Spouses Constantino vs. Benitez

A probate court, whether acting in testate or intestate proceedings, has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of possession that adjudicates title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent and in the third person's possession; any such writ is void. Corollarily, a motion for intervention may not be filed after rendition of judgment by the trial court, absent exceptional circumstances warranting relaxation of Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules.

Romeo Benitez died on June 15, 2004, survived by his wife Alejandria N. Benitez and their daughters Fritzie Joy Benitez and Analiza Benitez (adopted), leaving real properties in Laoag and Badoc, Ilocos Norte with an estimated value of P540,000.00, including Lot No. 9398-B covered by TCT No. T-26828 and Lot No. 9400-C covered by TCT No. T-27844. Spouses Bernardo T. Constantino and Editha B. Constantino later claimed to have purchased these lots from Ceazar Cu Benitez, the son of Romeo and Lolita Cu, both deceased. The dispute implicated the limited jurisdiction of a court sitting in probate or intestate proceedings over property claimed by third persons adversely to the estate, as well as the procedural rules governing intervention and the issuance of writs of possession.

Romeo Benitez died on June 15, 2004, leaving several real estate properties in Laoag and Badoc, Ilocos Norte with an estimated value of P540,000.00. He was survived by his wife, Alejandria N. Benitez, and their two daughters, Fritzie Joy Benitez and Analiza Benitez, the latter adopted. Among the properties were Lot No. 9398-B, covered by TCT No. T-26828, and Lot No. 9400-C, covered by TCT No. T-27844.

On December 1, 2004, Alejandria filed a petition for the settlement, division, and partition of Romeo's intestate estate before the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte, Branch 18, docketed as Spec. Proc. 4506-18. She alleged that Romeo had no existing debts other than taxes and funeral expenses, and asked to be appointed administrator. No opposition having been filed, the intestate court rendered a Decision dated April 22, 2005, declaring Alejandria, Analiza, and Fritzie Joy as the only lawful heirs of Romeo and appointing Alejandria as administrator upon the filing of a P100,000.00 bond. The intestate proceedings were thereafter terminated by the execution of a Deed of Settlement of Estate with Waiver and Quitclaim, in which the children granted Alejandria sole ownership over the subject parcels of land.

Meanwhile, on October 22, 2007, Alejandria and Analiza filed a petition for the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of TCT Nos. T-27844 and T-26828 before the RTC of Laoag City, Branch 65, docketed as CAD. Case No. 51, claiming that the documents were missing. In a Decision dated April 1, 2008, the cadastral court granted the petition, directed the Register of Deeds to issue replacement owner's copies, and ordered the lost copies cancelled and without legal effect.

On April 20, 2011, Spouses Constantino allegedly purchased the lots covered by TCT Nos. T-26828 and T-27844 from Ceazar Cu Benitez, the son of Romeo and Lolita Cu, both deceased, for P2,000,000.00. After the purchase, they learned of the cadastral court's April 1, 2008 Decision and filed a petition for annulment of judgment in the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 138997. They averred that the Affidavit of Loss executed by Alejandria — in which she stated that she was in joint physical possession of the original owner's duplicate copies with the late Romeo — was perjured, because the copies had never been lost and had always been under the exclusive custody and physical possession of Lolita, who turned them over to Ceazar on March 6, 2004 after Romeo executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the subject lots in Ceazar's favor. These were subsequently delivered to Spouses Constantino upon their purchase.

On February 8, 2013, Spouses Constantino filed a Motion for Intervention in Spec. Proc. 4506-18, praying that they be allowed to intervene, that their attached motion to exclude lots covered by TCT Nos. T-36271, T-26828, and T-27844 from Romeo's intestate estate be admitted, and that the notice of lis pendens annotated therein be cancelled. The intestate court denied the motion in an Order dated February 11, 2013, holding that Spec. Proc. 4506-18 had become final and immutable on December 8, 2010 and that the motion was filed outside the period under Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules; reconsideration was denied on March 12, 2013. On December 11, 2014, Alejandria asked for the issuance of a writ of possession and demanded possession over the subject lots, which Spouses Constantino opposed, insisting that the cadastral court's order was void for lack of jurisdiction. On March 4, 2015, the intestate court granted the motion and ordered the issuance of a writ of possession, directing Spouses Constantino and their daughter Bernadette Liu to surrender possession of Lots 9398-B and 9400-C under new titles TCT Nos. T-021-2013000655 and T-021-2013000656 to Alejandria or her duly authorized representative; reconsideration was denied on March 23, 2015. The writ was fully executed, and Alejandria took possession of the subject properties.

