Sublay vs. NLRC

Perfection of appeal within the reglementary period is mandatory and jurisdictional; notice to one of a party’s two or more lawyers suffices as notice to the party, and the client is bound by counsel’s negligence in filing a late appeal, absent a highly meritorious case warranting relaxation.

On 16 May 1991, Elizabeth Sublay was employed by Euro-Swiss Food Inc. (EURO-SWISS) as its Chief Accountant, a position she held until her termination on 31 December 1994. On the first day of December 1994, she received a letter from Werner Berger, President of EURO-SWISS, informing her of his decision to abolish the position of Chief Accountant and terminating her services effective 31 December 1994. The reason given was that the computerization of the accounting system and the burning down of the company’s factory significantly reduced its operations, so that Berger could perform his functions with “minimal assistance from the encoder and the accounting clerks.”

Petitioner filed a case for illegal dismissal and non-payment of her 13th month pay against EURO-SWISS and/or Werner Berger, maintaining that she was unjustly dismissed as there was no just and valid cause under Arts. 282, 283, and 284 of the Labor Code. The Labor Arbiter’s decision dated 18 November 1996 rested on the admitted facts and evidence that the dismissal was for installation of labor-saving devices and redundancy; the computerization of the accounting system and the burning of the factory reduced the company’s operations, and petitioner conceded that with the computer operational systems she helped set up, “only a push of a finger of a knowledgeable employee is needed and the reports needed by management could then be generated.” The Labor Arbiter also noted that petitioner’s dismissal was an accomplished and admitted fact, that she made final arrangements for payment of her last compensation, benefits, and separation pay, and that she turned over documents in her custody to her employer.

A copy of the Labor Arbiter’s decision was received by petitioner’s lead counsel, Atty. Gabriel Marquez, on 21 November 1996, so that the ten-day reglementary period to appeal ended on 2 December 1996, since 1 December 1996 was a Sunday. Petitioner later claimed that she received a copy on 2 December 1996 and immediately called Atty. Raymond Paolo Alikpala, a collaborating counsel who, she learned, had not been sent a copy of the decision. Atty. Alikpala discovered that co-counsel Atty. Marquez had already been furnished a copy on 21 November 1996. Atty. Alikpala had filed an Entry of Appearance on 13 May 1996 for petitioner in collaboration with Atty. Marquez, and in that entry the law office of Saguisag and Associates requested that it “be served and furnished with courtesy copies of all motions, orders, judgment, and other papers in the said case.”

Petitioner, through Atty. Alikpala, filed her appeal to the NLRC only on 9 December 1996, or seven days after the period had lapsed. The NLRC dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was filed beyond the ten-day reglementary period. Petitioner then filed a special civil action for certiorari in the SC, ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction to the NLRC for denying outright her appeal on a mere technicality and invoking the judicial policy of allowing late appeals when the interest of substantial justice so requires.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner argued that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it denied outright her appeal on a mere technicality, ignoring the facts and circumstances of the case for expediency.
• Relaxation of Procedural Rules: Petitioner contended that procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities, but efficiency and order should not override justice and equity; she invoked the judicial policy of allowing late appeals when substantial justice requires, citing Firestone and Rubber Co. of the Phils. vs. Lariosa and City Fair Corporation vs. NLRC.
• Service on Collaborating Counsel: Petitioner maintained that the Labor Arbiter erred in serving the decision only on lead counsel Atty. Marquez and not on Atty. Alikpala, her active collaborating counsel, despite the Entry of Appearance filed on 13 May 1996 requesting courtesy copies of all motions, orders, judgment, and other papers; had Atty. Alikpala been served, she would not have been in that situation.
• Counsel’s Negligence: Petitioner argued that Atty. Marquez failed to file the appeal and to notify her of the adverse decision, causing the late filing and dismissal; she claimed her counsel’s negligence justified judicial relief.

• Dismissal of Late Appeal: Whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner’s appeal as filed beyond the ten-day reglementary period, despite her claims of counsel’s negligence and lack of notice to her collaborating counsel.

• Dismissal of Late Appeal: No. The ten-day reglementary period is mandatory and jurisdictional; the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal filed seven days late, and the circumstances did not present a highly meritorious case warranting relaxation.

• Dismissal of Late Appeal: The SC began from the rule that perfection of appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is mandatory and jurisdictional; failure renders the questioned decision final and executory and deprives the appellate court or body of legal authority to alter the final judgment or entertain the appeal. Although the SC has relaxed the rule in highly meritorious cases, it does not do so for every claim of injustice; relaxation is reserved for highly meritorious cases, and such did not obtain here. The appeal was undisputedly filed on 9 December 1996, seven days after the period expired on 2 December 1996 (1 December being a Sunday), counted from Atty. Marquez’s receipt on 21 November 1996. Petitioner had two lawyers: Atty. Gabriel Marquez as lead counsel and Atty. Raymond Paolo Alikpala as collaborating counsel. The rule is that when a party is represented by two or more lawyers, notice to one suffices as notice to the party; the Labor Arbiter was not in error in serving the decision only on Atty. Marquez, who was still counsel of record when the decision was rendered. Petitioner could not claim that Atty. Marquez had effectively withdrawn because he did not formally withdraw; without compliance with the essential requisites for valid substitution of counsel, the court could presume that he continuously and actively represented her. The SC also held that clients are bound by the action of their counsel in the conduct of their case; otherwise, there would be no end to litigation if counsel’s mistake or negligence were admitted as a reason for reopening a case. Atty. Alikpala, as collaborating counsel who entered his appearance about six months before the proceedings ended, had the bounden duty to monitor the progress of the case and keep track of the appeal period; he could not rely on the courts to appraise him of developments or warn him against procedural blunders. Knowing that lead counsel was no longer participating actively several months before resolution, Atty. Alikpala should have anticipated the release of the Labor Arbiter’s decision. Petitioner’s lead counsel might have been negligent, but she was never really deprived of proper representation. Thus, the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

• Mandatory and jurisdictional nature of appeal period — Perfection of appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional; failure renders the questioned decision final and executory and deprives the appellate court or body of legal authority to alter the final judgment or entertain the appeal. The SC applied this to petitioner’s appeal filed seven days late.
• Notice to one counsel suffices — When a party is represented by two or more lawyers, notice to one suffices as notice to the party represented by him. The SC applied this to hold that service on Atty. Marquez, the lead counsel of record, was valid despite the failure to serve Atty. Alikpala.
• Client bound by counsel’s negligence — Clients are bound by the action of their counsel in the conduct of their case; otherwise, there would be no end to litigation if counsel’s mistake or negligence were admitted as a reason for reopening a case. The SC applied this to reject petitioner’s claim that Atty. Marquez’s failure to file a timely appeal and notify her excused the late filing.
• Valid substitution of counsel — Courts may not presume that the counsel of record has been substituted by a second counsel merely from the filing of a formal appearance by the latter. The essential requisites are: (1) a written request for substitution; (2) filing with the written consent of the client; (3) written consent of the attorney to be substituted; and (4) if the consent of the attorney to be substituted cannot be obtained, at least proof of notice that the motion for substitution was served on him in the manner prescribed by the Rules of Court. The SC applied this to hold that Atty. Marquez remained counsel of record.
• Highly meritorious case exception — The SC may relax the reglementary period only in highly meritorious cases to prevent grave injustice; it will not bend the rules for every claim of injustice. The SC applied this to hold that petitioner’s seven-day delay, with two counsel and no valid substitution, did not qualify.
• Duty of counsel to monitor appeal period — A lawyer has the responsibility of monitoring and keeping track of the period of time left to file an appeal and cannot rely on the courts to appraise him of developments or warn him against procedural blunders. The SC applied this to Atty. Alikpala, who should have monitored the case and anticipated the Labor Arbiter’s decision.

• “the perfection of appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and executory, and deprives the appellate court or body of the legal authority to alter the final judgment, much less to entertain, the appeal.” — This passage states the general rule that made the NLRC’s dismissal proper.
• “The rule is that when a party is represented by two (2) or more lawyers, notice to one (1) suffices as a notice to the party represented by him.” — This passage supports the holding that service on Atty. Marquez alone was valid.
• “The unbroken stream of judicial dicta is that clients are bound by the action of their counsel in the conduct of their case. Otherwise, if the lawyer's mistake or negligence was admitted as a reason for the opening of a case, there would be no end to litigation so long as counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or experienced or learned.” — This passage explains why Atty. Marquez’s failure to file a timely appeal did not excuse petitioner.
• “It is only in highly meritorious cases that this Court opts not to strictly apply the rules and thus prevent a grave injustice from being done. Such does not obtain in this case.” — This passage states the limited exception to the strict appeal period and the SC’s conclusion that petitioner’s case did not fall within it.

• Firestone and Rubber Co. of the Phils. vs. Lariosa, G.R. No. 70479, 27 February 1987, 148 SCRA 187 — Cited by petitioner as an example where the SC relaxed the appeal period because counsel relied on a notice stating ten “working” days instead of ten calendar days; the SC did not apply the relaxation here.
• City Fair Corporation vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 95711, 21 April 1995, 243 SCRA 1995 — Cited by petitioner as an example where the SC allowed an appeal filed one day late because greater injustice would occur if appeal was not given due course; not applied to petitioner’s seven-day delay.
• Nacuray vs. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 114924-27, 18 March 1997, 270 SCRA 9 — Cited in footnote for the essential requisites of valid substitution of counsel; applied to hold that there was no valid substitution of Atty. Marquez by Atty. Alikpala.

• Labor Code, Arts. 282, 283, and 284 — Petitioner invoked these provisions to claim she was dismissed without just and valid cause; the Labor Arbiter found the dismissal justified for installation of labor-saving devices and redundancy. The SC did not resolve the merits because the appeal was dismissed on procedural grounds.
• Ten-day reglementary period for appeal from the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC — The SC applied the period as mandatory and jurisdictional; counting from Atty. Marquez’s receipt on 21 November 1996, with 1 December 1996 a Sunday, the period ended on 2 December 1996, and the appeal filed on 9 December 1996 was seven days late.
• Essential requisites of valid substitution of counsel — The SC applied the requirements that there be a written request for substitution, filed with the client’s written consent and the substituted attorney’s written consent, or, if the latter’s consent cannot be obtained, proof of notice of the motion for substitution served on him in the manner prescribed by the Rules of Court; absent compliance, Atty. Marquez remained counsel of record.