Spouses Joon Hyung Park and Kyung Ah Lee vs. Hon. Rico Sebastian D. Liwanag

Procedural rules may be relaxed in adoption cases where a strict application would frustrate rather than promote substantial justice and the best interest of the child. The Court also held that aliens who have been residing in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to filing a petition for adoption may properly file under the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, and the referral of such a case to the Inter-Country Adoption Board constitutes an inappropriate disposal that would cause delay prejudicial to the adoptee's interest.

Petitioners Spouses Joon Hyung Park and Kyung Ah Lee are American citizens residing in Makati City, Philippines. They filed a Petition for Adoption with Change of Name of the minor "Mayca Alegado" a.k.a. "Innah Alegado" before the RTC of Makati City, docketed as Sp. Proc. Case No. R-MKT-16-01300-SP, and raffled to Branch 136 thereof. The petitioners have been residing in the Philippines since 2007 (petitioner Park) and since 2009 (petitioner Lee), and have been gainfully employed in the country for almost the same length of time. The DSWD processed the petitioners' application for adoption of Innah and issued its Affidavit of Consent on May 30, 2016, instructing them to file a petition for domestic adoption within 30 days from receipt of the written consent.

Petitioners Spouses Joon Hyung Park and Kyung Ah Lee, American citizens residing in Makati City, filed a Petition for Adoption with Change of Name of the minor "Mayca Alegado" a.k.a. "Innah Alegado" before the RTC of Makati City, docketed as Sp. Proc. Case No. R-MKT-16-01300-SP, and raffled to Branch 136 presided over by respondent Judge Rico Sebastian D. Liwanag. Petitioners have been residing in the Philippines since 2007 (petitioner Park) and since 2009 (petitioner Lee), and have been gainfully employed in the Philippines for almost the same length of time. Petitioner Park is the President of two Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA)-located corporations, Wyntron, Inc. and Danam Philippines, Inc., while petitioner Lee is the Senior Adviser of Banco De Oro's (BDO's) Korean Desk.

Innah was born on December 13, 2012 in Tuguegarao City. She was barely 22 days old when rescued by a non-government organization from trafficking and referred to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) Field Office in Cagayan. Innah's biological mother attempted to give her away in exchange for transportation fare. Innah was a little over one year old when her care and custody was officially bestowed by the DSWD upon petitioners on January 18, 2014, through a Pre-Adoption Placement Authority. Petitioners have also adopted another girl, Hannah, through domestic adoption, which the RTC of Makati City, Branch 144, granted on August 30, 2016. The DSWD processed petitioners' application for adoption of Innah and issued on May 30, 2016 its Affidavit of Consent, instructing petitioners to file a petition for domestic adoption not later than 30 days from date of receipt of the DSWD's written consent to adoption.

In an Order dated September 11, 2017, respondent Judge found that since petitioners are both foreigners, the Petition for Adoption with Change of Name of the minor Innah presented a proper case of inter-country adoption, instead of considering said petition as being appropriately filed under the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998. Thus, pursuant to Section 32 of the Rule on Adoption and Section 30 of the Amended Implementing Rules and Regulations on Inter-Country Adoption, the trial court directed the transmittal of a copy of the petition and its annexes to the Inter-Country Adoption Board (ICAB) for appropriate action. The Order stated that it amounts to a case disposal and cancelled the October 27 and November 24, 2017 settings.

On October 6, 2017, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration (First Motion for Reconsideration) praying for respondent Judge to reconsider and set aside the Order dated September 11, 2017, give petitioners time to confer with the ICAB and submit a best interest assessment, and allow the Deposition through Written Interrogatories to proceed. Said Motion for Reconsideration was denied by respondent Judge in an Order dated June 19, 2018, which petitioners received on July 2, 2018. On July 4, 2018, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Second Motion for Reconsideration, alleging that it had recently come to their attention that the Supreme Court and ICAB entered into an agreement regarding the treatment of foreigners who reside in the Philippines and file a petition for adoption through the courts, as referred to in a DSWD Memorandum dated June 1, 2018. Petitioners prayed for reconsideration of the Order dated June 19, 2018 and that they be given thirty days from notice to secure the necessary certification. In an Order dated July 10, 2018, respondent Judge denied the Manifestation and Second Motion for Reconsideration for being a prohibited pleading, which petitioners received on July 19, 2018.

On September 12, 2018, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA, assailing respondent Judge's Orders dated September 11, 2017, June 19, 2018, and July 10, 2018. The CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari for being filed out of time, reasoning that the 60-day period should have been counted from the denial of petitioners' First Motion for Reconsideration, not the second. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the transmittal of the copies of the records of the case to the ICAB was in the nature of an interlocutory order, and not a final decision, and as such, a second Motion for Reconsideration was permissible. The CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution dated June 19, 2019.

