Primary Holding
An implied conspiracy may be established by circumstantial evidence showing a community of purpose and unity of design in the contemporaneous or simultaneous performance of criminal acts, even without prior agreement; concerted acts toward the same objective signify conspiracy. The right of the people to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances cannot be abridged, and the use of bullets to disperse such an assembly is condemned.
Background
Petitioners Generoso N. Subayco, Alfredo T. Alcalde, and Eleuterio O. Ibañez were members of the Philippine Constabulary and Integrated National Police who were among the forty-five persons charged in the Sandiganbayan for the deaths and injuries during the Welga ng Bayan at Escalante, Negros Occidental. The rally was organized by BAYAN and allied groups to coincide with the anniversary of martial law, during the twilight of the Marcos government. The case is set against the constitutional guarantee of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances, which the Court invoked in condemning the use of firearms against demonstrators.
History
1985 – 1996-
Sep 20, 1985
The Welga ng Bayan at Escalante, Negros Occidental ended with 20 demonstrators killed and 24 wounded; 20 counts of murder and 24 counts of frustrated murder were filed with the Sandiganbayan against 45 accused.
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1 yr 4 mos later
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Jan 29, 1987
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the cases against Ex-Governor Armando C. Gustilo upon confirming his death while in the United States.
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Only 28 of the 45 accused were arrested and tried; the others remained at large.
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Oct 3, 1994
Sandiganbayan, First Division
Acquitted all accused except petitioners Alfredo Alcalde, Eleuterio Ibañez, and Generoso Subayco; convicted them of 16 murders, 10 frustrated murders, and 14 attempted murders, acquitted them in four murder cases, ordered alias warrants for 16 accused still at large, and archived those cases.
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Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, raising serious errors of law on the finding of implied conspiracy and the sufficiency of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
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Aug 22, 1996
Supreme Court, Second Division
Denied the petition and affirmed the Sandiganbayan Decision; costs against petitioners; copies furnished to the Secretary of Justice and the Secretary of Interior and Local Government to effectuate the early arrest of the other accused.
Facts
The Welga ng Bayan at Escalante, Negros Occidental began on September 18, 1985 and was planned to continue until September 21, 1985, the anniversary of the proclamation of martial law. It was participated in by members of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), the National Federation of Sugar Workers, the Kristianong Katilingban, the CYO, the KMU, the League of Filipino Students, and others, and was spearheaded by BAYAN, whose Escalante leader was Rolando Ponseca. Although the rally had no permit from local authorities, the plan was not kept secret from them; the planned demonstration was taken up at a conference called by the Provincial Command and attended by Capt. Sanson of the 334th PC Company stationed at Sagay, among other unit commanders, where operational guidelines were laid down. The local command headed by Capt. Sanson also met with the leaders of the projected Welga ng Bayan to agree on ground rules for the rally.
The rally started as scheduled on September 18, 1985, with a torch parade that evening. Demonstrators came to Escalante and occupied the national highway in front of the Rural Bank of Escalante and the market site. By September 20, the crowd was at its thickest, estimated at 3,000 to 10,000. Around noontime, speakers addressed the crowd from an improvised platform in front of the Rural Bank using a public address system, and the crowd shouted anti-Marcos and anti-military slogans.
Capt. Sanson was constantly apprised by Capt. Rafael Jugan, Station Commander of the INP at Escalante, that the rallyists had failed to honor their commitment not to barricade the entire national highway, that they were collecting money from passing motorists, and that they were becoming unruly. Sanson reported these to the Provincial Command and personally talked to Ponseca to remind him of the commitment. After Ponseca failed to disperse the crowd or open at least half of the road, Sanson prepared a dispersal operation and called fire-fighting personnel and equipment from Sagay, Escalante, San Carlos, and Cadiz. He also summoned his men under Capt. Jugan of the Escalante INP, the CHDF headed by Sgt. Subayco, and another team headed by Lt. Supaco.
After Ponseca’s last-ditch effort to peacefully disperse the crowd through a letter to the demonstrators in front of the Rural Bank failed, the dispersal operation began. Four firetrucks were dispatched; the Cadiz and Escalante firetrucks were sent toward the demonstrators massed in front of the Rural Bank. These hosed the demonstrators with water, but even after the water was exhausted, the demonstrators stayed put. Sanson then ordered two of his men, Amar and Mercado, to throw teargas. The tear gas caused demonstrators to lie face down, but they persisted rather than disperse. A single shot then rang out, followed by successive gunfire from different directions; one witness described it as like New Year’s Eve, and the firing lasted a few minutes. Sanson was heard shouting “Stop firing” repeatedly, and after some time the firing stopped, but not before men and women from the rallyists’ group had died and others were wounded.
