Spouses Rodolfo and Sylvia Cabico vs. Judge Evelyn L. Dimaculangan-Querijero

Payment of civil liability and an affidavit of desistance do not extinguish criminal liability or justify the dismissal of a criminal action already instituted in court; a judge who dismisses a criminal case on such grounds, and despite lack of jurisdiction over the person of an accused, is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Judicial office demands proficiency in basic laws and procedural rules, and unfamiliarity with such rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law and a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Complainants Rodolfo and Sylvia Cabico are the parents of AAA, the 17-year-old victim in Criminal Case No. 10383-AF, a rape case pending before the sala of respondent Judge Evelyn L. Dimaculangan-Querijero, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 26. The case involved three accused—Edwin Azarcon y Macabante, Rayshawn dela Rosa, and Rodrigo Nadora, Jr.—with only Azarcon in detention while Dela Rosa and Nadora were at large. Republic Act No. 8353 had reclassified rape as a crime against persons, and the Code of Judicial Conduct supplied the ethical standards governing judicial competence, impartiality, and courtesy.

Complainants Rodolfo and Sylvia Cabico are the parents of AAA, the 17-year-old rape victim in Criminal Case No. 10383-AF then pending before respondent Judge Evelyn L. Dimaculangan-Querijero, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 26. Of the three accused—Edwin Azarcon y Macabante, Rayshawn dela Rosa, and Rodrigo Nadora, Jr.—only Azarcon was detained, while Dela Rosa and Nadora were at large.

At the hearing on 12 October 2001, complainants' counsel manifested in open court that no settlement of the case would be pursued because one Atty. Ildefonso J. Cruz had informed him that the remaining amount for the settlement of the case would not be given to complainants. Respondent Judge then called Sylvia Cabico and, according to complainants, angrily uttered in a loud voice: "Mrs. Cabico, isauli mo ang lahat ng pera nila, ngayon din at ‘di puwedeng hindi, ngayon din." Complainants alleged that the utterance caused Sylvia Cabico great embarrassment and violated Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

After the trial was reset to 9 November 2001, someone called complainants and ordered them to appear before Atty. Fraizerwin Viterbo, Clerk of Court of the trial court. At his office, Atty. Viterbo ordered complainants and the victim to sign an Affidavit of Desistance and warned them, "Hindi maaari na di kayo pumirma at magagalit ang judge sa inyo." When they refused, Atty. Viterbo allegedly uttered, "Maaari naman kayong kumuha ng ibang abogado at maaari ninyong palitan maski ilan. Ang totoo niyan ay ubra naming pawalan ‘yan wala kayong magagawa." Atty. Viterbo then went inside the chambers and informed respondent Judge about the refusal. Respondent Judge came out of her chambers and, in a loud and angry voice, allegedly uttered: "Misis, bakit ayaw mong pumirma. Sige, huwag mo ng asahan na masisingil mo pa si Nadora. Didismisin ko ang lahat ang tatlo na iyan. Pumunta ka ng Batangas at doon mo pabistahan si Nadora. Mas takot kayo sa abogado ninyo kaysa sa akin."

On the same day, 12 October 2001, despite the absence of an affidavit of desistance, respondent Judge issued an order stating that because the private complainant had received the balance of the full amount of ₱50,000.00 from accused Rayshawn dela Rosa and ₱50,000.00 from accused Edwin Azarcon as payment for the civil liability, and because she was no longer interested in the criminal aspect, the case was dismissed with prejudice against both accused. The order directed the immediate release of Edwin Azarcon and the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Rodrigo Nadora, Jr., alias "Johny," who was still at large. Azarcon was released from detention. Complainants asserted that the order showed gross ignorance of the law because criminal actions cannot be compromised and the trial court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Dela Rosa, and that respondent Judge violated Canon 2, Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct by showing partiality in favor of the accused.

Respondent Judge offered a different account. She claimed the complaint arose from the machination and prodding of Atty. Carlito Inton, whom she described as an ambulance chaser and a perennial loser in Nueva Ecija politics, to get even with her after he lost a Petition for Habeas Corpus tried in her sala. She stated that before Atty. Inton entered his appearance on 26 September 2001, Mrs. Cabico and her daughter had manifested that Azarcon had already paid ₱47,500.00 leaving a balance of ₱2,500.00, and Dela Rosa had paid ₱49,000.00 leaving a balance of ₱1,000.00, and that the private complainant was no longer interested in the penal aspect of the case. She asserted that Atty. Inton advised the private complainant and Mrs. Cabico not to obey the court's order to execute an affidavit of desistance upon receipt of the balances, assuring them that they could demand more money and still proceed with trial. On 12 October 2001, the balances of ₱2,500.00 from Azarcon and ₱1,000.00 from Dela Rosa were paid, but the private complainant refused to sign the Pag-uurong ng Habla. Respondent Judge denied acting emotionally and claimed she stated: "Mrs. Cabico, kung gusto ninyong matuloy ang bista ay isauli ninyo ang perang ibinigay ng mga akusado at ngayon din ay bibistahan ang kaso kung handa ang inyong testigo." She maintained that the statement would not produce embarrassment, that no prosecutor objected, and that Mrs. Cabico was presumably embarrassed because she could no longer return the ₱100,000.00, as Atty. Inton had collected ₱43,000.00 from that amount.

Respondent Judge also admitted that due to heavy pressure of work she had an oversight regarding Dela Rosa, who was already under the court's jurisdiction. She stated that in the hearing of 21 November 2001 she motu proprio ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Dela Rosa; Dela Rosa voluntarily submitted himself to the court and was arraigned on 23 November 2001, while Nadora, previously at large, voluntarily submitted and was arraigned on 21 November 2001. On 23 November 2001, the private complainant finally signed a Salaysay ng Pag-uurong ng Habla and testified thereon, and the court issued an order dismissing the case. Respondent Judge asserted that she applied Section 2(a), Rule 18 of the Rules of Court and that she never acted in a harsh and oppressive manner. In their reply, complainants asserted that respondent Judge acted with malice because she issued her 12 October 2001 order without the consent of both the public prosecutor and the victim, and that perjured witnesses executed the affidavits she submitted. The OCA found merit in the charge, noting that the filing of an affidavit of desistance does not ipso facto make a criminal case dismissible, that respondent Judge committed gross ignorance of the law in dismissing the case with prejudice after payment of civil liability, and that her partiality was apparent from her haste in dismissing the complaint despite the refusal to sign the affidavit and before Dela Rosa had been arraigned.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law: Complainants argued that respondent Judge showed gross ignorance of the law because criminal actions cannot be compromised, payment of civil liability does not extinguish criminal liability, and the trial court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Dela Rosa when it dismissed the case with prejudice.
• Partiality: Complainants maintained that respondent Judge violated Canon 2, Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct by showing partiality in favor of the accused when she dismissed the criminal case despite the absence of an affidavit of desistance and the refusal of the victim and Sylvia Cabico to sign one.
• Discourtesy and Abuse of Authority: Complainants asserted that respondent Judge's angry and loud utterances toward Sylvia Cabico during the 12 October 2001 hearing caused embarrassment and violated Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
• Coercion to Sign an Affidavit of Desistance: Complainants alleged that Atty. Viterbo ordered them and the victim to sign an Affidavit of Desistance, warned them that the judge would be angry if they refused, and that respondent Judge threatened dismissal of the case when they continued to refuse.

• Motive and Harassment: Respondent Judge countered that the administrative complaint arose from the machination and prodding of Atty. Carlito Inton, who wanted to get even with her after losing a Petition for Habeas Corpus in her sala, and that Atty. Inton was an ambulance chaser and a perennial political loser.
• Settlement and Desistance: Respondent Judge argued that before Atty. Inton appeared, complainants had manifested that Azarcon and Dela Rosa had paid most of their civil liability and that the private complainant was no longer interested in the penal aspect; Atty. Inton then advised them not to execute the affidavit of desistance, and on 12 October 2001 the balances were paid but the private complainant refused to sign the Pag-uurong ng Habla.
• No Discourtesy: Respondent Judge maintained that she did not act emotionally and that her statement was "Mrs. Cabico, kung gusto ninyong matuloy ang bista ay isauli ninyo ang perang ibinigay ng mga akusado at ngayon din ay bibistahan ang kaso kung handa ang inyong testigo"; she claimed the statement was made in good faith and would not produce embarrassment.
• Jurisdiction Oversight: Respondent Judge admitted an oversight regarding Dela Rosa's jurisdiction due to heavy pressure of work, but asserted that she rectified it by motu proprio ordering a warrant of arrest on 21 November 2001, after which Dela Rosa and Nadora voluntarily submitted and were arraigned.
• Rule 18 Reliance: Respondent Judge asserted that in disposing of the case she applied Section 2(a), Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which requires courts to consider the possibility of amicable settlement or submission to alternative modes of resolution.
• No Harsh or Oppressive Conduct: Respondent Judge denied acting in a harsh and oppressive manner and claimed that she knows a judge is under the sanction of law.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law: Whether respondent Judge is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law in dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 10384-AF and 10383-AF with prejudice after the accused paid their civil liability and despite the absence of an affidavit of desistance and jurisdiction over Dela Rosa.
• Partiality: Whether respondent Judge showed partiality in favor of the accused in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
• Discourtesy: Whether respondent Judge's utterances during the 12 October 2001 hearing violated Rule 3.04 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
• Penalty: Whether a fine of ₱21,000 is the proper penalty for respondent Judge's administrative liability.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law: Yes. Payment of civil liability does not extinguish criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code, and an affidavit of desistance does not by itself justify dismissal once the criminal action has been instituted; dismissing the case on those grounds was gross ignorance of the law.
• Partiality: Yes. Respondent Judge showed partiality in favor of the accused by dismissing the criminal case despite the victim's and Sylvia Cabico's refusal to sign the affidavit of desistance and before Dela Rosa had been arraigned.
• Discourtesy: Yes. Respondent Judge's statements toward Sylvia Cabico were unbecoming and violated Rule 3.04 of Canon 3, which requires judges to be patient, attentive, and courteous to litigants.
• Penalty: A fine of ₱21,000 is proper. Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious charge under Rule 140, Section 8(9) of the Rules of Court, as amended, penalized by dismissal, suspension, or a fine ranging from above ₱20,000 to ₱40,000.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law: The dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 10384-AF and 10383-AF with prejudice after Dela Rosa and Azarcon paid their individual civil liability was in utter disregard and gross ignorance of the law because payment of civil liability does not extinguish criminal liability. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code lists the grounds for total extinction of criminal liability, and Article 94 lists the grounds for partial extinction; payment of civil liability is not among them. The victim's affidavit of desistance could not have justified dismissal. Republic Act No. 8353 reclassified rape as a crime against persons, so any public prosecutor may prosecute the offender even without the complaint of the victim or her parents or guardian. Even if the affidavit of desistance were considered, it would not justify dismissal because, by itself, an affidavit of desistance or pardon is not a ground for dismissal once the action has been instituted in court; here, the victim's so-called pardon came after the institution of the action. The victim had already lost the right or absolute privilege to decide whether the rape charge should proceed. When a law or rule is basic, a judge owes it to the office to simply apply it; anything less is gross ignorance of the law. A judge is expected to keep abreast with and be proficient in the interpretation of laws and to be acquainted with legal norms, statutes, and procedural rules. Respondent Judge failed to live up to these standards.
• Partiality: Respondent Judge violated Rule 2.01 of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides that a judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. She showed partiality in favor of the accused when she issued her 12 October 2001 order dismissing the criminal case because Dela Rosa and Azarcon had paid their civil liability and the private complainant was no longer interested in the criminal aspect. The record showed that on the same day the dismissal order was issued, complainant Sylvia Cabico and the victim had refused to sign the affidavit of desistance prepared for them. Respondent Judge also dismissed with prejudice the criminal case against Dela Rosa even when he had not been arraigned, and by her own admission she made an oversight regarding his jurisdiction; she later ordered a warrant of arrest against him on 21 November 2001. These actuations betrayed gross ignorance of procedural rules. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired by arrest. Rule 3.01 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence; unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence, and utter lack of familiarity with the rules erodes public confidence in the competence of courts. Basic rules of procedure must be at the palm of a judge's hands. When the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law; when inefficiency springs from failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, law, or principle in the discharge of duties, the judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position or too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.
• Discourtesy: Respondent Judge's discourtesy in insulting Sylvia Cabico during the 12 October 2001 hearing could not be countenanced. Her statement was unbecoming a judge, and her behavior toward Sylvia Cabico betrayed impatience in the conduct of the hearing. A display of petulance and impatience in the conduct of a trial is incompatible with the needful attitude and sobriety of a good judge. Respondent Judge's actuations violated Rule 3.04 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires a judge to be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court, and to avoid falling into the attitude that litigants are made for the courts instead of the courts for the litigants. She failed to observe courtesy and civility to the litigants who appeared before her.
• Penalty: Respondent Judge's reliance on Section 2(a), Rule 18 of the Rules of Court in disposing of the criminal case was misplaced. While the effort to hasten the resolution of cases is commendable, that task should not be done in utter disregard of the rudiments of law and procedure. The duty to dispose of court business promptly and to decide cases within the reglementary periods must be consistent with faithful compliance with the prescribed procedures. The avowed purpose of acting on cases as early as possible does not justify even the slightest abuse of judicial authority and discretion or excuse due observance of the basic elements of the rule of law. A judge must render justice without resorting to uncalled for shortcuts. Under Rule 140, Section 8(9) of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge and penalized with dismissal, suspension, or a fine ranging from above ₱20,000 to ₱40,000. Under the circumstances, a fine of ₱21,000 was in order.

