SPOUSES REYNALDO AND HILLY G. SOMBILON vs. ATTY. REY FERDINAND GARAY AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

The issuance of a writ of possession in favor of a purchaser after the one-year redemption period has lapsed and title has been consolidated is a ministerial duty, and neither an assertion of invalidity of a subsequent sale to a third party nor an alleged violation of Article 1491 of the Civil Code can defeat the registered owner’s immediate right to possession. On the administrative side, a judge who acts on a motion that fails to comply with the mandatory notice and proof-of-service requirements under Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, and who stays a writ of possession that should issue as a matter of course, is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

PNB foreclosed a mortgage on a 601-square-meter property in Maramag, Bukidnon owned by the spouses Sombilon, purchased it at public auction on July 15, 1998, and registered the certificate of sale in August 1999. The one-year redemption period expired without the Sombilons redeeming. In 2005, the Sombilons approached Atty. Garay — a PAO lawyer who had previously acted as counsel de officio for Hilly Sombilon and owned an adjacent lot — to help them reacquire the property. They had no funds and proposed that Atty. Garay advance the money; in return, they would sell him a 331-square-meter portion with a building for ₱5 million. Atty. Garay instead offered to purchase the entire property directly from PNB, making a 20% down payment. The Sombilons also attempted to repurchase but failed to pay the required 10% down payment. PNB consolidated title in its name (TCT No. 94384 issued on April 14, 2005) and approved Atty. Garay’s offer. On May 9, 2005, PNB filed an ex-parte petition for a writ of possession. The Sombilons opposed, arguing Atty. Garay was disqualified under Article 1491(5). The trial judge held the writ in abeyance and restored possession to the Sombilons, prompting the bank and Atty. Garay to seek certiorari.

• The Mortgage, Foreclosure, and Consolidation: The spouses Sombilon were the previous owners of a 601-square-meter property with two buildings in Maramag, Bukidnon. They mortgaged it to PNB to secure a loan. After foreclosure, PNB emerged as the winning bidder at the public auction on July 15, 1998. A Certificate of Sale was registered on August 25, 1999. The one-year redemption period expired without the Sombilons redeeming. On February 15, 2005, a Final Deed of Conveyance was issued in PNB’s favor, and on April 14, 2005, TCT No. 94384 was issued in PNB’s name.

• The Sombilons’ Arrangement with Atty. Garay: In 2005, the Sombilons sought the assistance of Atty. Garay, a PAO lawyer who had previously served as counsel de officio for Hilly Sombilon in a criminal case and who owned an adjacent lot. Lacking the funds to repurchase, they proposed that Atty. Garay advance the money and, in exchange, they would sell him a 331-square-meter portion of the property with a building for ₱5 million. On February 9, 2005, the parties went to PNB and learned the property could be bought at its fair market value of ₱2,938,000.00. The following day, Atty. Garay offered to buy the entire property for himself, making a down payment of ₱587,600.00 (20% of the purchase price). On February 14, 2005, upon learning of Atty. Garay’s intention, the Sombilons offered to repurchase the whole property from PNB but only paid ₱300,000.00 — less than the required 10% down payment of the bank’s total claim. PNB thereafter approved Atty. Garay’s purchase offer on April 14, 2005, and a Deed of Sale was executed on July 22, 2005.

• The Application for a Writ of Possession: On May 9, 2005, PNB filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession before the RTC of Malaybalay City (Special Civil Case No. 375-05). On June 10, 2005, Judge Venadas, Sr. granted the petition and issued a Writ of Possession on June 27, 2005.

• The Sombilons’ Motion and the Assailed Order: On July 10, 2005, the Sombilons moved for reconsideration, invoking Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code to argue that Atty. Garay, as Hilly Sombilon’s former counsel, was barred from acquiring the property. The motion lacked the required three-day notice and proof of service under Rule 15, and no copy was successfully served on PNB. On July 14, 2005, Judge Venadas, Sr. issued an Order holding implementation of the Writ of Possession in abeyance, directing the sheriff to return all items to the Sombilons’ house and restore them to full possession if the writ had already been enforced, and setting a hearing for Atty. Garay to present evidence — all without prior notice to PNB. The judge opined that implementing the writ might work “great injustice” and observed possible ethical violations by Atty. Garay.

