-Trial Brief: Whether the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring the petitioners non-suited and dismissing the case on the ground of failure to file a pre-trial brief.

• Timeliness of the Appeal: No. The notice of appeal filed on April 4, 2003 was timely, having been filed within fifteen days from the petitioners' receipt on March 21, 2003 of the order denying their motion for reconsideration, pursuant to the Neypes "fresh period rule," which is procedural and applies retroactively to actions pending at its promulgation.
• Dismissal for Failure to File a Pre-Trial Brief: No. The trial court had a valid basis for the dismissal, since Section 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that failure to file a pre-trial brief has the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial, which under Section 5, Rule 18 is a cause for dismissal of the action.

• Timeliness of the Appeal: Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court prescribes that an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a judgment or final order of the RTC must be taken within fifteen days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from, and that the period is interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. In Neypes vs. Court of Appeals, promulgated on September 14, 2005, the Court standardized the appeal periods and allowed a fresh period of fifteen days within which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration, thereby eradicating the confusion as to when the fifteen-day period should be counted. Applying Neypes in Sumiran vs. Damaso, which reiterated Makati Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Reyes and De Los Santos vs. Vda. de Mangubat, the Court explained that the fresh period rule may be applied to actions pending upon its effectivity, since procedural law prescribes the manner in which the period for appeal is computed or determined and does not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law. The retroactivity of Neypes was further explained in Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. vs. Homena-Valencia, where the Court held that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure, and that amendments to procedural rules operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing. Measured against these rules, the petitioners' notice of appeal was timely filed on April 4, 2003, within the fifteen-day period counted from their receipt on March 21, 2003 of the order denying their motion for reconsideration; the RTC's contrary computation, which left them only one day from receipt of the denial, rested on the discredited mode of counting that Neypes abandoned.

• Dismissal for Failure to File a Pre-Trial Brief: Rather than remand the case for the trial court to take due course of the appeal, the Court resolved the legality of the dismissal itself, considering that the issue had been extensively argued by the parties in their pleadings, that the petition specifically prayed for the annulment of the RTC's orders of dismissal and denial of reconsideration, and that both the CA and the RTC had decided the issue with in-depth discussion of the facts and the rationale for their rulings. Section 4, Rule 18 imposes on the parties and their counsel the duty to appear at the pre-trial, and Section 5, Rule 18 provides that the failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required shall be a cause for dismissal of the action, which dismissal shall be with prejudice unless otherwise ordered by the court. Section 6, Rule 18 requires the parties to file and serve their respective pre-trial briefs in such manner as shall ensure receipt by the adverse party at least three days before the pre-trial, and expressly provides that failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial. On these provisions, the trial court clearly had a valid basis for ordering the dismissal of the petitioners' action. The petitioners' plea for liberal interpretation was measured against the guidelines in Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Dando, which enumerate the reasons that may justify suspending strict adherence to procedural rules: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) the fact that the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. None of these grounds concurred. The dismissal caused no injustice to the petitioners, no special or compelling circumstance appearing; the alleged agreement with PDCP Bank for the purchase of the foreclosed properties by the petitioners' recommended buyers deserved scant consideration for being unsupported by sufficient proof and having been vehemently denied by the bank; and the records adequately established only the petitioners' failure to satisfy their obligation, the foreclosure of the mortgage securing it, the sale of the foreclosed properties, and their failure to make a timely redemption. The prior Suico ruling had already declared that title to the property had been transferred to PDCP Bank, which had the right to possess it as purchaser at the foreclosure sale, and that the petitioners had taken a procedural misstep in filing a suit for specific performance, injunction and damages instead of a petition to set aside the sale and cancel the writ of possession under Section 8 of Act No. 3135. The petitioners' allegations regarding their desire and efforts to negotiate during the pre-trial conference, and their argument that the case should merely have been suspended, were raised for the first time only in their reply through new counsel and merited no consideration, no record showing that such antecedents transpired or were made known to the courts below. In affirming the dismissal, the Court emphasized the ruling in Durban Apartments Corporation vs. Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation on the mandatory character of pre-trial and the importance of the parties' preparedness to go into the subjects assigned by law to a pre-trial, the obligation "to appear" denoting not simply personal appearance but readiness to proceed. No cogent reason existed to liberally apply the rules, since the petitioners and their counsel offered no sufficient justification for their failure to file the required pre-trial brief; as held in Lapid vs. Judge Laurea, concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to at least explain its failure to comply. Members of the bar were reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure rather than seek exceptions as loopholes, and that technical rules are designed to effect the prompt, proper and orderly disposition of cases and prevent the clogging of court dockets. The failure to file the pre-trial brief was attributable to the fault or negligence of the petitioners' counsel, and the settled rule is that the negligence of counsel binds his clients; neither counsel nor his clients can evade the effects thereof by invoking that the failure amounted to inexcusable negligence, since it is absurd for counsel to emphasize the gravity of his own inaction and then invoke the same misfeasance to evade the consequences of his act. As in Air Phils. Corp. vs. Int'l. Business Aviation Services Phils., Inc., the negligence here was simple, not gross — a plain disregard of a duty imposed by law, a slight want of care that circumstances reasonably impose, and a mere failure to exercise the degree of care an ordinarily prudent person would take under the circumstances, with neither a total abandonment of the petitioners' case nor a showing of conscious indifference to consequences. The petitioners' attempt to confuse the issues by citing the respondents' own prior delay in filing pleadings and the leniency accorded them by the trial court was unavailing, since the admission of belatedly filed pleadings depended on the sound discretion of the court, the circumstances then attending the case, and the particular consequences provided by law, and the petitioners should have availed of the available remedies to question those orders rather than raise the matter for the first time in the appeal from the dismissal.

