Suarez vs. Emboy

A complaint for unlawful detainer must allege and establish the key jurisdictional facts of (1) initial possession by the defendant by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff, (2) eventual illegality of possession upon notice of termination of the right to possess, (3) defendant's continued possession depriving the plaintiff of enjoyment, and (4) institution of the complaint within one year from the last demand. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria in the proper Regional Trial Court.

The dispute concerns a 222-square meter parcel of land, designated as Lot No. 1907-A-2, situated in Barangay Duljo, Cebu City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-174880 issued in the name of Carmencita on February 9, 2005. The subject lot was part of Lot No. 1907-A, which was partitioned among the heirs of Spouses Carlos Padilla and Asuncion Pacres, with the subject lot allocated to the Heirs of Vicente Padilla. The respondents Felix and Marilou claimed that their mother, Claudia Padilla-Emboy, had occupied the subject lot during her lifetime and that it was earmarked to become her share in Lot No. 1907-A, with the respondents thereafter staying in the subject lot for decades after inheriting the same from Claudia.

At the center of the dispute is a 222-square meter parcel of land, designated as Lot No. 1907-A-2 of the subdivision plan Psd-165686, situated in Barangay Duljo, Cebu City, and covered by TCT No. T-174880 issued in the name of Carmencita on February 9, 2005. The subject lot used to be a part of Lot No. 1907-A, which was partitioned among the heirs of Spouses Carlos Padilla and Asuncion Pacres, with Lot No. 1907-A-2 allocated to the Heirs of Vicente Padilla, namely: Azucena Padilla, Remedios Padilla, Veronica Padilla, and Moreno Padilla. A house occupied by respondents Felix and Marilou stands on the subject lot. The respondents claimed that their mother, Claudia, had occupied the subject lot during her lifetime and that it was earmarked to become her share in Lot No. 1907-A, and that they had thereafter stayed in the subject lot for decades after inheriting the same from Claudia, who had in turn succeeded her own parents, Carlos and Asuncion.

In 2004, respondents Felix and Marilou were asked by their cousins, the Heirs of Vicente, to vacate the subject lot and to transfer to Lot No. 1907-A-5, a landlocked portion sans a right of way. They refused to comply, insisting that Claudia's inheritance pertained to Lot No. 1907-A-2. Not long after, the respondents received from Carmencita's counsel, Atty. Jufelenito R. Pareja, a demand letter dated February 23, 2004, requiring them to vacate the subject lot, informing them that Carmencita had already purchased on February 12, 2004 the subject lot from the former's relatives. The respondents did not heed the demand. Instead, they examined the records pertaining to the subject lot and uncovered possible anomalies, i.e., forged signatures and alterations, in the execution of a series of deeds of partition relative to Lot No. 1907-A. On August 13, 2004, they filed before the RTC of Cebu City a complaint for nullification of the partition and for the issuance of new TCTs covering the heirs' respective portions of Lot No. 1907-A, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-30548.

On December 8, 2004, Carmencita filed before the MTCC a complaint for unlawful detainer against the respondents. She alleged that she bought the subject lot from Remedios, Moreno, Veronica and Dionesia, the registered owners thereof and the persons who allowed the respondents to occupy the same by mere tolerance. As their successor-in-interest, she claimed her entitlement to possession of the subject lot and the right to demand from the respondents to vacate the same. The respondents argued that they had been occupying the subject lot in the concept of owners for several decades, that Carmencita was a buyer in bad faith for having purchased the property despite the notice of lis pendens annotated on the subject lot's title, and that her complaint was filed subsequent to their institution of the petition for nullification of the partition. They also presented before the CA a newly discovered evidence — a duly notarized document captioned as an "Agreement," dated February 23, 1957, showing that Vicente and his spouse, Dionesia, had waived their hereditary rights to Lot No. 1907-A, which would mean that the Heirs of Vicente no longer had ownership rights over the subject lot to convey to Carmencita.

The respondents also averred that Carmencita's complaint lacked a cause of action, as the certification to file an action was issued by the officials of Barangay Duljo in the name of James Tan Suarez, Carmencita's brother, who had no real rights or interests over the subject lot, and that no demand to vacate was made upon the respondents after the deed of sale executed on April 1, 2004. The CA found that the complaint did not characterize the respondents' alleged entry into the land, did not state how they entered the land and constructed a house thereon, and was silent on whether their possession became legal before Carmencita demanded that they vacate the land. The CA concluded that the action was neither one of forcible entry nor unlawful detainer but essentially involved an issue of ownership which must be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria.

