Spouses Gabatan vs. Ahlgren

A voluntary easement of right of way is not automatically a personal servitude merely because it names specific individuals as beneficiaries; whether it is a real servitude that follows the dominant tenement depends on whether those named beneficiaries owned a dominant tenement at the time the easement was created.

Petitioners Spouses Rosemary D. Gabatan and Alexander N. Gabatan own Lot No. 2554-D, while respondent Dominga B. Ahlgren owns a portion of Lot No. 2561-L; the two lots adjoin, Lot No. 2554-D being bounded on the north by Lot No. 2561, and both trace their origins to the single parcel originally registered as Lot No. 2561 under OCT No. O-V-3583. The governing backdrop is Book II, Title VII of the Civil Code, which defines an easement as an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner under Article 613, while Article 614 allows servitudes for the benefit of a community or of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong. The case turns on the distinction between those two modes of servitude.

Lot No. 2561, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. O-V-3583, was registered in the name of Spouses Mamerto Divinagracia and Susana Orozca. On October 5, 1948, by virtue of a Deed of Sale, a right of way was voluntarily created on Lot No. 2561 in favor of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, and the grant was annotated on the certificate of title as Entry No. 19634, subjecting the parcel to a road right of way in favor of the Board per deed on file in the registry.

On February 20, 1987, the encumbrance under Entry No. 19634 was cancelled by virtue of a court order dated January 30, 1979 issued by the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, 12th Judicial District, Branch II, in favor of Conrado O. Divinagracia, et al., and the cancellation was recorded on OCT No. O-V-3583 as Entry No. 100107. Earlier, on August 18, 1986, the heirs of Conrado executed an Extrajudicial Settlement and divided Lot No. 2561 into 12 sublots, one of which — Lot No. 2561-L — was adjudicated to Eufresen O. Divinagracia and brought under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-24142. Inscribed on TCT No. T-24142 is a right of way granted by Eufresen in favor of his siblings and co-heirs, recorded on April 3, 1987 as Entry No. 100340, by which Eufresen, for and in consideration of his kindness and benevolent act, agreed and permitted Teofila, Alfredo, Felix, and Ester, all surnamed Divinagracia, to have a permanent easement of right of way over the land covered by the title, limited to a path or passageway enough for any motor vehicle to pass, per a deed notarized by Notary Public Nereo V. Catan. The right of way annotated on TCT No. T-24142 covering Lot No. 2561-L pertains to the same road previously described as a right of way under Entry No. 19634 on OCT No. O-V-3583 covering Lot No. 2561, which had been cancelled.

Petitioners Spouses Rosemary D. Gabatan and Alexander N. Gabatan own Lot No. 2554-D, a parcel adjoining Lot No. 2561-L and bounded on the north by Lot No. 2561. Sometime in 2001, petitioners constructed a residential house on Lot No. 2554-D and erected a fence around it, with their main gate facing the right of way previously established and annotated on OCT No. O-V-3583 and now under TCT No. T-24142. Thereafter, Ahlgren purchased a portion of Lot No. 2561-L from Eufresen.

In 2006, Ahlgren erected a garage and fence on the location where petitioners assert a right of way was created in their favor, referring to the right of way covered by Entry No. 100340. Petitioners assert that because of Ahlgren's newly constructed garage, they were deprived of access to and from the National Highway. On March 15, 2007, petitioners filed a Complaint — dated March 5, 2007 and docketed as Civil Case No. 2007-14081 — against Ahlgren to compel her to remove the structure she allegedly constructed on their road right of way to serve as a garage.

Ahlgren asserted that no right of way over Lot No. 2561 was created in favor of petitioners, that the right of way imposed on Lot No. 2561 in favor of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. had long been cancelled, and that the right of way granted to Eufresen and annotated on his title over Lot No. 2561-L applied only to the latter's siblings and was only large enough for any motor vehicle to pass.

