Sotto vs. The Commission on Elections, et al.

The Supreme Court cannot review the findings of fact of the Commission on Elections on certiorari under section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 657, which limits review to questions of law. A resolution adopted by a minority of the members of a political party's directorate, at a meeting called without the knowledge and consent of the party president and without notice to all members, is null and void and cannot validly accept a president's resignation or designate a replacement.

The Popular Front (Sumulong) Party was a minority political party whose president, Juan Sumulong, designated Emilio M. Javier in November 1941 as his substitute or acting President during his illness, pursuant to section 13 (third paragraph) of the Party's "Rules and Regulations." After Sumulong's death on January 9, 1942, Javier continued to act as Acting President, recognized by the members of the Directorate and by the Party convention. The Party's Rules and Regulations provided that the President and Executive Council constitute the Directorate, that the President is the supreme representative of the Party, and that the Executive Council shall be called to a meeting by the President.

Vicente Sotto filed a petition for review of the decision of the Commission on Elections which declared Emilio M. Javier as the true and legitimate President of the Popular Front (Sumulong) Party. Sotto contended that he was the President of the Party and prayed that the Commission's decision be reviewed and reversed.

The Commission on Elections found that during the illness of the late Juan Sumulong and after his death, Dr. Emilio M. Javier acted and was recognized by the members of the party as interim president of the Popular Front (Sumulong) Party, at least until February 1, 1946. On that date, four members of the party's directorate adopted a resolution accepting the resignation Javier had submitted on April 30, 1942, and designating Sotto as Acting President. The Commission found that no election had ever taken place to fill the vacancy created by Sumulong's death, and that all members of the Directorate, including those now opposing Javier, and all delegates to the alleged convention of January 27, 1946, recognized Javier as interim president.

The Commission ruled that the February 1, 1946 meeting of the Directorate, called by Secretary Laude without the knowledge or authorization of the President, and the resolution adopted by only four members of an eleven-member Directorate, were null and void. The Commission further found that the resignation letter was not real and effective, having been presented under pressure of circumstances prevailing during the Japanese regime.

Javier had been designated in November 1941 by Juan Sumulong as his substitute or acting President during his illness. After Sumulong's death on January 9, 1942, the members of the Directorate and the Party convention of January 27, 1946 recognized Javier as Acting President. Javier's right to act as President was only questioned after the February 1, 1946 meeting of four Directorate members.

The Court found that Javier's letter of April 30, 1942 tendering his resignation was not a real resignation, as he was compelled to write it to avoid being molested by the Japanese who wanted to appoint him to a government position. This explanation was uncontradicted and confirmed by Javier's subsequent conduct, as he continued to act as President in all meetings of the Directorate and the Party convention after the restoration of the Commonwealth Government. The four members of the Directorate had to dig the letter up from the records where it had lain buried and forgotten since 1942.

The February 1, 1946 meeting was called by Secretary Laude on January 30, 1946, without the knowledge and consent of President Javier. Under the Party's Rules and Regulations, the Executive Council shall be called to a meeting by the President, and since the President and Executive Council constitute the Directorate, Directorate meetings must be called and held in the same manner. Secretary Laude admitted that according to section 12, the call to a meeting must be made by the President or by his authority. Javier was not then absent or incapacitated to act as President.

The meeting was also called without previous notice to all members of the Directorate. While Secretary Laude certified that all members were notified, this certificate constituted at most a presumption juris tantum, which was rebutted by Javier's letter of January 30, 1946, reproaching Laude for calling a meeting without Javier's knowledge and consent and for sending notice only to the few members who solicited it. Laude did not deny this imputation in his answer of January 31, 1946.

A subsequent resolution adopted on February 11, 1946, by the same four members plus votes cast by Lorenzo Sumulong by proxy from Jose Alejandrino and Sixto Lopez, ratifying the February 1 resolution, was also null and void for the same reasons. Javier was still Acting President when the February 11 meeting was called, and only some members were notified, with Geronimo Santiago refusing to attend on the ground that the meeting was called in violation of the Rules and Regulations.

