Sps. Gonzalo T. Dela Rosa & Cristeta Dela Rosa vs. Heirs of Juan Valdez and Spouses Potenciano Malvar and Lourdes Malvar

A writ of preliminary mandatory injunction may issue to place a party in possession of land in litigation, notwithstanding the general rule against transferring possession by injunctive writ, where there is a clear finding of ownership in favor of the applicant and the opposing party's claim of title is doubtful or disputed. The issuance of such a writ is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute, and the trial court's exercise of discretion in injunctive matters will not be interfered with absent grave abuse of discretion.

The subject property is Lot 4, Psd-76374, a parcel of land in Barrio Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City, Rizal, with an area of 103 hectares. Manila Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (MCDC), through its President Honor P. Moslares, traced its claim to a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on January 16, 1996, while Juan Valdez and Apolinaria Valdez traced theirs to Sales Patent No. 38713 dated September 5, 1983, preceded by a Sales Application dated July 21, 1968 and Order of Sales Patent No. (IV-1) 13442 issued on August 31, 1983. The Dela Rosa spouses, for their part, anchored their claim on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 451423-A in the name of Cristeta dela Rosa, which in turn was traced to Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, a title previously nullified in the Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban vs. Court of Appeals. The dispute over the property generated multiple claims and conflicting muniments of title, prompting the filing of an action for quieting of title and declaration of nullity of transfer certificates of title.

The controversy centered on Lot 4, Psd-76374, a 103-hectare parcel of land located in Barrio Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City, Rizal. Manila Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (MCDC), through its President Honor P. Moslares, claimed to have acquired the property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on January 16, 1996, asserting that its predecessor-in-interest, Juan Valdez, had been awarded a Sales Patent after compliance with the corresponding requirements, and that MCDC and Valdez had been in continuous, adverse, and open possession of the property in the concept of owners. Juan Valdez and Apolinaria Valdez, on the other hand, claimed to be the absolute owners of the property as vendees or grantees of Sales Patent No. 38713 dated September 5, 1983, which was preceded by a Sales Application dated July 21, 1968 and an Order of Sales Patent No. (IV-1) 13442 issued on August 31, 1983, with payment made under Official Receipt No. 6030195 dated April 26, 1983.

MCDC filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title and Declaration of Nullity of Transfer Certificates of Title before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 71, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-6015, against Gonzalo and Cristeta dela Rosa and Juan, Jose, Pedro, and Maria, all surnamed De la Cruz. MCDC alleged that it had been unlawfully deprived of the possession and enjoyment of the property because of the continuing acts of dispossession committed by the Dela Rosa spouses and other occupants who had no property right at all. Complaints-in-intervention were thereafter filed by North East Property Ventures, Inc. (NEPVI), which claimed to be a co-owner to the extent of one-half or fifty percent of the property under a Deed of Absolute Conveyance/Transfer for valuable services to be rendered and for amounts to be advanced to update real estate taxes and clear the title of Juan Valdez from overlapping titles, and by the spouses Valdez and spouses Malvar. The Malvar spouses claimed to be the grantees or assignees under a Deed of Absolute Transfer/Conveyance executed on September 6, 2001 by the Valdez spouses.

The RTC, in its Order dated December 16, 2002, set out the parties' respective positions. On the side of MCDC, the RTC found that MCDC's right or claim was based on Sales Patent No. 38713 issued in the name of Juan Valdez; that the price or consideration stipulated in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 16, 1996 was not paid, rendering the sale simulated according to the handwritten letter dated April 5, 2002 of MCDC and according to the Joint Venture Agreement; and that the terms and conditions of the Joint Venture Agreement were not complied with, as shown by the very allegations in paragraphs 12, 14, and 15 of MCDC's complaint against the Dela Rosa spouses. On the part of the Dela Rosa spouses, the RTC found that they had been in physical possession of substantial portions of the questioned property; that they based their claim of possession and ownership, firstly, on Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, which had been previously nullified in the Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban vs. Court of Appeals, and secondly, on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 451423-A in the name of Cristeta dela Rosa, which on its face showed June 16, 1934 as the date of original registration even as the dates of survey of the subject land were July 14-25, 1969 with approval on June 30, 1971; that the technical description of the disputed property in Sales Patent No. 38713 was copied and manipulated in TCT No. 451423-A to be Lots 4-A and 4-B; and that TCT No. 451423-A was not recorded in the Registry of Deeds of Marikina, per certification dated April 11, 2002, nor in the Registry of Deeds of Antipolo City, per certification dated April 12, 2002. On the side of NEPVI, the RTC noted the Deed of Absolute Transfer/Conveyance executed on September 3, 1999 by the Valdez spouses, the Special Power of Attorney dated also September 3, 1999, and the failure of the complaint-in-intervention to attach any document showing accomplishment of any of the terms and conditions of the transfer or conveyance. On the part of the Valdez and Malvar spouses, the RTC enumerated the Sales Application, the Official Receipt, the Order of Issuance of Patent, Sales Patent No. 38713, the transmittal letter dated December 3, 1993 to the Registry of Deeds of Marikina, Rizal, the First Indorsement dated August 1, 1994 of the Land Registration Authority, the December 5, 1990 official communication of the Land Management Bureau signed by Director Abelardo Palad, Jr., the August 15, 1994 reply of Artemio B. Cana, Acting Register of Deeds of Marikina City, the letter of official inquiry dated November 21, 1994 of Hon. Estanislao U. Valdez, the letter dated August 1, 1994 of Juan Valdez to the Register of Deeds, Plan Psd-76374 of Lot 4, the Deed of Absolute Transfer/Conveyance dated September 6, 2001 executed by the Valdez spouses in favor of the Potenciano Malvar family corporation, Noel Rubber Development Corporation, and the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated September 6, 2001 covering 150,000 square meters or 15 hectares of Lot 4.

All the claimants — MCDC, NEPVI, and the Valdez and Malvar spouses — separately prayed for the relief of mandatory injunction against the Dela Rosa spouses and the other occupants of Lot 4. On December 16, 2002, the RTC granted the joint prayer of the Valdez and Malvar spouses and ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction placing them in possession of the subject property upon posting a bond of P1,000,000.00. The Dela Rosa spouses moved for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the motion in its Order dated February 28, 2003, ruling that the issues and evidence raised merely re-hashed those already thoroughly discussed in the December 16, 2002 Order. The Court of Appeals dismissed the Dela Rosas' Petition for Certiorari on June 10, 2003 and denied their Motion for Reconsideration on July 24, 2003, prompting the present Petition for Review.

• Improper Issuance of the Writ: Petitioner maintained that the Court of Appeals committed grave and reversible error in affirming the RTC Order that issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in favor of the Valdez and Malvar spouses, thereby taking away from the petitioners possession of the land in question and placing the private respondents in possession thereof.
• Falsity of the Exhibits: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in appreciating the exhibits relied upon by the respondent judge in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, which petitioner characterized as fake, falsified, spurious, and non-existent.
• Prejudgment of the Case: Petitioner contended that the Court of Appeals committed grave and reversible error in sustaining the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction which apparently and glaringly amounted to a prejudgment of the case, notwithstanding the fact that no trial on the merits had as yet been started.
• Disregard of the Motion for Reconsideration: Petitioner asserted that the Court of Appeals also seriously erred when it deliberately ignored the arguments raised in the Motion for Reconsideration despite its own admission that it could not pass upon the factual findings of the respondent judge.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Dela Rosa spouses' Petition for Certiorari, which in turn depends on whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction placing the Valdez and Malvar spouses in possession of the subject property during the pendency of Civil Case No. 00-6015.
• Sufficiency of the Legal Right: Whether the intervenors Valdez and Malvar spouses had established a clear legal right to be entitled to the relief of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, given the conflicting muniments of title over the subject property.
• Prejudgment: Whether the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction amounted to a prejudgment of the main case notwithstanding that no trial on the merits had yet begun.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, and the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari, the assailed orders having been based on substantial evidence and pertinent jurisprudence.
• Sufficiency of the Legal Right: Yes. Sales Patent No. 38713 issued in the name of Juan Valdez made him, at the very least, the equitable owner of the property, while the Dela Rosas' TCT No. 451423-A was nebulous, unregistered, and traced to the nullified Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136.
• Prejudgment: No. A writ of preliminary injunction becomes a prejudgment only when it grants the main prayer in the complaint or responsive pleading so that nothing is left for the trial court to try except merely incidental matters; the assailed orders settled nothing more than the question of possession pendente lite.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction rests on the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case, since the assessment and evaluation of evidence toward that end involves findings of fact left to the trial court for its conclusive determination. The exercise of judicial discretion in injunctive matters must not be interfered with except when there is grave abuse of discretion, which implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. A scrutiny of the RTC Orders dated December 16, 2002 and February 28, 2003 revealed that these were based on substantial evidence and pertinent jurisprudence. The Court likewise stressed that the assessment and evaluation of evidence in the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction involves findings of fact ordinarily left to the trial court for its conclusive determination, and that conclusions and findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal unless strong and cogent reasons dictate otherwise, because the trial court is in a better position to examine the real evidence and to observe the demeanor of the witnesses.