• Fresh Period Rule (Neypes Rule) — A party who timely files a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration is given a fresh period of fifteen days from receipt of the court's resolution denying that motion within which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC. The rule was adopted to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules of Court, to afford litigants a fair opportunity to appeal their cases, and to eradicate the confusion as to whether the fifteen-day period should be counted from receipt of notice of the judgment or from receipt of notice of the final order appealed from. In this case, the petitioners' notice of appeal, filed on April 4, 2003 or within fifteen days from their receipt on March 21, 2003 of the order denying reconsideration, was held timely notwithstanding the RTC's contrary computation.
• Retroactive Application of Procedural Rules — Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure; amendments to procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character, as they do not create new or remove vested rights but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing. The fresh period rule is irrefragably procedural, prescribing the manner in which the appropriate period for appeal is computed or determined, and may therefore be applied to actions pending upon its effectivity without danger of violating anyone else's rights. The Court applied this principle to uphold the timeliness of the appeal even though the period for appeal had already lapsed before Neypes was promulgated on September 14, 2005.
• Dismissal for Failure to File a Pre-Trial Brief — Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, the parties must file with the court and serve on the adverse party their respective pre-trial briefs in such manner as shall ensure receipt at least three days before the pre-trial, and failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial. Under Section 5, Rule 18, the failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required is a cause for dismissal of the action, which dismissal shall be with prejudice unless otherwise ordered by the court. The Court held that the trial court had a valid basis for dismissing the action on this ground.
• Guidelines for Liberal Construction of Procedural Rules (BPI vs. Dando) — The reasons that may justify a court in suspending strict adherence to procedural rules are: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) the fact that the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. The Court found that none of these grounds concurred in this case, so as to warrant relaxation of the rules.
• Negligence of Counsel Binds the Client — The settled rule is that the negligence of counsel binds his clients, and neither counsel nor his clients can evade the effects thereof by invoking that the failure amounts to inexcusable negligence which, by jurisprudence, should not bind the parties. Where the negligence is simple — a plain disregard of a duty imposed by law, a slight want of care that circumstances reasonably impose, and a mere failure to exercise the degree of care an ordinarily prudent person would take under the circumstances — and there is neither a total abandonment of the client's case nor a showing of conscious indifference to consequences, the client is bound by counsel's failure to file the required pre-trial brief.
• Mandatory Character of Pre-Trial — Pre-trial in civil actions is mandatory, and consistent with its mandatory character the Rules oblige not only the lawyers but the parties as well to appear for that purpose. The obligation "to appear" denotes not simply the personal appearance or physical presentation of a party but connotes, as importantly, preparedness to go into the different subjects assigned by law to a pre-trial. The Court cited Durban Apartments Corporation vs. Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation in emphasizing that the pre-trial's chief objective — the simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not indeed its dispensation — is attainable if the device is more intelligently and extensively handled.
• Duty to Explain Non-Compliance When Invoking Liberality — Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to at least explain its failure to comply with the rules. Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure rather than seek exceptions as loopholes; technical rules are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice but are provided to effect the prompt, proper and orderly disposition of cases and to prevent the clogging of court dockets, and utter disregard of these rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.