• Failure to File a Motion for Reconsideration: The Sombilons insisted that the Petition for Certiorari should have been dismissed outright because PNB and Atty. Garay did not first move for reconsideration of the July 14, 2005 Order before seeking extraordinary relief.

• Forum-Shopping: The Sombilons alleged that PNB and Atty. Garay engaged in forum-shopping by filing a Motion to Recall Order in the RTC while their certiorari petition was pending with the CA.

• Standing to Apply for a Writ of Possession: The Sombilons contended that PNB had lost legal personality to apply for a writ of possession since it had already sold the property to Atty. Garay, who was not entitled to possession.

• Disqualification Under Article 1491: The Sombilons argued that Atty. Garay was disqualified from purchasing the property under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code because he had acted as counsel de officio for Hilly Sombilon, rendering the sale invalid.

• Ministerial Duty and Grave Abuse of Discretion: Atty. Garay and PNB argued that Judge Venadas, Sr. acted with grave abuse of discretion by recalling the Writ of Possession without notice. They emphasized that it is a ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of possession after the redemption period has expired and title has been consolidated in the purchaser.

• Inapplicability of Article 1491: PNB asserted that it was not privy to any arrangement between Atty. Garay and the Sombilons. The prohibition in Article 1491(5) was irrelevant because Atty. Garay purchased the property directly from PNB, not from the Sombilons.

• Exception to the Motion for Reconsideration Requirement: PNB explained that the filing of a motion for reconsideration could be dispensed with because the issue was purely one of law and, more critically, because the assailed order was issued without affording PNB due process, rendering it a patent nullity.

• Absence of Forum-Shopping: PNB denied engaging in forum-shopping, stating it did not institute another action simultaneously with the certiorari petition it filed with the CA.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether Judge Venadas, Sr. committed grave abuse of discretion when he held in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession and ordered the restoration of possession to the Sombilons without notice to PNB.

• Administrative Liability: Whether Judge Venadas, Sr. should be administratively sanctioned for holding the writ in abeyance and for blatantly disregarding the mandatory notice and proof-of-service requirements under Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial duty once title has been consolidated in the purchaser’s name after the redemption period’s expiration, leaving no discretion to the court. The Sombilons’ claim that the subsequent sale to Atty. Garay was invalid under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code did not affect PNB’s right to possess the property as the registered owner; challenges to the validity of a mortgage, foreclosure sale, or subsequent transactions must be raised in a separate annulment action and cannot stay the writ. Judge Venadas, Sr. therefore acted with grave abuse of discretion by holding the writ in abeyance. The failure of PNB and Atty. Garay to file a prior motion for reconsideration was excused because the order was issued in violation of due process and thus a patent nullity. No forum-shopping was found. The Court of Appeals’ decision was affirmed.

• Administrative Liability: The motion for reconsideration filed by the Sombilons did not comply with the three-day notice rule and lacked the proof of service mandated by Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15, rendering it a mere scrap of paper. Despite this, Judge Venadas, Sr. took cognizance of the motion, depriving PNB and Atty. Garay of due process. His unsubstantiated claim that the motion was personally served but refused was rejected for lack of an affidavit. This blatant disregard of basic procedural rules constituted gross ignorance of the law, classified as a serious charge under Rule 140, Section 8 of the Rules of Court. Considering it was his first offense, a fine of ₱20,000.00 was imposed, deductible from his withheld retirement benefits.

• Ministerial Nature of a Writ of Possession after Consolidation of Title — Under Act No. 3135, after the one-year redemption period has lapsed and title is consolidated in the purchaser’s name, the issuance of a writ of possession becomes a ministerial act; the court has no discretion to deny or defer it. The purchaser is entitled to possession as a matter of right. This rule applies even if a separate action assailing the validity of the mortgage or foreclosure sale is pending.

• Grounds That Do Not Bar a Writ of Possession — Questions regarding the regularity and validity of the mortgage, the foreclosure sale, or any subsequent sale to a third party cannot be raised to oppose or hold in abeyance the writ. These must be ventilated in a separate action for annulment. Neither the pendency of such an action nor an alleged violation of Article 1491 by a subsequent buyer affects the registered owner’s right to immediate possession.

• Exceptions to the Requirement of a Prior Motion for Reconsideration in Certiorari — The filing of a motion for reconsideration before resorting to certiorari may be dispensed with when the assailed order is a patent nullity or issued in violation of due process. The July 14, 2005 Order fell within this exception because it was issued without notice to PNB.

• Effect of Non-Compliance with the Three-Day Notice Rule (Rule 15) — A written motion that does not comply with the mandatory three-day notice of hearing and lacks proof of service under Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 is fatally defective and should not be acted upon by the court. A judge who entertains such a motion ignores elementary procedural rules.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law by a Judge — Blatant disregard of basic, elementary, and well-known rules of procedure constitutes gross ignorance of the law, a serious charge under Rule 140, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, punishable by dismissal, suspension exceeding three months but not exceeding six months, or a fine between ₱20,000.01 and ₱40,000.00. The offense is aggravated when the judge further acts with grave abuse of discretion on substantive matters such as staying a ministerial writ.

• “A judge owes the public and the court the duty to know the law by heart and to have the basic rules of procedure at the palm of his hands.” (opening paragraph, quoting Fr. Guillen v. Judge Canon) — This dictum frames the standard against which the judge’s conduct was measured.

• “[O]nce title is consolidated under the name of the purchaser, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial on the part of the court; thus, no discretion is left to the court.” — This succinctly captures the ratio decidendi on the civil aspect of the case.

• “Questions regarding the regularity and validity of the mortgage or the foreclosure sale may not be raised as a ground to oppose or hold in abeyance the issuance of the writ of possession as these must be raised in a separate action for the annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure sale. The pendency of such action is also not a ground to stay the issuance of a writ of possession.” — Establishes the limited scope of inquiry in petitions for a writ of possession.

• Nagtalon v. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 172504, July 31, 2013 — Followed: Reiterated that after consolidation of title, the issuance of a writ of possession is ministerial and the court no longer enjoys discretion.

• Tolosa v. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 183058, April 3, 2013 — Followed: Confirmed that questions of validity of the mortgage or foreclosure sale are not grounds to oppose the writ and must be raised in a separate action.

• Cometa v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 235 Phil. 569 (1987); Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 245 Phil. 316 (1988); Sulit v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 914 (1997) — Cited as recognized instances where the issuance of a writ of possession may be deferred; none were present.

• Philippine National Construction Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 354 Phil. 274 (1998) — Followed: Held that a motion for reconsideration before certiorari may be dispensed with where the decision is a patent nullity or there is a violation of due process.

• Lilia v. Judge Fanuñal, 423 Phil. 443 (2001); Ogka Benito v. Judge Balindong, 599 Phil. 196 (2009) — Followed: Reaffirmed the definition of gross ignorance of the law as blatant disregard of basic rules.

• Atty. Gomos v. Judge Adiong, 484 Phil. 116 — Followed: Applied the penalty range for serious charges under Rule 140.

• Section 7, Act No. 3135, as amended — Allows the purchaser to obtain a writ of possession during the redemption period upon posting a bond, and after consolidation of title, the right to possession becomes absolute and the writ ministerial. Applied to establish that PNB, after consolidation, was entitled to immediate possession without any bond.

• Article 1491(5), Civil Code — Prohibits lawyers from acquiring property and rights involved in litigation in which they have taken part by virtue of their profession. The provision was invoked by the Sombilons but held inapplicable to the writ of possession proceedings because Atty. Garay purchased from PNB, not from his former clients, and the issue did not affect PNB’s right to possession.

• Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15, Rules of Court — Require that every written motion be set for hearing with a notice served at least three days before the hearing, specify the time and date, and be accompanied by proof of service. The Sombilons’ motion violated these provisions, yet Judge Venadas, Sr. acted on it; this disregard formed the basis of his administrative liability.

• Section 8, Rule 140, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC — Classifies gross ignorance of the law as a serious charge. Applied to find Judge Venadas, Sr. administratively liable and subject to the prescribed penalties.

Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion (Acting Chairperson), Associate Justice Jose Portugal Perez, Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, and Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe.

None.