Spouses Tayamen vs. People

An Information charging Estafa under Article 316(2) of the Revised Penal Code must allege that the offender made an express representation that the real property is free from encumbrance; the failure to allege this essential element renders the Information defective and the accused cannot be convicted of the crime charged. The issue of an Information failing to charge an offense may be raised at any stage of the proceedings and may even be taken up by the Court motu proprio on appeal, notwithstanding the accused's failure to move to quash before arraignment.

The petitioners, Spouses Ricardo Tayamen, Jr. and Carmelita Tayamen, were charged with Estafa under Article 316(2) of the Revised Penal Code before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. The charge arose from an alleged scheme involving the sale of a 120-square meter parcel of land in Dasmariñas, Cavite to two different buyers. The constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, as enshrined in Article III, Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution, and the requirement under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court that the acts or omissions constituting the offense be alleged in the Information, formed the legal backdrop for the dispute over the sufficiency of the Information.

On March 16, 2011, petitioners sold to private complainant Ma. Mildred G. Bangit a 120-square meter parcel of land located in Barangay Palapala, Dasmariñas, Cavite, then covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1028878, for P800,000.00. Despite full payment of the purchase price, petitioners failed to surrender the title to Bangit. Due to Bangit's repeated demands, petitioners issued an undertaking dated December 22, 2011 to turn over the title to Bangit, but they reneged on their promise.

Upon inquiry with the Registry of Deeds of Cavite, Bangit discovered that petitioners had subsequently sold the subject parcel of land to Spouses Margarito and Virginia Pacia on February 29, 2012. Aggrieved, Bangit demanded the return of the P800,000.00 from petitioners. Upon their failure to return the purchase price, Bangit filed a complaint for Estafa against them. The parties entered into a settlement covering the obligation subject of the case as well as other loans obtained by petitioners from Bangit. Upon the issuance of several checks by Carmelita, Bangit issued an Affidavit of Desistance and the case for Estafa was dismissed. However, the checks issued as payments were dishonored, prompting Bangit to revive the case.

Petitioners admitted to knowing Bangit and acknowledged previous loans obtained from her. However, they alleged that the Deed of Sale in favor of Bangit and the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Spouses Pacia were both falsified. The Officers of the Clerk of Court of the RTCs of Manila and Trece Martirez issued certifications stating that the two deeds of sale were not among the notarized documents submitted to their offices by the notaries public concerned, Atty. Ronald Segundino C. Ching and Atty. Wilfredo A. Ruiz, respectively. Petitioners likewise denied the due execution of the promissory notes and certifications, claiming they were merely coerced to execute the same to acknowledge their obligation to Bangit. Carmelita acknowledged the Manifestation purporting to reflect the terms of the parties' agreement before the Office of the City Prosecutor, but she denied the alterations and markings reflected therein.

The Information dated December 3, 2013 charged petitioners with disposing/conveying the parcel of land in favor of Margarito G. Pacia for P800,000.00 pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale, knowing fully well that they had previously encumbered the property by way of another deed of sale dated March 16, 2011 in favor of Bangit for the same amount. The Information did not allege that petitioners made an express representation in the second Deed of Sale that the subject real property was free from any encumbrance.

• Insufficiency of the Information: Petitioners contended that the Information filed against them was fatally defective because it failed to state all the elements of the crime of Estafa under Article 316(2) of the RPC, particularly, that there was an express representation by petitioners that the real property was free from encumbrance.
• Forgery of Deeds: Petitioners reiterated their claim that the subject Deeds of Sale were spurious, supported by certifications from the Officers of the Clerk of Court of the RTCs of Manila and Trece Martirez stating that the deeds were not among the notarized documents submitted by the notaries public concerned.

• Waiver of Defect: The prosecution argued that the defect raised by petitioners is merely a formal defect which can be rectified by amendment of the Information, and that petitioners' failure to question the defect before their arraignment and their participation in the proceedings before the trial court bar them from raising the issue on appeal.
• Nature of Deceit: The prosecution claimed that the law on Estafa does not distinguish whether the deceit was committed during the first or subsequent disposition of the same real property.

• Sufficiency of the Information: Whether petitioners can still question the sufficiency of the Information on the ground that it failed to charge an offense.
• Guilt for Estafa: Whether the CA gravely erred in finding petitioners guilty of the crime of Estafa under Article 316(2) of the RPC.

• Sufficiency of the Information: Yes. The issue of an Information failing to charge an offense may be raised at any stage of the proceedings and may even be taken up by the Court motu proprio on appeal, pursuant to Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which provides that failure to move to quash is not deemed a waiver of objections based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
• Guilt for Estafa: No. The Information failed to charge an offense because it did not allege that petitioners made an express representation in the second Deed of Sale that the subject real property was free from any encumbrance, which is an essential element of Estafa under Article 316(2) of the RPC. A person cannot be convicted of a crime not charged in the body of the Information.

• Sufficiency of the Information: Under Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, an accused may move to quash an Information before arraignment on grounds including that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. While failure to assert such grounds before pleading is generally deemed a waiver, Section 9, Rule 117 provides exceptions for grounds under paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3. The Court applied the ruling in Naya vs. Sps. Abing, which held that an appeal of a criminal case throws the case wide open for review and the appellate court is mandated to rule on any error, whether assigned or not. Thus, the issue of an Information failing to charge an offense may be raised at any stage and may even be taken up by the Court motu proprio on appeal. The Court found merit in petitioners' position notwithstanding their failure to quash the Information before arraignment, their entry of a plea, and their active participation in the proceedings before the RTC.

• Guilt for Estafa: The Court enumerated the essential elements of Estafa under Article 316(2) of the RPC: (1) that the thing disposed of be real property; (2) that the offender knew that the real property was encumbered, whether the encumbrance is recorded or not; (3) that there must be express representation by the offender that the real property is free from encumbrance; and (4) that the act of disposing of the real property be made to the damage of another. The Court emphasized that Article 316(2) does not prohibit the sale of an encumbered real property; criminal liability is brought about by the deceit in the selling of the property where the seller expressly represented that such real property is free from any encumbrance. A cursory reading of the questioned Information showed no allegation that petitioners made an express representation in the second Deed of Sale with Margarito G. Pacia that the subject real property was free from any encumbrance. Applying Naya and Estrellado-Mainar vs. People, the Court held that the MeTC committed reversible error in convicting petitioners, and the RTC and CA likewise erred in affirming the ruling. The Court further held that the award of civil liability ex contractu cannot be awarded in a criminal case where the elements of the crime were not duly proven. Citing Dy vs. People, the Court declared that civil liability ex delicto survives an acquittal for failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, but the mandatory fusion of civil and criminal actions is limited to civil liability ex delicto and does not include civil liability arising from a different source of obligation, such as a contract. Since there was no crime of Estafa, there was no delict, and the award of civil liability ex delicto could not be imposed; a separate civil action must be instituted by Bangit to claim civil liability ex contractu.

• Sufficiency of the Information — Every element composing an offense must be duly alleged in the Information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be alleged must be determined by reference to the definition and essential elements of the specific crimes. The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the facts alleged in the Information, not by the title or designation of the offense contained in the caption. A person cannot be convicted of a crime not charged in the body of the Information. In this case, the Information failed to allege the essential element of express representation that the property was free from encumbrance, rendering it defective.

• Waiver of Objections to the Information — Under Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before pleading shall be deemed a waiver of any objections, except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of the Rule. The ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense is among the exceptions, and thus the issue may be raised at any stage of the proceedings and may even be taken up by the Court motu proprio on appeal.

• Civil Liability Ex Delicto vs. Ex Contractu — Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable, and this civil liability ex delicto may be recovered through a civil action deemed instituted with the criminal action. However, this mandatory fusion is limited to civil liability ex delicto and does not include civil liability arising from a different source of obligation, such as a contract. Where the civil liability is ex contractu, the court hearing the criminal case has no authority to award damages. A finding that the source of obligation is a contract negates estafa, and any finding that the source of obligation is a contract means there is no civil liability ex delicto.

• "However, there is no allegation in the Information that petitioner expressly represented in the sale of the subject property to William Po that the said property was free from any encumbrance. Irrefragably, then, petitioner was not charged with estafa under Article 316, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code." — This passage, quoted from Naya v. Sps. Abing, articulates the controlling principle that the absence of the allegation of express representation renders the Information defective and prevents conviction for Estafa under Article 316(2).