• "A party is given a "fresh period" of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the court's resolution on a motion for reconsideration within which to file a notice of appeal." — This headnote states the canonical formulation of the Neypes fresh period rule, the controlling doctrine on which the Court reversed the RTC's and the CA's finding that the notice of appeal was filed out of time.
• "Failure to file a pre-trial brief within the time prescribed by the Rules of Court constitutes sufficient ground for dismissal of an action." — This headnote states the second ratio decidendi of the case, sustaining the dismissal of the petitioners' action notwithstanding their plea for a liberal interpretation of the rules.
• "The failure to file the pre-trial brief is then attributable to the fault or negligence of petitioners' counsel. The settled rule is that the negligence of a counsel binds his clients." — This passage applies the doctrine that counsel's negligence binds the client, foreclosing the petitioners' attempt to evade the consequences of their counsel's inaction by characterizing it as inexcusable negligence.
• "Instructive on this point are the guidelines we applied in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Dando, wherein we cited the reasons that may provide a justification for a court to suspend a strict adherence to procedural rules, namely: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) the fact that the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby." — This passage enumerates the six-factor test governing the suspension of strict adherence to procedural rules, a formulation frequently invoked in later cases resolving pleas for liberal construction.

• Neypes vs. Court of Appeals, 506 Phil. 603 (2005) — Controlling precedent. Established the "fresh period rule" allowing a fresh period of fifteen days from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration within which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC; applied by the Court to hold the petitioners' notice of appeal timely.
• Sumiran vs. Damaso, G.R. No. 162518, August 19, 2009, 596 SCRA 450 — Followed. Reiterated the rulings in Makati Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Reyes and De Los Santos vs. Vda. de Mangubat to explain that the fresh period rule may be applied to actions pending upon its effectivity.
• Makati Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 167403, August 6, 2008, 561 SCRA 234 — Followed. Held that with the advent of the fresh period rule, parties who availed themselves of the remedy of a motion for reconsideration are allowed to file a notice of appeal within fifteen days from the denial of that motion.
• De Los Santos vs. Vda. de Mangubat, G.R. No. 149508, October 10, 2007, 535 SCRA 411 — Followed. Explained that procedural law refers to the adjective law prescribing rules and forms of procedure, that procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law or the general rule against retroactive application of statutes, and that the fresh period rule, being irrefragably procedural, can be applied to actions pending upon its effectivity.
• Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. vs. Homena-Valencia, G.R. No. 173942, June 25, 2008, 555 SCRA 345 — Followed. Held that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure, and that Neypes bears the retroactive effect sought.
• Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Dando, G.R. No. 177456, September 4, 2009, 598 SCRA 378 — Applied. Source of the six guidelines enumerating the reasons that may justify a court in suspending strict adherence to procedural rules; the Court found that none of the grounds concurred in this case.
• Durban Apartments Corporation vs. Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation, G.R. No. 179419, January 12, 2011, 639 SCRA 441 — Cited with approval. Emphasized the mandatory character of pre-trial in civil actions since January 1, 1964 and the obligation of the parties and their lawyers not merely to appear but to be prepared to go into the different subjects assigned by law to a pre-trial.
• Lapid vs. Judge Laurea, 439 Phil. 887 (2002) — Applied. Held that concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to at least explain its failure to comply with the rules; relied upon to reject the petitioners' plea for liberal construction.
• Air Phils. Corp. vs. Int'l. Business Aviation Services Phils., Inc., 481 Phil. 366 (2004) — Followed. Characterized the negligence in this case as simple, not gross — a plain disregard of a duty imposed by law, a slight want of care that circumstances reasonably impose, and a mere failure to exercise the degree of care an ordinarily prudent person would take under the circumstances — so that the negligence of counsel bound the clients.
• Suico Industrial Corporation vs. CA, 361 Phil. 160 (1999) — Prior related ruling involving the same parties. Held that PDCP Bank's right to possess the property was clear and based on its right of ownership as purchaser at the foreclosure sale, and that the petitioners had taken a procedural misstep in filing a suit for specific performance, injunction and damages instead of a petition to set aside the sale and cancel the writ of possession under Section 8 of Act No. 3135.
• Barranco vs. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, 524 Phil. 533 (2006) — Cited in Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Dando as the source of the guidelines on the suspension of strict adherence to procedural rules.
• Development Bank of the Phils. vs. CA, 251 Phil. 390 (1989) — Cited in Durban Apartments Corporation vs. Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation for the proposition that a party who fails to appear at a pre-trial conference may be non-suited or considered as in default.
• Banco Filipino vs. Court of Appeals, 389 Phil. 644 (2000) — Cited in Lapid vs. Judge Laurea for the requirement that a party invoking liberal construction must explain its failure to comply with the rules.
• Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 413 Phil. 41 (2001) — Cited in Lapid vs. Judge Laurea in support of the ruling that technical rules of procedure are provided to effect the prompt, proper and orderly disposition of cases and that utter disregard of these rules cannot be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.

