Spouses Guidangen vs. Wooden

A plaintiff seeking to compel execution of a registrable deed of sale must prove by preponderance of evidence the existence of a perfected contract of sale; failure to present the alleged private document or otherwise establish a meeting of minds on the price defeats the claim, and the tax declaration in the opposing party’s name becomes prima facie evidence of ownership or possession.

Petitioners Spouses William and Mary Guidangen owned a two-storey house at the Philippine National Police Barracks in Lagawe, Ifugao. Respondent Devota B. Wooden was the wife of Nestor Wooden, a PNP member and petitioners’ nephew, whom petitioners treated as a son. The dispute required resolution of whether a contract of sale over the house had been perfected, implicating Articles 1357 and 1475 of the Civil Code on formal requirements and perfection of sale.

On September 2, 1997, Devota B. Wooden filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Lagawe, Ifugao against Spouses William and Mary Guidangen, seeking to compel them to execute a registrable document of conveyance of a two-storey house, referred to as the old house, located at the Philippine National Police Barracks in Lagawe, Ifugao, and to restrain them from entering or taking physical possession thereof. The old house was originally owned by petitioners, a fact respondent did not dispute. Respondent alleged that sometime in 1994 to 1995, she and her husband Nestor Wooden, a PNP member, bought the old house from petitioners for P60,000, as evidenced by a private document. That private document, she claimed, was taken by Mary Guidangen along with other documents when Mary processed the claims and benefits due from the PNP of Nestor, who died in 1997.

Petitioners denied having sold the old house to the Wooden spouses or having executed a private document relative to its sale. They alleged that they built the old house and lived there until 1988, after which they transferred to their new house along Rizal Avenue, Poblacion West, Lagawe, Ifugao. Since 1983, their nephew Nestor, then still single, lived with them in the old house as well as in their new house. Petitioners treated Nestor as their own son and allowed him and respondent to live in the old house free of rent in the latter part of 1995 after the couple married. They also entrusted to the couple the collection of rents from tenants in the ground floor to defray expenses for the maintenance of the old house. In support of their claim of ownership, petitioners presented the tax declaration and clearance for payment of taxes of the old house in their name.

Respondent maintained that petitioners sold the old house to her and Nestor. She denied that Nestor lived with petitioners or that she and her husband asked petitioners to allow them to stay in the old house. She also denied having sought permission from petitioners to collect rentals from tenants for minor repair works, asserting instead that what they undertook in the old house was not minor repairs but a major renovation. To bolster her claim of sale, respondent averred that Mary even prepared Nestor’s Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth for 1996 while Nestor was hospitalized, and that the old house was declared therein as part of Nestor’s assets, thereby proving that it already belonged to the Wooden spouses. On the witness stand, respondent stood by her claim of sale. On cross-examination, however, she testified that she only saw and read the alleged private document evidencing the sale but was neither present when it was executed and given to her husband nor was she or her husband a signatory thereto; that the document was signed only by Mary; and that she was present only during the payment of the first installment of the purchase price. She also testified that she gave her house key to Mary for purposes of securing some documents therefrom but did not personally and actually see Mary enter the old house. Upon further questioning by the court, respondent stated that she and her husband paid the first installment of P16,000 or P16,500 on August 19 or 20, 1994. The other installment amounting to about P35,000 was paid by Nestor sometime in December 1994 or 1995. Thereafter, a private writing was executed by Mary as receipt of the payment for the house. This was allegedly the only receipt that the Wooden spouses had as evidence of the sale but was supposedly taken by Mary.

Respondent presented as witnesses the former tenants in the ground floor of the old house, PO3 Oscar Mamaclay and Policeman Jay Telan, who testified that they paid their rentals to respondent. Telan recounted that he initially paid rentals to Mary but was later advised by her to make the payments to respondent because she had already sold the house to the Wooden spouses. Mary, for her part, testified that she and her husband constructed the old house in the latter part of 1981. They occupied the same in 1982 until 1988, after which they left and moved to their newly built house. The old house was leased to tenants, and in the latter part of 1995, they allowed the Wooden spouses to occupy the second floor thereof for free. Petitioners presented Tax Declaration No. 1645(R) issued by the Municipal Assessor’s Office in Mary’s name; tax receipts dated August 11, 1997, February 10, 1998, and November 20, 2002; a tax clearance also dated November 20, 2002; and evidence that on September 7, 1981, Mary and her husband filed an application for electric services for the old house with the Ifugao Electric Company, as shown by a Membership Index Card and a certification issued by the manager of IFELCO dated October 8, 2002. Mary also testified on her SALNs for the years 1986 to 1992 and 1997 to 2002, which generally showed that both the old and new houses were declared although there were lapses in the years of their acquisition, and in several instances only one house was declared, or only the lot where the house was built was declared. When presented with Nestor’s SALNs for the years 1994 to 1996, wherein the old house was declared as one of the assets acquired by purchase for P70,000, Mary reiterated that she and her husband never sold the old house to the Wooden spouses but only allowed them to stay there in the early part of 1995 upon the request of their nephew Nestor.