• Sufficiency of the Complaint: Carmencita argued that she purchased the subject lot from the Heirs of Vicente, who were then the registered owners thereof, and that the respondents' refusal to comply with the demand to vacate turned them into deforciants unlawfully withholding possession, making a complaint for unlawful detainer the proper recourse.
• Collateral Attack on Title: Carmencita insisted that a certificate of title shall not be subject to a collateral attack and that the issue of ownership cannot be resolved in an action for unlawful detainer, citing Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
• Non-Abatement by Pending Action: Carmencita argued that a pending suit involving the question of ownership of a piece of real property will not abate an ejectment complaint as the two are not based on the same cause of action and are seeking different reliefs, citing Punio vs. Judge Go and Silverio vs. CA.
• Right of Registered Owner to Possession: Carmencita invoked the doctrine in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. CA that the registered owner of a property is entitled to its possession, and Arcal vs. CA that occupation of a property not by its registered owner but by others depends on the former's tolerance, with occupants bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand.
• Inapplicability of Sarmiento: Carmencita alleged that Sarmiento vs. CA is not applicable since it involves a boundary dispute, and that Rivera vs. Rivera finds more relevance, where prior physical possession by the complainant is not necessary in an unlawful detainer case.

• Inadequacy of the Complaint: Respondents stressed that Carmencita's complaint for unlawful detainer was fundamentally inadequate, as there was practically no specific averment as to when and how possession by tolerance of the respondents began, citing Spouses Valdez, Jr. vs. CA that failure to allege key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal and deprives the MTCC of jurisdiction.
• Interwoven Issues of Possession and Ownership: Respondents argued that the issues of possession and ownership are inseparably linked in the case at bar, as Carmencita's complaint for ejectment was based solely on her spurious title, which is already the subject of the respondents' petition for nullification of partition of Lot No. 1907-A.
• Possession in Concept of Owners: Respondents argued that they have been occupying the subject lot in the concept of owners for several decades, and that Carmencita was a buyer in bad faith for having purchased the property despite the notice of lis pendens clearly annotated on the subject lot's title.
• Suspension of Ejectment Suit: Respondents invoked the doctrine in Amagan vs. Marayag that the pendency of another action anchored on the issue of ownership justifies the suspension of an ejectment suit involving the same real property, especially where the issue of possession is so interwoven with that of ownership.
• Spurious Deed of Sale: Respondents stressed that the deed of sale dated April 1, 2004 bore tell-tale signs of being spurious, including the discrepancy with the demand letter referring to a deed dated February 12, 2004, the signatory Teresita who had been estranged from Moreno since the 1980s, a fictitious person named Veronida Padilla, and the deed's registration only the following year.
• Waiver of Hereditary Rights: Respondents presented a newly discovered "Agreement" dated February 23, 1957 showing that Vicente and his spouse Dionesia had waived their hereditary rights to Lot No. 1907-A, meaning the Heirs of Vicente no longer had ownership rights over the subject lot to convey to Carmencita.
• Lack of Cause of Action: Respondents averred that the certification to file an action was issued in the name of James Tan Suarez, Carmencita's brother, who had no real rights or interests over the subject lot, and that no demand to vacate was made after the deed of sale, rendering the complaint fatally defective.

• Sufficiency of the Complaint for Unlawful Detainer: Whether Carmencita's complaint against the respondents had sufficiently alleged and proven a cause of action for unlawful detainer.
• Abatement of the Ejectment Suit: Whether the pendency of the respondents' petition for nullification of partition of Lot No. 1907-A and for the issuance of new certificates of title can abate Carmencita's ejectment suit.

• Sufficiency of the Complaint for Unlawful Detainer: No. Carmencita failed to clearly allege and prove how and when the respondents entered the subject lot and constructed a house upon it, and was conspicuously silent about the details on who specifically permitted the respondents to occupy the lot, and how and when such tolerance came about. The first requisite of unlawful detainer — initial possession by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff — was markedly absent.
• Abatement of the Ejectment Suit: Yes. As an exception to the general rule, the respondents' petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A can abate Carmencita's suit for unlawful detainer, given that the complaint was anchored on possession by mere tolerance, the respondents raised the defense of ownership, and the respondents' house would be subject to demolition.

• Sufficiency of the Complaint for Unlawful Detainer: The Court cited Spouses Valdez, Jr. vs. CA for the proposition that there are three kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property: accion interdictal (comprising forcible entry and unlawful detainer), accion publiciana, and accion reivindicatoria. In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key jurisdictional facts must be alleged and sufficiently established: (1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. In the case at bar, the first requisite was markedly absent. Carmencita failed to clearly allege and prove how and when the respondents entered the subject lot and constructed a house upon it, and was conspicuously silent about the details on who specifically permitted the respondents to occupy the lot, and how and when such tolerance came about. Instead, Carmencita cavalierly formulated a legal conclusion, sans factual substantiation, that the respondents' initial occupation was lawful by virtue of tolerance by the registered owners. The Court stressed that to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, the complaint must sufficiently show such a statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, without resort to parol testimony, as these proceedings are summary in nature. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
• Abatement of the Ejectment Suit: The Court cited Amagan vs. Marayag for the general rule that a pending civil action involving ownership of the same property does not justify the suspension of ejectment proceedings, but recognized that only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of the pending civil action. One such exception is Vda. de Legaspi vs. Avendaño, where the Court declared that where the action is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just to await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving legal possession or ownership. The Court found the doctrines in Amagan squarely applicable, as Carmencita's complaint for unlawful detainer was anchored upon the proposition that the respondents have been in possession of the subject lot by mere tolerance of the owners, while the respondents raised the defense of ownership and pointed to the pendency of Civil Case No. CEB-30548, a petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A, in which Carmencita and the Heirs of Vicente were impleaded as parties. Further, should Carmencita's complaint be granted, the respondents' house, which has been standing in the subject lot for decades, would be subject to demolition. These circumstances justified the exclusion of the instant petition from the purview of the general rule.

