Springfield Development Corporation vs. Presiding Judge of RTC of Misamis Oriental

The Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to annul a final judgment of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, which is co-equal in rank with the Regional Trial Court because its decisions are appealable to the Court of Appeals and therefore beyond Regional Trial Court control.

Petra Capistrano Piit owned Lot No. 2291 in Cagayan de Oro City, portions of which were acquired by Springfield Development Corporation, Inc. for development as the Mega Heights Subdivision. The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board is a quasi-judicial body created by Executive Order Nos. 229 and 129-A, with adjudicatory powers delineated by Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. Its Revised Rules of Procedure adopted December 26, 1988 provided for judicial review of its decisions by certiorari to the Court of Appeals.

Petra Capistrano Piit previously owned Lot No. 2291 in Cagayan de Oro City, measuring 123,408 square meters under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-62623. Springfield Development Corporation, Inc. bought Lot No. 2291-C with an area of 68,732 square meters and Lot No. 2291-D with an area of 49,778 square meters, leaving out 4,898 square meters, and developed these properties into the Mega Heights Subdivision.

On May 4, 1990, the Department of Agrarian Reform, through its Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, issued a Notice of Coverage placing the property under Republic Act No. 6657. Opposition by the heirs of Petra Piit led to the docketing of DARAB Case No. X-305. On August 27, 1991, DARAB Provincial Adjudicator Abeto A. Salcedo, Jr. declared the property residential and not suitable for agriculture. The Regional Director's notice of appeal was disallowed by the Provincial Adjudicator for being pro forma and frivolous, the decision became final and executory, and Springfield proceeded to develop the property.

Thereafter the DAR Regional Director filed a petition for relief from judgment, docketed as DARAB Case No. 0555. In its Decision dated October 5, 1995, the DARAB granted the petition, gave due course to the Notice of Coverage, and directed the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office to proceed with documentation, acquisition and distribution to the true and lawful beneficiaries. By Order dated May 22, 1997, the DARAB ordered the heirs and Springfield to pay the farmer-beneficiaries ₱12,340,800.00 corresponding to the property's value since it had already been developed into a subdivision.

On June 13, 1997, Springfield and the heirs filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 40, a petition for annulment of the October 5, 1995 DARAB Decision and all subsequent proceedings, contending the decision was rendered without notice and hearing. According to respondents, petitioners were impleaded and attended some hearings although counsel was absent. The trial court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and the Court of Appeals sustained the dismissal while leaving the alternative prohibition prayer unresolved.

• RTC General Jurisdiction: Petitioner argued that under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 no provision vests the Court of Appeals with jurisdiction over annulment of DARAB judgments, while Section 19 vests the Regional Trial Court with general jurisdiction covering annulment actions not expressly granted to any other court or tribunal.
• Judicial Stability: Petitioner maintained that the Court of Appeals committed clear error in applying judicial stability to divest the Regional Trial Court of jurisdiction vested by law, in effect modifying the applicable law.
• Prohibition Against Void Decision: Petitioner argued that the application for prohibition was necessary to restrain enforcement of a void decision, and that even if valid, prohibition could enjoin execution since changes rendered execution unjust and inequitable.
• Irregular Denial of Reconsideration: Petitioner maintained that the Court of Appeals irregularly dismissed the motion for reconsideration after resolving to entertain prohibition and review DARAB proceedings, departing from the usual course of judicial proceedings.
• Direct Supreme Court Cognizance: Petitioner urged the Supreme Court, to avoid serious miscarriage of justice and needless delay, to take cognizance of the CA-G.R. SP No. 44563 petition in the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction as if originally lodged before it.

• Due Process Afforded: Respondent countered that petitioners were not denied due process because they were impleaded as parties in the DARAB proceedings and in fact attended some hearings although their counsel was absent.
• Lack of RTC Jurisdiction: Respondent argued that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled the Regional Trial Court is not vested with jurisdiction to annul the DARAB decision.

• RTC Jurisdiction over DARAB Judgments: Whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to annul a final judgment of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board.
• CA Annulment Jurisdiction over Quasi-Judicial Judgments: Whether a petition for annulment of a DARAB judgment may be brought before the Court of Appeals under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
• Direct Supreme Court Cognizance and Prohibition: Whether the Supreme Court should take primary cognizance of the prohibition prayer and resolve the alleged nullity of the DARAB decision on the merits.