The prosecution’s thesis was that the entire dispersal operation was an unlawful conspiracy, that the firing at the crowd was part of the dispersal operation, and that all who took part should be liable for each death and injury. The accused denied conspiracy. Subayco and Ibañez claimed they merely fired into the air and not toward the crowd; Alcalde admitted firing his weapon to prevent rallyists from climbing the Cadiz City firetruck. The Sandiganbayan found insufficient evidence of a general conspiracy among the forty-five accused, but after examining individual acts it found an implied conspiracy only on the part of all accused who fired at the demonstrators. It found that the firing came from the Cadiz City firetruck and a jeep referred to as a “weapons carrier.” After the rallyists were hosed, the Cadiz City firetruck tried to move back but was trapped by logs and rocks ostensibly placed by rallyists under its wheels; the weapons carrier was maneuvered behind it. Teargas canisters were lobbed at the rallyists; Jovy Jaravelo picked up one and threw it back, and CHDF Alfredo Quinatagcan (a.k.a. Pidong Bagis) shot Jaravelo. Successive gunfire followed. Several witnesses saw CHDF personnel and PC men on board the Cadiz City firetruck and the weapons carrier fire their guns; some fired into the air while others directed shots at the rallyists. Twenty demonstrators died, twenty-four were wounded, and seventy-nine empty shells were recovered and traced to four firearms belonging to CHDF Cañete, CHDF Parcon, C2C Lerado, and C1C Ibañez. Witnesses identified as having fired included CHDF Alfredo M. Quinatagcan alias Pidong Bagis, CHDF Elias Torias, CHDF Jimmy Mayordomo, CHDF Teddy Magtubo, CHDF Jeremias Villanueva, CHDF Jose “Boy” Parcon, Roming Javier, C1C Eleuterio O. Ibañez, T/Sgt. Generoso W. Subayco, and C1C Alfredo Alcalde. On this basis, the Sandiganbayan held petitioners liable for the deaths and injuries of all the victims.
Arguments of the Petitioners
- Implied Conspiracy: Petitioners argued that the Sandiganbayan committed serious error of law in convicting them based merely on alleged implied conspiracy to perpetrate the crimes charged and not on clear, positive, and convincing proof of conspiracy.
- Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Petitioners argued that the Sandiganbayan committed serious error of law in convicting them despite the quantum of evidence required for a finding of guilt—proof beyond reasonable doubt—not having been satisfied.
- Denial of Conspiracy and Individual Defenses: The accused denied the existence of conspiracy; Subayco and Ibañez claimed they merely fired into the air but not toward the crowd, while Alcalde admitted firing his weapon to prevent rallyists from climbing the Cadiz City firetruck.
Issues
- Implied Conspiracy: Whether respondent Sandiganbayan committed serious error of law in convicting petitioners based merely on alleged implied conspiracy to perpetrate the crimes charged and not on clear, positive and convincing proof of conspiracy.
- Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether respondent Sandiganbayan committed serious error of law in convicting petitioners despite that the quantum of evidence required for a finding of guilt—proof beyond reasonable doubt—was not satisfied.
Ruling
- Implied Conspiracy: No. The Sandiganbayan did not commit serious error of law; implied conspiracy was established by the concerted acts of petitioners and their companions showing a community of purpose to fire at the demonstrators. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was committed.
- Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: No. The evidence adduced established petitioners’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and they were properly convicted for all the crimes charged.
Ruling Rationale
- Implied Conspiracy: Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it; it may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was committed, and the concerted acts of the petitioners to achieve the same objective signify conspiracy. The Court applied the doctrine of implied conspiracy enunciated in People vs. Guevarra, where complicity may be justified by circumstantial evidence showing community of purpose and unity of design in the contemporaneous or simultaneous performance of the criminal act, even without prior agreement; a positive overt act toward the realization of a common criminal intent, although instantaneous, makes the actor a co-conspirator by indispensable cooperation. The Sandiganbayan’s findings showed that after the Escalante firetruck withdrew, the Cadiz City firetruck took over and was trapped by logs and rocks; the weapons carrier moved behind it; teargas canisters were thrown; Jovy Jaravelo threw one back; CHDF Alfredo Quinatagcan shot Jaravelo; and successive gunfire followed. Seventy-nine empty shells were recovered and traced to four M-16 rifles issued to CHDF Cañete, CHDF Parcon, C2C Lerado, and C1C Ibañez, with Cañete and Parcon on the weapons carrier and Lerado and Ibañez on the Cadiz City firetruck; other personnel on these vehicles were also seen firing at the crowd. These circumstances intersected to show a community of purpose among petitioners and their companions to fire at the demonstrators. The plan to disperse the demonstrators did not include the use of guns, yet petitioners and their cohorts fired at the first crack of gunfire from Quinatagcan, as if on signal, and fired indiscriminately toward demonstrators already lying prone, when there was no imminent danger to their safety. The firing lasted several minutes and caused deaths and injuries. The collective acts thus clearly showed a common design toward a united purpose, and petitioners were properly convicted for all the crimes charged.
- Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: The same evidence that established implied conspiracy also established guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Sandiganbayan found that petitioners were among those who fired at the demonstrators; seventy-nine empty shells were recovered and traced to four firearms, including that of Ibañez, and witnesses identified Subayco and Alcalde as among those who fired. The Court rejected the claim that the evidence was insufficient, holding that the concerted firing and the resulting deaths and injuries proved the charges. Petitioners were thus properly convicted for all the crimes charged.
Doctrines
- Implied conspiracy — Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it; it may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was committed, and concerted acts to achieve the same objective signify conspiracy. Implied conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence showing community of purpose and unity of design in the contemporaneous or simultaneous performance of the criminal act, even without prior agreement; a positive overt act toward the realization of a common criminal intent, even if instantaneous, makes the actor a co-conspirator by indispensable cooperation. The Court applied this doctrine to petitioners and their companions who fired at the demonstrators after the first shot, finding that their simultaneous and indiscriminate firing showed a common design to use firepower against the rallyists.
- Right to peaceful assembly and petition for redress of grievances — The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances; disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd does not justify characterizing the assembly as seditious or tumultuous, and guilty individuals should be sought out and punished. The Court warned military and police authorities that they cannot shoot people exercising this right, and condemned the use of bullets to break up an assembly.
- Sovereignty resides in the people — Under Section 1, Article II of the Constitution, sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them; power does not come from the barrel of a gun but from the ballots of the people. The Court invoked this principle to remind officials that the right to assemble should not be abridged by those momentarily holding the powers of government.
- Proof beyond reasonable doubt — In criminal cases, guilt must be established beyond reasonable doubt. The Sandiganbayan’s findings, including eyewitness identification and the tracing of empty shells to firearms, satisfied this quantum, and the convictions were affirmed.
Key Excerpts
- "Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was committed. The concerted acts of the petitioners to achieve the same objective signify conspiracy." — States the definition of conspiracy and the basis for inferring it from the mode and manner of commission, which the Court used to uphold the implied conspiracy finding.
- "There can be no question that the appellant's act in holding the victim from behind immediately before the latter was stabbed by Eduardo constitutes a positive and overt act towards the realization of a common criminal intent, although the intent may be classified as instantaneous. The act was impulsively done on the spur of the moment. It sprang from the turn of events, thereby uniting the criminal design of the slayer immediately before the commission of the offense. That is termed as implied conspiracy." — Canonical formulation of implied conspiracy from People vs. Guevarra, cited by the Court to show that prior agreement is not required.
- "All these circumstances intersect to show a community of purpose among the petitioners and their companions, that is, to fire at the demonstrators. This common purpose was pursued by the petitioners and their companions who used firepower against the rallyists." — The Court’s application of implied conspiracy to the facts, finding a common design from the concerted firing.
- "The use of bullets to break up an assembly of people petitioning for redress of grievance cannot but be bewailed. It is bound to happen again for as long as abuses in government abound. Precisely to help put a brake on official abuses, people empowerment was codified in various provisions of the 1987 Constitution. It is high time to remind our officials that under our Constitution power does not come from the barrel of a gun but from the ballots of the people." — The Court’s constitutional admonition on the right to peaceful assembly and the limits on official power.
Precedents Cited
- People vs. Guevarra, 179 SCRA 334 (1989) — Enunciated the doctrine of implied conspiracy; cited by the Court to hold that prior agreement is not required and that community of purpose and unity of design in the contemporaneous or simultaneous performance of the criminal act can establish conspiracy.
- People vs. Silong, 232 SCRA 487 (1994) — Cited for the definition of conspiracy and the rule that it may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was committed; the citation also cites People vs. Villanueva, 211 SCRA 403 (1992), and People vs. De la Cruz, 207 SCRA 632 (1992).
- People vs. Carizo, 233 SCRA 628 (1994) — Cited in support of the finding of implied conspiracy based on the collective acts of petitioners and their companions.
- US vs. Apurado, 7 Phil. 422 — Early case quoted on the right to peaceful assembly; held that disorderly conduct by individuals in a crowd does not justify treating the assembly as seditious or tumultuous, and that guilty individuals should be punished.
Provisions
- Section 4, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the right of the people to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. The Court cited it in warning that military and police authorities cannot shoot people exercising this right.
- Section 1, Article II, 1987 Constitution — Declares that sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. The Court invoked it to remind officials that power comes from the ballots of the people, not the barrel of a gun.
Notable Concurring Opinions
Regalado, Romero, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.