• Section 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court — Prescribes the period of ordinary appeal: the appeal shall be taken within fifteen days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from, and where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from such notice; the period is interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration, and no motion for extension of time to file such a motion shall be allowed. This provision supplied the baseline period that the Neypes fresh period rule modified in the petitioners' favor.
• Section 13, Rule 41, Rules of Court — Provides that the court may dismiss an appeal filed out of time, motu proprio or on motion, prior to the transmittal of the original records or the record on appeal to the appellate court. The Court of Appeals cited this provision in dismissing the petitioners' petition for certiorari, but the Supreme Court's application of the fresh period rule removed the basis for the dismissal.
• Section 4, Rule 18, Rules of Court — Imposes on the parties and their counsel the duty to appear at the pre-trial. The Court cited this provision as the source of the obligation whose breach, through non-filing of the pre-trial brief, produced the same consequences as non-appearance.
• Section 5, Rule 18, Rules of Court — Provides that the failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the preceding section shall be a cause for dismissal of the action, which dismissal shall be with prejudice unless otherwise ordered by the court, and that a similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be a cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte. The Court relied on this provision in holding that the trial court had a valid basis for dismissing the petitioners' action.
• Section 6, Rule 18, Rules of Court — Requires the parties to file with the court and serve on the adverse party, in such manner as shall ensure receipt at least three days before the date of the pre-trial, their respective pre-trial briefs, and expressly provides that failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial. This is the pivotal provision on which the dismissal was sustained.
• Section 7, Act No. 3135 — Cited in the prior Suico ruling for the rule that the purchaser in a foreclosure sale is entitled to possession of the property. The Court referenced this provision, together with Section 35 of Rule 39, in recounting the basis of PDCP Bank's right to possess the foreclosed properties.
• Section 35, Rule 39, Rules of Court — Cited alongside Section 7 of Act No. 3135 in the prior Suico ruling as the basis of the purchaser's entitlement to possession of the property at a foreclosure sale.
• Section 8, Act No. 3135 — Provides the remedy of a petition to set aside the sale and cancel the writ of possession. The Court noted that the petitioners had taken a procedural misstep in filing a suit for specific performance, injunction and damages instead of availing of this remedy.
• Section 13, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — The certification appended to the decision, by which the Chief Justice certified that the conclusions in the decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

• Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Chairperson)
• Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro
• Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin
• Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr.