Sps. Elizabeth de la Cruz and Alfredo de la Cruz vs. Olga Ramiscal

A claim for a right of way cannot prevail absent proof of a voluntary easement or compliance with the requisites of a legal easement under Article 649 of the Civil Code; and the right to appeal, being a statutory privilege, may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by law.

Respondent Olga Ramiscal owns a parcel of land at the corner of 18th Avenue and Boni Serrano Avenue, Murphy, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 300302. Petitioners, the spouses Elizabeth and Alfredo de la Cruz, occupy an 85-square-meter parcel at the back of Ramiscal's property, covered by TCT No. RT-56958 (100547) in the name of Concepcion de la Peña, Alfredo's mother. The dispute concerns a 1.10-meter wide by 12.60-meter long strip of Ramiscal's land that petitioners use as a pathway to 18th Avenue. The Civil Code governs easements of right of way, distinguishing voluntary easements created by the will of the owners from legal easements arising by law.

Respondent Olga Ramiscal is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at the corner of 18th Avenue and Boni Serrano Avenue, Murphy, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 300302 of the Register of Deeds for Quezon City. Petitioners, the spouses Elizabeth and Alfredo de la Cruz, occupy an 85-square-meter parcel of land at the back of Ramiscal's property, covered by TCT No. RT-56958 (100547) in the name of Concepcion de la Peña, Alfredo's mother. The dispute centers on a 1.10-meter wide by 12.60-meter long strip of land owned by Ramiscal, which petitioners use as their pathway to and from 18th Avenue, the nearest public highway from their property. Petitioners had enclosed the strip with a gate, fence, and roof.

In 1976, Ramiscal leased her property, including the building thereon, to Phil. Orient Motors. Phil. Orient Motors also owned a property adjacent to Ramiscal's. In 1995, Phil. Orient Motors sold its property to San Benito Realty. After the sale, Engr. Rafael Madrid prepared a relocation survey and location plan for both contiguous properties of Ramiscal and San Benito Realty. It was only then that Ramiscal discovered that the pathway occupied by petitioners was part of her property.

Through her lawyer, Ramiscal immediately demanded that petitioners demolish the structure they had constructed on the pathway without her knowledge and consent. Her letter dated 18 February 1995 went unheeded, so she referred the matter to the Barangay for conciliation proceedings, but the parties arrived at no settlement. Ramiscal then filed a complaint with the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-95-25159, seeking demolition of the structure allegedly illegally constructed by petitioners on her property. She asserted that petitioners had an existing right of way to a public highway other than the current one they were using, which she owned, and prayed for damages.

In support of her complaint, Ramiscal presented TCT No. RT-56958 (100547) covering the property denominated as Lot 1-B in the name of Concepcion de la Peña, mother of petitioner Alfredo de la Cruz. The title revealed that a portion of Lot 1-B, consisting of 85 square meters and denominated as Lot 1-B-2, was occupied by petitioners. To prove that petitioners had an existing right of way to a public highway other than the pathway she owned, Ramiscal adduced a copy of the plan of a subdivision survey for Concepcion de la Peña and Felicidad Manalo prepared in 1965 and a subdivision plan for Concepcion de la Peña prepared in 1990. These documents established an existing 1.50-meter wide alley, identified as Lot 1-B-1, on the lot of Concepcion de la Peña, which served as a passageway from the lot occupied by petitioners (Lot 1-B-2) to Boni Serrano Avenue.

In their Answer, petitioners admitted having used the 1.10-meter wide by 12.60-meter long strip of land on the northern side of Ramiscal's property as their pathway to and from 18th Avenue, the nearest public highway from their property, but claimed that such use was with Ramiscal's knowledge. They alleged that in 1976, Ramiscal initiated the construction on her property of a motor shop known as Phil. Orient Motors, and that they, as well as the other occupants of the property at the back of Ramiscal's land, opposed the construction of the perimeter wall because it would enclose and render their property without adequate ingress and egress. They asked Ramiscal to give them a 1.50-meter wide and 40.15-meter long easement on the eastern side of her property, which would be reciprocated with an equivalent 1.50-meter wide easement by the owner of another adjacent estate. Ramiscal did not want to give them the easement on the eastern side towards Boni Serrano Avenue but instead offered the 1.10-meter wide passageway along the northern side of her property towards 18th Avenue, which offer they accepted. Petitioners added that they were made to sign a document stating that they waived their right to ask for an easement along the eastern side of Ramiscal's property towards Boni Serrano Avenue, which document was among those submitted in the application for a building permit by a certain "Mang Puling," the person in charge of the construction of the motor shop. According to petitioners, the perimeter wall on Ramiscal's property was constructed at a distance of 1.10 meters offset from the property line to provide a passageway for them to and from 18th Avenue, and Ramiscal knew all along of the pathway and had tolerated their use thereof.

