Solla vs. Ascueta

Where a universal heir has possessed the testatrix's property openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely to all the world — including the legatees and their successors — for thirty-nine years, declaring it for taxation, paying land taxes, and obtaining registered possessory information, the legatees' right of action and ownership are extinguished by extinctive prescription, and the universal heir acquires absolute title by acquisitive prescription, regardless of whether the legatees formally renounced their legacies. Additionally, a clause in the universal heir's will directing his executor to "comply with all the orders" of the original testatrix refers only to the pious bequests (annual masses), not to the delivery of legacies, where the context and surrounding circumstances of both wills demonstrate that the testatrix intended only the pious obligations to survive beyond the universal heir's lifetime.

Maria Solla, a resident of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, died in June 1883 leaving a will (Exhibit B) executed on April 19, 1883, in which she named several legatees — her brother Sergio Solla, her sisters Cayetana and Josefa Solla, her nephew Jacinto Serna, her protégées Rosenda Lagmay and Silvestra Sajor, and her servant Matias Seveda — and designated her grandson Leandro Serrano as universal heir. She declared that she had no forced heirs, her parents and two sons having predeceased her. She imposed upon Leandro Serrano the obligation to deliver the legacies and to provide an annual novena of masses for the repose of her soul and those of her relatives, and directed him to insist in his own will that his heirs comply with all her orders. Leandro Serrano died on August 5, 1921, leaving a will (Exhibit C) executed on August 22, 1921, in which he named his son Simeon Serrano as executor and bequeathed to him all property received from Maria Solla, directing him to separate it and comply with Maria Solla's wishes. The plaintiffs are the surviving legatees or the heirs and successors in interest of the original legatees; the defendants are the widow and children and heirs of Leandro Serrano.

Maria Solla died on June 11, 1883, in Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, leaving a nuncupative will executed on April 19, 1883 (Exhibit B). In her will, she declared that she had no forced heirs — her parents and two sons having died — and named her grandson Leandro Serrano as universal heir. She bequeathed specific legacies to her brother Sergio Solla, her sisters Cayetana and Josefa Solla, her nephew Jacinto Serna, her protégées Rosenda Lagmay and Silvestra Sajor, and her servant Matias Seveda. She imposed upon Leandro Serrano the obligation to deliver these legacies and to provide annually a novena of eight ordinary requiem masses and one solemn requiem mass with vigil and bier for the repose of her soul and those of her relatives, and directed him to insist in his own will that his heirs comply with all her orders.

Immediately after Maria Solla's death, Leandro Serrano took possession of all her property and continued in possession until his own death on August 5, 1921 — a period of thirty-nine years. During that time, he instituted possessory information proceedings covering the lands in question (Exhibits 1, 2, and 3), which were duly registered in the registry of deeds in 1895. In these proceedings, he claimed to be the absolute owner in fee simple, and his petitions were supported by the testimony of children of Sergio Solla, one of the legatees. He declared the property for taxation in his own name, paid the corresponding land taxes, and exclusively enjoyed the products thereof. None of the legatees or their successors in interest formally or judicially claimed any title to the property or asked for any share of the products during Leandro Serrano's lifetime. Additionally, some of the legatees formally renounced their respective legacies in proceedings recorded before the president of the municipality of Cabugao (Exhibit 4), and Matias Seveda sold his legacy parcel to Leandro Serrano by deed of sale (Exhibit 5). Leandro Serrano also obtained a royal title (Exhibit 7) from the Spanish Government covering six parcels of land in Barrio Alongoong, Cabugao.

On August 22, 1921, shortly before his death, Leandro Serrano executed his will (Exhibit C). In its third clause, he directed his executor, his son Simeon Serrano, to "put all of my property in order, separating first the property of his deceased grandmother Capitana Maria Solla," and to deliver it to Simeon, ordering that it be disposed of in conformity with Maria Solla's wishes. In the fifth clause, he ordered Simeon not to forget the souls of Maria Solla's relatives and to have masses said on the first and ninth days of the annual novena and to erect a first-class bier. He insisted that the property of Maria Solla be disposed of in conformity with all the provisions of her will and his own.