On cross-examination, Mary stated that the controversy involving the house only began when respondent filed the case in September 1997; that despite the case, she assessed her relationship with respondent, whom she considered and treated as her daughter-in-law, to be good; that she paid the real property taxes on the old house only on August 11, 1997 because she did not have enough money to pay the taxes before; and that at the time she paid the taxes she did not know that respondent was claiming ownership of the old house. She claimed that she was not aware of Nestor’s SALN as the same was prepared by Nestor himself, and denied preparing or assisting in the preparation of Nestor’s SALN for 1996 as their office had an administrative officer responsible for such task. She said she only found out that Nestor declared the old house as his own when the complaint was filed by respondent. When presented with a duplicate original copy of her own SALN purportedly for 1995 wherein only one house was declared as asset, Mary stated that what was declared was the old house; the new house was not declared due to inadvertence. When questioned further, Mary admitted that the house declared in her SALN for 1995 happened to be the new house and not the old house. Later, however, she explained the discrepancies in the values pertaining to her properties as declared in her SALN and reiterated that the house declared in the questioned SALN was the old house. Petitioners also presented Gloria Linda Guinawa, the Municipal Assessor of Lagawe, Ifugao, who confirmed that as per official records of the Provincial Assessor’s Office, the old house was first declared in Mary’s name on August 9, 1988; that said house had not been declared in another person’s name; and that there were instances where real property taxes are paid years after the assessment has been issued. Respondent’s neighbor Erlinda Paraguas narrated that she accompanied Mary to the old house after Nestor’s death and that Mary did not take any documents from the house. Dolores Wooden, respondent’s mother-in-law, testified that her son Nestor renovated the old house to make it convenient but denied that he purchased the same. SPO4 Florencio Kimmayong testified that as Administrative Officer of the Lagawe Police Station, he was responsible for preparing the 1996 SALN of Nestor.

The trial court found that respondent failed to prove the sale by preponderance of evidence and that petitioners proved their possession and ownership of the old house. The Court of Appeals, on appeal, found that respondent had presented other cogently strong proofs of sale that the trial court had ignored. The Supreme Court weighed these conflicting factual findings.

• Execution of Registrable Document: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals could not validly order them to execute a registrable document despite respondent’s failure to prove the due execution and existence of the alleged private document evidencing the alleged purchase of the house in dispute.
• Credibility of Witnesses: Petitioners maintained that the Court of Appeals could not validly ignore or disregard the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses.
• Findings of Fact: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals’ findings of fact were manifestly mistaken, without evidentiary basis, and contradictory to the findings of the trial court.
• Consent of William Guidangen: Petitioners contended that the alleged sale could not be considered valid despite the absence of evidence that petitioner William Guidangen had given his consent to the alleged sale made by petitioner Mary Guidangen in favor of respondent and her late husband.
• Evidentiary Value of Petitioners’ Documents: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the evidentiary value of petitioners’ tax declaration, payment of realty taxes, as well as the electrical connections of the house in the name of petitioners.

• Sale and Private Document: Respondent maintained that she and Nestor bought the old house from petitioners for P60,000 in 1994 to 1995, as evidenced by a private document allegedly taken by Mary.
• Renovation and Rentals: Respondent asserted that the Wooden spouses made a major renovation of the old house and collected rentals from tenants, which she claimed indicated ownership.
• SALN as Proof: Respondent averred that Mary prepared Nestor’s 1996 SALN, which declared the old house as part of Nestor’s assets, thereby proving the sale.
• Right to Compel Conveyance: Respondent sought to compel petitioners to execute a registrable document of conveyance under Article 1357 of the Civil Code, claiming that the contract had been perfected.

• Execution and Existence of Private Document: Whether the Court of Appeals could validly order petitioners to execute a registrable document despite respondent’s failure to prove the due execution and existence of the alleged private document evidencing the alleged purchase of the house in dispute.
• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the Court of Appeals could validly ignore or disregard the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses.
• Findings of Fact: Whether the Court of Appeals’ findings of fact are manifestly mistaken, without evidentiary basis, and contradictory to the findings of the trial court.
• Consent of William Guidangen: Whether the alleged sale may be considered valid despite the absence of evidence that petitioner William Guidangen had given his consent to the alleged sale made by petitioner Mary Guidangen in favor of respondent and her late husband.
• Evidentiary Value of Petitioners’ Documents: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the evidentiary value of petitioners’ tax declaration, payment of realty taxes, as well as the electrical connections of the house in the name of petitioners.
• Contract of Sale and Ownership: Whether there is a contract of sale between the parties, the determination of which will settle who the rightful owner of the disputed property is.

• Execution and Existence of Private Document: No. The Court of Appeals could not validly order execution of a registrable document because respondent failed to prove the due execution and existence of the alleged private document and, ultimately, failed to prove a perfected contract of sale.
• Credibility of Witnesses: No. The Court of Appeals could not disregard the trial court’s credibility assessment; absent strong and impelling reasons, the trial court’s findings on credibility must be respected.
• Findings of Fact: Yes. The Court of Appeals’ findings were without evidentiary basis and rested on conjectures and surmises, not facts.
• Consent of William Guidangen: No. The alleged sale cannot be considered valid because no perfected contract of sale was proven; the absence of evidence of William’s consent is subsumed in that failure.
• Evidentiary Value of Petitioners’ Documents: Yes. The Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the evidentiary value of petitioners’ tax declaration; with no contrary document from respondent, the tax declaration in Mary’s name became prima facie evidence of ownership or possession.
• Contract of Sale and Ownership: No. No contract of sale was perfected between the parties, so ownership remained with petitioners.