While the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 140213 was pending, the Court of Appeals issued a Decision dated August 22, 2016 in CA-G.R. SP No. 138997 granting Spouses Constantino's petition for annulment of judgment of the cadastral court in CAD. Case No. 51. The new titles, TCT Nos. T-021-2013000655 and T-021-2013000656, were cancelled, and TCT Nos. T-26828 and T-27844 registered under Romeo's name were reinstated; the Court of Appeals held that the original owner's duplicate copies had not been lost and were in fact in Spouses Constantino's possession. An Entry of Judgment dated August 4, 2017 declared that Decision final and executory.

• Propriety of Intervention: Spouses Constantino insisted that a motion for intervention was a proper remedy to prevent them from being dispossessed of the properties they claim to have purchased.
• Trust and Deed of Quitclaim: They argued that the Deed of Quitclaim allegedly issued by Romeo is an admission on his part that he was a mere trustee of the properties in question and that he agreed to execute the document in favor of Ceazar when the latter became an adult.
• Indispensable Party and Void Judgment: They claimed that the alleged intentional omission of Ceazar as co-heir and an indispensable party in the petition for the settlement of Romeo's intestate estate renders the judgment of the intestate court in Spec. Proc. 4506-18 void.
• Effect of CA-G.R. SP No. 138997: In their Reply, they maintained that the cancellation of the certificates of title in Alejandria's name in CA-G.R. SP No. 138997 settled ownership over the subject lots in their favor.

• Wrong Remedy and Prescription: Alejandria suggested that the proper remedy should have been an action to annul a judgment based on fraud pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules, but that such action had already prescribed.
• Action in Rem: She asserted that an intestate estate proceeding is an action in rem, and thus any decision or order rendered binds the whole world, including Ceazar.

• Propriety of Intervention: Whether the motion for intervention filed by Spouses Constantino in the intestate court should be given due course, despite having been filed after judgment had been rendered, on account of the reinstatement of TCT Nos. T-26828 and T-27844 in CA-G.R. SP No. 138997 and the fact that these had been sold to Spouses Constantino.
• Validity of the Writ of Possession: Whether the intestate court's Orders dated March 4, 2015 and March 23, 2015 issuing a writ of possession in favor of Alejandria are valid.
• Restoration of Possession: Whether possession of the real properties covered by TCT Nos. T-27844 and T-26828 should be returned to Spouses Constantino.
• Ownership: Whether the cancellation of the new certificates of title settled the issue of ownership of the subject lots in favor of Spouses Constantino.

• Propriety of Intervention: No. The motion was filed more than two years after the judgment became final and executory, in violation of Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules, and no exceptional circumstance warranted relaxing the rule.
• Validity of the Writ of Possession: Void. A probate court exercises limited jurisdiction and has no power to determine title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent; the present case does not fall under any of the instances where a writ of possession may be issued.
• Restoration of Possession: Yes. The void orders cannot serve as basis to dispossess Spouses Constantino of properties they claim to own; Alejandria was ordered to surrender possession to them.
• Ownership: No. Possession of the purported owner's duplicate copy of a certificate of title does not automatically confer ownership; the conflicting claims must be resolved in a separate ordinary civil action.

• Propriety of Intervention: Intervention is not an absolute right and may be secured only in accordance with the Rules. Under Section 2, Rule 19, a motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. Spouses Constantino filed their motion on February 8, 2013, more than two years after December 8, 2010, when the Decision of the RTC of Batac granting the petition for settlement became final and executory. While the Court has in exceptional cases relaxed the rules on the timeliness of intervention, the permissive tenor of the provision vests the court with full discretion that must be exercised judiciously and only after consideration of all the circumstances. No reason existed to depart from the clear language of the Rule. In Salandan vs. Court of Appeals, the Court denied a motion to reopen probate proceedings that had long attained finality, declaring that final orders cannot, by mere motion, be set aside. The reliefs prayed for by Spouses Constantino were similar to the motion to reopen in Salandan, as both essentially sought to revive a proceeding that had long attained finality. Following Salandan, the Court could not allow intervention in the intestate proceeding that had been closed and terminated more than two years before the motion was filed.

