Spouses Ricardo and Leonila de los Santos vs. Ma. Socorro V. Vda. de Mangubat, et al.

The "fresh period rule" in Neypes vs. Court of Appeals is a procedural rule that applies retroactively to pending actions, allowing a party whose motion for reconsideration is denied to file a notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the order denying the motion; procedural technicalities may be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice.

Private respondents are the registered owners of Lot No. 1033 in Sta. Cruz, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, while petitioners' house stands on Lot No. 1034 immediately east of it. Private respondents claim a permanent right of way over a strip of Lot No. 1034 under a notarized Deed of Assignment of Right of Way dated July 24, 1991. The dispute implicated the Rules of Court on appeal periods, the requirement that verification and non-forum shopping certification be signed by the principal party, the general rule requiring a motion for reconsideration before certiorari, and the Neypes "fresh period rule" later adopted by the Supreme Court.

Private respondents are the registered owners of Lot No. 1033 located in Sta. Cruz, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, with an area of 793 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 61.279. Located east of Lot No. 1033 is Lot No. 1034, where the house of petitioners is erected, with an area of 530 square meters and covered by Tax Declaration No. 18929 in the name of a certain Elena San Jose. In front of Lot No. 1034 is the provincial road.

On June 5, 1998, private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan, a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 442-M-98. In their Complaint, private respondents alleged that they could not reach the public road without using and passing upon a portion of Lot No. 1034, as it was the nearest and shortest passageway; that the alleged owners of Lot No. 1034 executed a duly notarized Deed of Assignment of Right of Way dated July 24, 1991 conveying a strip of Lot No. 1034 in favor of private respondents to be used as a permanent right of way; and that sometime in June 1998, petitioners, without any authority over the strip of land, deliberately placed sand and gravel along the passageway, violating the right of way and causing irreparable damage and injury to private respondents.

In their Answer dated June 22, 1998, petitioners denied liability. They alleged that the persons who executed the Deed of Assignment of Right of Way were neither the owners nor possessors of Lot No. 1034, and thus the Deed was null and void; that the Deed was executed because of the anticipation that Lot No. 1034 would be allotted to the assignors as their share in the estate of their ascendant, Pedro San Jose; that instead, Lot No. 1034 was inherited by petitioner Leonila de los Santos; and that private respondents could not demand the right of way because there was no proof that they had indemnified petitioners.

Trial ensued. On May 3, 2000, the RTC rendered its Decision granting a permanent right of way in favor of private respondents measuring 2.7 meters wide and 21 meters long, upon payment of the proper indemnification in the amount of ₱28,350.00, but denying private respondents' prayer for damages. Petitioners received a copy of the RTC Decision on May 12, 2000. On May 29, 2000, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration via registered mail. The RTC denied the motion in its Order dated July 19, 2000, which petitioners received on August 3, 2000. On August 15, 2000, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal. The RTC denied due course to the appeal in its Order dated August 17, 2000, holding that the Motion for Reconsideration was filed out of time and that the Notice of Appeal was likewise late.

Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 61394. On October 27, 2000, the CA dismissed the petition on two grounds: first, the verification and non-forum shopping certification were signed by petitioners' counsel, which is proscribed by law; and second, petitioners failed to file a Motion for Reconsideration before resorting to the petition for certiorari. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it on July 3, 2001. Hence, the present petition. On October 1, 2001, the Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order directing private respondents to refrain from executing the RTC Decision until further orders.

• Timeliness of Motion for Reconsideration: Petitioners argued that their Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Decision was timely filed; they received the Decision on May 12, 2000, and because the 15th day fell on May 27, 2000, a Saturday, their filing on the next working day, May 29, 2000, was proper.
• Timeliness of Notice of Appeal: Petitioners argued that their Notice of Appeal filed on August 15, 2000 was within the reglementary period; under the fresh period rule, they had 15 days from receipt of the July 19, 2000 Order denying their Motion for Reconsideration, which they received on August 3, 2000, and they filed only 12 days later.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion by the CA: Petitioners argued that the CA gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it dismissed their petition on technical considerations and effectively affirmed the RTC's order denying due course to their Notice of Appeal despite its timely filing.
• Right-of-Way Merits: Petitioners contended before the CA that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in granting a right of way that was more prejudicial and burdensome to the servient estate because an existing concrete residential building owned by third parties, who were never impleaded, obstructed the right of way.