• Execution and Existence of Private Document: Respondent bore the burden of proving her case by preponderance of evidence. She did not dispute that the old house was originally owned by petitioners, but she claimed to have obtained title through a sale in 1994 and 1995. She did not present the alleged private document or any document evidencing the supposed sale. Her claim that Mary took the receipt was a mere accusation, uncorroborated by any proof that the document existed and that Mary took it. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it, and a mere allegation is not evidence. With Mary’s outright denial of the sale and the lack of documentary evidence of payment, respondent had to prove her case and convince the court that her claims were true. She failed to do so. As the trial court observed, instead of establishing that there was indeed a sale, respondent wanted to prove her case by a receipt when it should be the receipt that should further corroborate the existence of the sale.
• Credibility of Witnesses: Although the appellate court’s findings of fact are generally binding and must be respected, the conflicting factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court constrained the Supreme Court to review the factual circumstances. Judicial policy accords the trial court’s findings of fact the highest respect and does not disturb them on appeal unless there are strong and impelling reasons. Trial courts have more opportunity and facilities to examine factual matters and are in a better position to assess the credibility of witnesses by their demeanor on the stand. No clear specific contrary evidence was cited by the Court of Appeals to justify reversing the trial court’s findings. Between the factual findings of the trial court and those of the Court of Appeals, the trial court’s findings must prevail.
• Findings of Fact: The Court of Appeals relied on “other cogently strong proofs” to determine the existence of a contract of sale: that the Wooden spouses renovated the old house, that they collected rental payments, and the contents of the SALNs of both Mary and Nestor. That reliance was misplaced. Petitioners had been challenging respondent’s claims from the very start. Mary explained that she and her husband only allowed the Wooden spouses to collect rental payments so that the latter could use the money for maintenance and minor repairs of the old house. The renovations could not be considered an act of ownership because only the second floor of the old house, or the area occupied by the Wooden spouses, was renovated; respondent did not mention renovating the ground floor, which was rented out to tenants. The Wooden spouses were able to renovate the second floor because petitioners gave them liberty to make improvements, and Dolores testified that the renovation was undertaken only on the area they occupied to make it more convenient for them. Dolores also stated that Nestor denied being the owner of the old house during one of her visits. The Court of Appeals’ surmise that Nestor bought the house after his mother’s visit was a mere assumption, and a judgment must be based on facts. A conjecture is always a conjecture; it can never be admitted as evidence. Even if the assumption were permitted, it ran counter to respondent’s claim that she and Nestor renovated the old house after they purchased it sometime in 1994 and 1995. As to the SALNs, Nestor’s 1995 SALN indicated the old house as part of his assets while Mary’s 1995 SALN did not declare the same as her asset, but respondent did not offer Mary’s SALN in evidence to enable the Court to determine the veracity of the appellate court’s conclusion. The Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Mary read Nestor’s SALN and took no issue with it because it was true was pure conjecture. Unless respondent proved that Mary indeed read and knew about the contents of the SALN, the Court of Appeals could not assume that Mary was aware of its contents or that the asset declared therein referred to the very same property subject of the case. It was immaterial that Nestor and Mary used to work in the same police station; that fact did not automatically mean that each member knew the affairs, financial or otherwise, of the other. Even granting that Mary browsed through Nestor’s SALN, the entry described a house located at EM’s Bario acquired in 1995 through purchase costing P70,000 and improved in the amount of P70,000, a description that did not clearly identify the property as the old house owned by Mary. Mary could not be charged with acquiescence to Nestor’s declaration of ownership. Even assuming the declaration was given weight, it was inconsistent with respondent’s claim that they purchased the old house for P60,000 and improved it to the tune of P175,000.
• Consent of William Guidangen: The decision does not separately discuss this issue. Its threshold holding that respondent failed to prove a perfected contract of sale necessarily means that the alleged sale cannot be considered valid, and the question of William’s consent need not be reached.
• Evidentiary Value of Petitioners’ Documents: The SALN cannot take precedence over the tax declaration issued in Mary’s name. Jurisprudence holds that ownership and possession are established by a certificate of title and, in its absence, by a tax declaration. Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land in the absence of other strong evidence; they are merely indicia of a claim of ownership. However, where respondent was unable to produce any shred of document as evidence of her claim, the tax declaration became prima facie evidence of ownership in favor of petitioners. Tax receipts and tax declarations are prima facie proof of ownership or possession of the property for which such taxes have been paid. The tax declaration was issued as early as 1988 in Mary’s name and had not been transferred to anyone else since its issuance, tilting the balance in favor of petitioners. Petitioners’ payment of real property taxes only on August 11, 1997, or a month before respondent filed her complaint, should have no bearing on the question of ownership. As clarified by the Municipal Assessor, it is a common occurrence that real property taxes are not paid religiously.
• Contract of Sale and Ownership: Under Article 1475 of the Civil Code, the contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. Respondent failed to establish that there was a meeting of minds between the parties as to the consideration or purchase price certain in money of the old house. Her testimony pertaining to the payment of a total amount of P51,000 was unclear as to whether it already represented the total amount of the supposed agreed purchase price or was merely part of the P60,000 she alleged in the complaint. The due execution and authenticity of the private document could not be ascertained because respondent was not present during its execution, neither her signature nor that of her husband appeared thereon, and she did not present any other witness who knew about and read the private document, much less saw it executed. In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish her case by preponderance of evidence. If she claims a right granted or created by law, she must prove her claim by competent evidence and must rely on the strength of her own evidence and not on the weakness of her opponent’s. Having filed an action involving property, respondent had the burden of proving her case by relying on the strength of her own title and not on the alleged weakness of petitioners’ claim. To award ownership to respondent absent any shred of corroborative evidence of her claim over the old house would open doubts on the veracity of her naked assertions.

• Burden of Proof and Strength of Plaintiff’s Evidence — In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish the case by preponderance of evidence. If the plaintiff claims a right granted or created by law, the claim must be proved by competent evidence, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of her own evidence and not on the weakness of the opponent’s. The Court applied this doctrine against respondent, who failed to present the alleged private document or any corroborative proof of sale.
• Perfected Contract of Sale — Under Article 1475 of the Civil Code, the contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. The Court found no meeting of minds on the consideration or purchase price because respondent’s testimony on the payment of P51,000 was unclear as to whether it was the total agreed price or only part of the alleged P60,000.
• Due Execution and Authenticity of Private Document — A party relying on a private document must prove its due execution and authenticity. Respondent was not present during the execution of the alleged private document, neither she nor her husband signed it, and no witness testified that he or she knew, read, or saw the document executed. The document’s due execution and authenticity could not be ascertained.
• Tax Declaration as Prima Facie Evidence of Ownership or Possession — Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land; they are merely indicia of a claim of ownership. However, in the absence of any other strong evidence, they are prima facie proof of ownership or possession of the property for which taxes have been paid. Because respondent produced no document supporting her claim, the tax declaration issued in Mary’s name as early as 1988 became prima facie evidence of ownership or possession in favor of petitioners.
• Conjecture and Surmise Not Evidence — A judgment must be based on facts; conjectures and surmises cannot substitute for evidence. The Court rejected the Court of Appeals’ assumptions that Nestor bought the house after his mother’s visit and that Mary read Nestor’s SALN and acquiesced in its contents.
• Trial Court’s Findings on Credibility — It is a matter of judicial policy to accord the trial court’s findings of fact the highest respect and not to disturb them on appeal unless there are strong and impelling reasons. Trial courts have more opportunity and facilities to examine factual matters and are in a better position to assess the credibility of witnesses. No clear specific contrary evidence justified the Court of Appeals’ reversal, so the trial court’s findings prevailed.
• Article 1357 Right to Compel Form — If the law requires a document or other special form, the contracting parties may compel each other to observe that form once the contract has been perfected. The Court of Appeals invoked this provision, but the Supreme Court held that no perfected contract of sale existed, so respondent had no right to compel execution of a registrable document of conveyance.

