Spouses Veroy vs. Layague

A warrantless search conducted after permission merely to enter a house and ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers cannot extend to a room-to-room search; absent any recognized exception, the articles seized are inadmissible under the exclusionary rule. Presidential Decree No. 1866 is not unconstitutional, and Republic Act No. 6968 did not repeal it.

Petitioners Leopoldo and Ma. Luisa Veroy were spouses who owned a residence in Davao City while residing in Quezon City. The Davao property was left under the care of houseboys and a caretaker, with the Veroys retaining the keys to the interior rooms. The charge was brought under Presidential Decree No. 1866, which penalizes illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in furtherance of rebellion. The case also implicated Republic Act No. 6968, which separately penalizes rebellion, coup d'etat, sedition, and disloyalty, and Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution on unreasonable searches and seizures.

Petitioners Leopoldo and Ma. Luisa Veroy were husband and wife who owned and formerly resided at No. 13 Isidro St., Skyline Village, Catalunan Grande, Davao City. After Leopoldo was promoted to Assistant Administrator of the Social Security System in June 1988, the family transferred to 130 K-8th St., East Kamias, Quezon City, where they were residing at the time of the search. The care and upkeep of the Davao residence was left to two houseboys, Jimmy Favia and Eric Burgos, who had quarters on the premises. The Veroys sent money to Edna Soguilon for the houseboys' salaries and other expenses. Although the Veroys kept the keys to the interior, only the key to the kitchen, where the circuit breakers were located, was entrusted to Edna Soguilon for emergencies; the keys to the master's bedroom and the children's rooms remained with the Veroys, so neither Edna nor the caretakers could enter the house.

On April 12, 1990, Capt. Reynaldo Obrero of the Talomo Patrol Station, PC/INP, acting on a directive from Metrodiscom Commander Col. Franco Calida, raided the Davao residence on information that it was being used as a safehouse of rebel soldiers. With the help of the caretakers, the officers entered the yard but did not enter the house because the owners were not present and they had no search warrant. Capt. Obrero telephoned Ma. Luisa in Quezon City to ask permission to search the house, which was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldiers. Ma. Luisa said she would fly to Davao to witness the search but eventually agreed, provided the search be conducted in the presence of Major Ernesto Macasaet, a PC/INP officer in Davao City and a long-time family friend. Capt. Obrero relayed the authority to Major Macasaet, who confirmed that Ma. Luisa had called him twice and that permission was given on the condition that the search be conducted in his presence.

The following day, Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet met at the house to conduct the search pursuant to Ma. Luisa's authority. The caretakers facilitated their entry into the yard, and using the key entrusted to Edna Soguilon, they gained entrance into the kitchen. A locksmith, George Badiang, was then employed to open the padlock of the door leading to the children's room. Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet entered the children's room and conducted the search. Inside an unlocked drawer in a black clutch bag, Capt. Obrero recovered a .45 caliber handgun with a magazine containing seven live bullets. Three half-full jute sacks containing printed materials of RAM-SFP were also found in the children's room. The search also yielded a big travelling bag containing assorted clothing and personal effects, a small black bag containing a book entitled "Islamic Revolution Future Path of the Nation", a road map of the Philippines, a telescope, and a plastic bag containing assorted medicines and religious pamphlets.

Sgt. Leo Justalero, upon Capt. Obrero's instruction, made an inventory and receipt of the articles seized in the house. The receipt was signed by Eric Burgos, one of the caretakers, and George Badiang, the locksmith, as witnesses. Sgt. Justalero turned over the articles to Sgt. Rodolfo Urbano at the police station. The case was referred for preliminary investigation to Quezon City Assistant Prosecutor Rodolfo Ponferrada, who had been designated Acting Provincial Prosecutor for Davao City by the Department of Justice through Department Order No. 88 dated May 16, 1990. In a resolution dated August 6, 1990, Fiscal Ponferrada recommended the filing of an information against the Veroys for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in Furtherance of Rebellion). On August 8, 1990, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City filed the information before the Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial Region, Davao City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 20595-90 and entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Atty. Leopoldo Veroy and Mrs. Maria Luisa Veroy." No bail was recommended by the prosecution.

At the time of the search and seizure, petitioners had been residing in Quezon City since 1988, while the articles were found in their Davao City residence under the care of the two caretakers.

• Constitutionality of PD 1866: Petitioners argued that Presidential Decree No. 1866, or at least the third paragraph of Section 1 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
• Repeal by RA 6968: Petitioners contended that Presidential Decree No. 1866 has been repealed by Republic Act No. 6968.
• Vagueness and Constructive Possession: Petitioners argued that Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 is couched in general or vague terms; the terms "deal in", "acquire", "dispose" or "possess" are capable of various interpretations such that there is no definiteness as to whether the definition includes "constructive possession" or how the concept of constructive possession should be applied. They maintained that they were not found in actual possession of the firearm and ammunitions, that they were in Quezon City while the prohibited articles were found in Davao City, and that they were charged under Presidential Decree No. 1866 upon the sole circumstance that the house wherein the items were found belongs to them. They further argued that there was no other evidence that they possessed or had control of the items seized, and that it was not shown that they had the intention to possess the firearms or to further rebellion.
• Illegal Search and Seizure: Petitioners averred that while they conceded that Capt. Obrero had permission from Ma. Luisa Veroy to break open the door of their residence, it was merely for the purpose of ascertaining the presence of the alleged rebel soldiers. The permission did not include any authority to conduct a room-to-room search once inside the house. The items taken were therefore products of an illegal search, violative of their constitutional rights, and inadmissible in evidence against them.