• Payment of civil liability does not extinguish criminal liability — Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code exhaustively list the grounds for total and partial extinction of criminal liability, and payment of civil liability is not among them. The Court applied this doctrine in finding respondent Judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law for dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 10384-AF and 10383-AF with prejudice after Dela Rosa and Azarcon paid their individual civil liability.
• Affidavit of desistance does not by itself justify dismissal of a criminal action — Once a criminal action has been instituted in court, an affidavit of desistance or pardon by the victim is not a ground for dismissal. Republic Act No. 8353 reclassified rape as a crime against persons, allowing any public prosecutor to prosecute the offender even without the complaint of the victim or her parents or guardian. The Court held that the victim's affidavit of desistance, even if considered, could not justify the dismissal of the rape cases.
• Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired by arrest — A court cannot validly dismiss with prejudice a criminal case against an accused over whose person it has not acquired jurisdiction. Respondent Judge dismissed the case against Dela Rosa even though he had not been arraigned, and she admitted an oversight regarding his jurisdiction; the Court found this to be gross ignorance of procedural rules.
• Gross ignorance of the law — When a law or rule is basic, a judge owes it to the office to simply apply it, and anything less is gross ignorance of the law. A judge must be proficient in the interpretation of laws and acquainted with legal norms, statutes, and procedural rules; unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence. The Court found respondent Judge liable for gross ignorance of the law for dismissing the criminal cases on grounds not recognized by law and for failing to observe basic procedural rules.
• Judicial impartiality and courtesy — Canon 2, Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to behave at all times so as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, while Canon 3, Rule 3.04 requires a judge to be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. Respondent Judge violated these standards by showing partiality in favor of the accused and by insulting Sylvia Cabico during the hearing.
• Prompt disposition of cases must comply with law and procedure — The duty to dispose of court business promptly and to decide cases within the reglementary periods must be consistent with faithful compliance with prescribed procedures. The purpose of acting on cases early does not justify abuse of judicial authority or excuse observance of the basic elements of the rule of law, and a judge must render justice without uncalled for shortcuts. Respondent Judge's reliance on Section 2(a), Rule 18 of the Rules of Court was misplaced.

• "There is no question that on 12 October 2001, respondent Judge dismissed with prejudice Criminal Case Nos. 10384-AF and 10383-AF against Dela Rosa and Azarcon after they had paid their individual civil liability. This is in utter disregard and in gross ignorance of the law, for payment of civil liability does not extinguish criminal liability." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the principal charge: payment of civil liability is not a legal ground for dismissing a criminal case, and dismissing on that basis constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
• "By itself, an affidavit of desistance or pardon is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, once the action has been instituted in court." — This is the Court's canonical formulation of the rule on affidavits of desistance, applied to reject the dismissal of the rape cases even though the victim later signed a Salaysay ng Pag-uurong ng Habla.
• "Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired by arrest." — This statement supplies the procedural rule violated when respondent Judge dismissed the case against Dela Rosa with prejudice before he had been arraigned or arrested.
• "When the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law." — This passage articulates the standard for gross ignorance of the law and supports the penalty imposed on respondent Judge for failing to apply basic legal and procedural rules.

