Suarez vs. Villarama, Jr.

The remedy against a final order dismissing a complaint for failure to prosecute is an ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals under Rule 41, not a petition for review on certiorari filed directly with the Supreme Court; and the 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration is mandatory and jurisdictional and cannot be extended, except in cases pending with the Supreme Court as a court of last resort.

Petitioner Ma. Rosario Suarez and respondents Spouses Escolastico and Cordelia Ballar were parties to an arrangement under which the spouses issued four post-dated checks. The spouses were permanent residents of the United States, a circumstance that required extraterritorial service of summons when Suarez sued them for specific performance before the Regional Trial Court. The Rules of Court then in force governed the modes of appeal from final orders of the Regional Trial Court and the reglementary periods for motions for reconsideration.

On 1 September 1993, Ma. Rosario Suarez filed a complaint for specific performance with a prayer for attachment before the Regional Trial Court against Spouses Escolastico and Cordelia Ballar. Because the spouses were permanent residents of the United States, extraterritorial service of summons was allowed. After being granted an extension of time to file their responsive pleadings, the spouses filed a motion to dismiss dated 11 January 1994. The RTC denied the motion on 9 March 1994 and gave them fifteen days to file an answer. Despite having received the order denying their motion to dismiss on 22 March 1994, the RTC received a copy of the spouses' answer, dated 22 November 1994, only on 9 February 1995.

In their answer, the spouses averred that they had issued four post-dated checks, the first of which was dishonored when presented for payment for the reason "Account Closed." This prompted them not to present the rest of the checks. On this basis, they contended that Suarez could not demand performance of their undertaking when she herself had failed to comply with her own undertaking. They interposed a counterclaim for moral and exemplary damages, as well as for payment of attorney's fees.

Due to repeated motions for postponement filed by both parties, pre-trial was terminated only on 3 July 1994, and trial on the merits commenced on 10 August 1995. The continuation of the trial was thereafter impeded by successive motions for postponement filed by both parties. The subsequent dates of the trial were set for August 21, September 11 and 21. No hearing was held on 21 August due to Suarez's request to have it transferred to the succeeding scheduled dates. The hearings set for the 11th and 21st of September were also moved to the 28th on her motion. The hearing set on the 28th was postponed upon the spouses' motion because their lawyer had another case to attend to.

The RTC moved the trial date to 23 October 1995, but on that date Suarez again moved for postponement of the hearing. The trial court transferred the hearing date to 7 December 1995. As Suarez was still out of the country at that time, the RTC moved the date of hearing to 15 February 1996 at the instance of her counsel. On 15 February 1996, Suarez as well as her counsel failed to appear at the continuation of the trial. Consequently, the trial court issued an order of even date dismissing the case for failure to prosecute.

On 4 March 1996, Suarez filed an entry of appearance of new counsel as well as a motion for time to file her motion for reconsideration. She filed the motion for reconsideration on 6 March 1996, alleging that the failure of her counsel to appear on the date of the trial was due to her counsel being terminally ill. In an order dated 11 April 1996, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration on the ground that the 15-day period for appeal cannot be extended. The RTC found that there had been countless postponements of the trial dates upon motion of Suarez's counsel, which culminated in their non-appearance on the scheduled date of hearing.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing the case for failure to prosecute and in denying her motion for reconsideration.
• Timeliness of the Motion for Reconsideration: Petitioner argued that the motion for reconsideration was filed on time. She received the order of dismissal on 20 February 1996, so the 15-day period for filing the motion for reconsideration would expire on 6 March 1996. On 4 March 1996, her new counsel filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion for Time to File Motion for Reconsideration, and she surmised that she had until 19 March 1996 within which to file her motion for reconsideration. She claimed she filed the motion on 11 March 1996, still within the 15-day period.
• Extension of the Reglementary Period: Petitioner argued that the filing of the motion for extension was based on valid, legitimate and reasonable grounds, such as her former counsel having been terminally sick and her new counsel needing more time to study the case.
• Liberality: Petitioner beseeched the Court's liberality in addressing her procedural lapses, arguing that the RTC should have considered that she had already started presenting her evidence to prove her causes of action, as well as the merits of her new counsel's reason in asking for an extension of time to file the motion for reconsideration.

• Propriety of the Remedy: Respondents argued that the remedy against an order dismissing a complaint is appeal, not certiorari.
• Non-Extendibility of the Period: Respondents contended that the motion for extension to file the motion for reconsideration may no longer be filed before all courts lower than the Supreme Court.

• Propriety of the Remedy: Whether a petition for review on certiorari filed directly with the Supreme Court is the proper remedy to challenge an RTC order dismissing a complaint for failure to prosecute.
• Hierarchy of Courts: Whether the direct resort to the Supreme Court violates the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
• Timeliness of the Motion for Reconsideration: Whether the motion for reconsideration was filed within the 15-day reglementary period.
• Non-Extendibility of the Reglementary Period: Whether the 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration may be extended.
• Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute: Whether the RTC properly dismissed the complaint for failure to prosecute.

• Propriety of the Remedy: No. The remedy against a final order dismissing a complaint for failure to prosecute is an ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals under Rule 41, not a petition for review on certiorari filed directly with the Supreme Court.
• Hierarchy of Courts: No. Direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court is not entertained unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals.
• Timeliness of the Motion for Reconsideration: No. The motion for reconsideration was filed out of time, the 15-day reglementary period having already lapsed when it was filed.
• Non-Extendibility of the Reglementary Period: No. The 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration is mandatory and jurisdictional and cannot be extended, except in cases pending with the Supreme Court as a court of last resort.
• Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute: Yes. The dismissal was proper, the plaintiff having been culpable for want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude.

• Propriety of the Remedy: The trial court's 15 February 1996 order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute is a final order; it operates as a judgment on the merits under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. The same characterization applies to the 11 April 1996 order denying the motion for reconsideration. It is axiomatic that the remedy against such a final order is appeal and not certiorari. Under Murillo vs. Consul, which was later adopted by the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, there are three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC: (1) ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of original jurisdiction, taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 41 on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law; (2) petition for review, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, brought to the Court of Appeals under Rule 42 on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law; and (3) petition for review to the Supreme Court under Rule 45, elevated only on questions of law. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Here, petitioner brought a petition for review on certiorari raising mixed questions of fact and law: she impugned the decision dismissing her complaint for failure to prosecute, the resolution of which entails a review of the factual circumstances that led the trial court to decide in such manner, and she also questioned the denial of her motion for reconsideration on the ground that it was filed out of time. She should therefore have brought the case to the Court of Appeals via the first mode of appeal under Rule 41. Section 4 of Circular No. 2-90, in effect at the time, provided that an appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed; this rule is now incorporated in Section 5, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

• Hierarchy of Courts: The filing of the case directly with the Supreme Court ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Pursuant to this doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition. Thus, a petition for review on certiorari assailing a decision involving both questions of fact and law must first be brought before the Court of Appeals.

• Timeliness of the Motion for Reconsideration: Petitioner received the order of dismissal on 20 February 1996. She had until 6 March 1996 to file the motion for reconsideration. The filing of the motion for extension did not toll nor extend the 15-day reglementary period. Hence, the period had already lapsed by the time petitioner filed her motion for reconsideration on 11 March 1996. The trial court did not err in dismissing the motion for reconsideration.

• Non-Extendibility of the Reglementary Period: As ruled in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. vs. Japson, settled is the rule that the 15-day reglementary period for appealing or filing a motion for reconsideration or new trial cannot be extended, except in cases pending with the Supreme Court as a court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. Petitioner has not demonstrated any cogent reason for the Court to take an exception. She committed a blatant disregard of the basic procedural rules in appeals. The 15-day reglementary period for the filing of the motion for reconsideration is mandatory and jurisdictional. Furthermore, the filing of the wrong mode of appeal to the Supreme Court is a patent ground for its dismissal.

• Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute: No fault may be attributed to the lower court. It is the duty of the plaintiff to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, prosecute his action within a reasonable length of time, and comply with the Rules and court orders; failure to do so would justify the dismissal of the case. The true test for the exercise of the power to dismiss a case on the ground of failure to prosecute is whether, under the prevailing circumstances, the plaintiff is culpable for want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. There had been countless postponements of the trial dates upon motion of petitioner's counsel which culminated in their non-appearance on the scheduled date of hearing. This fact, coupled with petitioner's failure to comply with the procedures laid down by the Rules of Court, justifies the dismissal of the case. It is an accepted tenet that rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when, for persuasive and weighty reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; concomitant to a liberal interpretation of the rules, however, should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.

• Modes of Appeal from RTC Decisions — Under Murillo vs. Consul, there are three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC: (1) ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of original jurisdiction, taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 41 on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law; (2) petition for review, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, brought to the Court of Appeals under Rule 42 on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law; and (3) petition for review to the Supreme Court under Rule 45, elevated only on questions of law. The Court applied this framework in holding that petitioner should have filed an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 rather than a petition for review on certiorari directly with the Supreme Court.

• Question of Law Distinguished from Question of Fact — A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The Court characterized petitioner's challenge to the dismissal for failure to prosecute as raising mixed questions of fact and law, since its resolution entailed a review of the factual circumstances that led the trial court to dismiss the case.

