Soriano vs. Estrella

In an ejectment suit, a court may provisionally pass upon the fact of death of the plaintiff solely to determine entitlement to possession de facto; any such finding is provisional and does not bar a subsequent action involving the same fact. The certificate of death is only prima facie evidence and may be controverted by the plaintiff’s living presence and the adverse party’s failure to contest his identity.

Antonio V. Estrella is the registered owner of a parcel of land at No. 64 South Maya Street, PhilAm Homes, Quezon City, covered by TCT No. RT-5674 (89911), conveyed to him by his parents. Petitioners Belinda E. Soriano, Christine Evangelista, Michelle Nicole Soriano, Jose Enrique Roxas III, and Bernardina Feliciano are the children of Maria Teresa Estrella, Antonio’s sister, and are therefore his nieces and nephew. Antonio married Rosario Castro on July 13, 1962, before the effectivity of the Family Code, so their property relations are governed by the Civil Code. The case concerns an ejectment action under Rule 70 and the effect of a certificate of death on the plaintiff’s legal capacity to sue.

On January 30, 2014, Antonio V. Estrella filed a Complaint for ejectment against Belinda Soriano, Christine Evangelista, Michelle Nicole Soriano, Jose Enrique Roxas III, and Bernardina Feliciano before the MeTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 14-00796. Antonio alleged that he was the registered owner of a real property located at No. 64 South Maya Street, PhilAm Homes, Quezon City, particularly described under TCT No. RT-5674 (89911), which had been conveyed to him by his parents. With Antonio’s consent, Maria Teresa Estrella, petitioners’ mother, occupied the basement of the house constructed on the subject property. Upon Teresa’s death on February 21, 2004, Belinda, Christine, and Jose begged Antonio to allow them to stay on the premises with the promise to leave once they found a suitable place to reside. As they were his nieces and nephew, Antonio acceded and allowed them to use the basement and to introduce improvements without payment of rent.

Sometime in September 2012, Antonio informed Belinda et al. of his plan to renovate the basement and subsequently demanded that they vacate the premises. Belinda et al. refused to leave. Antonio then filed a complaint before the Office of the Punong Barangay, but barangay conciliation failed and the Office issued a Certification to File Action. Antonio sent a demand letter to vacate dated July 1, 2013, which Belinda et al. received on July 19, 2013, reiterating his demand for them to vacate his property. The demand went unheeded, and Antonio filed the instant Complaint for ejectment.

Belinda et al. averred that their grandparents titled the subject property in the name of Antonio, while the lot and improvements made on the same were declared for tax purposes in the name of their mother, Teresa. Their mother and Antonio lived in the same house, with Antonio occupying the upper portion and Teresa and Belinda et al. living in the lower portion. Belinda et al. maintained that they were in peaceful, continuous, and notorious possession of the subject property even after the title was transferred to Antonio. They further claimed that Antonio was declared dead on November 14, 1990. Antonio’s wife, Maria Rosario Castro-Estrella, executed a notarized Authorization Letter dated March 12, 2014, allowing Belinda et al. to continue occupying the lower portion of the house without paying rent. Belinda et al. argued that the suit should be dismissed because the facts alleged demonstrated neither unlawful detainer nor forcible entry.

The MeTC found that Antonio failed to show entitlement to absolute possession of the subject property to the exclusion of Belinda et al.; that the subject property is conjugal property as stated in the title; that Rosario, a co-owner, countermanded the ejectment by allowing Belinda et al. to continue occupancy; and that Antonio was not able to establish rightful ownership and had lost his right to file the action because of the certificate of death. The RTC affirmed, finding that the ultimate facts alleged did not satisfy all the elements of unlawful detainer, that Belinda et al. had established actual, continuous, and lawful possession through receipts of real property taxes and utilities and the notarized authorization letter from Rosario, and that Antonio failed to contravene the authenticity and genuineness of the certificate of death. The CA reversed, finding that Antonio merely tolerated Belinda et al.’s possession, that the certificate of death was rebutted by Antonio’s living presence and other circumstances, that the authorization letter conveyed no rights, and that all elements of unlawful detainer were present.

• Certificate of Death: Petitioners argued that respondent failed to contravene the authenticity and genuineness of his certificate of death; that the certificate is a public document which courts must recognize unless properly cancelled in accordance with law; that the record of death and its legal consequences must be recognized; that respondent lost his legal capacity upon his recorded death on November 14, 1990; and that clear and convincing evidence is required to assail the certificate.
• Authorization by Rosario: Petitioners claimed that Rosario, a part owner of the subject property as shown on the face of the certified true copy of the title, authorized them and their families to continue living in the property for as long as they wished without rental payment; and that because respondent lost legal capacity upon his recorded death, his property rights were transferred to his wife and/or heirs, giving Rosario the right to transact for the estate and authorize petitioners to stay.
• Elements of Unlawful Detainer: Petitioners contended that the elements of unlawful detainer are not present; that there was no showing their possession became illegal or that their right of possession terminated; that they were in actual, continuous, and lawful possession as shown by receipts of real property taxes and utilities and the notarized authorization letter; that respondent failed to show their possession was based on his alleged tolerance; and that the Complaint and pleadings did not state how entry was effected and how and when dispossession started.

• Rebuttal of Certificate of Death: Respondent contended that while the certificate of death is prima facie evidence of the facts stated in such public document, he was able to produce clear, strong, and convincing evidence to overcome its positive value, citing the circumstances relied upon by the CA.
• Rosario’s Lack of Authority: Respondent claimed that the CA did not err when it found that Rosario had no authority to allow petitioners to stay in the subject property.
• Unlawful Detainer Elements: Respondent quoted the CA disposition concerning the presence of the elements of unlawful detainer in the instant case.

• Provisional Determination of Death: Whether the fact of death of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit may be provisionally passed upon by the courts solely to determine entitlement to possession de facto.
• Rebuttal of Certificate of Death / Legal Capacity: Whether respondent was able to controvert the fact of his death as recorded in the certificate of death and thus had legal capacity to bring the complaint for unlawful detainer.
• Validity of Rosario’s Authorization: Whether Rosario’s authorization letter validly allowed petitioners to continue occupying the subject property.
• Elements of Unlawful Detainer: Whether all elements of unlawful detainer are present in the instant case.

• Provisional Determination of Death: Yes. Courts may provisionally pass upon the fact of death of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit solely to determine possession de facto; such finding is provisional and not conclusive.
• Rebuttal of Certificate of Death / Legal Capacity: Yes. The certificate of death is prima facie evidence only and was rebutted by respondent’s living presence and petitioners’ failure to contest his identity; respondent has legal capacity to sue.
• Validity of Rosario’s Authorization: No. Although the property is provisionally conjugal and Rosario is a co-owner, Article 165 of the Civil Code makes the husband the administrator of the conjugal partnership, and none of the exceptions allowing the wife to bind it are present.
• Elements of Unlawful Detainer: Yes. Possession was initially by tolerance, became illegal upon demand, petitioners remained and deprived respondent of enjoyment, and the complaint was filed within one year from the last demand.