The records showed that the Directorate consisted of eleven members: Emilio Javier as acting President and Chairman, Geronimo Santiago, Vicente G. Cruz, Jose Palarca, Jose de Leon, Jose Alejandrino, Lorenzo Sumulong, Vicente Sotto, Servando de los Angeles, Mamerto Manalo, Jose Robles, and Josefina Phodaca. Of these, Jose de Leon, Jose Robles, Jr., and Lorenzo Sumulong sided with Sotto, while the majority — Geronimo Santiago, Vicente G. Cruz, Jose Palarca, Servando de los Angeles, Mamerto Manalo, and Josefina Phodaca — sided with Javier and constituted the legitimate Directorate.

• Legitimacy of the Resolution: Petitioner Vicente Sotto contended that he was the legitimate President of the Popular Front (Sumulong) Party, deriving his right from the resolution adopted by four members of the Directorate on February 1, 1946, accepting Javier's resignation and designating Sotto as Acting President.
• Review of Findings of Fact: Petitioner sought review of the Commission on Elections' decision, praying that it be reversed and that he be declared the legitimate President of the Party.

• Validity of the February 1, 1946 Resolution: Respondent Emilio M. Javier argued that the meeting of the Directorate called on February 1, 1946, and the resolution adopted by four members were null and void because the meeting was called by the Secretary without the knowledge or authorization of the President, and the resolution was adopted by a minority of four members of an eleven-member Directorate.
• Resignation Not Real: Respondent maintained that his letter of resignation dated April 30, 1942, was not real and effective, having been presented under pressure of circumstances prevailing during the Japanese regime, as he satisfactorily explained.
• Lack of Notice: Respondent argued that the meeting was called without previous notice to all members of the Directorate, at least to President Javier, contrary to section 13 of the Party's Rules and Regulations.

• Scope of Review: Whether the Supreme Court can review the findings of fact of the Commission on Elections under section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 657.
• Validity of the Resolution: Whether the action or resolution of the four members of the Directorate accepting Javier's resignation and designating Sotto as Acting President was valid.
• Right to Appoint Election Inspectors: Whether the Commission on Elections' statement that President Javier has the right, through his Directorate, to appoint the persons who shall propose the election inspectors to which the party is entitled, was erroneous.

• Scope of Review: No. Under section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 657, the Supreme Court cannot review the rulings or findings of fact of the Commission on Elections on certiorari, which is limited to questions of law.
• Validity of the Resolution: No. The resolution of the four members of the Directorate was null and void because the meeting was called without the knowledge and consent of the President, and without notice to all members of the Directorate, contrary to the Party's Rules and Regulations.
• Right to Appoint Election Inspectors: No. The Commission's statement that the President has the right, through his Directorate, to appoint the persons who shall propose the election inspectors was not erroneous, as the President is the supreme representative of the Party and acts as chairman of the Directorate.

• Scope of Review: Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 657 provides that any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission on Elections may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari in accordance with the Rules of Court. The Court explained that the law does not refer to the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 67, which only reviews acts of inferior courts, boards, or officers exercising judicial functions when the respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. Rather, by certiorari, the appellate court can only review questions or errors of law decided or committed by the lower court, as provided in Rules 43, 44, and 46 of the Rules of Court. Questions or findings of fact of the inferior tribunal cannot be reviewed on certiorari. The Court cited the general rule that, in the absence of statute or local practice otherwise, questions or findings of fact in the inferior tribunal are not reviewable on certiorari, and evidence which is made a part of the record cannot be examined to determine whether or not it justified the findings on which the decision or judgment was made. The Court noted that while Article X, section 2 of the Constitution provides that decisions, orders, and rulings of the Commission shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court, the Philippine Congress provided in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 657 that such review shall be by writ of certiorari, and since the constitutionality of that provision was not assailed, the presumption is that it is constitutional. The Court declined to pass upon the constitutional question, following the rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question unless raised by the parties.

