Spouses Fortaleza vs. Spouses Lapitan

The issuance of a writ of possession to the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is a ministerial duty of the trial court, not a discretionary act, once the one-year redemption period has expired and ownership has been consolidated and registered in the purchaser's name; the court may not inquire into the validity of the mortgage or the regularity of the foreclosure, which must be raised in a separate petition under Section 8 of Act No. 3135. The ministerial character of the writ yields only where a recognized exception obtains, such as the presence of a third party holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor, a pending action directly putting in issue the validity of the levy and sale, or gross inadequacy of the purchase price.

Spouses Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza were the mortgagor-debtors of a residential house and lot in Barrio Anos, Los Baños, Laguna, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-412512, which they conveyed by way of real estate mortgage to spouses Rolando and Amparo Lapitan as security for a P1.2 million loan. The purchasers at the subsequent foreclosure sale were the creditors' son, Dr. Raul Lapitan, and his wife Rona, who thereby stood as the opposing claimants to possession. The governing statutory backdrop is Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, which regulates the sale of property under special powers inserted in or annexed to real estate mortgages and which, in its Section 7, authorizes the purchaser to petition for possession in the form of an ex parte motion, and in its Section 8, supplies the debtor's remedy of a petition to set aside the sale and cancel the writ.

Spouses Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza obtained a loan from spouses Rolando and Amparo Lapitan in the amount of P1.2 million, subject to 34% interest per annum. As security, the Fortalezas executed on January 28, 1998 a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over their residential house and lot situated in Barrio Anos, Municipality of Los Baños, Laguna, registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-412512. The mortgage instrument, notarized by the Fortalezas' original counsel of record, acknowledged the P1.2 million indebtedness, undertook to pay it within six months from signing, with interest at the bank rate of 34%, extendible for another six months upon payment of accrued interest and part of the principal, and expressly authorized foreclosure, judicial or extrajudicial, at the option of the mortgagees, with the mortgagees constituted as attorneys-in-fact with authority to take possession of the mortgaged property and sell it at public auction.

When the Fortalezas failed to pay the indebtedness, including the interests and penalties, the creditors applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage before the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Calamba City, and the public auction sale was set for May 9, 2001. At the sale, the creditors' son, Dr. Raul Lapitan, and his wife Rona emerged as the highest bidders with a bid amount of P2.5 million. A Certificate of Sale was issued on October 24, 2002, and this was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Calamba City and annotated at the back of TCT No. T-412512 under Entry No. 615683 on November 15, 2002.

The one-year redemption period expired without the Fortalezas redeeming the mortgage. Spouses Lapitan accordingly executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership on November 20, 2003 and caused the cancellation of TCT No. T-412512 and the registration of the subject property in their names under TCT No. T-535945 on February 4, 2004. Despite a formal demand dated August 17, 2004, the Fortalezas refused to vacate and surrender possession of the subject property.

On August 27, 2004, spouses Lapitan filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession with Branch 35 of the RTC of Calamba City, docketed as SLRC Case No. 2528-2004-C, claiming entitlement to possession as new registered owners pursuant to Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118. In their opposition, the Fortalezas questioned the validity of the real estate mortgage and the foreclosure sale, arguing that the mortgage was void because the creditors bloated the principal amount by the imposition of exorbitant interest, and that the foreclosure proceeding was invalid for non-compliance with the posting requirement. For the repeated failure of the Fortalezas to appear at the scheduled hearings, the RTC allowed spouses Lapitan to present evidence ex parte.

The RTC thereafter granted the petition, and in its motion for reconsideration the Fortalezas claimed for the first time that the subject property was their family home and therefore exempt from foreclosure sale. The writ was issued and served, but implementation was held in abeyance upon the perfection of the Fortalezas' appeal. The findings material to the Supreme Court's analysis were that the one-year redemption period had expired without redemption; that ownership had been consolidated and a new certificate of title issued in the Lapitans' names; that no third party held the subject property adversely to the judgment debtor, the occupants being the debtor-mortgagors themselves and not strangers to the foreclosure proceedings; that the Fortalezas filed no direct action for annulment of the foreclosure sale; and that the circumstance of gross inadequacy of the purchase price was absent.

• Two-Raffle Rule and Judicial Bias: Petitioners maintained that the Court of Appeals violated the two-raffle system prescribed by the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals when it rendered the assailed Decision barely after the submission of the parties' briefs, with the justice assigned at the completion stage also deciding the case on the merits; this procedural shortcut, they argued, evinced the appellate court's bias and prejudgment in favor of the respondents and rendered the Decision null and void.
• Non-Ministerial Character of the Writ of Possession: Relying on Barican vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Cometa vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, and reiterating the irregularities allegedly attending the foreclosure sale, petitioners insisted that the issuance of a writ of possession is not always ministerial and that the trial court should have accorded them an opportunity to present contrary evidence.
• Family Home Exemption and Right of Redemption: Petitioners argued that the subject property is a family home exempt from forced sale and that, in the spirit of equity and following Tolentino vs. Court of Appeals and De los Reyes vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, they should be allowed to exercise the right of redemption even after the expiration of the one-year period, having allegedly been prevented from redeeming by the respondents' demand of a redemption price more than double the value of the foreclosed property.

• Two-Raffle Rule and Judicial Bias: Whether the Court of Appeals violated the two-raffle rule under the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals when it rendered its Decision immediately after the submission of the parties' briefs, thereby engaging in procedural shortcuts and acting with undue haste, rendering its Decision null and void and tainted by manifest bias and partiality.
• Propriety of the Writ of Possession: Whether the Court of Appeals committed serious reversible error in upholding the trial court's issuance of a writ of possession despite the respondents' alleged failure to establish entitlement to the writ, the non-compliance by the original mortgagors and the respondents with the statutory requirements of extrajudicial foreclosure under Act No. 3135, and the alleged fatal defects of the foreclosure proceedings.
• Family Home Exemption and Right of Redemption: Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in not holding that the petitioners were prevented by the respondents from exercising their right of redemption over the foreclosed property by the demand of a highly inequitable redemption price, especially considering that the foreclosed property is the family home of the petitioners and their children.

• Two-Raffle Rule and Judicial Bias: No. The alleged breach of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals does not invalidate the assailed Decision, the two-raffle system having been abandoned under the 2009 IRCA, and rules of procedure being modifiable at any time without impairing vested rights, of which there are none in procedural rules.
• Propriety of the Writ of Possession: No. The issuance of the writ was proper and ministerial under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, the redemption period having lapsed and a new certificate of title having been issued in the purchasers' names; the exceptions in Barican and Cometa are not present, and the validity of the mortgage and foreclosure cannot be raised to oppose the ex parte petition.
• Family Home Exemption and Right of Redemption: No. Article 155(3) of the Family Code expressly permits the forced sale of a family home for debts secured by a mortgage on the premises, and the exemption, being a personal privilege, must be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the public auction; the right of redemption was likewise waived for failure to file an action or make a formal offer to redeem with simultaneous tender of payment within the one-year period.

• Two-Raffle Rule and Judicial Bias: Under the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, appealed civil cases underwent a two-raffle system: a preliminary raffle to determine the Justice to whom the case would be assigned for completion of records, and, after completion, a second raffle to determine the Justice to whom the case would be assigned for study and report; each stage was distinct, and the Justice initially raffled for completion might not be the one to write the decision. That system, however, was abandoned under the 2009 IRCA, under which the Justice to whom a case is raffled acts on it both at the completion stage and for the decision on the merits. The alleged defect in the processing of the case was thus effectively cured, since rules of procedure may be modified at any time and become effective at once, so long as the change does not affect vested rights, and there are no vested rights to rules of procedure; unless the petitioners could establish a right by virtue of some statute or law, the alleged violation was not an actionable wrong. Moreover, the 2002 IRCA did not provide for the effect of non-compliance with the two-raffle system on the validity of a decision, nor did it prohibit the assignment by raffle of a case for study and report to a Justice who had handled the same case during its completion stage. Personal bias and prejudgment cannot be inferred from the alleged breach of internal rules, clear and convincing evidence being required to prove bias and prejudice; bare allegations and mere suspicions of partiality are insufficient in the absence of evidence to overcome the presumption that a member of the court will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor. No act or conduct of the division or the ponente was shown to indicate any arbitrariness against the petitioners, and the opinions formed in the course of the judicial proceedings were all based on the evidence presented.