• People vs. Ramirez, Jr., G.R. Nos. 150079-80, 10 June 2004, 431 SCRA 666 — Cited for the rule that an affidavit of desistance or pardon does not by itself justify dismissal once the criminal action has been instituted in court.
• People vs. Montes, 461 Phil. 563 (2003) — Cited together with Ramirez and Trelles to support the rule that an affidavit of desistance is not a ground for dismissing a criminal action already instituted.
• People vs. Trelles, 395 Phil. 38 (2000) — Cited for the same rule on the effect of an affidavit of desistance or pardon on a criminal action already filed in court.
• Almonte vs. Bien, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1532, 27 June 2005, 461 SCRA 218 — Cited for the principle that when a law or rule is basic, a judge owes it to the office to simply apply it, and anything less is gross ignorance of the law.
• Jamora vs. Bersales, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1529, 16 December 2004, 447 SCRA 20 — Cited to support the standard that a judge owes the public and the court proficiency in the law and must be acquainted with legal norms, statutes, and procedural rules.
• Pesayco vs. Layague, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1889, 22 December 2004, 447 SCRA 450 — Cited for the rule that when inefficiency springs from failure to consider a basic and elemental rule, law, or principle, the judge is either too incompetent or too vicious, and the oversight may be deliberate bad faith and grave abuse of judicial authority.
• Almojuela, Jr. vs. Ringor, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1521, 27 July 2004, 435 SCRA 261 — Cited together with Pesayco for the standard on gross ignorance of the law and judicial incompetence.
• The Officers and Members of the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter vs. Pamintuan, 464 Phil. 900 (2004) — Cited for the principle that a display of petulance and impatience in the conduct of a trial is incompatible with the needful attitude and sobriety of a good judge.
• Torres vs. Villanueva, 387 Phil. 516 (2000) — Cited for the rule that the duty to dispose of court business promptly must be consistent with faithful compliance with prescribed procedures.
• Zuño vs. Cabebe, A.M. OCA No. 03-1800-RTJ, 26 November 2004, 444 SCRA 382 — Cited for the principle that a judge must render justice without resorting to uncalled for shortcuts.
• Fortune Life Insurance, Co., Inc. vs. Luczon, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-05-1901, 30 November 2006 — Cited in connection with the penalty for gross ignorance of the law under Rule 140, Section 8(9) of the Rules of Court.
• Rockland Construction Co., Inc. vs. Singzon, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-06-2002, 24 November 2006 — Cited together with Fortune Life for the classification and penalty of gross ignorance of the law or procedure as a serious charge.

• Article 89, Revised Penal Code — Enumerates the grounds for total extinction of criminal liability, which do not include payment of civil liability. The Court cited it to show that respondent Judge had no legal basis to dismiss the criminal cases after the accused paid their civil liability.
• Article 94, Revised Penal Code — Enumerates the grounds for partial extinction of criminal liability, which likewise do not include payment of civil liability. The Court used it to reinforce that the dismissal was gross ignorance of the law.
• Section 2, Republic Act No. 8353 — Reclassified rape as a crime against persons, allowing any public prosecutor to prosecute the offender even without the complaint of the victim or her parents or guardian. The Court cited it to reject the affidavit of desistance as a basis for dismissing the rape cases.
• Rule 113, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired by arrest. The Court applied it in finding that respondent Judge acted improperly in dismissing the case against Dela Rosa before he had been arraigned or arrested.
• Section 2(a), Rule 18, Rules of Court — Requires the court to consider the possibility of an amicable settlement or submission to alternative modes of dispute resolution. The Court held that respondent Judge's reliance on this provision was misplaced because it does not authorize dismissal of a criminal case contrary to law and procedure.
• Rule 140, Section 8(9), Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC — Classifies gross ignorance of the law or procedure as a serious charge penalized with dismissal, suspension, or a fine ranging from above ₱20,000 to ₱40,000. The Court used it as the basis for imposing a ₱21,000 fine.
• Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Code of Judicial Conduct — Requires a judge to behave at all times so as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The Court found respondent Judge violated it by showing partiality in favor of the accused.
• Canon 3, Rule 3.01, Code of Judicial Conduct — Mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. The Court cited it in holding that respondent Judge's unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court was a sign of incompetence.
• Canon 3, Rule 3.04, Code of Judicial Conduct — Requires a judge to be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. The Court found respondent Judge violated it by insulting Sylvia Cabico during the hearing.

Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno; Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing; Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago; Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez; Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez; Justice Renato C. Corona; Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.; Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna; Justice Dante O. Tinga; Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario; Justice Cancio C. Garcia; Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura concurred.