Soriano vs. People

Separate informations, each charging a distinct offense, are not duplicitous even if they arise from the same act; a single act or incident may offend two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, justifying the filing of several charges against the accused, provided each offense requires proof of an additional fact or element not essential to the other.

Petitioners Hilario P. Soriano and Rosalinda Ilagan were the President and General Manager, respectively, of the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. (RBSM). The charges against them stemmed from alleged indirect borrowing from RBSM during their incumbency, in violation of Section 83 of Republic Act No. 337 (the General Banking Act), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1795, also known as the DOSRI Rules. The same conduct allegedly involved falsification of loan documents and misappropriation of loan proceeds, giving rise to separate charges for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents under the Revised Penal Code.

Hilario P. Soriano and Rosalinda Ilagan served as President and General Manager, respectively, of the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. (RBSM). Allegedly, on June 27, 1997 and August 21, 1997, during their incumbency, petitioners indirectly obtained loans from RBSM by falsifying loan applications and other bank records, making it appear that depositors Virgilio J. Malang and Rogelio Mañaol each obtained loans of ₱15,000,000.00, when in fact they did not.

On May 4, 2000, State Prosecutor Josefino A. Subia filed four informations in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. For the Malang loan, Soriano was charged with violation of Section 83 of R.A. No. 337, as amended (DOSRI rules), in Criminal Case No. 1719-M-2000, alleging that Soriano, as bank president, indirectly borrowed ₱15 million without the written approval of the majority of the directors, using the name of depositor Virgilio J. Malang, who had no knowledge of the loan, and converted the net proceeds of ₱14,775,000.00 to his own personal use. Soriano and Ilagan were likewise charged with estafa thru falsification of commercial document in Criminal Case No. 1720-M-2000, alleging that they conspired to falsify loan documents by making it appear that Malang filed the loan application and promissory note when he did not participate, and that by virtue of said falsification, they credited the loan proceeds to Malang's account and thereafter converted the same to their personal gain, to the damage and prejudice of RBSM, its creditors, and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. These cases were raffled to Branch 14, presided by Judge Petrita Braga Dime.

For the Mañaol loan, a similar information for violation of Section 83 of R.A. No. 337 was filed against Soriano in Criminal Case No. 1980-M-2000, alleging that on August 21, 1997, Soriano indirectly borrowed ₱15 million without the requisite board approval, using the name of depositor Rogelio Mañaol, who had no knowledge of the loan, and converted the amount to his own use. Soriano and Ilagan were also charged with estafa thru falsification of commercial document in Criminal Case No. 1981-M-2000, alleging that they conspired to falsify loan documents by making it appear that Mañaol filed the loan application and promissory note when he did not participate, and that they deposited the ₱15 million loan proceeds to Mañaol's account and converted the same to their personal gain, to the damage and prejudice of RBSM, its creditors, the BSP, and the PDIC. These cases were raffled to Branch 77, presided by Judge Aurora Santiago-Lagman.

Petitioners moved to quash the informations in all four cases on the grounds that more than one offense was charged and that the facts charged did not constitute an offense. They argued that the prosecutor charged more than one offense for a single act, since Soriano was charged with both a DOSRI violation and estafa thru falsification of commercial document for allegedly securing fictitious loans. RTC Branch 77 denied the motion to quash on November 15, 2000, holding that each information charged only one offense and that even if the cases arose from the same facts, prosecution under one provision would not bar prosecution under another. RTC Branch 14 denied the motion to quash on November 27, 2000, similarly holding that each information charged only one offense and that the allegations, if hypothetically admitted, constituted the offenses charged. Petitioners then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via certiorari, which consolidated the petitions and, on August 5, 2003, dismissed them, affirming the RTC orders. Petitioners thereafter filed the present petition for review before the Supreme Court.

• Duplicity of Offenses: Petitioners argued that the informations were duplicitous because Soriano was charged with both violation of DOSRI rules and estafa thru falsification of commercial document for allegedly securing fictitious loans, which they claimed proceeded from a single act.
• Single Act, Single Offense: Petitioners contended that Soriano should be charged with only one offense, because all the charges filed against him proceeded from and were based on a single act of obtaining fictitious loans; thus, he could not be charged with estafa thru falsification of commercial document if already being prosecuted for obtaining a DOSRI loan.
• Sufficiency of Allegations: Petitioners questioned the sufficiency of the allegations in the informations, contending that the facts charged did not constitute an offense.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioners asserted that RTC Branches 14 and 77 abused their discretion in denying the motions to quash, and that the CA committed reversible error in dismissing their petitions for certiorari.

• Distinct Offenses: Respondent Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, in its memorandum, pointed out that there are differences between the two offenses: a DOSRI violation consists in the failure to observe procedural, reportorial, or ceiling requirements prescribed by law in the grant of a loan to a director, officer, stockholder, or related interest, while the elements of abuse of confidence, deceit, fraud, or false pretenses, and damage — essential to estafa — are not elements of a DOSRI violation.

• Duplicity of Offenses: Whether the informations were duplicitous for charging more than one offense arising from a single act.
• Multiplicity of Charges: Whether a single act of obtaining fictitious loans can give rise to separate charges for DOSRI violation and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents.
• Sufficiency of Allegations: Whether the facts alleged in the informations, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the offenses charged.
• Propriety of Certiorari: Whether a special civil action for certiorari is the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information.

• Duplicity of Offenses: No. Each information charged only one offense — violation of DOSRI rules in one and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents in the other — so there was no duplicity, which requires a single information charging more than one offense under Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
• Multiplicity of Charges: No bar to multiple charges. A single act or incident may offend two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, justifying the filing of several charges, provided each offense requires proof of an additional fact or element not essential to the other.
• Sufficiency of Allegations: Yes, the informations sufficiently constitute the offenses charged. The informations alleged the essential elements of both DOSRI violation under Section 83 of R.A. No. 337 and estafa under Article 315(1)(b) and (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as hypothetically admitted.
• Propriety of Certiorari: No. Certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash; the accused must enter a plea, go to trial, present special defenses, and appeal any adverse judgment.

• Duplicity of Offenses: Duplicity of charges means a single complaint or information that charges more than one offense. Section 13, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that a complaint or information must charge but one offense, except where existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses. In this case, Soriano was faced not with one information charging more than one offense, but with separate informations, each charging a different offense — violation of DOSRI rules in one and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents in the others. Ilagan was charged with estafa thru falsification of commercial documents in separate informations. Petitioners therefore erroneously invoked duplicity of charges as a ground to quash.

• Multiplicity of Charges: Jurisprudence establishes that a single act or incident might offend two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense. The only limit is the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy for the "same offense." Two or more offenses arising from the same act are not the "same" if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not. As the BSP pointed out, a DOSRI violation consists in the failure to observe procedural, reportorial, or ceiling requirements — lack of written approval of the majority of directors, failure to enter such approval into corporate records, and failure to transmit a copy to the BSP supervising department. The elements of abuse of confidence, deceit, fraud, false pretenses, and damage, essential to estafa, are not elements of a DOSRI violation. The filing of several charges against Soriano was therefore proper.

• Sufficiency of Allegations: The fundamental test in considering a motion to quash under Section 3(a), Rule 117 is the sufficiency of the averments — whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the offense charged. The trial court may not consider a situation contrary to that set forth in the information; facts constituting the defense must be proved during trial. The informations in Criminal Case Nos. 1719 and 1980 alleged that Soriano, as bank president, with Ilagan's direct participation, used the names of Malang and Mañaol to indirectly obtain loans without complying with the requisite board approval, reportorial, and ceiling requirements, in violation of Section 83 of R.A. No. 337. The informations in Criminal Case Nos. 1720 and 1981 alleged that petitioners made it appear that Malang and Mañaol obtained loans and received the proceeds when they did not, and further alleged the elements of estafa under Article 315(1)(b) — receipt of money in trust or under obligation to return, misappropriation or conversion, prejudice to another, and demand — and Article 315(2)(a) — false pretense or fraudulent act executed prior to or simultaneously with the fraud, reliance by the offended party, and resulting damage. The informations thus charged the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents.

• Propriety of Certiorari: The Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The proper procedure is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice to presenting the special defenses invoked in the motion to quash, and if an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. Petitioners should not have forthwith filed a petition for certiorari with the CA; they should have gone to trial and reiterated their special defenses. No special or exceptional circumstances justified immediate resort to certiorari. The CA committed no reversible error, much less grave abuse of discretion, in dismissing the petition.

• Duplicity of Offenses — Duplicity of charges exists when a single complaint or information charges more than one offense. Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that a complaint or information charge but one offense, except where existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses. The rule aims to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense. In this case, the doctrine was applied to hold that separate informations, each charging a distinct offense, are not duplicitous even if arising from the same act.