• Validity of the Resolution: The Court held that the Commission on Elections' conclusion that the resolution was not valid was in conformity with the facts and the law, for four reasons. First, Javier's letter of April 30, 1942, was not a real resignation, as he was compelled to write it to avoid being molested by the Japanese, and this explanation was uncontradicted and confirmed by his subsequent conduct in acting as President in all meetings after the restoration of the Commonwealth Government. Second, the February 1, 1946 meeting was called by the Secretary without the knowledge and consent of President Javier, contrary to the Party's Rules and Regulations which require that the Executive Council be called to a meeting by the President. Third, the meeting was called without previous notice to all members of the Directorate, and the certificate of Secretary Laude constituted at most a presumption juris tantum that was rebutted by Javier's letter of January 30, 1946. The Court cited the well-established rule that notice of a special meeting must be given to every director, unless there is some express provision in the charter or by-laws or established usage to the contrary, and that a special meeting held in the absence of some directors without notice is illegal and its action invalid. Fourth, the resolution of February 11, 1946, ratifying the previous resolution, was also null and void for the same reasons, as Javier was still Acting President and only some members were called to the meeting.

• Right to Appoint Election Inspectors: The Court held that the Commission's statement that President Javier "tiene derecho, por medio de su Directorio," to appoint the persons who shall propose the election inspectors was not erroneous. Section 8 of Act No. 725 provides that the inspector shall be recommended by the political party, and a political party, as any other association, acts generally through its directorate. Under section XI of the Party's Rules and Regulations, the President is the supreme representative of the Party and acts as chairman of the Directorate. Although the Directorate votes for or selects the representatives, the President, as chairman of the Directorate and the supreme representative of the Party, is the one who shall appoint the representative selected or approved by the Directorate.

• Scope of Certiorari Review of the Commission on Elections — Under section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 657, decisions, orders, or rulings of the Commission on Elections may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari in accordance with the Rules of Court. By certiorari, the appellate court can only review questions or errors of law decided or committed by the lower court; questions or findings of fact of the inferior tribunal cannot be reviewed on certiorari. Evidence which is made a part of the record cannot be examined to determine whether or not it justified the findings on which the decision or judgment was made. The Court applied this doctrine to decline review of the Commission's factual findings, while noting that even if reviewable, the findings were supported by the evidence.

• Notice Requirement for Special Meetings of a Directorate — The great weight of authority is that notice of a special meeting must be given to every director, unless there is some express provision in the charter or by-laws or established usage to the contrary, or unless it is impossible or impracticable to do so. A special meeting held in the absence of some directors without notice is illegal, and the action at such a meeting, although by a majority of the directors, is invalid, unless subsequently ratified or unless rights have been acquired by innocent third persons. Each member of a corporate body has the right to consultation with the others and to be heard upon all questions considered, and it is presumed that if the absent members had been present, they might have dissented and their arguments might have convinced the majority. The Court applied this rule to the special meeting of the Directorate of the Popular Front Party, holding that the February 1, 1946 meeting was illegal for lack of notice to all members.

• Presumption Juris Tantum of a Secretary's Certificate of Notice — A certificate of the secretary that all members of a directorate were notified of a meeting constitutes at most a presumption juris tantum of the truth of the facts therein stated. The presumption can be rebutted by evidence showing that not all members were actually notified. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that Secretary Laude's certificate was rebutted by Javier's letter of January 30, 1946, which Laude did not deny.

• Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius — The express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another. The Court applied this maxim in holding that section 8 of Commonwealth Act No. 725, which expressly provides for the division of election inspectors when the majority party is divided into two factions of national character, could not be invoked by analogy to divide inspectors when a minority party splits, as Congress did not intend to authorize such division in the case of minority parties.

• "The general rule is that, in the absence of statue or local practice otherwise, questions or findings of fact, in the inferior tribunal, are not reviewable on certiorari, and that evidence which is made a part of the record cannot be examined to determine whether or not it justified the findings on which the decision or judgment was made; nor will rulings on questions of fact, within the inferior tribunal's jurisdiction, be reviewed." — This passage states the controlling doctrine on the scope of certiorari review, which the Court applied to decline review of the Commission on Elections' factual findings.

• "The great weight of authority, therefore, is to the effect that notice of a special meeting must be given to every director, unless there is some express provision in the charter or by-laws or established usage to the contrary, or unless it is impossible or impracticable to do so. Except in these cases, a special meeting held in the absence of some of the directors, and without any notice to them, is illegal, and the action at such a meeting, although by a majority of the directors, is invalid, unless subsequently ratified or unless rights have been acquired by innocent third persons, as against whom the corporation must be held estopped." — This passage articulates the rule on notice requirements for special meetings, which the Court applied to invalidate the February 1, 1946 resolution of the four Directorate members.

• "The requirement of notice to all the members of the Directorate or Board of Directors for the validity of the acts or resolutions adopted by those present in a special meeting, as that of February 1, 1946, is in conformity with the following well-established rule, which may be applied to special meeting of directorates of political parties and other associations." — This passage confirms that the notice requirement for corporate directorates applies by analogy to the directorates of political parties and other associations.

• Sumulong vs. Commission on Elections, 71 Phil., 12 — Cited in the dissenting opinion of Justice Ozaeta as authority for the proposition that, by analogy to section 8 of Commonwealth Act No. 725, it would be against the spirit and purpose of the Election Law to give all the minority's inspectors in a given district to one faction of the minority party to the exclusion of the other faction.

• Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 657 — Provides that any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission on Elections may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari in accordance with the Rules of Court. The Court applied this provision to hold that findings of fact of the Commission are not reviewable on certiorari, which is limited to questions of law.

• Article X, Section 2, Constitution of the Philippines — Provides that decisions, orders, and rulings of the Commission on Elections shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court. The Court noted this constitutional provision but applied section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 657, since its constitutionality was not assailed and the presumption is that it is constitutional.

• Section 2, Article VIII, Constitution of the Philippines — Provides that final judgments and decrees of inferior or lower courts may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by appeal, writ of error, or certiorari. The Court cited this provision to distinguish the three modes of review and their respective scopes.

• Section 8, Commonwealth Act No. 725 — Provides that should the majority party be divided into two factions of national character with candidates for President, Vice-President, and Senators, each faction shall have one inspector and his substitute. The Court held that this provision could not be invoked by analogy to divide inspectors in the case of a split minority party, applying the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

• Section 72, Election Code (Commonwealth Act No. 357) — Provides that no inspector shall be granted to any branch or faction which has seceded from its respective party. The Court applied this provision in rejecting the contention that the minority party had split into two groups, finding that the most that could be inferred was a tentative secession of some members of the Directorate.

• Section 73, Election Code (Commonwealth Act No. 357) — Provides that inspectors and poll clerks and their respective substitutes shall be from among those proposed by the authorized representatives of the national directorates of the parties. Cited in the dissenting opinions as vesting the right to propose inspectors in the directorate, not the president.

Jaranilla, Pablo, and Briones, JJ., concurred. Moran, C.J., concurred in the result. Perfecto, J., wrote a separate concurring opinion, with De Joya, J., concurring.

• Ozaeta, J. (dissenting) — Argued that the real issue was which of the two groups or factions of the Sumulong Popular Front Party was entitled to propose the appointment of election inspectors, and that the law vests in the directorate of the party, not the president, the right to appoint representatives to propose inspectors. He held that since the party had split into two groups, it would be neither just nor conducive to a clean and honest election to grant all election inspectors to one group to the exclusion of the other, and proposed dividing the inspectors equally between the two factions.

• Paras, J. (dissenting) — Argued that the Constitution confers on the Supreme Court absolute power to review the decision of the Commission on Elections, comprising not only conclusions of law but also of fact, and that neither Congress nor the Court could validly impose that limitation. He also argued that the dispositive part of the Commission's decision was erroneous because section 73 of the Election Code concedes to the directorate the right to designate the persons who should propose the names of representatives of the party in the board of inspectors, making the question of who is president immaterial. He voted to set aside the appealed decision and remand the case to the Commission to determine the will of the directorate. Hilado and Bengzon, JJ., concurred.