• Timeliness of Motion for Reconsideration: Whether petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Decision was timely filed.
• Timeliness of Notice of Appeal: Whether petitioners' Notice of Appeal was timely filed under the "fresh period rule" in Neypes vs. Court of Appeals.
• Retroactivity of the Fresh Period Rule: Whether the "fresh period rule" may be applied retroactively to a pending action.
• Verification and Non-Forum Shopping Certification: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari because the verification and non-forum shopping certification were signed by petitioners' counsel rather than by petitioners.
• Prior Motion for Reconsideration: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari for failure to file a motion for reconsideration before resorting to certiorari.
• Proper Remedy and Liberal Application: Whether the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed with the Supreme Court, though an improper remedy and filed beyond the 15-day period for a petition for review under Rule 45, may be given due course in the interest of substantial justice.

• Timeliness of Motion for Reconsideration: Yes. The Motion for Reconsideration was timely filed; the last day fell on a Saturday, and filing on the next working day, May 29, 2000, was proper.
• Timeliness of Notice of Appeal: Yes. Under the fresh period rule, petitioners had 15 days from receipt of the order denying their Motion for Reconsideration on August 3, 2000; the Notice of Appeal filed on August 15, 2000 was timely.
• Retroactivity of the Fresh Period Rule: Yes. The fresh period rule is procedural and may be applied retroactively to pending actions, as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.
• Verification and Non-Forum Shopping Certification: No. The CA erred in dismissing the petition on this ground; verification is a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement, and the non-forum shopping certification rule may be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice.
• Prior Motion for Reconsideration: No. The CA erred in dismissing the petition for failure to file a motion for reconsideration; the rule admits exceptions and may be suspended when rigid application frustrates justice.
• Proper Remedy and Liberal Application: Yes. Although a Rule 65 petition is not the proper remedy and was filed beyond the Rule 45 period, the Court may relax procedural rules and treat the petition as one under Rule 45 in the interest of substantial justice.

• Timeliness of Motion for Reconsideration: The RTC Decision was received on May 12, 2000. The 15-day period to file a motion for reconsideration ended on May 27, 2000, which fell on a Saturday. Under the rules, the filing could be made on the next working day, May 29, 2000. Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration via registered mail on May 29, 2000. The RTC denied the motion on July 19, 2000, and petitioners received the denial on August 3, 2000. The Court proceeded on the basis that the motion was timely filed, thereby interrupting the appeal period and allowing the fresh period rule to apply.
• Timeliness of Notice of Appeal: Before Neypes, Section 3, Rule 41 required an appeal within 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order, and a timely motion for reconsideration interrupted the period. Under the old rule, petitioners should have filed their Notice of Appeal on August 4, 2000. They filed it on August 15, 2000. However, in Neypes, the Court established the fresh period rule: a party may file a notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration. Petitioners received the denial on August 3, 2000 and filed their Notice of Appeal on August 15, 2000, or 12 days later. Thus, the Notice of Appeal was timely under the fresh period rule.
• Retroactivity of the Fresh Period Rule: Procedural law prescribes rules and forms of procedure for the administration of justice. Procedural laws are not within the legal conception of retroactive laws and may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, because there are no vested rights in rules of procedure. The fresh period rule is procedural because it prescribes a fresh 15-day period within which to appeal after denial of a motion for reconsideration. It should therefore apply to the present case, which was pending when Neypes was decided. Denying petitioners its benefit would be unjust and absurd because their notices were issued later than those in Neypes.
• Verification and Non-Forum Shopping Certification: Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91, as amended by SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94, and Section 1, Rule 65 require the verification and certification of non-forum shopping to be signed by the plaintiff, petitioner, applicant, or principal party seeking relief, and failure to do so is a cause for dismissal. In this case, Atty. Eduardo G. Araullo, counsel for petitioners, signed both. However, in Pajuyo vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that verification is a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement and may be signed by a representative, lawyer, or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged. The rule on non-forum shopping certification has also been relaxed in several instances where procedural lapses are overlooked in the interest of substantial justice and for compelling reasons. Since the issues raised are proper subjects of appeal and the fresh period rule applies, the Court gave due course to the petition.
• Prior Motion for Reconsideration: The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration must be filed before a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. However, this rule admits exceptions. When the Rules of Procedure are applied rigidly and strictly, resulting in technicalities that frustrate rather than promote justice, the Court is empowered to suspend them. The Court found this case to be an instance where the rigid application of the rule on filing a motion for reconsideration before certiorari may be suspended to give way to the fresh period rule in Neypes.
• Proper Remedy and Liberal Application: A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not the proper remedy to reverse the CA's Resolutions; the proper remedy is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. While the Court may treat a Rule 65 petition as one filed under Rule 45 to serve the higher interest of justice, this liberal application does not apply if the petition is filed well beyond the reglementary period for a Rule 45 petition without any reason. Here, the petition was filed on the 60th day from receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration, beyond the 15-day period for a Rule 45 petition. Nevertheless, rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and the Supreme Court is empowered to suspend their operation when rigid application tends to frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice. Considering that petitioners are entitled to the fresh period rule, the Court relaxed the procedural rules and proceeded to determine the merits.