The trial court gave probative weight to Ramiscal's evidence. It found that Concepcion de la Peña had provided petitioners with an adequate ingress and egress towards Boni Serrano Avenue. The trial court gave weight to TCT No. RT-56958 (100547), which indicated that Lot 1-B-2, consisting of 85 square meters, was occupied by petitioners. The 1965 and 1990 subdivision plans revealed an existing 1.50-meter wide alley, Lot 1-B-1, on de la Peña's lot, serving as a passageway from Lot 1-B-2 to Boni Serrano Avenue. During trial, petitioner Elizabeth de la Cruz admitted knowledge of the subdivision plan of Lot 1-B prepared for Concepcion de la Peña by Engr. Julio Cudiamat in 1990. That plan subdivided Lot 1-B into (1) Lot 1-B-1, an existing alley consisting of 59.60 square meters towards Boni Serrano Avenue; (2) Lot 1-B-2, consisting of 85.20 square meters, occupied by petitioners; and (3) Lot 1-B-3, also consisting of 85.20 square meters, occupied by the sister of petitioner Alfredo de la Cruz. Elizabeth admitted that Lot 1-B-1 was intended by the owner, Concepcion de la Peña, to serve as access to a public highway for the occupants of the interior portion of her property. Elizabeth claimed that although there was a portion of land allotted by Concepcion de la Peña to serve as their ingress and egress to Boni Serrano Avenue, petitioners could no longer use it because de la Peña had constructed houses on it. The trial court found that the isolation of petitioners' property was due to the acts of Concepcion de la Peña, who was required by law to grant a right of way to the occupants of her property. The trial court also noted that Atty. Federico R. Onandia, counsel of Phil. Orient Motors, wrote petitioners on 25 August 1994 advising them that his client would close the pathway along 18th Avenue, implying that it was Phil. Orient Motors, Ramiscal's lessee, which tolerated petitioners' use of the pathway. The trial court further found that title to both lots was still registered in the name of Concepcion de la Peña under TCT No. RT-56958 (100547), and petitioners did not produce the deed of sale evidencing their alleged purchase of the property from de la Peña. Finally, Ramiscal, in her Comment, brought to the Court's attention that petitioners had converted the pathway into a canteen and videoke bar, as shown by pictures bearing the signage "FRED'S CANTEEN/VIDEOKE KAMBINGAN," and had installed structures that encroached on her property line as a result of their commercial activities; petitioners implicitly admitted this conversion by their silence in their Reply and Memorandum.

• Timeliness of Appeal: Petitioners asserted that their petition was filed on time on 30 April 1998, well within the 45-day period reckoned from 17 March 1998, when the secretary of their former counsel received the notice to file appeal.
• Liberal Application of Rules: Petitioners argued that even assuming the brief was filed late, the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal in light of rulings of the Supreme Court allowing delayed appeals on equitable grounds.
• Voluntary Easement: Petitioners claimed that in 1976 respondent, through her foreman Mang Puling, offered them the 1.10-meter passageway along the northern side of her property towards 18th Avenue; they accepted, signed a waiver of the eastern easement, and the perimeter wall was built 1.10 meters from the property line to provide the passageway, with respondent's knowledge and tolerance.
• Legal Easement: Petitioners maintained that they were entitled to a legal easement of right of way under Article 649 of the Civil Code, claiming no adequate outlet to a public highway because the alley provided by Concepcion de la Peña had been built over.
• Laches: Petitioners contended that respondent was barred by laches from closing the pathway after almost twenty years, which they claimed amounted to waiver of her right.