• Mootness: Respondents submitted that the petition for mandamus to compel respondent Judge to resolve petitioners' Motion for Bail and the petition for certiorari to review the order initially denying their Motion for Hospital Confinement had been rendered moot and academic by the resolutions of the Supreme Court dated November 20, 1990 and October 25, 1990, respectively.

• Constitutionality of PD 1866: Whether Presidential Decree No. 1866, or at least the third paragraph of Section 1 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
• Repeal by RA 6968: Whether Presidential Decree No. 1866 has been repealed by Republic Act No. 6968.
• Admissibility of Seized Articles: Whether the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in admitting in evidence certain articles which were clearly inadmissible for being violative of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.

• Constitutionality of PD 1866: No. The challenge to the third paragraph of Section 1 was foreclosed by Misolas vs. Panga, which held that the provision is neither a bill of attainder nor productive of double jeopardy.
• Repeal by RA 6968: No. Presidential Decree No. 1866 and Republic Act No. 6968 create distinct offenses—illegal possession of firearms and rebellion, coup d'etat, sedition, and disloyalty—and the later law did not clearly eliminate the former.
• Admissibility of Seized Articles: Yes. The warrantless search exceeded the limited consent given and fell under no recognized exception; the seized articles are inadmissible under the exclusionary rule, and the criminal case was dismissed.

• Constitutionality of PD 1866: The challenge to Presidential Decree No. 1866, or at least the third paragraph of Section 1 thereof, was foreclosed by Misolas vs. Panga, G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990 (181 SCRA 648). That case held that a declaration of unconstitutionality of the third paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 lacked legal basis because the provision is neither a bill of attainder nor does it provide a possibility of double jeopardy. On petitioners' related contention that Section 1 was vague as to "constructive possession," the Court cited U.S. vs. Jose and Tan Bo, 34 Phil. 724 (1916), where the Court held that animus possidendi must be proved in opium cases where the prohibited drug was found on the premises, and that the same rule applies to possession of firearms. The mere fact that a firearm is found on the accused's premises does not establish possession if other persons had access to the place and could have placed the item there without the accused's knowledge; doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. The Court ultimately resolved the case on the illegal search, but the constitutional challenge to Presidential Decree No. 1866 itself did not succeed.

• Repeal by RA 6968: The contention that Republic Act No. 6968 repealed Presidential Decree No. 1866 was without merit. The Court applied the cardinal rule of statutory construction that where the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous, its meaning and the intention of the legislature must be determined from the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity, there is no room for construction, citing Provincial Board of Cebu vs. Presiding Judge of Cebu, CFI, Br. IV, G.R. No. 34695, March 7, 1989 (171 SCRA 1). A perusal of the laws showed that the legislature provided for two distinct offenses: (1) illegal possession of firearms under Presidential Decree No. 1866; and (2) rebellion, coup d'etat, sedition, and disloyalty under Republic Act No. 6968. These involved different subjects, and it was not clearly shown that the later law eliminated the former. Thus, no repeal by implication.

• Admissibility of Seized Articles: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. The rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not absolute; recognized exceptions are (1) a search incidental to an arrest, (2) a search of a moving vehicle, and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view, citing People vs. Lo Ho Wing, G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991 (193 SCRA 122). None applied. The reason for searching the house was that it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldiers. Although Capt. Obrero was able to enter the compound, he did not enter the house because he did not have a search warrant and the owners were not present. This showed that he recognized the need for a search warrant; he contacted the Veroys to seek permission. Permission was granted by Ma. Luisa Veroy to enter the house, but only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers. The police had ample time to procure a search warrant but did not. In Guazon vs. De Villa, People vs. Aminnudin, G.R. No. L-74869, July 6, 1988 (163 SCRA 402), and Alih vs. Castro, G.R. No. L-69401, June 23, 1987 (151 SCRA 279), warrantless searches were declared illegal because the officials conducting the search had every opportunity to secure a search warrant. The objects seized, being products of illegal searches, were inadmissible in evidence in the criminal actions subsequently instituted against the accused-appellants, citing People vs. Cendana, G.R. No. 84715, October 17, 1990 (190 SCRA 538). The offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum, but it does not follow that the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited; a search warrant is still necessary. Because the rule was violated and no exception applied, the articles seized were illegally confiscated and protected by the exclusionary principle; they could not be used as evidence against petitioners in the criminal action for illegal possession of firearms, citing Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 689-690 (1986). The Court added that, assuming a search warrant, in mala prohibita while there is no need of criminal intent, there must be knowledge that the prohibited item existed; without knowledge or voluntariness there is no crime. The criminal case was accordingly dismissed.