• Validity of the Writ of Possession: Although neither party assailed the intestate court's jurisdiction, Section 8, Rule 51 of the Rules permits consideration of errors affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the judgment, and courts have ample authority to rule on matters not raised by the parties if indispensable or necessary to the just and final resolution of the pleaded issues. The resolution of the propriety of the writ of possession was indispensable to determining whether the motion for intervention may be given due course. In Valera vs. Inserto, the Court emphasized the limited jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court in testate or intestate proceedings: a probate court has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all other parties having legal interest consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question, or the interests of third persons are not prejudiced. Spouses Constantino were undisputed in possession of the disputed property before the intestate court issued the writ, and in issuing it the intestate court took cognizance of and resolved the issue of ownership summarily even though it remained in dispute. A writ of possession is a writ of execution employed to enforce a judgment to recover possession of land, and may be issued only: (1) in land registration proceedings under Section 17 of Act 496; (2) in a judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; (3) in an extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended; and (4) in execution sales under the last paragraph of Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules. The present case fell under none of these circumstances. The intestate court could not arrogate unto itself the authority to issue a writ beyond its jurisdiction and for circumstances not contemplated by prevailing laws and the Rules; lack of jurisdiction may be raised or considered at any stage, even on appeal.

• Restoration of Possession: Because the Orders dated March 4, 2015 and March 23, 2015 are void, they cannot be made the basis to dispossess Spouses Constantino of the properties they claim to own. No legal justification existed to permit Alejandria to continue possessing the subject lots, and she was ordered to surrender possession to Spouses Constantino. The order to revert possession was intended to bring the parties back to their original condition prior to the issuance of the voided titles in Alejandria's favor. The Court further held that the CA should have granted the petition for certiorari even though the propriety of the writ of possession was not raised, because it should have noticed the intestate court's apparent lack of jurisdiction.

• Ownership: The erroneous issuance of the writ of possession was, in effect, a recognition by the intestate court of Alejandria's ownership without a full-blown trial where each claiming party may present evidence, and to deprive Spouses Constantino of the lots without the opportunity to be heard would defeat the essence of due process. In Mayor vs. Tiu, the Court explained that a probate court may pass upon title only provisionally for purposes of determining whether a property should be included in the inventory, and such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title; a probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate but equally claimed by outside parties. Considering the finality of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 138997 ruling that TCT Nos. T-26828 and T-27844 had never been lost, the denial of the motion for intervention had been overtaken by events and should now be resolved through the filing of the appropriate ordinary action. In Bilote vs. Solis, the Court declared that in a petition for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of a certificate of title in lieu of one allegedly lost, the RTC, acting only as a land registration court, has no jurisdiction to pass upon the question of actual ownership, and that possession of a lost owner's duplicate copy is not necessarily equivalent to ownership; the certificate of title by itself does not vest ownership but is merely evidence of title. Even with the finality of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 138997, possession of the purported owner's duplicate copy would not automatically confer ownership. The conflicting ownership claims of Alejandria, Romeo's legal wife, and Spouses Constantino, buyers from Romeo's alleged illegitimate son, could not be resolved in this case and must be threshed out in a separate ordinary civil action.

• Limited jurisdiction of probate courts over title — A court sitting in testate or intestate proceedings exercises limited jurisdiction and cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate but equally claimed by outside parties. It may pass upon title only provisionally, for the purpose of determining whether a property should be included in the inventory, and such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title. The exception is where the claimant and all other parties having legal interest consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question, or where the interests of third persons are not prejudiced. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the intestate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it issued a writ of possession that summarily resolved ownership against Spouses Constantino, who were in possession and claimed the property adversely to the estate.

• Instances when a writ of possession may issue — A writ of possession is a writ of execution employed to enforce a judgment to recover possession of land, commanding the sheriff to enter the land and give possession to the person entitled under the judgment. It may be issued only: (1) in land registration proceedings under Section 17 of Act 496; (2) in a judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; (3) in an extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended; and (4) in execution sales under the last paragraph of Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules. Because the present case fell under none of these circumstances, the writ issued by the intestate court was void.

• Intervention; time to intervene — Intervention is not an absolute right and may be secured only in accordance with the Rules. Under Section 2, Rule 19, a motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. The permissive tenor of the provision shows the intention of the Rules to afford the court full discretion in permitting or disallowing intervention, but this discretion must be exercised judiciously and only after consideration of all the circumstances. The Court held that the motion, filed more than two years after the judgment became final and executory, could not be given due course.

• Possession of owner's duplicate copy is not ownership — In a petition for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of a certificate of title in lieu of one allegedly lost, the RTC, acting only as a land registration court, has no jurisdiction to pass upon the question of actual ownership of the land covered by the lost owner's duplicate copy. Possession of a lost owner's duplicate copy of a certificate of title is not necessarily equivalent to ownership of the land covered by it; the certificate of title, by itself, does not vest ownership but is merely evidence of title over a particular property. The Court applied this to hold that the cancellation of the new titles did not settle ownership in Spouses Constantino's favor.

• Due process in the determination of title — To deprive Spouses Constantino of the subject lots they claim to own, without being given the opportunity to be heard, would defeat the very essence of due process. The conflicting claims of ownership must be resolved in a separate ordinary civil action where each claiming party may present evidence to prove their claim.

• "settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), acting as a Probate Court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all the other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly, or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced" — Quoted from Valera vs. Inserto and adopted as the ratio for holding that the intestate court exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the writ of possession; it states the canonical formulation of the probate court's limited jurisdiction over title.
• "a probate court or one in charge of proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate but which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. It can only determine whether they should, or should not, be included in the inventory or list of properties to be overseen by the administrator." — Quoted from Mayor vs. Tiu; it defines the outer limit of a probate court's authority and supports the ruling that the conflicting ownership claims must be litigated in a separate ordinary action.
• "Possession of a lost owner's duplicate copy of a certificate of title is not necessarily equivalent to ownership of the land covered by it. The certificate of title, by itself, does not vest ownership; it is merely an evidence of title over a particular property." — Quoted from Bilote vs. Solis; it disposes of the argument that the cancellation of the new titles settled ownership in Spouses Constantino's favor.
• "The intestate court cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to issue a writ that is beyond its jurisdiction and for circumstances not contemplated by prevailing laws and the Rules. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised or considered at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal." — States the Court's own conclusion that the writ of possession was void and that the jurisdictional defect could be considered despite not being raised by the parties.

• Valera vs. Inserto, 233 Phil. 552 (1987) — Controlling precedent cited for the rule that a probate court exercises limited jurisdiction and has no power to determine title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, absent consent of all parties having legal interest or prejudice to third persons.
• Mayor vs. Tiu, 800 Phil. 700 (2016) — Cited for the rule that a probate court may pass upon title only provisionally for inventory purposes, and cannot adjudicate title to properties equally claimed by outside parties; the determination is subject to a separate action to resolve title.
• Bilote vs. Solis, 760 Phil. 712 (2015) — Cited for the rule that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to pass upon actual ownership in a petition for issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy, and that possession of such a copy is not equivalent to ownership.
• Salandan vs. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 114 (1998) — Instructive precedent; the Court relied on its principle that final orders of a probate court cannot, by mere motion, be set aside, and that a proceeding that has long attained finality cannot be reopened.
• Spouses Reyes vs. Spouses Chung, 818 Phil. 225 (2017) — Cited for the definition of a writ of possession and the enumeration of instances when it may be issued.
• Philippine National Bank vs. Sanao Marketing Corp., 503 Phil. 206 (2005) — Cited, through Spouses Reyes vs. Spouses Chung, as authority for the instances when a writ of possession may issue.
• Mago vs. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 225 (1999) — Cited for the rule that the permissive tenor of the provision on intervention shows the intention of the Rules to afford the court full discretion, to be exercised judiciously after consideration of all circumstances.
• Pinlac vs. Court of Appeals, 457 Phil. 527 (2003) and Castro vs. Mendoza, Sr., 809 Phil. 789 (2017) — Cited as instances where the Court relaxed the rules on the timeliness of filing an intervention.
• Asian Transmission Corporation vs. Canlubang Sugar Estates, 457 Phil. 260 (2003); Multi-Realty Development Corp. vs. Makati Tuscany Condominium Corp., 524 Phil. 318 (2006); Hi-Tone Marketing Corporation vs. Baikal Realty Corporation, 480 Phil. 545 (2004) — Cited for the rule that a court does not have power to decide questions except as presented by the parties in their pleadings, subject to exceptions for errors affecting jurisdiction or indispensable matters.

• Section 2, Rule 19, Rules of Court — Provides that a motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. Applied to hold that Spouses Constantino's motion, filed on February 8, 2013, more than two years after the December 8, 2010 finality of the intestate court's Decision, was time-barred and could not be given due course.
• Section 8, Rule 51, Rules of Court — Provides that no error not affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error, save as the court may pass upon plain errors. Applied to justify the Court's consideration of the intestate court's lack of jurisdiction over the writ of possession even though neither party raised it.
• Section 17, Act No. 496 — Cited as the first instance in which a writ of possession may be issued, namely in land registration proceedings. The present case was held not to fall under this instance.
• Section 7, Act No. 3135, as amended — Cited as the third instance in which a writ of possession may be issued, namely in an extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage. The present case was held not to fall under this instance.
• Last paragraph, Section 33, Rule 39, Rules of Court — Cited as the fourth instance in which a writ of possession may be issued, namely in execution sales. The present case was held not to fall under this instance.

Peralta, C.J., Caguioa, Zalameda, and Gaerlan, JJ., concur.