• Sufficiency of the Legal Right: A preliminary mandatory injunction is more cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive injunction since, more than its function of preserving the status quo between the parties, it also commands the performance of an act. Its issuance is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute; when the complainant's right is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and the issuance of the writ is improper. While the right claimed need not be conclusively established, it is still necessary to show, at least tentatively, that the right exists and is not vitiated by any substantial challenge or contradiction. Here, the RTC found that neither MCDC nor NEPVI had shown by credible facts a clear legal right to the relief of injunction, since their proprietary rights under their respective muniments of title were subject to conditions that were not complied with — the price in the January 16, 1996 Deed of Absolute Sale was not paid, rendering the sale simulated, and the terms and conditions of the Joint Venture Agreement were not complied with. In contrast, the intervenors Valdez and Malvar spouses had established a clear legal right. Sales Patent No. 38713 covering the subject property had already been issued to Juan Valdez, making him at the very least the equitable owner, and a request for its registration was pending before the Registry of Deeds of Marikina City; the Valdez spouses acknowledged the transfer of the subject property to the Malvar spouses. Relying on Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, the RTC held that what divests the government of title to the land is the issuance of the sales patent and its subsequent registration with the Register of Deeds. The Dela Rosas' title, by contrast, was nebulous: TCT No. 451423-A was not registered with the Registry of Deeds of Marikina City or Antipolo City, and it was traced back to Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, which had already been declared null and void in the Intestate Estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban vs. Court of Appeals, from which no rights could be derived. The RTC also found that the technical description of Lot 4 in Sales Patent No. 38713 had been copied and manipulated into TCT No. 451423-A, and that the dates of survey and approval of the subject property were likewise copied from the Sales Patent. The RTC further justified the writ under the exceptional or extreme urgency cases enumerated in Nelly Raspado vs. Court of Appeals and Cagayan de Oro City Landless Residents Asso., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, namely, where the right to possession during the pendency of the main case is very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in favor of the complainant seeking possession pendente lite; where there was willful and unlawful invasion of the plaintiff's rights over his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one; and where the effect of the preliminary mandatory injunction is to re-establish and maintain a pre-existing and continuing relationship between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, rather than to establish a new relationship during the pendency of the principal case. Although the general rule is that a court should not by means of a preliminary injunction transfer property in litigation from the possession of one party to another, that rule admits of exceptions, as when there is a clear finding of ownership and possession of the land or unless the subject property is covered by a Torrens title pointing to one of the parties as the undisputed owner.

• Prejudgment: The contention that the RTC Orders amounted to a prejudgment of the case had no merit. In Levi Strauss (Phils.) Inc. vs. Vogue Traders Clothing Company, the Court explained that a writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence adduced by the applicant; the evidence submitted during the hearing of the incident is not conclusive, for only a sampling is needed to give the trial court an idea of the justification for its issuance pending the decision of the case on the merits. The findings of fact and opinion of a court when issuing the writ are interlocutory in nature, and the sole object of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. Since Section 4 of Rule 58 gives the trial courts sufficient discretion to evaluate the conflicting claims in an application for a provisional writ, appellate courts generally will not interfere in the absence of manifest abuse of such discretion. A writ of preliminary injunction would become a prejudgment of a case only when it grants the main prayer in the complaint or responsive pleading, so much so that there is nothing left for the trial court to try except merely incidental matters. The assailed RTC Orders settled nothing more than the question of which party or parties was or were entitled to possession of the subject property while Civil Case No. 00-6015 was still being heard, and the RTC was not precluded from proceeding with the case to receive additional evidence and hear further arguments to determine with finality the rightful owner and possessor of the subject property.

• Preliminary Mandatory Injunction — Clear Case Requirement — A preliminary mandatory injunction is more cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive injunction because, beyond preserving the status quo, it commands the performance of an act. Its issuance is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute; where the complainant's right is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and the writ is improper. While the right claimed need not be conclusively established, it must at least tentatively appear to exist and must not be vitiated by any substantial challenge or contradiction. The Court applied this standard in holding that the Valdez and Malvar spouses had shown a clear legal right anchored on Sales Patent No. 38713, while the Dela Rosas' claim was doubtful.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Injunctive Matters — The grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction rests on the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case, since the assessment and evaluation of evidence involves findings of fact left to the trial court for conclusive determination. Interference is warranted only upon grave abuse of discretion, which implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or the exercise of power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. No such abuse attended the RTC's issuance of the writ.

• Exception to the General Rule Against Injunctive Transfer of Possession — As a general rule, a court should not by means of a preliminary injunction transfer property in litigation from the possession of one party to another. The rule admits of exceptions, such as when there is a clear finding of ownership and possession of the land in favor of the applicant, or unless the subject property is covered by a Torrens title pointing to one of the parties as the undisputed owner. The Court applied this exception, the RTC having made a clear finding of ownership in favor of the intervenors.

• Exceptional or Extreme Urgency Cases Justifying Mandatory Injunction — A preliminary mandatory injunction may issue where: (a) the right to possession during the pendency of the main case is very clear; (b) considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in favor of the complainant seeking possession pendente lite; (c) there was willful and unlawful invasion of the plaintiff's rights over his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one; and (d) the effect of the writ is to re-establish and maintain a pre-existing and continuing relationship between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, rather than to establish a new relationship during the pendency of the principal case. The RTC found the case to fall within these exceptional categories.

• Interlocutory Nature of Injunction Findings; No Prejudgment — A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence; only a sampling is needed to give the trial court an idea of the justification for its issuance pending the decision on the merits. The findings of fact and opinion of a court when issuing the writ are interlocutory in nature, and the sole object of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits can be heard. A writ becomes a prejudgment only when it grants the main prayer in the complaint or responsive pleading, leaving nothing for the trial court to try except merely incidental matters. The assailed orders settled only the question of possession pendente lite.

• Sales Patent and Divestiture of Government Title — The approval of a sales application merely authorizes the applicant to take possession of the land so that he may comply with the requirements prescribed by law before a final patent may be issued in his favor; meanwhile, the government remains the owner, and the application may still be cancelled and the land awarded to another applicant should it be shown that the legal requirements were not complied with. What divests the government of title to the land is the issuance of the sales patent and its subsequent registration with the Register of Deeds. The Court relied on this principle in finding that Sales Patent No. 38713 issued to Juan Valdez made him, at the very least, the equitable owner of the subject property.

• Great Weight Accorded to Trial Court Findings of Fact — The assessment and evaluation of evidence in the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction involves findings of fact ordinarily left to the trial court for its conclusive determination. Conclusions and findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal unless strong and cogent reasons dictate otherwise, because the trial court is in a better position to examine the real evidence and to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying.

• "A preliminary mandatory injunction is more cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive injunction since, more than its function of preserving the status quo between the parties, it also commands the performance of an act. Accordingly, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute. When the complainant's right is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is improper." — This passage states the controlling standard for the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction, the ratio on which the Court's affirmance of the writ in favor of the Valdez and Malvar spouses rests.

• "Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law." — This passage supplies the canonical formulation of grave abuse of discretion as applied to injunctive writs, the threshold the Dela Rosas failed to meet.

• "Again it must be stressed that as a general rule a parcel of land in dispute cannot be taken from one party and given to another by an injunctive writ. But that is not absolute or without exception. The exception to the general rule is when there is a clear finding of ownership of the land in litigation, as in this case." — Quoted from the RTC Order and adopted by the Court, this passage articulates the exception to the general rule against injunctive transfer of possession, the doctrinal basis for placing the intervenors in possession pendente lite.

• "A writ of preliminary injunction would become a prejudgment of a case only when it grants the main prayer in the complaint or responsive pleading, so much so that there is nothing left for the trial court to try except merely incidental matters." — This passage, drawn from Levi Strauss (Phils.) Inc. vs. Vogue Traders Clothing Company, disposes of the Dela Rosas' prejudgment argument and defines the limit beyond which a provisional writ becomes a premature adjudication on the merits.

• Philippine National Bank vs. RJ Ventures Realty & Development Corporation, G.R. No. 164548, September 27, 2006, 503 SCRA 639 — Cited for the propositions that a preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy adjunct to the main case and not a cause of action in itself, and for the definition of grave abuse of discretion in injunctive matters.
• Spouses Anthony L. Ngo and So Hon K. Ngo vs. Allied Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 177420, October 6, 2010 — Cited for the rule that while the right claimed as basis for injunctive relief need not be conclusively established, it must at least tentatively appear to exist and must not be vitiated by any substantial challenge or contradiction.
• Levi Strauss (Phils.) Inc. vs. Vogue Traders Clothing Company, 500 Phil. 438 (2005) — Cited for the rule that a writ of preliminary injunction is based on initial and incomplete evidence, that its findings are interlocutory, and that it becomes a prejudgment only when it grants the main prayer in the complaint or responsive pleading.
• Levi Strauss & Co., & Levi Strauss (Phils.) Inc. vs. Clinton Apparelle, Inc., G.R. No. 138900, September 20, 2005, 470 SCRA 236 — Cited in connection with Rule 58, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, distinguishing prohibitory from mandatory injunctions.
• Intestate Estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban vs. Court of Appeals, 333 Phil. 597 (1996) — Cited as the case in which Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, the root of the Dela Rosas' claim, was declared null and void, from which no rights could be derived.
• Cagayan de Oro City Landless Residents Asso., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 220 — Cited for the exception to the general rule against injunctive transfer of possession, namely, when there is a clear finding of ownership and possession of the land or the subject property is covered by a Torrens title pointing to one of the parties as the undisputed owner.
• Nelly Raspado vs. Court of Appeals, 220 SCRA 650 — Cited for the enumeration of exceptional or extreme urgency cases in which a preliminary mandatory injunction may issue.
• Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 414 — Cited for the rule that what divests the government of title to the land is the issuance of the sales patent and its subsequent registration with the Register of Deeds.
• Visayan Realty, Inc. vs. Meer — Cited within the DBP ruling for the principle that the approval of a sales application merely authorizes the applicant to take possession of the land so that he may comply with the requirements prescribed by law before a final patent is issued in his favor.
• Philippine National Construction Corporation vs. Mars Construction Enterprises, Inc., 323 SCRA 624 — Cited for the rule that deeds involving the same parties and covering the same disputed parcel of land are to be interpreted jointly and harmonized.
• Lopez vs. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 743 (2000) — Cited for the rule that findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal absent strong and cogent reasons.

• Rule 58, Section 1, Rules of Court — Defines a preliminary injunction as an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, and classifies it as either a prohibitory injunction, which commands a party to refrain from doing a particular act, or a mandatory injunction, which commands the performance of some positive act to correct a wrong in the past. The Court used this provision to characterize the assailed writ as a preliminary mandatory injunction.
• Rule 58, Section 3, Rules of Court — Enumerates the grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitive or mandatory: (a) that the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; (b) that the commission, continuance, or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or (c) that a party, court, agency, or person is doing, threatening, or attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. The Court cited this provision as the statutory basis for the writ issued by the RTC.
• Rule 58, Section 4, Rules of Court — Cited in the discussion of prejudgment for the rule that trial courts are given sufficient discretion to evaluate the conflicting claims in an application for a provisional writ which often involves a factual determination, such that appellate courts generally will not interfere in the absence of manifest abuse of such discretion.

Corona, C.J. (Chairperson), Bersamin, Del Castillo, and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.