Spouses Martin vs. Tulfo

The writ of amparo is confined to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, or threats thereof, and requires a showing of government participation; it does not extend to alleged threats by private individuals absent such allegations.

Petitioners are spouses Rozelle Raymond Martin “Raymart” and Claudine Margaret Santiago, while respondents Raffy, Ben, and Erwin Tulfo are brothers of Ramon “Mon” Tulfo. The controversy concerns the availability of the writ of amparo under A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the rule promulgated to address extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, or threats thereof.

At around 11:40 in the morning of May 6, 2012, petitioners-spouses Rozelle Raymond Martin “Raymart” and Claudine Margaret Santiago arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Terminal 3 aboard a Cebu Pacific Airline flight from a vacation with their family and friends. They waited for the arrival of their baggage but were eventually informed that it was offloaded and transferred to a different flight. Aggrieved, petitioners lodged a complaint before the Cebu Pacific complaint desk.

While they were complaining, they noticed a man taking photos of Claudine with his cellular phone. Raymart approached the man and asked what he was doing. The man, later identified as Ramon “Mon” Tulfo, allegedly punched and kicked Raymart, forcing the latter to fight back. When Claudine saw the commotion, she approached Mon and the latter likewise allegedly kicked and pushed her back against the counter. Raymart rushed to defend his wife, while one Edoardo Benjamin Atilano joined in the brawl. Immediately thereafter, several airport security personnel came to stop the altercation and brought them to the Airport Police Department for investigation.

Days after the incident, respondents Raffy, Ben, and Erwin Tulfo, brothers of Mon, aired on their TV program comments and expletives against petitioners, and threatened that they will retaliate. Terrified by the gravity of the threats hurled, petitioners filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo against respondents on May 11, 2012 before the RTC.

The RTC found that the petition did not allege any case of extrajudicial killing and/or enforced disappearance, or any threats thereof, and was merely anchored on a broad invocation of respondents’ purported violation of petitioners’ right to life and security, carried out by private individuals without any showing of direct or indirect government participation.

• Scope of the Writ of Amparo: Petitioners argued that the issuance of a writ of amparo is not limited to cases of extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, or threats thereof.
• No Need for Human Rights Abuse: Petitioners submitted that they need not undergo human rights abuses such as extrajudicial killings or enforced disappearances, as is common to landmark decisions on military and police abuses, before their right to life, liberty, and security may be protected by a writ of amparo.
• Prohibited Pleading: Petitioners insisted that the May 23, 2012 Motion was a prohibited pleading and, hence, should not have been allowed.

• No Actual Threat: Respondent Ben Tulfo claimed that the statements he uttered did not involve any actual threat and that he merely expressed his strong sentiments to defend his brother.

• Scope of the Writ of Amparo: Whether the writ of amparo is available to petitioners whose petition alleges threats by private individuals but does not allege extrajudicial killing, enforced disappearance, or threats thereof, or government participation.
• Propriety of Dismissal: Whether the RTC correctly dismissed the amparo petition motu proprio notwithstanding the filing of a prohibited motion to dismiss.

• Scope of the Writ of Amparo: No. The writ is confined to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, or threats thereof, and requires government participation; the petition alleged only private acts without such participation.
• Propriety of Dismissal: Yes. The RTC properly dismissed the petition motu proprio because it had the discretion to determine whether it had authority to grant the relief; when the petition falls outside the Amparo Rule, dismissal is proper regardless of the prohibited motion.

• Scope of the Writ of Amparo: Under Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo, the Amparo Rule was intended to address extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, and its coverage is confined to these two instances or threats thereof. Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC states that the writ is available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity, but its second paragraph expressly limits coverage to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. The two paragraphs must be read together; clauses and phrases must not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole must be considered to produce a harmonious whole. Extrajudicial killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. Enforced disappearance, under Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 9851, means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. In Navia vs. Pardico, the Court held that the petitioner in an amparo case must prove by substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation; the same requirement applies to extralegal killings. Petitioners’ petition did not allege any extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance, or threats thereof, in those senses; it was anchored on a broad invocation of respondents’ purported violation of their right to life and security, carried out by private individuals without any showing of direct or indirect government participation. Thus, the petition fell outside the purview of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and had to fail.
• Propriety of Dismissal: The RTC properly exercised its discretion to dismiss the petition motu proprio under its principal determination that the petition was outside the Amparo Rule, regardless of the filing of the May 23, 2012 Motion. The court has the discretion to determine whether it has authority to grant the relief in the first place, and when it is apparent that the petition falls beyond the purview of the rule, it has the duty to dismiss so as not to prejudice any of the parties through prolonged but futile litigation.

• Writ of Amparo Coverage — The writ of amparo under A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC is confined to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, or threats thereof. Although Section 1’s first paragraph describes the remedy as available for violations or threats to the right to life, liberty, and security by public officials or private individuals, the second paragraph limits the writ’s coverage to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof; the two paragraphs must be read together.
• Government Participation — In an amparo case involving enforced disappearance, the petitioner must prove by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person, with the intention of removing the person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period. The same requirement of government participation applies to extralegal killings. Absent such allegation or proof, the amparo petition fails.
• Extrajudicial Killing — An extrajudicial killing is a killing committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings.
• Enforced Disappearance — Under Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 9851, enforced disappearance means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
• Statutory Construction: Read Together — Clauses and phrases must not be taken as detached and isolated expressions; the whole and every part must be considered in fixing the meaning of any part to produce a harmonious whole. Applied to Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, the second paragraph qualifies the first.
• Motu Proprio Dismissal — A court has the discretion to determine whether it has authority to grant amparo relief in the first place, and when it is apparent that the petition falls beyond the purview of the Amparo Rule, it has the duty to dismiss the petition motu proprio, regardless of a prohibited motion to dismiss, to avoid prolonged but futile litigation.

• "The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof." — Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC as quoted by the Court; it states the coverage limitation that controls the availability of the writ.
• "Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation." — The Court states the evidentiary burden for amparo petitions, derived from Navia vs. Pardico and applied to extralegal killings as well.
• "Thus, it is apparent that their amparo petition falls outside the purview of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and, perforce, must fail." — The Court applies the coverage rule to petitioners’ allegations, which involved private individuals and no government participation.
• "The court, indeed, has the discretion to determine whether or not it has the authority to grant the relief in the first place." — The Court justifies the RTC’s motu proprio dismissal despite the filing of a prohibited motion to dismiss.

• Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo, 589 Phil. 1 (2008) — Controlling precedent; relied upon to hold that the Amparo Rule was intended to address extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, with coverage confined to those instances or threats thereof, and to discuss the origins and varying scope of amparo.
• Navia vs. Pardico, G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2012, 673 SCRA 618 — Followed; held that the petitioner in an amparo case must prove by substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation, a requirement the Court applied to extralegal killings as well.
• Civil Service Commission vs. Jason, Jr., 473 Phil. 844 (2004) — Cited for the statutory construction rule that clauses and phrases must not be taken as detached and isolated expressions but read together to produce a harmonious whole; applied to Section 1 of the Amparo Rule.

• Section 1, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC (The Rule on the Writ of Amparo) — Provides that the petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity; its second paragraph states that the writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. The Court read the two paragraphs together to confine the writ’s coverage.
• Section 3(g), Republic Act No. 9851 — Defines enforced disappearance as the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. The Court used this definition to assess whether the petition alleged a covered enforced disappearance.

Sereno, C.J. (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, and Bersamin, JJ., concur. Velasco, Jr. was designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 2253 dated October 14, 2015.