• Existing Right of Way: Respondent asserted that petitioners have an existing right of way to a public highway other than the pathway she owns, and prayed for demolition of the illegally constructed structure and damages.
• Conversion of Use: In her Comment, respondent brought to the Court's attention that petitioners had converted the pathway into a canteen and videoke bar, as shown by pictures bearing the signage "FRED'S CANTEEN/VIDEOKE KAMBINGAN," and had installed structures encroaching on her property line, which petitioners implicitly admitted by silence.

• Dismissal of Appeal: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal for failure to file appellants' brief within the reglementary period.
• Easement of Right of Way: Whether petitioners are entitled to a voluntary or legal easement of right of way over respondent's property.
• Laches: Whether respondent is barred by laches from closing the right of way used by petitioners.

• Dismissal of Appeal: No. The notice to file brief was received on 12 March 1998 by the office of petitioners' former counsel; the 45-day period expired before 30 April 1998, when new counsel filed the brief. Section 1(b), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure authorized dismissal.
• Easement of Right of Way: No. No voluntary easement was proved because there was no written document and the alleged agreement was made only with respondent's foreman, who had no authority to bind her. No legal easement under Article 649 because petitioners had an adequate outlet to Boni Serrano Avenue, paid no indemnity, and the isolation was due to the acts of Concepcion de la Peña; petitioners also failed to prove ownership or a real right over the dominant estate.
• Laches: No. Laches requires knowledge of the defendant's acts and delay in filing suit; respondent discovered the encroachment only in 1995, immediately demanded demolition, referred the matter to the Barangay, and filed the complaint in the same year.

• Dismissal of Appeal: The registry return receipt card showed that the Notice to File Brief was received on 12 March 1998 by May Tadeo from the Office of Atty. Judito Angelo C. Tadeo, petitioners' previous counsel. Thus, when petitioners' new counsel entered his appearance and filed an appellants' brief on 30 April 1998, the 45-day period had already expired. The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the appeal under Section 1(b), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The written note on the face of the Order claiming receipt on 17 March 1998 could not prevail over the registry return card; service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee as shown by the registry return card, which is an official record presumed accurate unless proven otherwise, unlike a private note that is self-serving and easily fabricated. The error of the former counsel's secretary amounted to negligence or incompetence in record-keeping, which did not excuse the delay. The belated transmission of the order to petitioners on 20 March 1998 was likewise not a good reason, since petitioners and their counsel had the responsibility to devise a system for receiving mail. Rules on procedure cannot be made to depend on the singular convenience of a party. The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural, or inherent right but a statutory privilege, available only if granted or provided by statute and exercisable only in the manner prescribed by law. No justifiable reasons or meritorious grounds were shown for a liberal application of the rules.
• Easement of Right of Way: An easement or servitude is a real right constituted on the corporeal immovable property of another, by virtue of which the owner must refrain from doing or must allow someone to do something on his property for the benefit of another thing or person; it may be established by law or by the will of the owners. No voluntary easement was established. Petitioners failed to show by competent evidence, other than their bare claim, that they and their tenants entered into an agreement with respondent, through her foreman Mang Puling, to use the pathway to 18th Avenue in exchange for an equivalent easement. First, no document evidencing such agreement was produced, and the Civil Code requires transactions involving the sale or disposition of real property to be in writing. Second, only the foreman talked with petitioners regarding the pathway; petitioner Elizabeth de la Cruz testified that she did not talk to respondent about the arrangement, and the foreman had no authority to bind respondent. Third, the explanation that Mang Puling submitted the agreement to the Quezon City Engineer's Office, which could no longer produce a copy, did not inspire belief; petitioners should have requested a subpoena duces tecum to compel production or prove unavailability. The fact that the perimeter wall was constructed 1.10 meters from the property line did not by itself bolster petitioners' story. The letter of Atty. Federico R. Onandia, counsel of Phil. Orient Motors, dated 25 August 1994, advising petitioners that his client would close the pathway along 18th Avenue, implied that it was Phil. Orient Motors, respondent's lessee, that tolerated petitioners' use of the pathway. As to the legal easement under Article 649, the requisites are: (1) the immovable is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) payment of proper indemnity; (3) the isolation is not the result of its own acts; (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. The first three requisites were not obtaining. The trial court found that Concepcion de la Peña had provided petitioners with an adequate ingress and egress towards Boni Serrano Avenue through the existing 1.50-meter wide alley, Lot 1-B-1. Petitioners therefore had no right to insist on using a portion of respondent's property as a pathway towards 18th Avenue, especially since they paid no indemnity. The isolation of petitioners' property was due to the acts of Concepcion de la Peña, who constructed houses on the alley; Article 649 does not make the easement compulsory if the isolation is due to the proprietor's own acts. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough; there must be a real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity. Francisco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court held that a person granted access to a public highway through an adjacent estate cannot claim a similar easement in an alternative location if the existing easement was rendered unusable by the owner's own act of isolating his property. Moreover, under Article 649, only the owner or a person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use the immovable is entitled to demand a right of way. Petitioners failed to prove that they owned the supposed dominant estate or possessed a real right to use it. They claimed to have acquired Lot 1-B-2 from Concepcion de la Peña, but title to both lots remained registered in de la Peña's name, and no deed of sale was produced. Thus, de la Peña, not petitioners, was the real party-in-interest to claim a right of way, although any action by de la Peña would not lie because her own acts of building houses on the allotted pathway caused the isolation.
• Laches: Laches is not just lapse of time or delay. Its essence is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, through due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert the right had either abandoned or declined to assert it. The elements are: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of; (b) delay in asserting complainant's rights after he had knowledge of defendant's acts and after he had the opportunity to sue; (c) lack of knowledge or notice by defendant that the complainant will assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (d) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event the relief is accorded to the complainant. The second and third elements were lacking. It was only in 1995 that respondent found out that the pathway being used by petitioners was part of her property, when the relocation survey and location plan were prepared. She immediately demanded demolition, and when her letter dated 18 February 1995 fell on deaf ears and no settlement was reached at the Barangay, she seasonably filed her complaint with the RTC in the same year. Laches therefore did not bar respondent. Respondent also brought to the Court's attention petitioners' conversion of the pathway into a canteen and videoke bar, as shown by pictures bearing the signage "FRED'S CANTEEN/VIDEOKE KAMBINGAN," and their installation of structures encroaching on her property line; petitioners implicitly admitted this by their silence. Such conversion was a telltale sign of petitioners' veiled pecuniary interest in asserting a right over the litigated property under the pretext of an innocuous claim for a right of way.

• Right to appeal is a statutory privilege — It is not a constitutional, natural, or inherent right; it exists only if granted or provided by statute and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by law. The Court applied this to uphold the Court of Appeals' dismissal of petitioners' appeal for failure to file their brief within the reglementary period, notwithstanding their plea for liberal application of the rules.
• Service by registered mail — Service by registered mail is deemed complete and effective upon actual receipt by the addressee as shown by the registry return card. The registry return card is an official record of the court, presumed accurate unless proven otherwise, and prevails over a private written note or record of a party, which is self-serving and easily fabricated. The Court used this to reject petitioners' claim that the notice was received on 17 March 1998 instead of 12 March 1998.
• Easement or servitude — A real right constituted on the corporeal immovable property of another, by virtue of which the owner must refrain from doing or must allow someone to do something on his property for the benefit of another thing or person. Easements are established either by law (legal) or by the will of the owners (voluntary). The Court used this framework to analyze petitioners' claim.
• Voluntary easement — A voluntary easement requires the will of the owner of the servient estate. The Court found no voluntary easement because petitioners failed to produce any written document, the alleged agreement was made only with respondent's foreman who had no authority to bind her, and the evidence showed that Phil. Orient Motors, respondent's lessee, merely tolerated the use of the pathway.
• Requisites of legal easement of right of way under Article 649 — The claimant must prove: (1) the immovable is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) payment of proper indemnity; (3) the isolation is not the result of its own acts; (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. The Court held the first three requisites absent: petitioners had an adequate outlet to Boni Serrano Avenue, paid no indemnity, and the isolation was caused by Concepcion de la Peña's own acts.
• Real necessity, not mere convenience — A legal easement of right of way cannot be imposed merely because the claimed route is a shorter or more convenient route to a public highway; there must be a real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity. The Court applied this in rejecting petitioners' claim to use respondent's property towards 18th Avenue when an existing 1.50-meter alley to Boni Serrano Avenue had been provided.
• Laches — Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, through due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert the right had abandoned or declined to assert it. Its elements are: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant giving rise to the situation complained of; (b) delay in asserting complainant's rights after knowledge of defendant's acts and opportunity to sue; (c) lack of knowledge or notice by defendant that complainant will assert the right; and (d) injury or prejudice to defendant if relief is accorded. The Court found the second and third elements lacking because respondent discovered the encroachment only in 1995 and promptly sued.
• Ownership or real right required to claim legal easement — Under Article 649, only the owner or a person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use the immovable is entitled to demand a right of way. The Court found petitioners failed to prove ownership or a real right over the dominant estate because title remained in Concepcion de la Peña and no deed of sale was produced.