• Fresh Period Rule — A party may file a notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the RTC decision, or within a fresh 15-day period from receipt of the order denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. The fresh period is available only if such motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final after the original appeal period. The Court applied the rule to petitioners, who filed their Notice of Appeal 12 days after receiving the order denying their Motion for Reconsideration.
• Retroactivity of Procedural Laws — Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, because there are no vested rights in rules of procedure. The fresh period rule is procedural and was applied retroactively to the pending case.
• Relaxation of Procedural Rules — Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice; the Supreme Court may suspend their operation when rigid application tends to frustrate rather than promote justice. The Court relaxed the rules on verification, non-forum shopping certification, prior motion for reconsideration, and the proper mode of review.
• Verification as a Formal Requirement — Verification is a formal, not jurisdictional, requisite; it may be signed by a representative, lawyer, or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged. The Court excused the signing of the verification by petitioners' counsel.
• Non-Forum Shopping Certification — The certification must generally be signed by the principal party, but the rule has been relaxed in several instances where procedural lapses are overlooked in the interest of substantial justice and for compelling reasons. The Court excused the signing by counsel.
• Motion for Reconsideration before Certiorari — A motion for reconsideration is generally required before filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, but the rule admits exceptions and may be suspended when rigid application results in technicalities that frustrate justice. The Court suspended the rule in this case.

• "To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration." — This passage states the Neypes fresh period rule, the controlling doctrine applied by the Court.
• "Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statues - they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure." — This passage justifies the retroactive application of the fresh period rule to pending actions.
• "The 'fresh period rule' is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within which an appeal may be made in the event that the motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower court. Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the 'fresh period rule' should be applied to pending actions, such as the present case." — This passage applies the retroactivity principle to the case at bar.
• "Petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal on August 15, 2000 or 12 days from receipt of the Order denying their motion for reconsideration on August 3, 2000. Hence, following the 'fresh period rule,' the notice of appeal filed by petitioners may now be considered as having been filed well within the fresh period of 15 days." — This passage concludes that the Notice of Appeal was timely under the fresh period rule.

• Neypes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005, 469 SCRA 633 — Controlling precedent; established the fresh period rule, which the Court applied retroactively to the pending case.
• Pajuyo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146364, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 492 — Cited for the rule that verification is a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement and may be signed by a representative or lawyer who personally knows the facts.
• Office of the Ombudsman vs. Valera, G.R. No. 164250, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 715 — Cited for the relaxation of the non-forum shopping certification requirement.
• Caballes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163108, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 312 — Cited for the rule that a Rule 65 petition may be treated as a Rule 45 petition only if not filed beyond the reglementary period.
• Metro Rail Transit Corporation vs. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. 166273, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 562 — Cited for the Supreme Court's power to suspend procedural rules when rigid application frustrates justice.
• Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Republic, G.R. No. 160560, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 77 — Cited for the relaxation of mandatory procedural rules in the interest of substantial justice.
• Jamero vs. Melicor, G.R. No. 140929, May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 113 — Cited for the retroactivity of procedural laws.
• Lopez vs. Gloria, 40 Phil 28 (1919) — Cited for the definition of procedural law.

• Section 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court — Before Neypes, provided that appeal must be taken within 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from, and the period is interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. The Court used it to contrast the old rule with the fresh period rule.
• Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Requires the petition to be accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in Section 3, Rule 46. The CA dismissed the petition because the verification and certification were signed by counsel.
• Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91, as amended by SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94 — Provided that verification and certification of non-forum shopping must be signed by the plaintiff, petitioner, applicant, or principal party seeking relief, and failure to do so is a cause for dismissal. The Court relaxed this requirement.
• Section 13, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Cited in the certification that the conclusions of the Court were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion.

Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, and Ruben T. Reyes concurred. The Decision was attested by Consuelo Ynares-Santiago as Chairperson of the Third Division and certified by Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno.