Spouses Manuel vs. Ong

Personal service of summons under Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is validly effected by tendering the summons and complaint to the defendant who refuses to receive and sign for them, regardless of the place of service; jurisdiction over the person is thereby acquired. Relief from an order of default under Rule 9, Section 3(b), however, requires a motion under oath, an affidavit of merit, and compliance with the notice requirements, and may be granted only on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.

Ramon Ong and Spouses Benedict and Sandra Manuel were opposing parties in a civil action for recovery of property. The proceeding required construction of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on service of summons, default, and relief from default, particularly Rule 14, Section 6, Rule 9, Section 3, and Rule 11, Section 1.

On December 21, 2009, Ramon Ong filed with the Regional Trial Court, La Trinidad, Benguet, a complaint for accion reivindicatoria against Spouses Benedict and Sandra Manuel. Ong alleged that the Spouses had constructed improvements on a property he supposedly owned through force, intimidation, strategy, threats, and stealth. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 09-CV-2582. Ong later filed an amended complaint on January 19, 2010, and summons was issued on February 3, 2010.

According to the sheriff's return on summons, Sheriff Joselito Sales, accompanied by Ong's counsel Atty. Christopher Donaal and a certain Federico Laureano, attempted to personally serve summons on the Spouses Manuel at their address in Lower Bacong, Loacan, Itogon, Benguet on February 12, 2010. The Spouses requested that service be made at another time because Sandra Manuel's mother was then critically ill. On March 16, 2010, Sheriff Sales made another attempt at personal service. After personally explaining the content of the summons and complaint to Sandra Manuel, she refused to sign and receive the summons and complaint. The sheriff then merely tendered the summons and complaint to her and advised her to file an answer within fifteen days.

The Spouses Manuel alleged that it was Sandra Manuel's siblings who resided in Lower Bacong, Itogon, Benguet, while they resided in Ambiong, La Trinidad, Benguet. They surmised that Ong and his companions mistook Sandra Manuel's siblings as the defendants in Civil Case No. 09-CV-2582. They further claimed that they only subsequently received via registered mail copies of a compliance and manifestation filed by Ong and the Regional Trial Court's order scheduling the ex parte presentation of evidence. Attached to their motion to lift the order of default was their answer.

Because the Spouses Manuel failed to file an answer within the fifteen-day period, Ong filed a motion to declare them in default on April 23, 2010. On June 28, 2010, the Regional Trial Court granted the motion and declared the Spouses Manuel in default. Ong then moved for the ex parte presentation of evidence, which the Regional Trial Court granted. On September 13, 2010, the Spouses Manuel filed a motion to lift the order of default. The Regional Trial Court denied the motion on November 30, 2010, noting that it was not sworn to and that they did not show that their failure to timely file an answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Their motion for reconsideration was denied on February 16, 2011.

The Court of Appeals noted that the Spouses Manuel's motion to lift the order of default was not made under oath and that they set the motion for hearing on the same date they filed it. The sheriff's return stated that Sandra Manuel had refused to sign and receive the summons and complaint after the sheriff explained their contents. The Spouses did not deny the occurrence of the events narrated in the sheriff's return but claimed that no valid service was made because they did not reside at the place of service. The barangay clearances attached by the Spouses themselves as proof of their identities indicated that they were residents of Bacong Loacan, Itogon, Benguet.

• Invalid Service of Summons: Petitioners maintained that the Regional Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons because summons was not validly served; they alleged that they resided in Ambiong, La Trinidad, Benguet, not in Lower Bacong, Loacan, Itogon, Benguet, where service was made.
• Mistaken Identity: Petitioners surmised that Ong and his companions mistook Sandra Manuel's siblings, who resided in Lower Bacong, as the defendants in Civil Case No. 09-CV-2582.
• Late Notice: Petitioners claimed that they only subsequently received via registered mail copies of Ong's compliance and the Regional Trial Court's order scheduling the ex parte presentation of evidence.
• Relief from Default: Petitioners sought to lift the order of default and attached their answer to the motion.

• Residence and Service: Respondent Ramon Ong pointed out that the barangay clearances attached by the Spouses themselves as proof of their identities indicated that they were residents of Bacong Loacan, Itogon, Benguet, contradicting their claim of residence elsewhere.
• Default: Ong sought the declaration of default on the ground that the Spouses Manuel failed to file an answer within the period provided by the Rules.

• Jurisdiction over Persons: Whether the Regional Trial Court validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of Spouses Benedict and Sandra Manuel through personal service of summons by tender to Sandra Manuel.
• Relief from Default: Whether Spouses Manuel may be granted relief from the Regional Trial Court's June 28, 2010 order of default.

• Jurisdiction over Persons: Yes. Personal service under Rule 14, Section 6 was validly effected by tendering the summons and complaint to Sandra Manuel after she refused to receive and sign for them; the place of service is inconsequential.
• Relief from Default: No. The motion to lift the order of default was not under oath, lacked an affidavit of merit, and did not comply with the three-day notice rule; the failure to answer was not due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.

• Jurisdiction over Persons: Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that whenever practicable, summons shall be served by handing a copy to the defendant in person or, if the defendant refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. Tendering is itself a means of personal service. It is distinguished from substituted service under Rule 14, Section 7, which applies only when the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time. Here, the sheriff attempted personal service twice. On the first attempt, he deferred in deference to the medical condition of Sandra Manuel's mother. On the second attempt, Sandra Manuel refused to accept the summons and complaint, so the sheriff tendered them to her. The Spouses did not deny the events narrated in the sheriff's return but claimed that no valid service was made because they did not reside in Lower Bacong, Loacan, Itogon, Benguet. That argument fails because personal service has nothing to do with the location where summons is served; what determines validity is the person of the defendant, not the locus of service. The sheriff's return, if complete on its face, is presumed regular and is taken as an accurate and exhaustive recital of the steps undertaken. Under Rule 131, Section 3(m) of the Revised Rules on Evidence, official duty is presumed regularly performed, and under Rule 131, Section 3(d), a person is presumed to take ordinary care of his concerns. The Spouses failed to prove any irregularity in the sheriff's return and relied only on a self-serving claim of an alternative address, which was contradicted by the barangay clearances they themselves attached showing residence in Bacong Loacan, Itogon, Benguet. Thus, valid personal service was made, and the Regional Trial Court acquired jurisdiction over the persons of both Spouses Manuel. The fifteen-day period to file an answer consequently ran.
• Relief from Default: Because valid service of summons was made, Rule 11, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure required the Spouses Manuel to file their answer within fifteen days from service. They failed to do so and were rightly declared in default under Rule 9, Section 3. The requisites for declaring a party in default, as stated in Spouses Delos Santos vs. Carpio, are: (1) the claiming party must file a motion asking the court to declare the defending party in default; (2) the defending party must be notified of the motion; and (3) the claiming party must prove that the defending party failed to answer within the period provided by the Rules. All requisites were satisfied: Ong filed a motion to declare the Spouses in default; the Spouses were notified of the motion, as shown by Ong's compliance regarding the registry return card; and the Spouses filed their answer only on September 13, 2010, after the fifteen-day period had lapsed. Under Rule 9, Section 3(b), a party declared in default may, at any time after notice and before judgment, file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing that the failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. Jurisprudence requires that the motion be accompanied by an affidavit showing the invoked ground and an affidavit of merit setting forth facts constituting the meritorious defense. In Agravante vs. Patriarca, the Court emphasized that the motion to lift an order of default must be accompanied by an affidavit showing the ground and an affidavit of merit. In Montinola, Jr. vs. Republic Planters Bank, the requisites to set aside an order of default are: (1) the motion must be made under oath by one with knowledge of the facts; (2) it must be shown that the failure to file an answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence; and (3) there must be a proper showing of a meritorious defense. Here, the Spouses Manuel's motion was not made under oath and was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit. It was therefore pro-forma and not worthy of consideration. They also set the motion for hearing on the same date they filed it, violating Rule 15, Section 4, which requires service of a motion upon the adverse party in such a manner as to ensure receipt at least three days before the date of hearing. While jurisprudence generally frowns upon default judgments and directs courts to be liberal in setting aside orders of default, that liberality is tempered by the fact that it is the defendant who is at fault in failing to timely file an answer. Rule 9, Section 3(b) gives an exclusive list of four grounds for relief—fraud, accident, mistake, and excusable negligence—which relate to factors extraneous to the defendant. The situation is analogous to dismissal of an action due to the fault of the plaintiff under Rule 17, Section 3. The Spouses Manuel only had themselves to blame for not properly receiving the summons and complaint. Sandra Manuel refused to sign and receive the summons and complaint despite the sheriff's explanation, an act of obstinate refusal to submit to court processes. They were not deserving of leniency.

• Personal Service of Summons by Tender — Under Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service is made by handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person or, if the defendant refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. Tendering is itself a means of personal service. The Court applied this rule because Sandra Manuel refused to receive and sign the summons and complaint, and the sheriff tendered them to her. The validity of personal service depends on the person of the defendant, not the locus of service.
• Presumption of Regularity of a Sheriff's Return — A sheriff's return, if complete on its face, is presumed regular and is taken as an accurate and exhaustive recital of the circumstances relating to the steps undertaken by a sheriff. The sheriff is also presumed to have taken ordinary care and diligence in serving the proper person. The Court applied this because the Spouses failed to prove any irregularity and merely relied on a self-serving claim of residence elsewhere, contradicted by their own barangay clearances.
• Requisites for Declaration of Default — Before a defending party may be declared in default, the claiming party must (1) file a motion asking the court to declare the defending party in default; (2) notify the defending party of the motion; and (3) prove that the defending party failed to answer within the period provided by the Rules. The Court found all requisites satisfied.
• Relief from Order of Default — Under Rule 9, Section 3(b), a party declared in default may, at any time after notice and before judgment, file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing that the failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. Jurisprudence requires an affidavit showing the invoked ground and an affidavit of merit setting forth facts constituting the meritorious defense. The Court found the Manuels' motion defective for lack of oath and affidavit of merit.
• Liberal Construction of Rules on Default — Orders of default are generally frowned upon and should be the exception rather than the rule, allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal to comply with court orders. The Court recognized this liberality but tempered it because the defaulting defendant is at fault; the four grounds for relief are exclusive and relate to factors extraneous to the defendant. The Manuels' obstinate refusal to receive summons made them undeserving of leniency.
• Notice of Motion — Rule 15, Section 4 requires that a written motion required to be heard and its notice of hearing be served in such a manner as to ensure receipt by the other party at least three days before the hearing, unless the court for good cause sets a shorter notice. The Manuels set their motion to lift default for hearing on the same date they filed it, violating this rule.

• "Tendering summons is itself a means of personal service as it is contained in Rule 14, Section 6." — The Court used this to establish that the sheriff's tender of the summons and complaint to Sandra Manuel, after her refusal to receive and sign, constituted valid personal service.
• "What is determinative of the validity of personal service is, therefore, the person of the defendant, not the locus of service." — This states the ratio for rejecting the Manuels' argument that service was invalid because it occurred at an address where they did not reside.
• "A sheriff’s return, if complete on its face, must be accorded the presumption of regularity and, hence, taken to be an accurate and exhaustive recital of the circumstances relating to the steps undertaken by a sheriff." — This defines the evidentiary presumption that defeated the Manuels' self-serving claim of invalid service.
• "Failing both in making their motion under oath and in attaching an affidavit of merits, the Spouses Manuel’s motion to lift order of default must be deemed pro-forma. It is not even worthy of consideration." — This is the Court's core reason for denying relief from default on procedural grounds.

• Spouses Delos Santos vs. Carpio, 533 Phil. 42 (2006) — Cited for the three requisites that must be complied with before a defending party may be declared in default.
• Agravante vs. Patriarca, 262 Phil. 127 (1990) — Cited for the requirement that a motion to lift an order of default must be accompanied by an affidavit showing the invoked ground and an affidavit of merit setting forth a meritorious defense.
• Montinola, Jr. vs. Republic Planters Bank, 244 Phil. 49 (1988) — Cited for the three requisites to warrant setting aside an order of default: motion under oath by one with knowledge of the facts; showing that failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence; and proper showing of a meritorious defense.
• Ponio vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 218 Phil. 548 (1984) — Cited for the exception that an affidavit of merit is not necessary where the motion to lift default is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the defendant.
• Tanhu vs. Judge Ramolete, 160 Phil. 1101 (1975) — Cited for the rule that neither a formal verification nor a separate affidavit of merit is necessary when the motion to lift default contains the reasons for failure to answer and the facts constituting the defense and is sworn to by the defendant; also cited on the remedies available to a defaulted defendant.
• Acance vs. Court of Appeals, 493 Phil. 676 (2005) — Cited for the principle that orders of default should be the exception rather than the rule and should be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal to comply with trial court orders.
• Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank vs. Ortiz, 234 Phil. 376 (1987) — Cited for the requirement that the same affidavits required in a motion to lift default must be attached to a motion for new trial.

• Rule 14, Section 6, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides for service in person on defendant by handing a copy or, if the defendant refuses to receive and sign, by tendering it. Applied to uphold service on Sandra Manuel.
• Rule 14, Section 7, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides for substituted service when personal service cannot be made within a reasonable time. The Court distinguished it from personal service by tender.
• Rule 11, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Requires the defendant to file an answer within fifteen days after service of summons. The Spouses failed to do so.
• Rule 9, Section 3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Governs declaration of default, effect of default, and relief from order of default. The Court applied it to affirm the default and deny relief.
• Rule 8, Section 5, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Requires circumstances constituting fraud or mistake to be stated with particularity. Cited to support the need for an affidavit of merit.
• Rule 15, Section 4, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Requires notice of hearing to be served at least three days before the hearing. The Manuels violated this by setting their motion for hearing on the same date of filing.
• Rule 17, Section 3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides for dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. The Court used it as an analogy to hold that a culpable defendant must suffer the consequences of his own failure.
• Rule 37, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides grounds and period for motion for new trial or reconsideration. Cited as a remedy available to a defaulted defendant before judgment becomes final.
• Rule 38, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides for petition for relief from judgment. Cited as a remedy after judgment becomes final.
• Rule 47, Sections 1 and 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Govern annulment of judgment on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Cited as another available remedy.
• Rule 131, Section 3(m), Revised Rules on Evidence — Establishes the disputable presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. Applied to the sheriff's return.
• Rule 131, Section 3(d), Revised Rules on Evidence — Establishes the disputable presumption that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. Applied to the sheriff's performance of duty.

Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson), Mariano C. del Castillo, Jose Catral Mendoza, and Bienvenido L. Reyes.