• Multiplicity of Charges from a Single Act — A single act or incident may offend two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, justifying the filing of several charges against the accused. The only limit is the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy for the "same offense." Two offenses arising from the same act are not the "same" if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that DOSRI violation and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents are distinct offenses, as the elements of abuse of confidence, deceit, fraud, and damage essential to estafa are not elements of a DOSRI violation.

• Sufficiency of Allegations in a Motion to Quash — The fundamental test in considering a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense (Section 3(a), Rule 117) is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined by law. The trial court may not consider a situation contrary to that set forth in the information; facts constituting the defense must be proved during trial and are not proper grounds for a motion to quash.

• Certiorari Not a Proper Remedy for Denial of a Motion to Quash — A special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The accused must enter a plea, go to trial, present special defenses, and appeal any adverse judgment. Immediate resort to certiorari is justified only by special or exceptional circumstances.

• "A single act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense. The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for 'the same offense.'" — This passage articulates the controlling doctrine on multiplicity of charges from a single act, distinguishing it from double jeopardy by the "additional fact or element" test.

• "By duplicity of charges is meant a single complaint or information that charges more than one offense." — This is the canonical formulation of duplicity of offenses, defining the precise scope of the prohibition under Section 13, Rule 110.

• "The fundamental test in considering a motion to quash anchored on Section 3(a), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, is the sufficiency of the averments in the information; that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined by law." — This passage states the standard for testing the sufficiency of allegations in an information for purposes of a motion to quash, emphasizing hypothetical admission of the facts alleged.

• "A special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The proper procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law." — This passage defines the procedural doctrine governing the remedy for denial of a motion to quash, directing the accused to trial and appeal rather than certiorari.

• Loney vs. People, G.R. No. 152644, February 10, 2006, 482 SCRA 194 — Controlling precedent followed for the doctrine that a single act may offend two or more distinct provisions of law, justifying multiple charges. The Court relied on this case to reject petitioners' argument that Soriano could be charged with only one offense.

• People vs. Doriquez, 133 Phil. 295 (1968) — Cited within Loney vs. People for the test that two offenses arising from the same act are not the "same offense" if one requires proof of an additional fact or element not essential to the other.

• Caballero vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 137355-58, September 25, 2007, 534 SCRA 30 — Cited for the proposition that the test for sufficiency of allegations in a motion to quash is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the offense charged.

• Torres vs. Hon. Garchitorena, 442 Phil. 765 (2002) — Cited for the rule that facts constituting the accused's defense are not proper grounds for a motion to quash and must be proved during trial.

• Torres vs. Abundo, Sr., G.R. No. 174263, January 24, 2007, 512 SCRA 564 — Cited for the definition of grave abuse of discretion in its juridical sense, as capricious, despotic, oppressive, or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

• Sasot vs. People, G.R. No. 143193, June 29, 2005, 462 SCRA 138 — Cited for the doctrine that certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash, and that the accused should go to trial and appeal instead.

• Section 83, Republic Act No. 337 (General Banking Act), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1795 — Prohibits directors or officers of banking institutions from directly or indirectly borrowing bank funds, or becoming guarantor, indorser, or surety for loans, except with the written approval of the majority of directors, which must be entered upon corporate records and transmitted to the Superintendent of Banks. Applied to charge Soriano with violation of DOSRI rules for allegedly obtaining loans without the requisite board approval.

• Section 13, Rule 110, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides that a complaint or information must charge but one offense, except where existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses. Applied to determine that no duplicity existed because each information charged only one offense.

• Section 3(a) and (e), Rule 117, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure — Lists grounds for a motion to quash, including (a) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense and (e) that more than one offense is charged. Applied to test the sufficiency of the allegations and the duplicity of the informations.

• Article 315(1)(b), Revised Penal Code — Defines estafa by unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence through misappropriating or converting money or property received in trust or under obligation to return, to the prejudice of another. Applied to the information in Criminal Case No. 1720, which alleged receipt of loan proceeds, misappropriation, prejudice to the bank, and demand.

• Article 315(2)(a), Revised Penal Code — Defines estafa by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts, including using a fictitious name or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business, or imaginary transactions. Applied to the information in Criminal Case No. 1981, which alleged false pretenses through the use of fictitious borrowers, reliance by the bank, and resulting damage.

Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (Associate Justice, Chairperson), Minita V. Chico-Nazario (Associate Justice), Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Associate Justice), Diosdado M. Peralta (Associate Justice). All concurred in the decision; no separate concurring opinions were written.