• “The plaintiff must rely on the strength of [her] own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant’s.” — This opening quotation states the burden-of-proof principle that controlled the case; respondent could not rely on alleged weaknesses in petitioners’ claim but had to prove her own title through sale.
• “Respondent failed to prove the existence of a perfected contract of sale between the parties.” — This is the core holding of the Decision; it resolves the ultimate issue and explains why the Court of Appeals’ order to execute a deed of sale could not stand.
• “A conjecture is always a conjecture; it can never be admitted as evidence.” — The Court used this formulation to reject the Court of Appeals’ assumptions about Nestor’s alleged purchase and Mary’s alleged knowledge of Nestor’s SALN.
• “Tax receipts and [tax] declarations are prima facie proof of ownership or possession of the property for which such taxes have been paid.” — This passage defines the evidentiary weight of tax declarations and supports the Court’s conclusion that Mary’s tax declaration became prima facie evidence of ownership or possession in petitioners’ favor.

• Heirs of the Deceased Carmen Cruz-Zamora vs. Multiwood International, Inc., G.R. No. 146428, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 137, 148 — Cited for the rule that the plaintiff must rely on the strength of her own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant’s.
• Borillo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 55691, May 21, 1992, 209 SCRA 130, 140 — Cited for the binding effect of the appellate court’s factual findings and for the policy of respecting the trial court’s findings on credibility absent strong and impelling reasons.
• Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 144 Phil. 678, 684 (1970) — Cited in Borillo for the same rule on factual findings.
• Fernandez vs. Amagna, G.R. No. 152614, September 30, 2009, 601 SCRA 330, 348 — Cited for the rule that he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.
• Caoile vs. Vivo, 210 Phil. 67, 80 (1983) — Cited for the rule that a judgment has to be based on facts and that conjectures and surmises cannot substitute for facts.
• Alsua-Betts vs. Court of Appeals, 180 Phil. 737, 768 (1979) — Cited for the statement that a conjecture is always a conjecture and can never be admitted as evidence.
• Heirs of Brusas vs. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil. 47, 55 (1999) — Cited for the rule that tax receipts and declarations are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.
• De La Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 458 Phil. 929, 941 (2003) — Cited for the rule that tax receipts and declarations are prima facie proof of ownership or possession of the property for which taxes have been paid.
• Heirs of Spouses Dela Cruz vs. Heirs of Quintos, Sr., 434 Phil. 708, 719 (2002) — Cited for the rule that in civil cases the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish her case by preponderance of evidence.
• Umpoc vs. Mercado, 490 Phil. 118, 135 (2005) — Cited for the same burden-of-proof rule in civil cases.
• Ocampo vs. Ocampo, 471 Phil. 519, 539 (2004) — Cited for the rule that in an action involving property, the plaintiff has the burden of proving her case by relying on the strength of her own title and not on the alleged weakness of the opponent’s claim.
• Spouses de la Cruz vs. Ramiscal, 491 Phil. 62, 75 (2005) — Cited for the principle that awarding ownership absent corroborative evidence opens doubts on the veracity of naked assertions.
• Claudel vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85240, July 12, 1991, 199 SCRA 113, 124 — Cited for the rule that between the factual findings of the trial court and those of the Court of Appeals, the trial court’s findings must prevail.

• Article 1357, Civil Code — If the law requires a document or other special form, the contracting parties may compel each other to observe that form once the contract has been perfected. The Court of Appeals invoked this provision to order execution of the deed of sale, but the Supreme Court held that no perfected contract existed, so the right to compel form did not arise.
• Article 1475, Civil Code — The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. The Court applied this provision and found that respondent failed to establish a meeting of minds on the consideration or purchase price of the old house.

Corona, C.J. (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Reyes, JJ., concur. Reyes, J., participated per raffle dated January 30, 2012.