• "The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right - it is a statutory privilege and of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or provided by statute." — This passage states the foundational rule on the nature of the right to appeal, which the Court used to justify the strict dismissal of petitioners' appeal for late filing of their brief.
• "The conferment of a legal easement of right of way under Article 649 is subject to proof of the following requisites: (1) it is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) payment of proper indemnity; (3) the isolation is not the result of its own acts; (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest." — This is the Court's canonical formulation of the requisites for a legal easement of right of way, which it applied to deny petitioners' claim.
• "It is not just the lapse of time or delay that constitutes laches. The essence of laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, through due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, thus giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it had either abandoned or declined to assert it." — This passage defines laches and was used to reject petitioners' claim that respondent's alleged twenty-year inaction barred her from closing the pathway.
• "Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve as its basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial necessity for it." — Quoted from the trial court's rationale and adopted by the Supreme Court, this passage underscores that a right of way cannot be imposed merely because the claimed route is more convenient.

• Dela Cruz vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. L-48697, 15 April 1988, 160 SCRA 361 — Cited for the rule that service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee as shown by the registry return card.
• Sps. Aguilar vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120972, 19 July 1999, 310 SCRA 393 — Cited to support the principle that litigants and counsel must devise a system for receiving mail and cannot excuse delay by relying on the negligence of counsel's staff.
• NYK International vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 146267, 17 February 2003, 397 SCRA 607 — Cited in connection with the exceptional allowance of delayed appeals on equitable grounds, which the Court found inapplicable absent justifiable reasons.
• Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132425, 31 August 1999, 313 SCRA 376 — Cited for the rule that the right to appeal is a statutory privilege, not a constitutional or inherent right.
• Antonio vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135869, 22 September 1999, 315 SCRA 62; Lamzon vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 113600, 28 May 1999, 307 SCRA 665 — Cited to support the rule that the right to appeal may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by law.
• Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124699, 31 July 2003, 407 SCRA 518 — Cited for the definition of an easement or servitude as a real right over another's corporeal immovable property.
• Villanueva vs. Velasco, G.R. No. 130845, 27 November 2000, 346 SCRA 99 — Cited for the requisites of a legal easement of right of way under Article 649.
• Francisco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 527 — Cited for the rule that a person granted access to a public highway through an adjacent estate cannot claim a similar easement in an alternative location if the existing easement was rendered unusable by the owner's own act of isolating his property.
• Españo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123823, 17 February 1997, 268 SCRA 511 — Cited for the essence of laches as failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do what could or should have been done earlier.
• Avisado vs. Rumbaua, G.R. No. 137306, 12 March 2001, 354 SCRA 245 — Cited for the essential elements of laches.

• Section 1(b), Rule 50, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides a ground for dismissal of appeal for failure to file the notice of appeal or record on appeal within the period fixed by the Rules; the Court cited it (while the Court of Appeals resolution invoked Section 1(e) of the same Rule) in upholding the dismissal of petitioners' appeal for failure to file their appellants' brief on time.
• Article 613, Civil Code — Defines an easement or servitude as an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner, and identifies the dominant and servient estates. Applied to frame the easement claim.
• Article 619, Civil Code — Provides that easements are established either by law or by the will of the owners, the former being legal and the latter voluntary easements. Applied to distinguish voluntary from legal easement.
• Article 649, Civil Code — Governs the legal easement of right of way, entitling the owner or person with a real right to use an immovable surrounded by other immovables without adequate outlet to a public highway to demand a right of way through neighboring estates after payment of proper indemnity. The Court applied its requisites and found them not satisfied.
• Article 1358, Civil Code — Requires acts and contracts creating, transmitting, modifying, or extinguishing real rights over immovable property to appear in a public document. Cited to support the finding that no voluntary easement was proved because no written document evidencing the alleged agreement was produced.

Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ.