Soriano vs. People of the Philippines

A conviction for libel requires that the victim be identifiable; defamatory statements directed at a large class or religious group, without circumstances specifically pointing to a particular member, do not give rise to individual causes of action for group libel. Conversely, where the offended party is specifically named and the defamatory words are clearly malicious, the elements of libel are satisfied notwithstanding the speaker's claim of religious expression.

Eliseo Soriano was the anchorman of the religious radio program "Ang Dating Daan" aired over DZAL, a radio station in Iriga City with considerable coverage in the city and throughout the Bicol Region. The libel charges arose from statements Soriano made on air concerning Wilde Almeda, the evangelist leader of the Jesus Miracle Crusade International Ministry (JMCIM), and the pastors and members of that religious group. The statements were prompted by Almeda's act of laying hands on presidential candidate Jose De Venecia during a prayer rally at Luneta, Manila, shortly before the May 8, 1998 elections, and decreeing that De Venecia would be the next president — a prediction that proved false.

On July 31, 1998, Eliseo Soriano, anchorman of the religious radio program "Ang Dating Daan" aired over DZAL radio station in Iriga City, broadcast a prepared taped program containing statements directed at Wilde Almeda, leader of the Jesus Miracle Crusade International Ministry (JMCIM), and the pastors and members of that religious group. The statements were prompted by Almeda's act of placing his hands on the head of presidential candidate Jose De Venecia during a prayer rally at Luneta, Manila, shortly before the May 8, 1998 elections, and declaring that De Venecia would be the next president of the Philippines. After De Venecia lost the election, Soriano used this incident to assail Almeda and the JMCIM on air, branding Almeda as "BULAANG PROPETA" (false prophet), "TARANTADO," and "GAGO," and labeling the pastors as "PASTOR NG DEMONYO" (pastor of the devil), "MGA PASTOR NA IMPAKTO," and "GAGO," and the members as "ISANG DAKOT NA GAGO" and "SIRA ULO" (crazy-minded).

Two separate Informations for libel were filed. On January 15, 1999, Soriano was indicted in Criminal Case No. IR-4848, which charged him with libel against the "persons comprising the JMCIM," specifically its pastors, alleging that the broadcast was intended to cause dishonor, discredit, and ridicule upon the group. On June 9, 2000, a similar Information was filed in Criminal Case No. IR-5273, charging Soriano with libel specifically against Evangelist Wilde E. Almeda, alleging that the defamatory statements were deliberately and maliciously transmitted to the public to discredit and destroy Almeda's reputation.

Upon arraignment, Soriano pleaded not guilty to both charges and posted cash bonds for his provisional liberty. During trial, the prosecution presented Eudes Cuadro, Joel Cortero, Jerry Cabanes, and Liza Martinez as witnesses in Criminal Case No. IR-5273, while Joel Cortero was the sole witness in Criminal Case No. IR-4848. The defense presented Marlon Igana. Soriano filed a Demurrer to Evidence on December 22, 2008, which the RTC denied in a Resolution dated January 6, 2008.

After trial, the RTC found Soriano guilty of two counts of libel, imposing a fine of ₱6,000 for each case pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and awarding no civil damages. The CA affirmed the RTC's Consolidated Judgment in its Decision dated August 17, 2015, and denied reconsideration in its Resolution dated May 18, 2016. Soriano elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

• No Discredit or Dishonor: Petitioner argued that the prosecution failed to prove that any discredit or dishonor was caused to the private complainant.
• No Malice: Petitioner maintained that there was no malice or ill will behind his statements, claiming his motive was to caution other religious leaders and members of any religious congregation not to use the institution of religion in a manner that would subject pastors, ministers, and the religion itself to public distrust and disdain.
• No Identifiable Person: Petitioner contended that there was no identifiable person in the alleged libelous statement.
• No Knowledge or Consent in Publication: Petitioner argued that he had no knowledge of, much less consent to, the publication of the alleged libelous statement.
• Chilling Effect on Free Expression: Petitioner asserted that the conviction effectively curtails and creates a chilling effect on the constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of expression.

• Defamatory Imputation: Whether the statements uttered by petitioner constituted defamatory imputation under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Malice: Whether the prosecution proved malice or ill will behind petitioner's statements.
• Publication: Whether the element of publication was satisfied.
• Identifiability of Victim: Whether there was an identifiable victim in the alleged libelous statements, particularly in Criminal Case No. IR-4848 where the charge referred to the "persons comprising the JMCIM."
• Freedom of Expression: Whether the conviction curtails the constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of expression and religious speech.

• Defamatory Imputation: Yes. The words "GAGO," "TARANTADONG PASTOR," "PASTOR NG DEMONYO IYAN," and "BULAANG PROPETA" are clearly defamatory as they disparage the private complainant and tend to dishonor, discredit, or hold him up to public ridicule.
• Malice: Yes. Actual malice was established; no good intention or justifiable motive was shown, and the language used reflected a conscious design to discredit and humiliate the private complainant.
• Publication: Yes. The defamatory statements were broadcast through petitioner's radio program, making them known to persons other than the offended party.
• Identifiability of Victim: Yes as to Criminal Case No. IR-5273 (Almeda was specifically named); No as to Criminal Case No. IR-4848 (no specific individual was singled out). Declarations about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified individual.
• Freedom of Expression: No. Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech; the statements were motivated by anger and retribution, not religious conviction.

• Defamatory Imputation: An allegation is defamatory if it ascribes to a person a vice or defect, or any act or circumstance tending to dishonor, discredit, or hold him in contempt. The words are construed in their entirety and in their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning. Petitioner's labels — "GAGO," "TARANTADONG PASTOR," "PASTOR NG DEMONYO IYAN," "BULAANG PROPETA" — are on their face insulting and disparaging. Evidence aliunde is unnecessary to establish that these words are without malice. Examination of the statements revealed no good intention or justifiable motive to negate the presumption of malice. Petitioner's claimed motive — to caution religious leaders not to misuse religion — is not reflected in his malicious statements and insulting labels toward the pastors of JMCIM. The statements do not qualify as privileged communications under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, as they were not private communications in performance of a legal, moral, or social duty, nor fair and true reports of official proceedings, nor fair commentaries on matters of public interest. While religion is arguably a matter of public interest, the words used do not debunk purported falsities in JMCIM's preachings but actually degrade and insult their pastor or founder.

• Malice: Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. No good motive can be inferred from the language used by Soriano against the private complainants. The apparent objective was to discredit and humiliate the private complainants so as to sow the seeds of JMCIM's dissolution and to encourage membership in his own religion. The CA's finding of actual malice was cited with approval.

• Publication: Publication in libel means making the defamatory matter, after it is written, known to someone other than the person against whom it has been written. Libel is published when the matter is made known or brought to the attention of another person other than its author and the offended party. The video footage of petitioner was broadcast through his radio program, satisfying the element of publication.

• Identifiability of Victim: In Criminal Case No. IR-5273, Almeda was specifically named in the Information and in the statements, making him identifiable. In Criminal Case No. IR-4848, however, the Information did not refer to any specific individual or pastor but merely mentioned "persons comprising the JMCIM." Applying the doctrine from MVRS Publications, Inc. vs. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Phils., Inc., declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing to a particular member of a class, no member has a right of action. The Court found nothing in the records establishing or singling out any specific pastor, specifically Joel Cortero. The statements could not be considered sweeping enough to injure the reputation of all JMCIM members. Each reputation is personal in character; together, the members do not have a single common reputation giving them a common interest in the controversy. Hence, conviction in IR-4848 could not be affirmed.

• Freedom of Expression: Petitioner's claim that his statements are absolutely protected by the Constitution as expressions of religious belief was rejected. Citing Soriano vs. Laguardia, plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Petitioner's own attempts to place his words in context showed he was moved by anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction.

• Elements of Libel — For an imputation to be libelous, four requisites must be present: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable. All four must concur for a conviction. The Court applied each element to the facts, finding all satisfied in IR-5273 but the identifiability element lacking in IR-4848.

• Presumption of Malice — Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. This presumption may be rebutted by showing that the communication falls under the qualifiedly privileged categories in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, or by proving good faith and justifiable motive. The Court found no good intention or justifiable motive in petitioner's statements, and the statements did not fall under any privileged category.

• Group Libel Doctrine — Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of a class, no member of such class has a right of action. Each individual's reputation is personal, separate, and distinct; members of a group do not share a single common reputation that gives them a common interest in the subject matter. The Court applied this doctrine to acquit petitioner in IR-4848, where the charge referred to "persons comprising the JMCIM" without singling out any specific individual.

• Religious Speech vs. Insults — Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Where the speaker's words show he was moved by anger and the need for retribution rather than religious conviction, the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression does not shield the statements from libel liability.

• "Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of a class, no member of such class has a right of action without at all impairing the equally demanding right of free speech and expression, as well as of the press, under the Bill of Rights." — This passage articulates the group libel doctrine, the controlling rationale for acquitting petitioner in Criminal Case No. IR-4848 where no specific individual was identified.

• "Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioner attempts to place his words in context show that he was moved by anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction." — This quotation, drawn from Soriano vs. Laguardia, defines the boundary between protected religious expression and actionable insults, and was applied to reject petitioner's free-expression defense.

• "An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead." — This passage sets out the test for defamatory imputation, applied to conclude that petitioner's labels ("GAGO," "BULAANG PROPETA," etc.) were defamatory on their face.

• Manila Bulletin Publishing Corporation and Ruther Batuigas vs. Victor A. Domingo and the People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170341, July 5, 2017 — Followed for the rule on determining defamatory imputation: words are construed in their entirety and in their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning, and a charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce hearers to suppose the person was guilty of certain offenses or to impeach honesty, virtue, or reputation.

• Buatis, Jr. vs. People, 520 Phil. 149 (2006) — Cited for the proposition that evidence aliunde is unnecessary to establish that defamatory words are without malice, and for the definition of publication in libel.

• MVRS Publications, Inc., et al. vs. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Phils., Inc., 444 Phil. 230 (2003) — Controlling precedent applied to acquit petitioner in IR-4848. The Court found the facts analogous: declarations about a large class (Muslims in MVRS; JMCIM members in the present case) cannot be interpreted to refer to an identifiable individual, and each member's reputation is personal and distinct from the group's.

• Soriano vs. Laguardia, et al., 605 Phil. 43 (2009) — Followed for the principle that plain insults cannot be elevated to religious speech, and that the speaker's words showed he was motivated by anger and retribution, not religious conviction.

• Diaz vs. People, 551 Phil. 192 (2007) — Cited for the four requisites of libel: defamatory, malicious, given publicity, and identifiable victim.

• Philippine Journalists, Inc. (People's Journal) vs. Thoenen, 513 Phil. 607 (2005) — Cited for the definition of libel under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Yuchengco vs. The Manila Chronicle Publishing Corp., et al., 620 Phil. 697 (2009) — Cited for the definition of publication in libel: libel is published when the defamatory matter is made known to someone other than the author and the offended party.

• Article 353, Revised Penal Code — Defines libel as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, vice, defect, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. Applied as the foundational provision for the libel charges.

• Article 354, Revised Penal Code — Presumes every defamatory imputation to be malicious, even if true, unless good intention and justifiable motive are shown, except for (1) private communications made in performance of a legal, moral, or social duty, and (2) fair and true reports of official proceedings made in good faith without comments or remarks. The Court examined whether petitioner's statements fell under these exceptions and found they did not; the enumeration is not exclusive, as fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged, but petitioner's statements did not qualify.

Bersamin (Acting Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, and Gesmundo, JJ., concurred. No separate concurring opinions were written.