Spouses Bernales vs. Heirs of Sambaan

A deed whose supposed vendor's signature is forged is totally void or inexistent and conveys no title; registration under the Torrens system does not protect the assignee in a forged deed, and an action to declare the contract's inexistence does not prescribe.

Julian Sambaan, married to Guillerma Saarenas-Sambaan, was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Bulua, Cagayan de Oro City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-14202. The respondents are the children of Julian and Guillerma; petitioner Myrna Bernales, the eldest child, is married to co-petitioner Patricio Bernales and is the present owner and possessor of the property. The dispute concerns the ownership of that property and the validity of a deed purportedly conveying it to the Bernales spouses. The case implicates the Torrens system's protection of registered titles and the Civil Code provisions on void and inexistent contracts.

Julian Sambaan, married to Guillerma Saarenas-Sambaan, was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Bulua, Cagayan de Oro City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-14202 issued on March 8, 1972 and described as Lot No. 5947-A of the subdivision plan, containing 3,643 square meters. The respondents and petitioner Myrna Bernales are the children of Julian and Guillerma; Myrna, the eldest, is the present owner and possessor of the property. Sometime in 1975, Julian was ambushed at Merayon, Talakad, Bukidnon, and was hospitalized due to a gunshot wound. On April 11, 1975, Julian allegedly requested his children to gather so that he could make his last two wishes: first, that the children redeem the subject property, which was mortgaged to Myrna and her husband Patricio Bernales; and second, that his remains not be brought to Myrna's house at Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City. In 1982, respondent Absalon Sambaan offered to redeem the property, but the petitioners refused because they were allegedly using it as a tethering place for their cattle.

In January 1991, respondents received information that the property covered by TCT No. T-14202 had already been transferred to petitioners' name. They secured a copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 7, 1970, which bore the signatures of their parents, and had it examined by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The NBI examination revealed that the signatures of Julian and Guillerma were forged. On April 13, 1993, respondents, together with their mother Guillerma, filed a Complaint for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-14204 with Damages and Writ of Preliminary Injunction against petitioners. They alleged that despite the forged signatures of their parents, petitioners were able to register the Deed of Absolute Sale with the Registry of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City and secure TCT No. T-14204 on March 8, 1972. They prayed for injunctive relief to prevent petitioners from selling, disposing, or mortgaging the property; annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT No. T-14204; a declaration that they are the absolute owners; a declaration that all documents executed relative to the title are void; and an order for petitioners to pay ₱300,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, ₱50,000.00 as attorney's fees, and ₱1,000.00 as appearance fee.

Petitioners filed their Answer on May 6, 1992, as stated in the decision. They alleged that the subject property, Lot No. 5947-A, used to be a portion of Lot No. 5947, originally owned by Clodualdo Sambaan and Gliceria Dacer and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 7921 issued on September 23, 1940. After the death of Clodualdo and Gliceria in 1949, their heirs executed an Extra Judicial Settlement and Sale dated April 10, 1970 involving the land covered by OCT No. 7921. Juanito, Aida, and Renato sold their share to Domingo Ebarrat, leaving portions belonging to Julian and Ebarrat. Because of the co-ownership between Ebarrat and Julian, they executed a Deed of Partition dated September 8, 1970, dividing Lot No. 5947: the eastern half of 3,643 square meters was assigned to Julian, while the western half of the same area went to Ebarrat. Petitioners claimed that Julian subsequently sold his share to them by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 7, 1970. Thereafter, on December 10, 1970, Ebarrat and Patricio executed an Agreement in which Ebarrat acknowledged that petitioners owned the 18 coconut trees planted on Ebarrat's property, with Julian as a witness. Petitioners alleged that the imputation of falsification was a product of respondents' inflamed imagination because the latter envied petitioners' success in managing their properties. They prayed for dismissal of the complaint, affirmation of their title, and an award of ₱500,000.00 as moral damages, ₱300,000.00 as exemplary damages, ₱50,000.00 as attorney's fees, and costs of litigation.

On July 27, 1992, petitioners filed a Motion for Production and Inspection of Document to compel respondents to produce and permit them to inspect, copy, or photograph the Deed of Absolute Sale subject of the examination. The trial court issued an Order dated August 14, 1992 granting the motion and directing the Regional Office of the NBI to bring the document to court for proper examination. On August 11, 1992, Guillerma died in Cagayan de Oro City and was accordingly dropped as co-plaintiff.