• Propriety of the Writ of Possession: The authorities invoked by the petitioners are not on all fours. In Barican, the Court held that the obligation of a court to issue a writ of possession ceases to be ministerial if there is a third party holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor, in which case the trial court should conduct a hearing to determine the nature of the adverse possession. In Cometa, there was a pending action in which the validity of the levy and sale of the properties in question was directly put in issue, which the Court found pre-emptive of resolution, for if the applicant for a writ of possession acquired no interest in the property by virtue of the levy and sale, he is not entitled to its possession; moreover, the properties in that case were undisputedly sold at an unusually lower price than their true value, so that equitable considerations moved the Court to withhold the writ to prevent injustice. Here, no third party holds the subject property adversely to the judgment debtor; it is the spouses Fortaleza themselves, as debtors-mortgagors, who occupy the property, and they are not strangers to the foreclosure proceedings in which the ex parte writ was applied for. Significantly, they filed no direct action for annulment of the foreclosure sale, and the peculiar circumstance of gross inadequacy of the purchase price is absent. Accordingly, unless a case falls under recognized exceptions provided by law and jurisprudence, the ex parte, non-adversarial, summary and ministerial nature of the issuance of a writ of possession is maintained, as outlined in Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118. Under that provision, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale may apply for a writ of possession during the redemption period; here, the one-year period to redeem had already lapsed, ownership had been consolidated, and a new certificate of title had been issued in the Lapitans' names. As new registered owners, they are even more entitled to possession and have the unmistakable right to file an ex parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession. As explained in Edralin vs. Philippine Veterans Bank, the duty of the trial court to grant the writ in such instances is ministerial and the court may not exercise discretion or judgment: the purchaser who has a right to possession after the expiration of the redemption period becomes the absolute owner when no redemption is made; he can demand possession at any time following consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new TCT; after consolidation of title in the purchaser's name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, the purchaser's right to possession ripens into the absolute right of a confirmed owner; and at that point the issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper application and proof of title, becomes merely a ministerial function, the court being unable to exercise its discretion. The Lapitans sufficiently established their right to the writ, presenting the Certificate of Sale and its annotation at the back of TCT No. T-412512, the Affidavit of Consolidation proving failure to redeem within the one-year period, TCT No. T-535945 issued in their names, and the formal demand on the Fortalezas to vacate. Any question regarding the regularity and validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be raised as a justification for opposing the petition, those issues being determinable only after the issuance of the writ; the judge with whom an application for a writ of possession is filed need not look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure, and the writ issues as a matter of course, the rationale being to allow the purchaser to have possession of the foreclosed property without delay, such possession being founded on the right of ownership. Section 8 of Act No. 3135 gives the debtor-mortgagor the right to file a petition for the setting aside of the foreclosure sale and for the cancellation of a writ of possession in the same proceedings where the writ was issued, within 30 days after the purchaser-mortgagee was given possession; the court's decision thereon may be appealed by either party, but the order of possession shall continue in effect during the pendency of the appeal. Until the foreclosure sale is annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction, the issuance of a writ of possession remains the ministerial duty of the trial court, and the same is true of its implementation; otherwise the writ would be a useless paper judgment, a result inimical to the mandate of Act No. 3135 to vest possession in the purchaser immediately.

• Family Home Exemption and Right of Redemption: The argument that the subject property is exempt from forced sale because it is a family home deserves scant consideration. As a rule, the family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment; however, Article 155(3) of the Family Code explicitly allows the forced sale of a family home for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution. There is no doubt that the Fortalezas voluntarily executed on January 28, 1998 a deed of real estate mortgage over the subject property, which was even notarized by their original counsel of record. Assuming the property is exempt from forced sale, they did not set up and prove such exemption to the Sheriff before it was sold at the public auction. As elucidated in Honrado vs. Court of Appeals, while it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction, and failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption; as ruled in Gomez vs. Gealone, although the Rules of Court does not prescribe the period within which to claim the exemption, the right of exemption is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such must be claimed not by the sheriff but by the debtor himself at the time of the levy or within a reasonable period thereafter. Reasonable time for purposes of the law on exemption does not mean a time after the expiration of the one-year period for a judgment debtor to redeem the property. Equally without merit is the reliance on Tolentino and De los Reyes in praying for the exercise of the right of redemption beyond the one-year period. In Tolentino, the Court held that an action to redeem filed within the period of redemption, with a simultaneous deposit of the redemption money tendered to the sheriff, is equivalent to an offer to redeem and has the effect of preserving the right to redemption for future enforcement even beyond the one-year period; in De los Reyes, the mortgagor was allowed to redeem after the Court found that the tender of the redemption price to the sheriff was made within the one-year period and for a sufficient amount. The circumstances here are far different: the Fortalezas neither filed an action nor made a formal offer to redeem the subject property accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of payment, and it is undisputed that they allowed the one-year period to lapse from the registration of the certificate of sale without redeeming the mortgage. For all intents and purposes, they waived or abandoned their right of redemption. Although the rule on redemption is liberally interpreted in favor of the original owner of the property, the privilege of liberality cannot be applied to accommodate the Fortalezas due to their negligence or omission to exercise the right of redemption within the prescribed period without justifiable cause.