• RTC Jurisdiction over DARAB Judgments: No. The DARAB is co-equal with the Regional Trial Court because its decisions are appealable to the Court of Appeals, placing them beyond Regional Trial Court control.
• CA Annulment Jurisdiction over Quasi-Judicial Judgments: No. Section 9(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 vests exclusive original jurisdiction only over annulment of Regional Trial Court judgments, with silence indicating lack of authority over quasi-judicial judgments.
• Direct Supreme Court Cognizance and Prohibition: No compelling reason exists for direct resort; the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to resolve the motion for reconsideration concerning prohibition after full review of the records.

• RTC Jurisdiction over DARAB Judgments: Under pre-Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 rulings, a court of first instance could annul another court of first instance's judgment, later refined by comity and by Ngo Bun Tiong vs. Sayo into judicial stability and non-interference between concurrent courts. With Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Section 9(2) gave the Intermediate Appellate Court exclusive original jurisdiction over annulment of Regional Trial Court judgments, while BF Northwest Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court allowed Regional Trial Courts to annul decisions only of inferior courts and quasi-judicial bodies of equal ranking pursuant to certiorari, prohibition and mandamus power. Because DARAB Rule XIV, Section 1 and Rule 43 provide appeal by certiorari/appeal from DARAB to the Court of Appeals, the DARAB ranks co-equal with the Regional Trial Court under Board of Commissioners vs. Dela Rosa, so dismissal of the annulment action was correct.
• CA Annulment Jurisdiction over Quasi-Judicial Judgments: Section 9(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 expressly covers only Regional Trial Court judgments, and Elcee Farms, Inc. vs. Semillano and Galang vs. Court of Appeals denied Court of Appeals jurisdiction over National Labor Relations Commission and Securities and Exchange Commission judgments on that ground. Cole vs. Court of Appeals and Macalalag vs. Ombudsman likewise confined Rule 47 annulment to Regional Trial Court civil actions for extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, with identical scope under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Hence silence on quasi-judicial bodies like the DARAB indicates lack of such annulment authority, and a Rule 43 review would not lie for fraud and lack of jurisdiction which allege no error of judgment.
• Direct Supreme Court Cognizance and Prohibition: Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court share concurrent certiorari, prohibition and mandamus jurisdiction, direct resort requires exceptional compelling circumstances such as national interest, unobtainable redress below, or speedy justice as in Fortich vs. Corona. Fortich was distinguished because the Office of the President acted motu proprio to modify a final executory decision after a hunger strike, while the October 5, 1995 DARAB Decision appears regular on its face pursuant to a petition for relief and requires record review on the factual due process claim. Because the Court is not a trier of facts and the Court of Appeals left prohibition unresolved despite recognizing collateral attack as a proper mode against void judgments, remand for the Court of Appeals to adjudicate on the merits, receive additional documents, and reconcile conflicting findings on the property's residential versus agricultural nature best serves substantial justice.

• Judicial Stability and Non-Interference Between Co-Equal Courts — The judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. Applied to sustain dismissal where the Regional Trial Court was asked to annul a co-equal DARAB judgment.
• Limited RTC Annulment Power over Inferior and Equal-Ranking Bodies — Despite absence of express provision in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Regional Trial Courts may annul final judgments only of inferior courts and administrative or quasi-judicial bodies of equal ranking, pursuant to original certiorari, prohibition and mandamus jurisdiction. Applied to deny Regional Trial Court power because the DARAB outranks that category.
• Co-Equal Status by Appealability to the Court of Appeals — Where legislation provides appeal from administrative bodies to the Court of Appeals, such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Court in rank and stature and beyond its control. Applied because DARAB decisions are brought to the Court of Appeals by certiorari under its rules and by appeal under Rule 43.
• Exclusive CA Annulment Confined to RTC Judgments — Section 9(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and Rule 47 confine annulment by the Court of Appeals to judgments or final orders in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction where ordinary remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner. Applied to hold that annulment does not lie against DARAB, National Labor Relations Commission, Securities and Exchange Commission, Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, Office of the President, or Ombudsman judgments.
• Hierarchy of Courts and Factual Review — Direct resort to the Supreme Court is disfavored unless redress cannot be obtained below and exceptional compelling circumstances justify primary jurisdiction; factual questions belong to lower courts as the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Applied to decline direct resolution of the due process and prohibition issues and remand to the Court of Appeals.
• Setting Aside Final Executory Judgments Including Collateral Attack — A final executory judgment may be set aside by (a) petition for relief under Rule 38 for fraud, accident, mistake and excusable negligence, (b) direct annulment for extrinsic fraud, and (c) direct certiorari or collateral attack to annul a judgment void on its face or by its recitals. Applied to characterize the prohibition prayer as a collateral attack requiring Court of Appeals resolution.