After trial, the RTC and the CA found that the signatures of Julian and Guillerma in the Deed of Absolute Sale were forged. NBI Senior Document Examiner Caroline Moldez Pitoy testified that comparative examinations of the standard specimen signatures and the questioned signatures showed that they were not written by one and the same person. Petitioners failed to present evidence to rebut the NBI findings. The trial court's own observation, affirmed by the CA, was that even a cursory examination of Guillerma's questioned signature against her specimen signatures in the enlarged photographs (Exhibits "F" and "F-1") showed a wide difference in stroke and writing style in the capital "G." Emma S. Felicilda, Guillerma's daughter, testified that her mother filed the complaint because, according to her, she did not sign the document. The lower courts also found that Julian was unaware of any absolute conveyance of his rights over the property; he had requested his children to redeem it; Absalon offered to redeem it in 1982 but petitioners refused; and the caretaker, Eufronio Abrea, testified that Myrna's brothers and sisters sometimes went to the land and asked for coconuts. Myrna admitted that she was not present when her parents signed the assailed Deed and did not know who the witnesses were. Guillerma, one of the alleged signatories, joined the respondents in filing the annulment action on the ground of forgery. The lower courts further found that because the subject property belonged to Julian's capital, the Deed could have been validly executed by Julian even without his wife's signature; her name was not typed in the deed, and her purported signature merely appeared next to Julian's, confirming that the preparer knew her signature was unnecessary. They concluded that Julian never executed the assailed Deed in favor of Myrna and that it conveyed no ownership.

• Prescription: Petitioners asserted that since respondents admitted a mortgage transaction between Julian and petitioners, an implied trust was created by operation of law under Article 1454 of the Civil Code; respondents' right to reconveyance had prescribed when they filed the annulment case on April 3, 1992, more than 10 years after petitioners repudiated the implied trust.
• Expert Witness Testimony: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals disregarded settled principles on the admissibility and appreciation of expert witness opinions by its blanket acceptance of the inadequate testimony of the document examiner commissioned by respondents prior to Civil Case No. 92-179.
• Specimen Signatures: Petitioners maintained that the Court of Appeals disregarded the rules of evidence in concluding that the Deed of Absolute Sale was forged on the basis of specimen signatures whose genuineness was never established.
• Handwriting Comparison: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals disregarded legal principles on handwriting comparison in using specimen signatures of Guillerma Sambaan that were made at the time and for the specific purpose of the handwriting analysis of the Deed of Absolute Sale.
• Proof of Forgery: Petitioners contended that the Court of Appeals disregarded jurisprudence on the proof required to establish forgery in concluding that Julian Sambaan's signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was forged because it believed that Guillerma Sambaan's signature was also forged.
• December 10, 1970 Agreement: Petitioners asserted that the Court of Appeals contravened the legal rules governing the appreciation of documents in ruling against the validity of Julian Sambaan's sale of the subject property despite the existence of the Agreement dated December 10, 1970 confirming the sale.
• Damages and Counterclaims: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's award of damages in favor of respondents and in dismissing petitioners' counterclaims for damages.

• Nullity Due to Forgery: Respondents asserted that the element of consent was totally wanting in the assailed Deed of Absolute Sale because the signatures of Julian and Guillerma, which are equivalent to their consent, were forged by petitioners; the absence of consent made the document null and void.
• Imprescriptibility: Respondents maintained that the case falls under Article 1410 of the Civil Code, which provides that an action to declare the inexistence of void contracts does not prescribe.

• Prescription: Whether prescription barred respondents' action to recover ownership of the subject property.
• Expert Witness Testimony: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in accepting the testimony of the document examiner commissioned by respondents prior to the commencement of Civil Case No. 92-179.
• Specimen Signatures: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the Deed of Absolute Sale was forged on the basis of specimen signatures whose genuineness was never established.
• Handwriting Comparison: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in using specimen signatures of Guillerma Sambaan that were made at the time and for the specific purpose of the handwriting analysis of the Deed of Absolute Sale.
• Proof of Forgery: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Julian Sambaan's signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was forged because it believed that Guillerma Sambaan's signature was also forged.
• December 10, 1970 Agreement: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling against the validity of Julian Sambaan's sale of the subject property despite the existence of the Agreement dated December 10, 1970 confirming the sale.
• Damages and Counterclaims: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's award of damages in favor of respondents and in dismissing petitioners' counterclaims for damages.