• Warrantless searches and recognized exceptions — The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures requires a valid warrant, but the rule is not absolute. The recognized exceptions are: (1) a search incidental to an arrest; (2) a search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view. In this case, none applied; the police had ample opportunity to secure a warrant, and the search exceeded the limited consent given.
• Consent to search — A consent to enter and search must be measured by its terms. Ma. Luisa Veroy's permission allowed entry into the house only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers; it did not authorize a room-to-room search. The search of the children's room and other areas therefore exceeded the consent and was illegal.
• Exclusionary rule — Objects seized as products of an illegal search are inadmissible in evidence in the criminal action subsequently instituted against the accused. The firearm and ammunition recovered from the Veroys' residence could not be used against them.
• Mala prohibita and knowledge — In offenses that are malum prohibitum, motive is immaterial and criminal intent need not be shown, but the subject of the offense may not be summarily seized simply because it is prohibited; a search warrant is still necessary. Moreover, there must be knowledge that the prohibited item existed; without knowledge or voluntariness, there is no crime.
• Repeal by implication — Repeal by implication is not favored. Where the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous, the legislature's meaning and intention must be determined from the language employed, and there is no room for construction. Presidential Decree No. 1866 and Republic Act No. 6968 created distinct offenses and the latter did not clearly eliminate the former.
• Constitutionality of PD 1866 — The third paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 is not unconstitutional; it is neither a bill of attainder nor does it provide a possibility of double jeopardy, as held in Misolas vs. Panga.
• Animus possidendi in illegal possession of firearms — The animus possidendi must be proved where the prohibited item is found on the accused's premises; the mere finding of a firearm in a place accessible to others does not establish possession if the accused had no knowledge of its existence. Doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused, as stated in U.S. vs. Jose and Tan Bo.

• "The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures (Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution). However, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute one. Among the recognized exceptions thereto are: (1) a search incidental to an arrest; (2) a search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view (People v. Lo Ho Wing, G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991 [193 SCRA 122])." — This passage states the general constitutional rule and the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, which the Court then applied to hold that none of the exceptions justified the search.
• "Permission was indeed granted by Ma. Luisa Veroy to enter the house but only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers. Under the circumstances it is undeniable that the police officers had ample time to procure a search warrant but did not." — This is the ratio decidendi on the invalidity of the warrantless search: the consent given was limited, and the police had sufficient opportunity to obtain a warrant.
• "Undeniably, the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum but it does not follow that the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary." — This passage explains why the malum prohibitum nature of illegal possession of firearms does not dispense with the warrant requirement for seizing the prohibited items.
• "Besides, assuming that there was indeed a search warrant, still in mala prohibita, while there is no need of criminal intent, there must be knowledge that the same existed. Without the knowledge or voluntariness there is no crime." — This passage states the knowledge requirement in mala prohibita offenses and reinforces the conclusion that the seized articles could not sustain the criminal charge.

• Misolas vs. Panga, G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990 (181 SCRA 648) — Controlling precedent cited to foreclose the constitutional challenge to Presidential Decree No. 1866; held that the third paragraph of Section 1 is neither a bill of attainder nor a source of double jeopardy.
• Provincial Board of Cebu vs. Presiding Judge of Cebu, CFI, Br. IV, G.R. No. 34695, March 7, 1989 (171 SCRA 1) — Cited for the rule of statutory construction that unambiguous statutory language leaves no room for construction.
• U.S. vs. Jose and Tan Bo, 34 Phil. 724 (1916) — Cited for the requirement of animus possidendi in illegal possession cases; mere finding of the prohibited item on the premises does not suffice when others had access.
• People vs. Lo Ho Wing, G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991 (193 SCRA 122) — Cited for the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.
• Guazon vs. De Villa — Cited as one of the cases holding warrantless searches illegal where the officials had every opportunity to secure a search warrant.
• People vs. Aminnudin, G.R. No. L-74869, July 6, 1988 (163 SCRA 402) — Cited for the same principle that warrantless searches are illegal when a warrant could have been obtained.
• Alih vs. Castro, G.R. No. L-69401, June 23, 1987 (151 SCRA 279) — Cited for the same principle.
• People vs. Cendana, G.R. No. 84715, October 17, 1990 (190 SCRA 538) — Cited for the rule that objects seized as products of illegal searches are inadmissible in the criminal action.
• Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 689-690 (1986) — Cited for the exclusionary principle: illegally confiscated articles cannot be used as evidence against the accused.

• Article III, Section 2, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the right against unreasonable searches and seizures; applied to invalidate the warrantless search and exclude the seized articles.
• Presidential Decree No. 1866, Section 1 (third paragraph) — Penalizes illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in furtherance of rebellion; constitutionality upheld; not repealed by Republic Act No. 6968.
• Republic Act No. 6968 — Penalizes rebellion, coup d'etat, sedition, and disloyalty; held to be a distinct offense from illegal possession of firearms under Presidential Decree No. 1866, so it did not repeal the latter.
• Rule 65, Rules of Court — Governs the original petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition; the certiorari and mandamus aspects became moot, leaving the prohibition aspect for resolution.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, and Bellosillo, JJ., concurred. Nocon, J., was on leave.