The plaintiffs — Julian Solla, Lucia Solla, Ambrosio Lagmay, Rosenda Lagmay, Francisco Serna, Juana Baclig, Pedro Serna, Agapita Serna, Pedro Garcia, and Silvestra Sajor — are the surviving legatees or the heirs and successors in interest of the original legatees named in Maria Solla's will. The defendants — Ursula Ascueta (the widow of Leandro Serrano) and Simeon, Cesario, Santiago, Primitiva, and Maxima Serrano — are the heirs of Leandro Serrano, with Simeon Serrano serving as executor of his estate and possessing the property claimed by the plaintiffs. The parties submitted a stipulation of facts on October 15, 1924, and agreed to submit the case for decision on the basis of that stipulation and the documentary evidence, including Exhibits A (a list of properties left by Maria Solla), B (Maria Solla's will), C (Leandro Serrano's will), and Exhibits 1 through 7 presented by the defendants. The trial court found that the plaintiffs were the surviving legatees or heirs of the original legatees and ordered the defendants to separate and deliver the claimed property, together with one-half of the fruits from September 5, 1921, and to partition the lands in which the plaintiffs had a participation.

• Admissibility of Exhibit A: Defendants-appellants argued that the trial court erred in considering plaintiffs' Exhibit A as part of the stipulation of facts despite the alleged lack of appropriate description of each parcel of land claimed, and in holding that said defect was ignored in the stipulation of facts.
• Weight of Defendants' Evidence: Defendants-appellants maintained that the trial court erred in not giving full weight to their Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, and in considering Exhibit 4 (the record of renunciation of legacies) as deficient, weak, and worthless evidence.
• Prescription: Defendants-appellants argued that the plaintiffs' action had prescribed, Leandro Serrano having possessed the property adversely for thirty-nine years under claim of ownership, with the legatees never having formally or judicially claimed their legacies during his lifetime.
• Interpretation of Leandro Serrano's Will: Defendants-appellants contended that the third clause of Leandro Serrano's will (Exhibit C) referred only to the pious bequests specified in Maria Solla's will (Exhibit B), not to the delivery of legacies, and that the trial court erred in interpreting it as ordering the delivery of legacies.
• Acquisitive Prescription and Merger of Title: Defendants-appellants argued that Maria Solla's property was inherited by Leandro Serrano by universal title, some by renunciation and sale by the legatees, and that his title was further protected and cleared by acquisitive prescription, the property having been merged with the estate that passed to Leandro Serrano as universal heir.
• Procedural Errors: Defendants-appellants assigned errors regarding the lower court's reinstatement of Rosenda Lagmay as a plaintiff, its refusal to consider their amended answer and the plaintiffs' last amendment to the complaint, its denial of a motion for dismissal, and its denial of a motion for new trial.

• Silence as Consent: Plaintiffs-appellants argued that the trial court erred in holding that their silence led to the belief that they consented to the exclusive enjoyment of the property by Leandro Serrano.
• Accounting of Products: Plaintiffs-appellants maintained that the defendants, as heirs of Leandro Serrano, should be ordered to render an account to the plaintiffs of the products of the lands of the deceased Maria Solla from the time Leandro Serrano took possession thereof as executor of Maria Solla's estate.

• Prescription: Whether the plaintiffs' action to recover the legacies had prescribed, and whether Leandro Serrano acquired absolute title to the properties by acquisitive prescription through thirty-nine years of adverse possession.
• Interpretation of Wills: Whether the third clause of Leandro Serrano's will, directing his executor to separate Maria Solla's property and comply with all her orders, referred to the delivery of legacies or only to the pious bequests (annual masses for the repose of souls).
• Admissibility and Weight of Evidence: Whether the trial court erred in admitting Exhibit A as part of the stipulation of facts and in not giving full weight to the defendants' Exhibits 1 through 7.
• Procedural Matters: Whether the trial court committed procedural errors regarding the reinstatement of a plaintiff, refusal to consider pleadings, and denial of motions.

• Prescription: Yes. The plaintiffs lost by extinctive prescription not only their right of action to recover the property but also whatever right of ownership they had, Leandro Serrano's thirty-nine years of exclusive, open, peaceful, and continuous possession under claim of ownership having given him absolute title by operation of law, pursuant to Articles 1940 and 1957 of the Civil Code and Sections 38, 40, and 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
• Interpretation of Wills: No. The third clause of Leandro Serrano's will referred exclusively to the pious bequests — the annual masses for the repose of souls — and not to the delivery of legacies, the trial court having erred in interpreting it as applicable to the provisions of Maria Solla's will relative to the legacies.
• Admissibility and Weight of Evidence: No. The trial court did not err in admitting Exhibit A as part of the stipulation of facts, the defendants' counsel having expressly agreed to its admission; the first and second assignments of error were groundless.
• Procedural Matters: N/A. The remaining assignments of error being merely corollaries of the fifth and sixth, the points raised therein were impliedly decided in the disposition of the interpretation and prescription issues.