• Ministerial nature of the writ of possession in extrajudicial foreclosure — Under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale may petition for possession of the property in the form of an ex parte motion, and the court, upon approval of the bond, shall order the issuance of a writ of possession. The proceeding is ex parte, non-adversarial, and summary, and the issuance of the writ is a ministerial function that the court may not withhold in the exercise of discretion or judgment. The Court applied the doctrine because the one-year redemption period had lapsed and a new certificate of title had been issued in the purchasers' names, so that the RTC had no choice but to grant the petition.

• Ripening of the purchaser's right to possession into the absolute right of a confirmed owner — After consolidation of title in the purchaser's name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, the purchaser's right to possession ripens into the absolute right of a confirmed owner; he may demand possession at any time following consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new TCT, and the issuance of a writ of possession upon proper application and proof of title becomes merely a ministerial function. The Court applied this in holding that the Lapitans, as new registered owners, were even more entitled to possession and had the unmistakable right to file an ex parte motion for the writ.

• Recognized exceptions to the ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession — The duty ceases to be ministerial, and a hearing becomes necessary, where (a) a third party holds the property adversely to the judgment debtor, in which case the trial court must determine the nature of the adverse possession (Barican vs. Intermediate Appellate Court); (b) there is a pending action in which the validity of the levy and sale is directly put in issue, which is pre-emptive of resolution, since an applicant who acquired no interest in the property by virtue of the levy and sale is not entitled to possession (Cometa vs. Intermediate Appellate Court); and (c) equitable considerations obtain, as where the properties were sold at an unusually lower price than their true value. The Court found none of these exceptions present because the occupants were the debtor-mortgagors themselves and not strangers to the foreclosure, no direct action for annulment had been filed, and gross inadequacy of the purchase price was absent.

• Non-admissibility of collateral attacks on the mortgage or foreclosure in writ of possession proceedings — Any question regarding the regularity and validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be raised as a justification for opposing the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession; such issues may be raised and determined only after the issuance of the writ. The judge with whom an application for a writ of possession is filed need not look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure, the writ issuing as a matter of course, the rationale being to allow the purchaser to have possession of the foreclosed property without delay, such possession being founded on the right of ownership. The debtor's remedy is a petition under Section 8 of Act No. 3135 to set aside the sale and cancel the writ, filed in the same proceedings within 30 days after the purchaser was given possession, with the order of possession continuing in effect during the pendency of the appeal.

• Family home exemption as a personal privilege that must be seasonably claimed — Although the family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Article 153 of the Family Code, Article 155(3) expressly allows its forced sale for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after its constitution. The claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction; failure to do so estops the party from later claiming the exemption, the right being a personal privilege of the judgment debtor that must be claimed by the debtor himself at the time of the levy or within a reasonable period thereafter, which does not extend beyond the expiration of the one-year redemption period.

• Waiver of the right of redemption; limits of liberal interpretation — An action to redeem filed within the period of redemption, with a simultaneous deposit of the redemption money tendered to the sheriff, is equivalent to an offer to redeem and preserves the right of redemption for future enforcement even beyond the one-year period (Tolentino vs. Court of Appeals); and redemption after the period may be allowed where the tender of the redemption price to the sheriff was made within the one-year period and for a sufficient amount (De los Reyes vs. Intermediate Appellate Court). Where the mortgagor neither files such an action nor makes a formal offer to redeem accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of payment, and allows the one-year period to lapse from the registration of the certificate of sale, the right of redemption is waived or abandoned. The rule on redemption is liberally interpreted in favor of the original owner, but liberality cannot accommodate negligence or omission to exercise the right within the prescribed period without justifiable cause.

• No vested rights in rules of procedure — Rules of procedure may be modified at any time and become effective at once, so long as the change does not affect vested rights, and there are no vested rights to rules of procedure. Unless a party can establish a right by virtue of some statute or law, an alleged violation of a procedural rule is not an actionable wrong. This doctrine defeated the petitioners' reliance on the two-raffle system of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, which had been abandoned under the 2009 IRCA.

• Bias and prejudice must be established by clear and convincing evidence — Bare allegations and mere suspicions of partiality are not enough in the absence of evidence to overcome the presumption that a member of the court will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor. Personal bias and prejudgment cannot be inferred from an alleged breach of internal rules, and no arbitrariness may be imputed where the opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings are all based on the evidence presented.

• "Unless a case falls under recognized exceptions provided by law and jurisprudence, courts should maintain the ex parte, non-adversarial, summary and ministerial nature of the issuance of a writ of possession." — This is the Court's opening statement of the governing principle and functions as the thesis of the decision, framing the narrow exceptions that alone justify a departure from the ministerial rule.
• "Consequently, the purchaser, who has a right to possession after the expiration of the redemption period, becomes the absolute owner of the property when no redemption is made. x x x The purchaser can demand possession at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new TCT. After consolidation of title in the purchaser's name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchaser's right to possession ripens into the absolute right of a confirmed owner. At that point, the issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper application and proof of title becomes merely a ministerial function. Effectively, the court cannot exercise its discretion." — Quoted with approval from Edralin vs. Philippine Veterans Bank, this passage supplies the canonical formulation of the doctrine that the purchaser's possessory right ripens into an absolute right upon consolidation of title, and is the ratio decidendi for the denial of the petition.
• "Indeed, '[t]he judge with whom an application for writ of possession is filed need not look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure.'" — This states the rule barring collateral attacks on the mortgage and foreclosure in ex parte writ of possession proceedings, and explains why the Fortalezas' allegations of bloated principal, exorbitant interest, and defective posting were unavailing.
• "While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption." — Quoted from Honrado vs. Court of Appeals, this passage defines the seasonable-claim requirement for the family home exemption and disposes of the petitioners' equitable argument.

• Barican vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 245 Phil. 316 (1988) — Distinguished. The Court held in that case that the obligation to issue a writ of possession ceases to be ministerial where a third party holds the property adversely to the judgment debtor, requiring a hearing on the nature of the adverse possession; the exception was held inapplicable because the occupants here were the debtor-mortgagors themselves.
• Cometa vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 235 Phil. 569 (1987) — Distinguished. There, a pending action directly put in issue the validity of the levy and sale, which was pre-emptive of resolution, and the properties had been sold at an unusually low price, moving the Court on equitable considerations to withhold the writ; neither circumstance obtained in this case.
• Edralin vs. Philippine Veterans Bank, G.R. No. 168523, March 9, 2011, 645 SCRA 75 — Followed and quoted at length. It supplies the controlling rule that the purchaser's right to possession ripens into the absolute right of a confirmed owner upon consolidation of title, rendering the issuance of the writ a ministerial function beyond the court's discretion.
• Honrado vs. Court of Appeals, 512 Phil. 657 (2005) — Followed and quoted. It establishes that the family home exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the public auction, failing which the debtor is estopped from later claiming it.
• Gomez vs. Gealone — Cited within Honrado. It holds that the right of exemption is a personal privilege of the judgment debtor that must be claimed by the debtor himself at the time of the levy or within a reasonable period thereafter.
• Tolentino vs. Court of Appeals, 193 Phil. 663 (1981) — Distinguished. It held that an action to redeem filed within the redemption period, with simultaneous deposit of the redemption money tendered to the sheriff, is equivalent to an offer to redeem and preserves the right of redemption beyond the one-year period; the petitioners filed no such action and made no tender.
• De los Reyes vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 257 Phil. 406 (1989) — Distinguished. Redemption beyond the period was allowed there because the tender of the redemption price to the sheriff was made within the one-year period and for a sufficient amount; no tender was made in this case.
• Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Tarampi, G.R. No. 174988, December 10, 2008, 573 SCRA 537 — Followed. It holds that until the foreclosure sale is annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction, the issuance and implementation of a writ of possession remain the ministerial duty of the trial court, since otherwise the writ would be a useless paper judgment.
• Chailease Finance Corporation vs. Spouses Ma, 456 Phil. 498 (2003) — Followed. It supports the rule that questions on the regularity and validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be raised to oppose the issuance of the writ of possession.
• Samson vs. Rivera, G.R. No. 154355, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 759 — Followed. It holds that issues on the validity of the mortgage and foreclosure may be raised and determined only after the issuance of the writ of possession.
• Fernandez vs. Espinoza, G.R. No. 156421, April 14, 2008, 551 SCRA 136 — Followed. It states that the judge with whom an application for a writ of possession is filed need not look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure.
• De Liano vs. Court of Appeals, 421 Phil. 1033 (2001) — Cited. It explains that under the two-raffle system each stage is distinct and the Justice to whom the case was initially raffled for completion may not be the same Justice who will write the decision.
• Alindao vs. Joson, 332 Phil. 239 (1996) — Cited. It supports the proposition that there are no vested rights to rules of procedure.
• Aguillon vs. Director of Lands, 17 Phil. 506 (1910) and Laurel vs. Misa, 76 Phil. 372 (1946) — Cited. Both support the rule that rules of procedure may be modified at any time and become effective at once, so long as vested rights are not affected.
• Spouses De Mesa vs. Spouses Acero, G.R. No. 185064, January 16, 2012 — Cited. It supports the holding that reasonable time for claiming the exemption does not extend beyond the expiration of the one-year redemption period.
• Belisario vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 247-A Phil. 184 (1988) — Cited. It is cited in connection with the rule on redemption within the period with simultaneous tender of payment.
• Rockwell Perfecto Gohu vs. Spouses Gohu, 397 Phil. 126 (2000) and Heirs of Generoso A. Juaban vs. Bancale, G.R. No. 156011, July 3, 2008, 557 SCRA 1 — Cited. Both support the requirement of clear and convincing evidence to prove bias and prejudice, bare allegations and suspicions being insufficient.
• Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. vs. Lamb Construction Consortium Corporation, G.R. No. 170906, November 27, 2009, 606 SCRA 159 and Sulit vs. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 914 (1997) — Cited. Both are cited as instances of the recognized exceptions to the ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession.

• Section 7, Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118 — Provides that in any sale made under the Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place where the property or part thereof is situated to give him possession during the redemption period, furnishing a bond equivalent to the use of the property for twelve months to indemnify the debtor should the sale be shown to have been made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of the Act; the petition shall be under oath and filed in the form of an ex parte motion, and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff, who shall execute the order immediately. The Court relied on this provision to hold that the writ issues as a matter of course and that the proceeding is ex parte, non-adversarial, summary, and ministerial.
• Section 8, Act No. 3135 — Provides that the debtor may, in the proceedings in which possession was requested but not later than thirty days after the purchaser was given possession, petition that the sale be set aside and the writ of possession cancelled, specifying the damages suffered, on the ground that the mortgage was not violated or the sale was not made in accordance with the Act; the court shall take cognizance of the petition in accordance with the summary procedure provided in Section 112 of Act No. 496, and if it finds the debtor's complaint justified, shall dispose in his favor of all or part of the bond furnished by the person who obtained possession; either party may appeal from the order, but the order of possession shall continue in effect during the pendency of the appeal. The Court invoked this provision to identify the proper remedy for the petitioners' challenges to the mortgage and foreclosure, which could not be raised in the ex parte proceeding itself.
• Article 153, Family Code — Cited as the general rule that the family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment. The Court acknowledged the exemption but held it unavailing in light of Article 155(3) and the petitioners' failure to claim it seasonably.
• Article 155(3), Family Code — Expressly allows the forced sale of a family home for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution. The Court applied this exception to defeat the petitioners' claim that the subject property, being their family home, could not be foreclosed.
• Section 35, Rule 39, Rules of Court, made applicable to extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages by Section 6 of Act No. 3135 — Cited as one of the recognized exceptions to the ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession.
• Section 2, Rule 111, 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals — Requires that assignment of cases to a Justice, whether for completion of records or for study and report, be by raffle, with records deemed completed upon filing of the required briefs or memoranda or expiration of the period therefor and resolution of all pending incidents, whereupon the Division Clerk of Court reports the case to the Justice concerned for issuance of a resolution declaring the case submitted for decision and referring it to the Raffle Committee for raffle to a Justice for study and report. The Court held that the alleged breach of this provision did not invalidate the assailed Decision.
• Section 2, Rule 111, 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals — Provides that cases shall be assigned to a Justice by raffle for completion of records, study and report, and that upon completion the Division Clerk of Court reports the case to the Justice concerned for issuance of a resolution declaring the case submitted for decision. The Court applied this provision to hold that the two-raffle system had been abandoned and the alleged procedural defect effectively cured.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — The procedural vehicle for the Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
• Rule 41, Rules of Court — The procedural vehicle by which the petitioners elevated the RTC Order to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86287.

• Antonio T. Carpio (Senior Associate Justice)
• Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro (Associate Justice, Acting Chairperson)
• Lucas P. Bersamin (Associate Justice)
• Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (Associate Justice)