• Prescription: No. The action did not prescribe because the forged Deed was void or inexistent under Article 1409, and under Article 1410 an action to declare the inexistence of a void contract does not prescribe.
• Expert Witness Testimony: No. The fact that the NBI examination was commissioned by respondents did not nullify it; the court has discretion to determine the probative value of the examination and the credibility of the examiner.
• Specimen Signatures: No. Substantial evidence supported the finding of forgery; the NBI findings were unrebutted and corroborated by the trial court's own observation and by testimonial evidence.
• Handwriting Comparison: No. Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court was not violated because respondents were not authenticating a private document but were challenging the signatures appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale.
• Proof of Forgery: No. The conclusion of forgery did not rest solely on Guillerma's signature; the confluence of circumstances, together with the NBI findings, established forgery by preponderance of evidence.
• December 10, 1970 Agreement: No. The Agreement did not justify the forgery or validate the forged Deed; it did not convey title to petitioners.
• Damages and Counterclaims: No. The awards of moral damages, attorney's fees, and actual damages were proper, and no ground was shown to reverse the dismissal of petitioners' counterclaims.

• Prescription: Petitioners invoked Article 1454 of the Civil Code, arguing that because respondents admitted a mortgage transaction between Julian and petitioners, an implied trust was created by operation of law and respondents' right to reconveyance had prescribed more than 10 years after repudiation. Respondents countered that consent was totally wanting because the signatures of Julian and Guillerma were forged, making the document null and void and placing the case under Article 1410. The Court agreed with respondents. The supposed vendor's signature having been proved to be a forgery, the instrument was totally void or inexistent as "absolutely simulated or fictitious" under Article 1409 of the Civil Code. Under Article 1410, the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. The inexistence of a contract is permanent and incurable and cannot be cured either by ratification or by prescription. Prescription therefore did not bar respondents' action.

• Expert Witness Testimony: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals disregarded settled principles on the admissibility and appreciation of expert witness opinions and accepted the inadequate testimony of the document examiner commissioned by respondents before Civil Case No. 92-179. The Court found no error. The fact that the examination was commissioned by respondents did not make the examination null and void. It is the court which has the discretion and authority on whether to give probative value to the results of the examination. In Sali vs. Abubakar, the Court held that the fact that the NBI conducted the examination of contested documents upon the request of a private litigant does not necessarily nullify the examination. Any person, expert or not, may testify in court on matters within his personal knowledge which are relevant to a suit, subject to the judicial authority to determine the credibility of the testimony and its weight. The NBI examiner's testimony was thus properly given probative value, and petitioners failed to present evidence to rebut the findings.

• Specimen Signatures: Petitioners maintained that the Court of Appeals disregarded the rules of evidence in concluding that the Deed of Absolute Sale was forged on the basis of specimen signatures whose genuineness was never established. The Court found substantial evidence on record to support the conclusion of the Court of Appeals and the trial court that the signatures of Julian and Guillerma in the Deed of Absolute Sale were forged. The examination conducted by the NBI disclosed that the signatures were forged. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly gave probative value to the testimony of NBI Senior Document Examiner Caroline Moldez Pitoy, who categorically testified that the signatures of Julian and Guillerma in the Deed of Absolute Sale were forged. The findings were corroborated by the trial court's own observation, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that even a cursory examination of Guillerma's questioned signature from her specimen signatures in the enlarged photographs (Exhibits "F" and "F-1") would show a wide difference in stroke and writing style in the capital "G." Emma S. Felicilda, Guillerma's daughter, also testified that her mother filed the complaint because she did not sign the document. Petitioners failed to present any evidence to rebut the NBI findings.

• Handwriting Comparison: Petitioners alleged that the comparisons made by the document examiner, the Court of Appeals, and the trial court of Guillerma's signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale and her specimen signatures violated Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court on the authentication of private documents. The Court held that respondents were not presenting evidence to authenticate a private document; on the contrary, they were challenging the signatures appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale. Section 22 allows handwriting to be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of a person because he has seen the person write, or by comparison made by the witness or the court with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. The comparison was therefore proper, and no violation of Section 22, Rule 132 was shown.

• Proof of Forgery: Petitioners contended that the Court of Appeals disregarded jurisprudence on the proof required to establish forgery in concluding that Julian's signature was forged because it believed that Guillerma's signature was also forged. The Court found that the conclusion of forgery did not rest solely on Guillerma's signature. The confluence of circumstances proved by preponderance of evidence that the Deed of Absolute Sale was forged. Julian was unaware of any absolute conveyance of his rights over the subject property; he even requested his children to redeem the property from petitioners. In 1982, Absalon offered to redeem the property, but petitioners refused because they were allegedly using it as a tethering place for their cattle. The caretaker, Eufronio Abrea, testified that Myrna's brothers and sisters sometimes went to the land and asked for coconuts. Myrna admitted that she was not present when her parents signed the assailed Deed and did not know who the witnesses were. Guillerma, one of the alleged signatories, joined respondents in filing the annulment action on the ground of forgery. The lower courts also found that because the subject property belonged to Julian's capital, the Deed could have been validly executed by Julian even without his wife's signature; her name was not typed in the deed, and her purported signature merely appeared next to Julian's, confirming that the preparer knew her signature was unnecessary. These circumstances, together with the NBI findings, established forgery.