• Hierarchy of Courts — Direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that a petition for review on certiorari assailing a decision involving both questions of fact and law must first be brought before the Court of Appeals.

• Final Order Dismissing a Complaint for Failure to Prosecute — A dismissal for failure to prosecute under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court is a final order that operates as a judgment on the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court. The remedy against such a final order is appeal, not certiorari. The same characterization applies to an order denying a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal.

• Non-Extendibility of the 15-Day Reglementary Period — The 15-day reglementary period for appealing or filing a motion for reconsideration or new trial cannot be extended, except in cases pending with the Supreme Court as a court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. The period is mandatory and jurisdictional, and the filing of a motion for extension does not toll or extend it.

• Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute — True Test — The true test for the exercise of the power to dismiss a case on the ground of failure to prosecute is whether, under the prevailing circumstances, the plaintiff is culpable for want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. It is the duty of the plaintiff to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, prosecute his action within a reasonable length of time, and comply with the Rules and court orders; failure to do so justifies dismissal.

• Liberal Interpretation of Rules of Procedure — Rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when, for persuasive and weighty reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal interpretation of the rules, however, should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules. The Court found no cogent reason to relax the rules in petitioner's favor.

• "It is axiomatic that the remedy against such final order is appeal and not certiorari." — This states the ratio decidendi on the procedural issue: a final order dismissing a complaint for failure to prosecute is reviewable by appeal, not by certiorari, and thus petitioner's direct petition for review on certiorari was the wrong mode of appeal.

• "The first mode of appeal, governed by Rule 41, is taken to the Court of Appeals on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law." — This defines the first of the three modes of appeal from RTC decisions and is the provision the Court held petitioner should have availed of, since her petition raised mixed questions of fact and law.

• "The 15-day reglementary period for the filing of the motion for reconsideration is mandatory and jurisdictional." — This is the canonical formulation of the non-extendibility rule applied against petitioner, whose motion for reconsideration was filed after the period had lapsed.

• "The true test for the exercise of the power to dismiss a case on the ground of failure to prosecute is whether, under the prevailing circumstances, the plaintiff is culpable for want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude." — This states the controlling standard for dismissal for failure to prosecute, which the Court applied in upholding the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's complaint.

• Murillo vs. Consul — Clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC; the Court relied on it in holding that petitioner should have filed an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 with the Court of Appeals. The ruling was later adopted by the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
• Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. vs. Japson — Settled the rule that the 15-day reglementary period for appealing or filing a motion for reconsideration or new trial cannot be extended, except in cases pending with the Supreme Court as a court of last resort; the Court applied this rule in holding that the RTC did not err in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
• Heirs of the Late Flor Tungpalan vs. Court of Appeals and Ilasco vs. Court of Appeals — Cited for the proposition that a dismissal for failure to prosecute is a final order that operates as a judgment on the merits.
• Meneses vs. Court of Appeals — Cited for the rule that the remedy against a final order is appeal and not certiorari.
• Ouano vs. PGTT International Investment Corporation — Cited for the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, under which direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals.
• Belonio vs. Rodriguez — Cited for the true test for the exercise of the power to dismiss a case on the ground of failure to prosecute.
• Navarro vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company — Cited for the rule that rules of procedure may be relaxed only for persuasive and weighty reasons, and that the party invoking liberality must adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.
• Manipor vs. Ricafort — Cited for the rule that the 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration is mandatory and jurisdictional.
• Barnes vs. Padilla — Cited for the non-extendibility of the 15-day reglementary period for appealing or filing a motion for reconsideration or new trial.

• Section 3, Rule 17, Rules of Court — Provides that if, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with the Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the defendant's right to prosecute his counterclaim; the dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court. The Court applied this provision in characterizing the dismissal as a final order operating as a judgment on the merits and in upholding the dismissal for failure to prosecute.
• Section 5, Rule 56, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Enumerates the grounds for dismissal of an appeal, including error in the choice or mode of appeal. The Court noted that this provision now incorporates the rule previously found in Section 4 of Circular No. 2-90.
• Section 4, Circular No. 2-90 — Provided that an appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong mode or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed. This was the rule in effect at the time of the antecedents and was applied against petitioner.
• Rule 41, Rules of Court — Governs ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error, taken to the Court of Appeals on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of original jurisdiction. The Court held that this was the mode of appeal petitioner should have availed of.
• Rule 42, Rules of Court — Governs the petition for review brought to the Court of Appeals on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Governs the petition for review to the Supreme Court, elevated only on questions of law.
• Section 13, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Cited in the certification accompanying the decision, pursuant to which the conclusions in the decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

• Leonardo A. Quisumbing (Chairperson)
• Antonio T. Carpio
• Conchita Carpio Morales
• Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.