Before the RTC, it was established that a portion of Lot No. 2561, now a portion of Lot No. 2561-L, had been used as a road ever since the parents of Eufresen sold the property to the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., and that prior to and after the subdivision of Lot No. 2561 a portion thereof served as a right of way in favor of petitioners, their predecessors-in-interest, and the public in general. It was likewise established that Lot No. 2561 was divided into 12 sublots by the heirs of Conrado through an Extrajudicial Settlement, but the record is bereft of any evidence on the location of the heirs' lots in relation to Lot No. 2561-L, which belonged to Eufresen.

• Existence of a Right of Way: Petitioners asserted that a right of way exists in their favor on Ahlgren's property, alleging in their Complaint that a road on Ahlgren's property — a portion of Lot No. 2561-L containing the right of way — "has been in existence for more than 50 long years, utilized and used as such by the public."

• No Right of Way in Petitioners' Favor: Ahlgren asserted that no right of way over Lot No. 2561 was created in favor of petitioners, the right of way imposed on Lot No. 2561 in favor of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. having long been cancelled.
• Scope of the Annotated Easement: Ahlgren asserted that the right of way granted to Eufresen and annotated on his title over Lot No. 2561-L applied only to the latter's siblings and was only large enough for any motor vehicle to pass.

• Entitlement to a Right of Way: Whether petitioners are entitled to a right of way on Ahlgren's land.

• Entitlement to a Right of Way: Remand. The SC did not resolve entitlement outright; it remanded to the CA to receive evidence on whether Teofila, Alfredo, Felix, and Ester Divinagracia owned a dominant tenement when the easement under Entry No. 100340 was created, since that fact determines whether the easement is a real servitude following the servient estate or a personal servitude confined to the named grantees and their heirs and assigns.

• Entitlement to a Right of Way: Petitioners bore the burden of proving their entitlement to a right of way, whether as a voluntary easement granted by the landowner or as a servitude established by law, over Ahlgren's property. A right of way, which is an apparent and discontinuous easement, may only be acquired by title under Articles 620 and 622 of the Civil Code, and a duly registered certificate of title is a public document whose entries are presumed correct unless the party contesting their accuracy produces evidence establishing otherwise. It was not disputed that a right of way was voluntarily granted and annotated under Ahlgren's title, but Entry No. 100340 on TCT No. T-24142 named only Teofila, Alfredo, Felix, and Ester, all surnamed Divinagracia, and their successors-in-interest. The CA read this as a personal servitude effective only between the parties, their heirs, and assigns, and concluded that petitioners — who are neither the named grantees nor their heirs or assigns — could not avail of it. The SC held that the CA failed to appreciate the nature of an easement as an encumbrance upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable, and not simply a personal or contractual right granted to an individual, as Article 613 provides. While Article 614 allows servitudes for the benefit of a community, or of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong, this does not mean that all voluntary easements are purely contractual obligations; a servitude may exist either for the benefit of a particular tenement, in which case it is a real servitude under Article 613, or for the benefit of persons without a dominant tenement, in which case it is a personal servitude under Article 614. The case therefore turns on whether Teofila, Alfredo, Felix, and Ester were owners of a dominant tenement when the easement under Entry No. 100340 was created: if they were, the easement is a real servitude that follows the servient estate and whose enjoyment is not limited to specific persons; if they were not, it is a personal servitude that can only be enjoyed by them and their heirs and assigns. There is no evidence on record of the land ownership, if any, of Teofila, Alfredo, Felix, and Ester in relation to Lot No. 2561; while it was established by the RTC that Lot No. 2561 was divided into 12 sublots by the heirs of Conrado through an Extrajudicial Settlement, the record is bereft of any evidence pertaining to the location of the heirs' lots in relation to Lot No. 2561-L, which belonged to Eufresen. The CA thus erred in automatically concluding that the easement was a personal servitude without inquiring into whether the named grantees were owners of a dominant tenement, but there is likewise no basis in the record for the SC to rule that the easement is a real servitude and that petitioners, as owners of the lot adjoining Lot No. 2561-L, are entitled to it. In the interest of substantial justice, the SC remanded the case to the CA to receive evidence on this crucial factual issue.