• Prescription: The stipulation of facts established that Leandro Serrano took possession of Maria Solla's property immediately after her death on June 11, 1883, and continued in possession until his own death on August 5, 1921 — a period of thirty-nine years. During that entire period, he obtained registered possessory information proceedings claiming absolute ownership, declared the property for taxation in his own name, paid the land taxes, and exclusively enjoyed the products, without any of the legatees or their successors in interest having formally or judicially claimed any title or asked for any share of the products or contributed to the payment of land tax. The children of Sergio Solla, one of the legatees, even testified in support of Leandro Serrano's possessory information petitions. Under Articles 1940 and 1957 of the Civil Code and Sections 38, 40, and 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this exclusive, open, peaceful, and continuous possession, adverse to all the world including the legatees and their successors, for thirty-nine years under claim of ownership, extinguished by extinctive prescription not only the right of action to recover but also whatever ownership the legatees had, and conferred upon Leandro Serrano by acquisitive prescription exclusive and absolute title to the properties — even assuming the legatees had not renounced their legacies. The Court relied on Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857, 869, in support of this conclusion.

• Interpretation of Wills: Maria Solla's will named Leandro Serrano as universal heir and imposed upon him two categories of obligations: first, the distribution and delivery of legacies to her brothers, sisters, nephew, protégées, and servant; and second, the pious bequests consisting of the annual novena of masses for the repose of souls. She also directed him to insist in his own will that his heirs comply with "all that I have here ordered." Leandro Serrano's will, in its third clause, directed his executor Simeon Serrano to separate Maria Solla's property and comply with all her orders, and in its fifth clause, ordered the annual masses and bier. The Court reasoned that it was not logical to suppose Maria Solla intended the insistence upon heirs to refer to the legacies, because those were obligations Leandro Serrano could and should have fulfilled during his lifetime, and she had expressed full confidence in him. The only obligations that could not be wholly fulfilled during his lifetime and that would require continuation by his heirs were the pious bequests — the annual masses. This interpretation was confirmed by the fifth clause of Leandro Serrano's will, which linked the bequest of all Maria Solla's property to Simeon Serrano specifically to the duty to celebrate the annual masses for the souls of Maria Solla's relatives. If Leandro Serrano had intended the legacies to be delivered, he would have done so during his lifetime or would have stated so clearly in his will rather than bequeathing all the property to Simeon. The Court applied the rule that where the testator's intention is manifest from the context and surrounding circumstances but obscured by inapt or inaccurate modes of expression, the language must be subordinated to the intention, and the court may restrict the application of words or supply omitted phrases to give effect to that intention (40 Cyc. 1392, 1399). Accordingly, the words "all that I have here ordered" used by Maria Solla and "all her orders" used by Leandro Serrano were restricted to the pious orders, and the phrase "in regard to the annual masses" was supplied after the words used by both testators.

• Admissibility and Weight of Evidence: The transcript of the stenographic notes showed that on the morning of October 16, 1924, the attorney for the defendants, Mr. Antonio Belmonte, expressly agreed to the admission of all documentary evidence presented at that time as part of the stipulation of facts, including Exhibit A, which contained a list of the supposed legacies with their respective descriptions. While the trial court found that six of the parcels described in Exhibit A were the exclusive property of Leandro Serrano and covered by the royal title (Exhibit 7), this did not mean the other parcels were not those left by Maria Solla to her brothers and nephews. The first and second assignments of error were therefore groundless. As to the third assignment of error regarding Exhibits 1 through 7, the Court did not separately address it, as the disposition of the prescription and interpretation issues rendered it moot.

• Procedural Matters: The remaining assignments of error were merely corollaries of the fifth and sixth (interpretation of wills), and the points raised therein were impliedly decided in the disposition of those two assignments. The plaintiffs' appeal was likewise without merit in view of the foregoing considerations.

• Extinctive and Acquisitive Prescription in Succession — Under Articles 1940 and 1957 of the Civil Code and Sections 38, 40, and 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the exclusive, open, peaceful, and continuous possession of property under claim of ownership for thirty-nine years, adverse to all the world including the legatees and their successors — evidenced by possessory information proceedings, tax declarations, payment of land taxes, and exclusive enjoyment of products — extinguishes by extinctive prescription not only the right of action to recover but also the ownership of the legatees, and confers upon the possessor exclusive and absolute title by acquisitive prescription. This applies even if the legatees have not formally renounced their legacies. The Court relied on Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857, 869.