• Timeliness of the Petition for Certiorari: Petitioners argued that the 60-day period should be counted from the receipt of the Order denying their Manifestation and Second Motion for Reconsideration, which they received on July 19, 2018, making their Petition for Certiorari filed on September 12, 2018 well within the 60-day period, which ended on September 17, 2018.
• Nature of the Order: Petitioners asserted that the trial court's Order referring the case to the ICAB was an interlocutory order, which was a temporary disposal of the case subject to determination by the ICAB, and that the Manifestation and Second Motion for Reconsideration was not a rehash of the arguments in the First Motion for Reconsideration since it was filed on the ground of a supervening event newly discovered by the petitioners.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioners argued that respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in referring the Petition for Adoption to the ICAB since the Petition was appropriately filed under the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, which confers jurisdiction on Family Courts to hear adoption cases filed by aliens who have been residing in the Philippines for at least three continuous years.
• Applicability of Inter-Country Adoption Act: Petitioners pointed out that the Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 applies to aliens who permanently reside abroad, but petitioners do not permanently reside in the U.S., having resided in the Philippines for more than three continuous years prior to the filing of their Petition for Adoption.
• Substantial Compliance: Petitioners argued that substantial compliance with the Home Study and certification requirements is sufficient because such requirements are not jurisdictional.
• Liberal Construction: Petitioners argued that adoption laws must be construed liberally to promote the best interest of the child.

• Procedural Grounds for Dismissal: The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment, noted that the dismissal by the CA was based purely on procedural grounds, citing Aguam vs. Court of Appeals, opining that it is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties.

• Timeliness of the Petition for Certiorari: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari for being filed out of time, and whether the 60-day period should be counted from the receipt of the Order denying the Manifestation and Second Motion for Reconsideration.
• Propriety of Referral to ICAB: Whether respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in referring the Petition for Adoption to the ICAB, or whether the Petition was appropriately filed under the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.

• Timeliness of the Petition for Certiorari: Yes. The CA erred in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari for being filed out of time. A relaxation of the rules of procedure was necessary to promote the best interest of the adoptee child, Innah, and the petitioners did not sleep on their rights but filed the Manifestation and Second Motion for Reconsideration to secure the necessary certification from their Foreign Adoption Agencies and/or Embassies.
• Propriety of Referral to ICAB: No. The referral to the ICAB was inappropriate. The petitioners' Petition for Adoption was appropriately filed under the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, which the appropriate Family Court or RTC can properly take cognizance of, since the petitioners have been residing in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the petition for adoption.

• Timeliness of the Petition for Certiorari: The Court found that a relaxation of the rules of procedure was necessary in the instant case to promote the best interest of the adoptee child, Innah. Citing Heirs of Deleste vs. Land Bank of the Phils., the Court pronounced that a strict and rigid application of technicalities must be avoided if it tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. The Court also found that the petitioners did not sleep on their rights and simply allow the 60-day period from the denial of the First Motion for Reconsideration to lapse; rather, they filed the Manifestation and Second Motion for Reconsideration with the RTC to secure the necessary certification from their Foreign Adoption Agencies and/or Embassies, which effort was not meant to cause delay but to actually assist the court in the speedy disposal of the case.

• Propriety of Referral to ICAB: The Court conducted a comparative review of the relevant provisions on Domestic Adoption and Inter-Country Adoption, particularly on who are qualified to adopt and where to file the application for adoption. Under Section 4 of the Domestic Adoption Act, any alien possessing the same qualifications as Filipino nationals may adopt, provided that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he has been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the petition for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he has been certified by his diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency to have the legal capacity to adopt in his country, and that his government allows the adoptee to enter his country as his adopted child. The Court noted that petitioners, who are both American citizens, have been residing and have been gainfully employed in the Philippines since 2007 (petitioner Park) and since 2009 (petitioner Lee), and are thus living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, as required by the Domestic Adoption Act. The Court also took cognizance of the agreement entered into between the Supreme Court and the ICAB regarding the treatment of foreigners who reside in the Philippines and file a petition for adoption through the courts, as incorporated in the DSWD's Memorandum dated June 1, 2018, which provides that if cases are endorsed to ICAB by the courts, ICAB will file a manifestation so that the domestic adoption could be pursued. Thus, even if the instant adoption proceeding would be referred to the ICAB, there is still a high probability that the ICAB will file a manifestation so that the domestic adoption before the trial court could be pursued, and the referral to the ICAB would only cause a delay in the adoption proceedings, a matter that would be clearly prejudicial to the interest of the adoptee and the petitioners. The Court also noted that the child, Innah, had been living with petitioners for six years and has recognized them as her parents, and that in adoption proceedings, the welfare of the child is of paramount interest. Citing In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, the Court pronounced that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption, and the interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration. The Court also cited Art. 10 of the New Civil Code, which provides that in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

• Relaxation of Procedural Rules — A strict and rigid application of technicalities must be avoided if it tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. Rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice; if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it is always within the power of the Court to suspend the rules or except a particular case from their operation. The Court applied this doctrine to relax the 60-day period for filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, given the need to promote the best interest of the adoptee child.