• "It bears stressing that a person cannot be convicted of a crime not charged in the body of the Information." — This statement states the fundamental due process principle underlying the Court's reversal of the conviction, emphasizing that the Information defines the charge and the accused cannot be convicted of an offense not alleged therein.

• "When the court finds that the source of obligation is in fact, a contract, as in a contract of loan, it takes a position completely inconsistent with the presence of estafa. In estafa, a person parts with his money because of abuse of confidence or deceit. In a contract, a person willingly binds himself or herself to give something or to render some service." — This passage, quoted from Dy v. People, explains the distinction between civil liability ex delicto and ex contractu, supporting the Court's deletion of the civil award and the directive to file a separate civil action.

• Naya vs. Sps. Abing, 446 Phil. 484 (2003) — Controlling precedent. The Court applied this case to hold that the issue of an Information failing to charge an offense may be raised at any stage of the proceedings and may even be taken up by the Court motu proprio on appeal, and that the absence of an allegation of express representation that the property was free from encumbrance renders the Information defective.

• Estrellado-Mainar vs. People, 765 Phil. 21 (2015) — Followed. The Court applied the ruling in Naya to acquit the accused where the Information and the Agreement to Buy and Sell did not contain any representation that the property being sold was free from any encumbrance.

• Dy vs. People, 792 Phil. 672 (2016) — Followed. The Court relied on this case to settle the matter of civil liability in Estafa cases, upholding the rulings in Pantig and Singson that civil liability ex contractu cannot be awarded in a criminal case where the elements of the crime were not duly proven.

• People vs. Pantig, 97 Phil. 748 (1955) — Followed. Cited for the principle that whenever the elements of Estafa were not duly proven, any civil liability arising from the Estafa cannot be awarded in the criminal case because the civil liability arising from the contract is not civil liability ex delicto.

• People vs. Singson, 290 Phil. 9 (1992) — Followed. Cited alongside Pantig for the same principle regarding civil liability in Estafa cases.

• Eusebio-Calderon vs. People, 484 Phil. 87 (2004) — Distinguished. Cited as one of the cases where the Court declared that despite acquittal for failure to prove fraud or deceit, the accused may still be held civilly liable for delivery of personal property made pursuant to a contract; this line of cases was settled by Dy.

• People vs. Cuyugan, 440 Phil. 637 (2002) — Distinguished. Cited alongside Eusebio-Calderon for the same proposition, which was subsequently settled by Dy.

• Herrera vs. Court of Appeals, 427 Phil. 576 (2002) — Cited to support the proposition that the accused can still assail the sufficiency of the Information on the ground that it charges no offense even after arraignment.

• People vs. Solar, G.R. No. 225595, August 6, 2019 — Cited to support the proposition that petitioners are deemed to have waived only the waivable defects in the Information, which do not include the allegation that the Information failed to charge an offense.

• Garcia vs. People, 457 Phil. 713 (2003) — Cited for the principle that what facts and circumstances are necessary to be alleged in the Information must be determined by reference to the definition and essential elements of the specific crimes.

• Article 316(2), Revised Penal Code — The provision defining and penalizing the crime of Estafa with which petitioners were charged. The Court held that the essential elements include an express representation by the offender that the real property is free from encumbrance, which must be alleged in the Information.

• Section 3, Rule 117, Rules of Court — Lists the grounds for a motion to quash, including that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. The Court applied this provision to determine whether the Information was defective.

• Section 9, Rule 117, Rules of Court — Provides that failure to move to quash is deemed a waiver of objections except those based on grounds under paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3. The Court applied this provision to hold that the ground that the Information failed to charge an offense is not waived.

• Section 6, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Requires that a complaint or Information state the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. The Court applied this provision to determine the sufficiency of the Information.

• Article III, Section 14(2), 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the accused's right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The Court cited this provision as the constitutional basis for requiring that all elements of the offense be alleged in the Information.

Gesmundo, C.J., Leonen (Chairperson), Hernando, and Inting, JJ., concurred in the decision.