• Provisional Determination of Death: The appeal raises mixed questions of fact and law; although Rule 45 generally limits appeals to pure questions of law, review is allowed because the CA’s findings conflict with those of the MeTC and RTC. An ejectment suit under Rule 70 is summary in nature, designed to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right of possession; title is not involved, and only physical or material possession de facto is resolved. If a plaintiff had to first secure cancellation of his certificate of death under Rule 108 before filing ejectment, the summary nature of the action would be defeated. Thus, courts may provisionally pass upon the fact of death solely to determine possession de facto. This is akin to the provisional resolution of ownership under Rule 70, Section 16, as explained in Co vs. Militar, and to the determination of legal capacity to sue under Rule 3, Section 1 and Article 42 of the Civil Code, as in Pasricha vs. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc. The finding is provisional, does not bar a subsequent Rule 108 action, and cannot be used as basis or proof in such action. The certificate of death is prima facie evidence under Article 410 of the Civil Code and Rule 132, Section 23 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, not conclusive until cancelled; prima facie evidence may be controverted, and Heirs of Cabais vs. Court of Appeals requires strong, complete, and conclusive proof of falsity or nullity.
• Rebuttal of Certificate of Death / Legal Capacity: It is undisputed that respondent is the Antonio V. Estrella named in the certificate of death and the same Antonio V. Estrella indicated in TCT No. RT-5674 (89911) as registered owner. The parties stipulated before the MeTC that respondent is the registered owner of the property, with petitioners qualifying only that he was not absolute owner because the title stated he was married to Rosario. Petitioners did not question respondent’s identity as the registered owner, although as relatives they had sufficient personal knowledge to contest his identity as their uncle or the brother of their mother. This is not a case of respondent being an impostor. Petitioners relied merely on the certificate of death to assert respondent’s fact of death and lack of legal capacity. The very living presence of respondent constitutes strong, complete, and conclusive proof of his being alive. Respondent’s living presence, coupled with petitioners’ failure to contest his identity, is sufficient evidence to controvert the fact of his death as recorded in the certificate of death. The finding is provisional and only for the purpose of resolving entitlement to possession de facto in the ejectment suit. Accordingly, respondent has legal capacity to bring the complaint for unlawful detainer.
• Validity of Rosario’s Authorization: Petitioners relied on two theories: first, that Rosario is a co-owner because the TCT states the registered owner is “Antonio V. Estrella, of legal age, married to Rosario Castro”; and second, that respondent’s death transmitted his legal rights over the property to Rosario. On the first, the CA erred in holding that Rosario is not a co-owner. Nevertheless, petitioners still cannot rely on Rosario’s authorization. The property relations of respondent and Rosario are governed by the Civil Code because they married on July 13, 1962, before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Under Article 160 of the New Civil Code, all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless proved to pertain exclusively to the husband or wife; the party invoking the presumption must first prove the property was acquired during the marriage, and the presumption may be rebutted only by strong, clear, categorical, and convincing evidence. The TCT over the subject property was issued on March 4, 1965, during the marriage, so there is a presumption that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership of gains. Respondent failed to present evidence showing how he acquired the property, and there is no strong, clear, categorical, and convincing evidence that it is his exclusive property. The Court doubted that he acquired it by inheritance because his parents appeared to have still been alive at the time the property was registered in his name, since they executed a Joint Affidavit on September 5, 1981. The Court also could not assume acquisition by devise, legacy, or donation. Thus, the presumption of conjugality stands, and the subject property is the conjugal property of respondent and Rosario, provisionally under Rule 70, Section 16. However, Rosario cannot validly bind the subject property through her authorization. Article 165 of the Civil Code provides that the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. Under Spouses Go vs. Yamane, a wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the support of the family, or borrows money for that purpose upon her husband’s failure to deliver the needed sum; when administration is transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband; or when the wife gives moderate donations for charity. None of these circumstances are present. Respondent is the administrator, and his wife’s authorization cannot take precedence over his decision to evict petitioners. On the second theory, respondent has already been provisionally shown to be alive; hence, he remains legally capacitated to bring the ejectment suit, and no successional rights were transmitted to Rosario.
• Elements of Unlawful Detainer: Under Rule 70, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, a person deprived of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom possession is unlawfully withheld after expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, may bring an action within one year after unlawful deprivation or withholding. The settled elements of unlawful detainer are: (1) initially, possession by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the last demand to vacate, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. All elements are present. Respondent merely tolerated petitioners’ possession because they are his nieces and nephew. In a letter dated July 1, 2013, received on July 19, 2013, respondent demanded that they vacate. Petitioners refused, and their originally lawful possession became illegal. They deprived respondent of the enjoyment of the subject property. Respondent instituted the complaint on January 30, 2014, within one year from the last demand. Petitioners’ reliance on Rosario’s authorization cannot be credited. Their apparent co-ownership theory with Teresa cannot be given weight because they admitted before the MeTC that respondent is the registered owner, failed to advance the theory, and did not assert ownership rights but based their authority to occupy only on Rosario’s authorization. Thus, respondent is entitled to the remedy under Rule 70 for ejectment due to unlawful detainer.

• Provisional determination of the fact of death in ejectment — In an ejectment suit, a court may provisionally pass upon the fact of death of the plaintiff solely to determine entitlement to physical or material possession de facto. The finding is provisional, not conclusive as to the actual fact of death, does not bar a subsequent action involving the same fact, and cannot be used as basis or proof in a Rule 108 proceeding. This treatment is akin to the provisional resolution of ownership under Rule 70, Section 16.
• Certificate of death as prima facie evidence — Under Article 410 of the Civil Code and Rule 132, Section 23 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. A certificate of death is therefore prima facie evidence of death but may be controverted; strong, complete, and conclusive proof of falsity or nullity is necessary to overcome a public document. The plaintiff’s living presence, coupled with the adverse party’s failure to contest his identity, may suffice to rebut the certificate.
• Legal capacity to sue — Under Rule 3, Section 1 of the 2019 Rules of Civil Procedure, only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law, may be parties in a civil action. Article 42 of the Civil Code provides that civil personality is extinguished by death. The fact of death of a plaintiff necessarily affects legal capacity to bring suit, and courts must determine that fact to settle whether the plaintiff has legal capacity.
• Elements of unlawful detainer — A complaint for unlawful detainer must allege: (1) initially, possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the last demand on the defendant to vacate, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
• Conjugal partnership presumption under the Civil Code — Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. The party invoking the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. The presumption may be rebutted only by strong, clear, categorical, and convincing evidence, with the burden of proof on the party asserting exclusive ownership.
• Husband as administrator of the conjugal partnership — Article 165 of the Civil Code provides that the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the support of the family, or borrows money for that purpose upon her husband’s failure to deliver the needed sum; when administration is transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband; or when the wife gives moderate donations for charity. Absent these circumstances, the wife’s authorization cannot take precedence over the husband’s decision as administrator.

• "Courts may validly pass upon the issue of the fact of death of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit where the same is necessary for the resolution of the issue of possession. Any such finding as to the fact of death of the plaintiff is merely provisional in nature and will not bar a subsequent action involving the same." — This is the Court’s opening statement of the core ruling, establishing the provisional nature of the death determination in ejectment.
• "The certificate of death is a public document. It is prima facie evidence of the facts stated in it. In this case, the certificate of death of Antonio V. Estrella is prima facie evidence of the fact of death of the latter." — This passage states the evidentiary character of the certificate of death and why it is not conclusive.
• "The very living presence of respondent constitutes strong, complete, and conclusive proof of his being alive." — This is the decisive factual basis for rebutting the certificate of death and upholding respondent’s legal capacity to sue.
• "All elements of unlawful detainer are present in this case." — This conclusion resolves the third issue and affirms the CA’s finding that respondent was entitled to eject petitioners.

• Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company vs. Citi Appliance M.C. Corporation, 864 Phil. 899 (2019) — Cited for the nature of an ejectment suit as a summary proceeding to protect actual possession or right of possession, where title is not involved and only physical or material possession de facto is resolved.
• Co vs. Militar, 466 Phil. 217 (2004) — Cited for the rule that ownership may be provisionally resolved in ejectment solely to determine possession, without binding title or being conclusive in a subsequent action.
• Pasricha vs. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc., 572 Phil. 52 (2008) — Cited for the propriety of resolving legal capacity or standing to sue in an ejectment case.
• Heirs of Cabais vs. Court of Appeals, 374 Phil. 681 (1999) — Cited for the requirement that strong, complete, and conclusive proof of falsity or nullity is necessary to controvert a public document.
• Wa-acon vs. People, 539 Phil. 485 (2006) — Cited for the definition of prima facie evidence as evidence sufficient on its face but which may be contradicted by other evidence.
• Spouses Go vs. Yamane, 522 Phil. 653 (2006) — Cited for the conjugal partnership presumption under the Civil Code and the limited circumstances under which a wife may bind the conjugal partnership.
• Cabrera vs. Getaruela, 604 Phil. 59 (2009) — Cited for the four elements of unlawful detainer.
• Ruiz vs. Armada, 903 Phil. 701 (2021) — Cited for the rule that appeals by certiorari are limited to questions of law, subject to exceptions such as conflicting findings of fact between the CA and the trial court.

• Article 408, Civil Code — Provides that deaths shall be entered in the civil register; this is the basis for the certificate of death relied upon by petitioners.
• Article 410, Civil Code — Provides that the books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto are public documents and prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained; applied to treat the certificate of death as prima facie evidence of death.
• Rule 132, Section 23, Revised Rules on Evidence — Provides that documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein; applied to the certificate of death.
• Rule 108, Sections 1 and 2, Rules of Court — Provide for the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry, including deaths; held to be the proper remedy to cancel a certificate of death, but not a prerequisite to the provisional determination of death in an ejectment suit.
• Rule 3, Section 1, 2019 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law, may be parties in a civil action; applied to the issue of respondent’s legal capacity to sue.
• Article 42, Civil Code — Provides that civil personality is extinguished by death; applied to explain why the fact of death affects a plaintiff’s legal capacity to bring suit.
• Rule 70, Section 1, Rules of Court — Governs who may institute ejectment proceedings and the one-year period; applied to find the complaint for unlawful detainer timely and meritorious.
• Rule 70, Section 16, Rules of Court — Provides that the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession; applied by analogy to the provisional determination of the fact of death.
• Article 160, New Civil Code — Provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless proved exclusive; applied to hold the subject property provisionally conjugal.
• Article 165, Civil Code — Provides that the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership; applied to hold Rosario’s authorization ineffective against respondent’s decision to evict.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Governs appeals by certiorari limited to questions of law; the Court applied an exception because the CA’s factual findings conflicted with those of the MeTC and RTC.

Hernando, Zalameda, Rosario, and Marquez, JJ., concur.