• Liberal Construction of Adoption Statutes — Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. The Court applied this doctrine in determining that the petitioners' Petition for Adoption was appropriately filed under the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.

• Best Interest of the Child — In adoption proceedings, the welfare of the child is of paramount interest. The Court applied this principle in remanding the case to the RTC for continuation of the adoption proceedings with dispatch, noting that the child had been living with petitioners for six years and has recognized them as her parents.

• "Time and again, this Court has held that a strict and rigid application of technicalities must be avoided if it tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice." — This passage from Heirs of Deleste vs. Land Bank of the Phils. states the controlling doctrine on relaxation of procedural rules, which the Court applied to excuse the petitioners' technical lapse in filing the Petition for Certiorari.

• "Rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. If the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it is always within our power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from their operation." — This passage, quoted from Sta. Ana vs. Spouses Carpo, articulates the canonical formulation of the Court's power to relax procedural rules, which was central to the Court's ruling on the timeliness issue.

• "It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not miscarriage of justice." — This passage from Aguam vs. Court of Appeals, cited by the OSG, supports the Court's decision to excuse the procedural lapse and resolve the case on the merits.

• "Liberal Construction of Adoption Statutes In Favor Of Adoption- It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law." — This passage from In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia states the doctrine of liberal construction of adoption statutes, which the Court applied in determining that the petition was appropriately filed under the Domestic Adoption Act.

• Heirs of Deleste vs. Land Bank of the Phils., 666 Phil. 350 (2011) — Controlling precedent on the relaxation of procedural rules, cited for the proposition that a strict and rigid application of technicalities must be avoided if it tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice.

• Sta. Ana vs. Spouses Carpo, 593 Phil. 108 (2008) — Cited for the principle that rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and that courts have the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules.

• Tanenglian vs. Lorenzo, 573 Phil. 472 (2008) — Cited for the principle that in cases where the Court dispenses with technicalities, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice, and that the judicial system must maintain a healthy balance between strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.

• Aguam vs. Court of Appeals, 388 Phil. 587 (2000) — Cited by the OSG for the proposition that it is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice.

• In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, 494 Phil. 515 (2005) — Controlling precedent on the liberal construction of adoption statutes in favor of adoption, cited for the principle that the interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration.

• Section 4, Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 (Republic Act No. 8552) — Provides who may adopt, including any alien possessing the same qualifications as Filipino nationals, provided that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he has been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the petition for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he has been certified by his diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency to have the legal capacity to adopt in his country, and that his government allows the adoptee to enter his country as his adopted child. The Court applied this provision to determine that the petitioners were qualified to file for domestic adoption.

• Section 9, Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 (Republic Act No. 8043) — Provides who may file an application for inter-country adoption, specifically an alien or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad. The Court distinguished this provision from the Domestic Adoption Act, noting that the petitioners do not permanently reside in the U.S. and thus the Inter-Country Adoption Act does not apply.

• Section 6, Rule on Adoption (A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC) — Provides that the petition for adoption shall be filed with the Family Court of the province or city where the prospective adoptive parents reside. The Court applied this provision in determining that the RTC had jurisdiction over the petition.

• Section 28, Rule on Adoption (A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC) — Provides where to file a petition for inter-country adoption, specifically with the Family Court having jurisdiction over the place where the child resides or may be found, or directly with the Inter-Country Adoption Board. The Court distinguished this provision from the domestic adoption venue provision.

• Section 32, Rule on Adoption (A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC) — Provides the duty of the court to transmit the petition to the Inter-Country Adoption Board for appropriate action after finding that the petition is sufficient in form and substance and a proper case for inter-country adoption. The Court applied this provision in determining that the RTC's referral to the ICAB was inappropriate because the case was not a proper case for inter-country adoption.

• Section 30, Amended Implementing Rules and Regulations on Inter-Country Adoption — Provides that foreigners who file a petition for adoption in the Philippines under the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, the Court, after finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance and a proper case for inter-country adoption, shall immediately transmit the petition to the Board for appropriate action. The Court applied this provision in the context of the RTC's referral to the ICAB.

• Section 4, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Provides the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari. The Court relaxed this period in light of the circumstances of the case.

• Section 5, Rule 37, Rules of Court — Prohibits a second motion for reconsideration. The Court considered this provision in the context of the petitioners' filing of the Manifestation and Second Motion for Reconsideration.

• Article 10, New Civil Code — Provides that in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. The Court cited this provision to support the liberal construction of adoption statutes.

Perlas-Bernabe, Reyes, Jr. A, Inting, and Zalameda, JJ., concurred.