• Real Servitude vs. Personal Servitude — Under Article 613 of the Civil Code, an easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner; this is a real servitude. Under Article 614, servitudes may also be established for the benefit of a community, or of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong; this is a personal servitude. The SC applied the distinction to hold that a voluntary easement naming specific individuals is not for that reason alone personal — the inquiry is whether those named persons owned a dominant tenement when the easement was created. If they did, the easement is real and follows the servient estate, its enjoyment not being limited to specific persons; if not, it is personal and may be enjoyed only by the named grantees and their heirs and assigns.
• Right of Way as an Apparent and Discontinuous Easement Acquired Only by Title — A right of way is an apparent and discontinuous easement that may only be acquired by title, per Articles 620 and 622 of the Civil Code. The burden therefore fell on petitioners to establish title to the easement, whether by voluntary grant or by operation of law, over Ahlgren's property.
• Presumption of Correctness of Torrens Title Entries — A duly registered certificate of title is a public document and the entries found in it are presumed correct, unless the party who contests its accuracy can produce evidence establishing otherwise. The SC applied this to the annotation under Entry No. 100340 on TCT No. T-24142, which defined the extent and the beneficiaries of the voluntary easement.
• Remand for Reception of Evidence in the Interest of Substantial Justice — Where the disposition of the case hinges on a crucial factual issue that the appellate court never inquired into and on which the record is silent, the SC may remand the case for reception of evidence rather than resolve the issue on an incomplete record.

• "An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner." — Quoting Article 613 of the Civil Code, the SC used this definition to correct the CA's treatment of the annotated right of way as a merely personal or contractual right rather than a real right attaching to a dominant tenement.
• "Petitioners' case thus turns on whether Teofila, Alfredo, Felix, and Ester were owners of a dominant tenement when the easement under Entry No. 100340 was created. If Teofila, Alfredo, Felix, and Ester were owners of a dominant tenement, then the easement under Entry No. 100340 is a real servitude that follows the servient estate the enjoyment of which is not limited to specific persons." — This is the ratio decidendi: the character of the easement, and hence petitioners' entitlement, depends on the existence of a dominant tenement at the time of creation.
• "Accordingly, the CA erred in automatically concluding that the easement under Entry No. 100340 was a personal servitude in favor of Teofila, Alfredo, Felix, and Ester without inquiring into whether the said persons were owners of a dominant tenement." — States the specific error that warranted the remand.
• "a duly-registered certificate of title is considered a public document and the entries found in it are presumed correct, unless the party who contests its accuracy can produce evidence establishing otherwise." — The evidentiary rule the SC applied to the annotation on TCT No. T-24142.

• Heirs of the late Joaquin Limense vs. Rita Vda. De Ramos, 619 Phil. 592 (2009) — Cited by the SC in support of the rule that a right of way, being an apparent and discontinuous easement, may only be acquired by title; the same case had been relied upon by the RTC for the proposition that one who is fully aware of the long existence of an alley or right of way is bound to respect it.
• Lasquite vs. Victory Hills, Inc., 608 Phil. 418 (2009) — Cited for the rule that a duly registered certificate of title is a public document and the entries found in it are presumed correct unless the party contesting their accuracy produces evidence to the contrary.

• Article 613, Civil Code — Defines an easement or servitude as an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner; applied to characterize the annotated right of way as a real right attaching to a dominant tenement rather than a mere personal right of the named grantees.
• Article 614, Civil Code — Allows servitudes for the benefit of a community, or of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong; the SC clarified that this provision does not convert all voluntary easements into purely contractual obligations, since a servitude may still be real under Article 613.
• Articles 620 and 622, Civil Code — Cited for the rule that a right of way, being an apparent and discontinuous easement, may only be acquired by title, which placed on petitioners the burden of proving their entitlement.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — The procedural vehicle by which the CA Decision dated September 27, 2018 and Resolution dated June 28, 2019 were brought before the SC.