• "The rule is that where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of certain administrative bodies to the CA, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the RTC, in terms of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter." — States the test for co-equal status used to place the DARAB beyond Regional Trial Court annulment power because its decisions go to the Court of Appeals.
• "Given that DARAB decisions are appealable to the CA, the inevitable conclusion is that the DARAB is a co-equal body with the RTC and its decisions are beyond the RTC's control." — Formulates the ratio for affirming dismissal of the annulment petition filed with the Regional Trial Court.
• "It must be stressed at this point that the Court, as a rule, will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction." — Defines the hierarchy-of-courts limitation invoked to refuse direct Supreme Court resolution and remand the prohibition issue.

• Dulap vs. Court of Appeals, 149 Phil. 636 (1971) — Cited as pre-Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 authority that a court of first instance could annul another court of first instance's final executory judgment, later modified by comity and statute.
• Ngo Bun Tiong vs. Sayo, G.R. No. L-45825, June 30, 1988 — Followed for judicial stability and non-interference between concurrent and coordinate courts.
• BF Northwest Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-72370, May 29, 1987 — Followed to limit Regional Trial Court annulment to decisions of inferior courts and quasi-judicial bodies of equal ranking via certiorari, prohibition and mandamus jurisdiction.
• Board of Commissioners vs. Dela Rosa, 274 Phil. 1156 (1991) — Controlling precedent that appealability to the Court of Appeals makes an administrative body co-equal with the Regional Trial Court.
• Elcee Farms, Inc. vs. Semillano, G.R. No. 150286, October 17, 2003 — Followed to deny Court of Appeals annulment jurisdiction over National Labor Relations Commission judgments under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
• Galang vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139448, October 11, 2005 — Followed to deny Court of Appeals annulment jurisdiction over Securities and Exchange Commission final decisions.
• Cole vs. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 920 (2000) — Followed to hold Rule 47 annulment confined to Regional Trial Court decisions and unavailable against Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and Office of the President decisions, with fraud and lack of jurisdiction outside Rule 43.
• Macalalag vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 147995, March 4, 2004 — Followed to hold Ombudsman administrative judgments cannot be annulled by the Court of Appeals under Rule 47.
• Fortich vs. Corona, 352 Phil. 461 (1998) — Distinguished as involving motu proprio Office of the President modification of a final decision amid national-interest circumstances justifying Supreme Court primary jurisdiction, unlike the regular DARAB relief proceedings here.

• Section 9(2), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 — Vests the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, with exclusive original jurisdiction over annulment of Regional Trial Court judgments; construed as excluding annulment of quasi-judicial judgments like the DARAB's.
• Section 9(3), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 — Vests the Court of Appeals with exclusive appellate jurisdiction over Regional Trial Court and quasi-judicial final judgments, implemented to treat DARAB decisions as appealable to the Court of Appeals.
• Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 — Invoked by petitioners as Regional Trial Court general jurisdiction; held insufficient to confer annulment power over a co-equal DARAB.
• Section 21(1), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 — Basis for Regional Trial Court original certiorari, prohibition and mandamus over inferior courts, extended in jurisprudence to annulment of equal-ranking inferior bodies but not to the co-equal DARAB.
• Republic Act No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 — Placed the property under coverage through the May 4, 1990 Notice of Coverage and delineated DARAB adjudicatory powers.
• Executive Order Nos. 229 and 129-A — Created the DARAB as a quasi-judicial body.
• Rule XIV, Section 1, DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure — Provides certiorari to the Court of Appeals within fifteen days from DARAB decisions on agrarian disputes, supporting co-equal status and immediate executory effect.
• Rule 43, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides appeal from DARAB to the Court of Appeals limited to errors of judgment, hence unavailable for fraud and lack of jurisdiction pleaded as annulment grounds.
• Rule 47, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Confines Court of Appeals annulment to Regional Trial Court civil actions for extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction where ordinary remedies are lost without petitioner's fault; held identical to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and inapplicable to DARAB judgments.

Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Associate Justices, concurred without separate opinions.