• December 10, 1970 Agreement: Petitioners asserted that the Court of Appeals contravened the legal rules governing the appreciation of documents in ruling against the validity of Julian's sale despite the Agreement dated December 10, 1970 confirming the sale. The Court found that the Agreement did not justify the forgery committed in the Deed of Absolute Sale. The Court of Appeals held that there was no need to delve on the Agreement since it would not in any way give justification to the forgery committed in the Deed. The valid execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale was the main thrust of the case; since the Deed was not signed by Julian and the signatures of Julian and Guillerma were forged, the subsequent issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-14204 had no basis at all because ownership was not conveyed to petitioners by reason of the forged Deed. The Agreement between Ebarrat and Patricio did not cure the forged Deed or convey title to petitioners.

• Damages and Counterclaims: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's award of damages in favor of respondents and in dismissing petitioners' counterclaims. The Court held that the award of moral damages and attorney's fees was proper. The blood relations among the parties were considered. Emma S. Felicilda testified that they had high regard for Myrna, their eldest sister; Anita Sambaan echoed the same. They could not believe that Myrna would keep and appropriate the land for herself and transfer the title exclusively to her name. Emma S. Felicilda also testified that the forgery caused them anger and bad emotions. Julian's dying wish was for the property to be redeemed from petitioners. The sentimental significance of the property and the anger and emotions caused by the unlawful transfer moved respondents to recover the property through the action. The award of ₱20,000.00 as moral damages was therefore proper. In view of the complexity of the case and the multiple levels of appeal, the award of attorney's fees of ₱20,000.00 and actual damages of ₱1,671.00, which were substantiated during trial, was affirmed. No ground was shown to reverse the dismissal of petitioners' counterclaims.

• Forged Deed and the Torrens System — A holder of a certificate for value issued by virtue of the registration of a voluntary instrument may be considered a holder in good faith for value only if the instrument registered is not forged. When the instrument presented is forged, even if accompanied by the owner's duplicate certificate of title, the registered owner does not thereby lose his title, and neither does the assignee in the forged deed acquire any right or title to the property. The innocent purchaser for value protected by law is one who purchases titled land by virtue of a deed executed by the registered owner himself, not by a forged deed. In this case, because the Deed of Absolute Sale was forged, petitioners acquired no title and could not take refuge in the protection accorded by the Torrens system.

• Void or Inexistent Contracts and Imprescriptibility — Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts that are absolutely simulated or fictitious are inexistent and void from the beginning. Under Article 1410, the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. The inexistence of a contract is permanent and incurable and cannot be cured either by ratification or by prescription. The Court applied these provisions because the supposed vendor's signature was proved to be a forgery, making the instrument totally void or inexistent; hence, respondents' action to declare its inexistence was not barred by prescription.

• Substantial Evidence — Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise. The Court used this standard to affirm the lower courts' finding that the signatures of Julian and Guillerma were forged.

• Question of Fact vs. Question of Law — For a question to be one of law, it must involve no examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is pertaining to a certain state of facts. There is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of alleged facts. The Court characterized the authenticity of the Deed of Absolute Sale as a question of fact, the determination of which is best left to the courts below.

• NBI Examination at the Request of a Private Litigant — The fact that the NBI conducted the examination of certain contested documents upon the request of a private litigant does not necessarily nullify the examination thus made. Any person, expert or not, either in his private or official capacity, may testify in court on matters within his personal knowledge which are relevant to a suit, subject to the judicial authority to determine the credibility of the testimony and the weight thereof. The Court applied this doctrine in upholding the probative value given to the NBI document examiner's testimony despite the examination having been commissioned by respondents.

• Handwriting Authentication Under Section 22, Rule 132 — Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court governs how the genuineness of handwriting may be proved, including by comparison made by the witness or the court with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. The provision does not bar comparison where the party is challenging the signatures appearing in a document rather than presenting evidence to authenticate a private document. The Court applied this doctrine in rejecting petitioners' claim that the comparison of Guillerma's signatures violated the Rules of Court.

• Moral Damages and Attorney's Fees — Moral damages may be awarded where the forgery of a deed caused anger and bad emotions, especially considering the blood relations among the parties and the sentimental significance of the property. Attorney's fees and actual damages may be affirmed where the case is complex, has gone through multiple levels of appeal, and the expenses were substantiated during trial. The Court applied this doctrine in affirming the awards of ₱20,000.00 moral damages, ₱20,000.00 attorney's fees, and ₱1,671.00 actual damages.

• "When the instrument presented is forged, even if accompanied by the owner’s duplicate certificate of title, the registered owner does not thereby lose his title, and neither does the assignee in the forged deed acquire any right or title to the property." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the effect of a forged deed under the Torrens system; it explains why petitioners acquired no title despite registration and why they could not invoke the protection of the Torrens system.
• "The supposed vendor's signature having been proved to be a forgery, the instrument is totally void or inexistent as "absolutely simulated or fictitious" under Article 1409 of the Civil Code." — This passage defines the status of the forged Deed of Absolute Sale and anchors the Court's holding that the instrument conveyed no title.
• "According to Article 1410, "the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe". The inexistence of a contract is permanent and incurable which cannot be cured either by ratification or by prescription." — This passage is the Court's controlling statement on prescription, explaining why respondents' action to declare the inexistence of the forged Deed was not barred.
• "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise." — This passage states the standard of review applied to the lower courts' factual finding of forgery.

• Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 315 Phil. 805, 820 (1995) — Cited for the distinction between a question of law and a question of fact; used to characterize the authenticity of the Deed of Absolute Sale as a factual matter.
• Xentrex Motors, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 258, 262 (1998) — Cited for the rule that factual findings of the lower courts are entitled to great weight and respect and are accorded finality when supported by substantial evidence.
• Judge Español vs. Judge Mupas, 484 Phil. 636, 657 (2004) — Cited for the definition of substantial evidence as more than a mere scintilla.
• Bascos, Jr. vs. Tagahanan, G.R. No. 180666, February 18, 2009 — Cited for the substantial evidence standard.
• Sali vs. Abubakar, 124 Phil. 444, 447-448 (1966) — Cited to hold that an NBI examination conducted upon the request of a private litigant does not necessarily nullify the examination and that any person may testify on matters within personal knowledge, subject to judicial determination of credibility and weight.
• Sps. Solivel vs. Judge Francisco, 252 Phil. 223, 231 (1989) — Cited for the rule that when the instrument presented is forged, the registered owner does not lose title and the assignee in the forged deed acquires no right or title.
• Instrade, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 395 Phil. 791, 801 (2000) — Cited for reiterating the forged deed rule and the principle that the instrument registered must not be forged for the holder to be considered a holder in good faith for value.
• Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84464, June 21, 1991, 198 SCRA 472, 479 — Cited in connection with the rule that a forged instrument is totally void or inexistent under Article 1409.
• Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 341 Phil. 624, 633 (1997) — Cited for the rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals supported by substantial evidence are binding, final, and conclusive upon the Supreme Court.
• Chase vs. Buencamino, Sr., 221 Phil. 65, 78 (1985) — Cited for the rule that conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal.
• Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 1, 13 (1999) — Cited for the exception to the binding effect of factual findings where the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court.
• Alba Vda. De Raz vs. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil. 710, 725 (1999) — Cited for the exception where the factual findings are unsupported by the evidence on record.
• Coronel vs. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 15 — Mentioned in the Court of Appeals' discussion of the contract of sale, that by the contract of sale one party obligates himself to transfer ownership and deliver a determinate thing and the other to pay a sum certain in money or its equivalent.

• Article 1409, Civil Code — Contracts that are absolutely simulated or fictitious are inexistent and void from the beginning. The Court applied this provision because the supposed vendor's signature was proved to be a forgery, making the Deed of Absolute Sale totally void or inexistent.
• Article 1410, Civil Code — The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. The Court applied this provision in holding that respondents' action to declare the inexistence of the forged Deed was not barred by prescription.
• Article 1454, Civil Code — If an absolute conveyance of property is made in order to secure the performance of an obligation of the grantor toward the grantee, a trust by virtue of law is established; if the fulfillment of the obligation is offered by the grantor when it becomes due, he may demand reconveyance of the property. Petitioners invoked this provision to argue that an implied trust was created and that reconveyance had prescribed, but the Court rejected the argument because the forged Deed was void and inexistent, not an implied trust.
• Section 22, Rule 132, Rules of Court — The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person; evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. The Court held that the comparison of Guillerma's signatures did not violate this provision because respondents were challenging the signatures, not authenticating a private document.

Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson), Arturo D. Brion, Roberto A. Abad, and Jose P. Perez concurred. No separate concurring opinions are summarized in the text.