Soriano vs. Court of Appeals

Conviction for indirect contempt requires an actual hearing where the charged party may adduce documentary or testimonial evidence, and cannot be had solely on the basis of written pleadings or a show-cause order. Because the RTC adjudged Soriano guilty of indirect contempt without ever setting or conducting a hearing, the contempt order was void for failure to comply with the third requisite of Section 3, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Ronald Soriano was charged with and convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, of the crime of Homicide, Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence, stemming from the death of Isidrino Dalusong. Rather than appealing the conviction, Soriano applied for probation, which the RTC granted subject to several conditions, including indemnification of the heirs of Dalusong in the amount of ₱98,560.00. This petition is the second of two related cases arising from the same factual matrix; the first, docketed as G.R. No. 123936, resolved the validity of the revocation of Soriano's probation and had already become final.

On 7 December 1993, the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, presided by Judge Rodolfo V. Toledano, found Ronald Soriano liable for the death of Isidrino Dalusong and convicted him of Homicide, Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence, sentencing him to two years, four months and one day to six years of prision correccional. Soriano did not appeal; instead, on 12 January 1994, he filed an application for probation. The RTC granted probation for a period of three to six years in an Order dated 8 March 1994, imposing among its conditions that Soriano indemnify the heirs of Dalusong in the amount of ₱98,560.00.

On 26 April 1994, Provincial State Prosecutor Benjamin A. Fadera filed a Motion to Cancel Probation on the ground that Soriano had failed to indemnify the heirs, contrary to Condition Number 11 of the Order of Probation. Soriano opposed the motion, while the Zambales Parole and Probation Office recommended that probation continue but that Soriano be required to submit a program of payment. The RTC, in an Order dated 20 June 1994, denied the Motion to Cancel Probation but directed Soriano to submit within ten days from notice his program of payment of the civil liability. A copy of this Order was received by Soriano's counsel on 23 June 1994. Despite such receipt, no program of payment was submitted.

The Zambales Parole and Probation Office then asked the RTC to require Soriano to explain his non-compliance. On 15 August 1994, the RTC issued an Order directing Soriano to explain within ten days why he should not be held in contempt for failure to comply with the 20 June 1994 Order, and further directing him to submit his program of payment within ten days. Instead of complying, Soriano filed a Motion for Reconsideration, alleging that he had not personally received a copy of the 20 June 1994 Order — notwithstanding his counsel's acknowledged receipt — and manifesting that he was unemployed, dependent on his parents, and incapable of formulating a feasible program of payment.

Unsatisfied, the RTC issued an Order dated 4 October 1994 ordering Soriano's detention for ten days for contempt of court, revoking the 8 March 1994 Order granting probation, and ordering that he serve the sentence originally imposed. The RTC noted that Soriano apparently had no intention of submitting a program of payment or eventually complying with his civil obligation, and that his ability to hire two private counsels belied his claim of financial hardship, indicating a lack of repentance or predisposition to reform. Soriano filed a Notice of Appeal on 12 October 1994, specifically appealing the contempt judgment. The RTC, in an Order dated 17 October 1994, directed that the records pertaining to the contempt charge be forwarded to the Court of Appeals, while noting that an order revoking probation was not appealable. Simultaneously, Soriano filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing both the contempt finding and the probation revocation. The Court of Appeals dismissed both the certiorari petition and the appeal, sustaining the RTC's actions. The probation revocation issue was resolved with finality by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 123936 on 4 March 1999, leaving only the question of whether the RTC erred in declaring Soriano in contempt.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner argued that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that there was a deliberate refusal on his part to comply with its Orders dated 20 June 1994 and 15 August 1994, and in revoking the probation order for failure to satisfy the civil liability to the heirs of the victim.
• Lack of Notice and Hearing for Contempt: Petitioner contended that there must be prior notice and hearing before he could be held liable for indirect contempt, and that no hearing was conducted as to the contempt charge.

• Indirect Contempt — Requisites: Whether the RTC erred in declaring Soriano in contempt of court without conducting a hearing on the charge of indirect contempt, as required under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.

• Indirect Contempt — Requisites: Yes. The RTC erred in declaring Soriano in contempt without conducting a hearing. Section 3, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court requires three requisites before conviction for indirect contempt: a written charge, an opportunity to comment, and a hearing. While the first two requisites were satisfied, the third — an actual hearing — was never complied with.

• Indirect Contempt — Requisites: The contempt charged against Soriano was properly classified as indirect contempt, consisting of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a court. Section 3, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down three requisites prior to conviction: (a) a charge in writing to be filed, (b) an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court, and (c) to be heard by himself or counsel. The RTC satisfied the first requisite through its 15 August 1994 Order, which served as the written charge, and the second requisite through Soriano's Motion for Reconsideration, which constituted his comment. However, the third requisite was not met because no hearing was ever set or conducted. Relying on Balasabas vs. Hon. Aquilisan, the Court emphasized that a notice of the charge is not equivalent to a notice of hearing; the two serve distinct purposes. Because indirect contempt proceedings are criminal in nature, any liberal construction of the rules must favor the accused. Conviction cannot rest merely on written pleadings; the contemner is entitled to his day in court, where he may adduce documentary or testimonial evidence and subject his defense to interrogation. Soriano's defense — that he had no knowledge of the Order requiring submission of a program of payment — was susceptible to verification through testimonial evidence, yet the RTC denied him the opportunity to present such evidence, adjudging him guilty based solely on the bare assertions in his pleading. A finding derived without comprehensive evaluation of arguments or evidence cannot be sanctioned and must be overturned.

• Requisites for Indirect Contempt — Section 3, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court prescribes three requisites before a person may be convicted of indirect contempt: (a) a charge in writing must be filed; (b) the respondent must be given an opportunity to comment thereon within the period fixed by the court; and (c) the respondent must be heard by himself or counsel. All three requisites must be satisfied; the absence of any one — particularly the holding of an actual hearing — renders the conviction void. The Court applied this doctrine by finding that while the RTC issued a written charge and afforded Soriano the opportunity to comment, it never conducted a hearing, thereby violating the third requisite.

• Criminal Nature of Indirect Contempt Proceedings — Proceedings for indirect contempt are criminal in nature, and the modes of procedure and rules of evidence are similar to those used in criminal prosecutions. Accordingly, any liberal construction of the rules governing contempt proceedings must favor the accused, and the contemner must be accorded the same rights as an accused in a criminal case, including the right to an actual hearing and to present evidence. The Court applied this principle by holding that Soriano could not be convicted on the basis of written pleadings alone, as a criminal charge requires the opportunity to adduce evidence in open court.

• Distinction Between Notice of Charge and Notice of Hearing — A written charge or show-cause order in indirect contempt proceedings serves as notice of the charge but is not equivalent to a notice of hearing. The two notices have distinct objects and purposes: the former informs the respondent of the accusation, while the latter affords the opportunity to be heard and present evidence. The Court relied on this distinction to invalidate the RTC's contempt order, which had conflated the two by treating Soriano's written response as a substitute for an actual hearing.

• "Section 3, Rule 71 requires that there must be a hearing of the indirect contempt charge after notice thereof is validly served on the person charged with indirect contempt. As adverted to earlier, an order requiring petitioner to submit a written explanation constitutes the written charge for indirect contempt, and at the same time serves as notice of said charge. However, such notice cannot by all means, be considered as a notice of hearing itself. The two notices are different, for they have distinct object and purpose." — This passage, quoted from Balasabas vs. Hon. Aquilisan, articulates the critical distinction between notice of charge and notice of hearing that forms the doctrinal basis for setting aside the contempt order.

• "Since an indirect contempt charge partakes the nature of a criminal charge, conviction cannot be had merely on the basis of written pleadings. The contemner is assured of his or her day in court." — This formulation establishes the principle that indirect contempt proceedings require an actual hearing, not merely the exchange of written pleadings, because of their criminal character.

• "Judges are enjoined to extend to an alleged contemner the same rights accorded to an accused." — This closing reiteration underscores the Court's holding that the procedural safeguards of criminal proceedings must be observed in indirect contempt proceedings, serving as a directive to lower courts.

• Balasabas vs. Hon. Aquilisan, 193 Phil. 639 (1981) — Controlling precedent followed. The Court relied on this case for the proposition that a notice of charge in indirect contempt proceedings is not equivalent to a notice of hearing, and that a hearing must be conducted after valid service of the charge. The Court quoted extensively from this decision to support its ruling that the RTC's failure to conduct a hearing was fatal to the contempt conviction.

• Rustia vs. People, 74 Phil. 105 (1943) — Cited for the proposition that proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in nature.

• Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 330 Phil. 420 (1996) — Cited for the principle that the modes of procedure and rules of evidence in contempt proceedings are similar to those used in criminal prosecutions.

• Section 3, Rule 71, Revised Rules of Court — Prescribes the three requisites for conviction of indirect contempt: (a) a charge in writing to be filed, (b) an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court, and (c) to be heard by himself or counsel. Applied to find that the RTC satisfied the first two requisites but failed to comply with the third, as no hearing was ever conducted.

• Section 11, Rule 71, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that the appropriate remedy from a judgment of contempt in indirect contempt proceedings is an appeal to the proper court, as in criminal cases, and not the special civil action of certiorari. Applied to explain why Soriano's certiorari petition could not assail the contempt judgment, and why his Notice of Appeal was the correct remedy for the contempt charge.

Justices Reynato S. Puno, Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Alicia Austria-Martinez, and Romeo A. Callejo, Sr. concurred.