• Interpretation of Wills — Intention Controls Over Literal Language — Where the testator's intention is manifest from the context of the will and surrounding circumstances but is obscured by inapt and inaccurate modes of expression, the language is subordinated to the intention. The court may depart from the strict wording, restrict the application of words, or supply omitted words or phrases to give effect to the testator's intention (40 Cyc. 1392, 1399). In ascertaining intention, the court should place itself as near as possible in the position of the testator, taking into consideration the situation of the testator and the facts and circumstances surrounding him at the time the will was executed.

• Distinction Between Pious Bequests and Legacies in Successive Wills — Where a testatrix directs her universal heir to insist in his will that his heirs comply with "all her orders," and the universal heir's will directs his executor to comply with "all her orders," the phrase must be interpreted in light of which obligations could and should have been fulfilled during the universal heir's lifetime (the delivery of legacies) and which could only be partially fulfilled and required continuation by heirs (the pious bequests — annual masses). The insistence upon heirs refers only to the latter category, as it is not logical to suppose the testatrix doubted the universal heir's compliance with obligations he could fulfill during his lifetime.

• "So that under the provisions of articles 1940 and 1957 of the Civil Code, as well as the provisions of sections 38, 40 and 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the plaintiffs have lost by, extinctive prescription, not only all right of action to recover the ownership of the property left to their predecessors in interest, but also whatever right of ownership they have had to the same because of Leandro Serrano's exclusive, open, peaceful and continuous possession which was adverse to all the world including the legatees and their successors, for the period of thirty-nine years under claim of ownership, evidenced not only by his applications for possessory information, but also by his exclusive enjoyment of the products of said property, — even if it is considered that the legatees have not renounced their part in the legacy — has given him, by operation of law, exclusive and absolute title to the said properties." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on prescription: thirty-nine years of adverse possession under claim of ownership extinguished both the right of action and the ownership of the legatees, and conferred absolute title on the universal heir.

• "In order to determine the testator's intention, the court should place itself as near as possible in his position, and hence, where the language of the will is ambiguous or doubtful, should take into consideration the situation of the testator and the facts and circumstances surrounding him at the time the will executed." — This passage articulates the governing rule for interpreting ambiguous wills, which the Court applied to restrict the words "all that I have here ordered" to the pious bequests only.

• "Where the testator's intention is manifest from the context of the will and surrounding circumstances, but is obscured by inapt and inaccurate modes of expression, the language will be subordinated to the intention, and in order to give effect to such intention, as far as possible, the court may depart from the strict wording and read word or phrase in a sense different from that which is ordinarily attributed to it, and for such purpose may mould or change the language of the will, such as restricting its application or supplying omitted words or phrases." — This passage sets forth the doctrine that intention prevails over literal language in wills, authorizing courts to restrict, modify, or supplement the wording to effectuate the testator's true purpose.

• "It is not logical to suppose that Maria Solla in ordering Leandro Serrano to insist in his will that his heirs after his death comply with all the requests contained in her said will, referred to the orders and requests that he could and should comply with during his lifetime, because neither is it logical nor reasonable to suppose that she for a moment doubted that the person whom she had named as her universal heir — for, according to her, he was the only person in whom she had any confidence — would comply with her requests." — This passage encapsulates the Court's reasoning for distinguishing between obligations the universal heir could fulfill during his lifetime (legacies) and those requiring continuation by heirs (pious bequests), thereby limiting the scope of the testamentary insistence to the latter.

• Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857, 869 — Cited as controlling authority for the proposition that long, continuous, adverse possession under claim of ownership confers absolute title by acquisitive prescription, barring recovery by the original owners or their successors. The Court relied on this case to conclude that Leandro Serrano's thirty-nine-year possession extinguished the legatees' rights and conferred absolute title upon him.

• Articles 1940 and 1957, Civil Code (Spain) — Applied to hold that the legatees' right of action and ownership were extinguished by extinctive prescription due to Leandro Serrano's thirty-nine years of exclusive, adverse possession, and that acquisitive prescription conferred absolute title upon him.
• Sections 38, 40, and 41, Code of Civil Procedure — Applied in conjunction with the Civil Code provisions to establish the prescriptive periods and the effect of adverse possession on the rights of the legatees and their successors in interest.
• 40 Cyc. 1392, 1399 — Cited as authority for the rules of testamentary interpretation: that the court should place itself in the testator's position and consider surrounding circumstances, and that where intention is manifest but obscured by inapt language, the language must yield to the intention, permitting the court to restrict, modify, or supplement the wording.

Avanceña, C.J., Street, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concurred.