• Requisites for Unlawful Detainer — For a complaint for unlawful detainer to prosper, the following key jurisdictional facts must be alleged and sufficiently established: (1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. In this case, the first requisite was markedly absent because Carmencita failed to allege and prove how and when the respondents entered the subject lot and how and when tolerance by the owners came about.
• Three Kinds of Actions to Recover Possession — The Court recognized three kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property: (a) accion interdictal, comprising forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which are summary in nature and lie in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court; (b) accion publiciana, the plenary action to recover the right of possession brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and (c) accion reivindicatoria, an action to recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
• Abatement of Ejectment Proceedings — As a general rule, a pending civil action involving ownership of the same property does not justify the suspension of ejectment proceedings. However, as an exception, where the action is one of unlawful detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just to await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving legal possession or ownership. The exception applies where the ejectment of the defendants would mean a demolition of their house, a matter likely to create confusion, disturbance, inconveniences and expenses.

• "In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key jurisdictional facts must be alleged and sufficiently established: (1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment." — This passage states the canonical formulation of the requisites for unlawful detainer, which is the controlling doctrine in the case and is frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.
• "When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria." — This passage articulates the consequence of a complaint's failure to allege jurisdictional facts, which is the basis for the dismissal of Carmencita's complaint.
• "Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of the pending civil action. One such exception is Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendaño, wherein the Court declared: 'x x x. Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of physical possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses.'" — This passage defines the exception to the general rule on abatement of ejectment proceedings, which the Court applied to justify the suspension of the ejectment suit in this case.

• Spouses Valdez, Jr. vs. CA, 523 Phil. 39 (2006) — Controlling precedent cited for the three kinds of actions to recover possession of real property and for the rule that failure to allege key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal and deprives the MTCC of jurisdiction.
• Amagan vs. Marayag, 383 Phil. 486 (2000) — Controlling precedent cited for the general rule that a pending civil action involving ownership of the same property does not justify the suspension of ejectment proceedings, and for the exception allowing suspension in rare instances, which the Court found squarely applicable to the instant petition.
• Sarmiento vs. CA, 320 Phil. 146 (1995) — Cited by the respondents for the proposition that even if one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested from another who had been in the physical or material possession of the same for more than one year by resorting to a summary action of ejectment.
• Vda. de Legaspi vs. Avendaño — Cited within Amagan as the exceptional case where suspension of ejectment proceedings is allowed to await the outcome of a pending civil action involving ownership.
• Corpuz vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 183822, January 18, 2012, 663 SCRA 350 — Cited for the proposition that the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession, but the owner cannot simply wrest possession from whoever is in actual occupation of the property and must resort to the proper judicial remedy.
• Jose vs. Alfuerto, G.R. No. 169380, November 26, 2012, 686 SCRA 323 — Cited for the rule that the jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint, and when the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the remedy should be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
• Rivera vs. Rivera, 453 Phil. 404 (2003) — Cited by Carmencita for the proposition that in an unlawful detainer case, prior physical possession by the complainant is not necessary; instead, what is required is a better right of possession.
• Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. CA, 424 Phil. 544 (2002) — Cited by Carmencita for the doctrine that the registered owner of a property is entitled to its possession.
• Arcal vs. CA, 348 Phil. 813 (1998) — Cited by Carmencita for the proposition that occupation of a property not by its registered owner but by others depends on the former's tolerance, and the occupants are bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand.

• Section 1, Rule 70, Rules of Court — Defines who may institute proceedings for forcible entry and unlawful detainer and when, providing that a person deprived of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom possession is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied, may bring an action within one year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession. The Court applied this provision in determining that Carmencita's complaint failed to qualify as either forcible entry or unlawful detainer.
• Section 48, Presidential Decree No. 1529 (The Property Registration Decree) — Cited by Carmencita for the proposition that a certificate of title shall not be subject to a collateral attack, though the Court did not rely on this provision in its ruling.

Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Chairperson), Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, and Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr.