Solis y Aquino vs. People

A conviction for frustrated homicide requires proof beyond reasonable doubt that the victim's wounds were fatal, which necessitates testimony from the attending physician who treated those wounds; absent such testimony, a medico-legal certificate alone is insufficient and the character of the wounds remains doubtful, warranting conviction only for attempted homicide.

Petitioner Ian Solis y Aquino and three minors identified by fictitious initials XXX, YYY, and ZZZ were charged with frustrated homicide and theft arising from the stabbing of Jun Ferriol y Ursabia in Pangasinan. The minors' identities are concealed pursuant to Republic Act No. 9344 in relation to SC Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015. Petitioner and the victim had been friends for approximately two years prior to the incident. ZZZ escaped pending the proceedings below but later surrendered, at which point the victim executed an affidavit of desistance in ZZZ's favor and the case against him was dismissed.

Petitioner Ian Solis y Aquino and the victim, Jun Ferriol y Ursabia, had been friends for about two years. On the evening of March 2, 2017, at around 10:30 p.m., Ian arrived at Jun's house in Pangasinan accompanied by his brother XXX and two other minors, YYY and ZZZ, whom Jun was meeting for the first time. At Ian's request, Jun purchased brandy, and the five shared drinks while watching a movie on Jun's laptop. When Jun decided to sleep, he told his guests to turn off the light, switch on the dim light, and lock the door when they left. The defense would later claim that all four visitors departed at 11:00 p.m.

Jun was awakened while lying on his left side by what he initially thought was a pinch on his right side, but which turned out to be a pair of scissors planted in his body. When he turned onto his back, someone choked him while others covered his mouth and held his hands and feet. The room was dim, and Jun could not see his attackers. He sustained a stab wound on his right side and two more on his chest. Realizing his assailants would not stop, Jun played dead until they left, then cried for help and went to his mother's house, mentioning to her that Ian had visited that night. Jun was taken to Medical City Pangasinan, where he underwent surgery.

The incident was reported to the police at around 2:00 a.m. on March 3, 2017, and recorded in the blotter. Police Officer II Dexter V. Zarate responded and recovered from the crime scene a white SKK mobile phone and a blood-stained pair of scissors. Police Officer II Ernes Karl Rufino III noticed a man's photograph on the confiscated phone, which neighbors identified as Ian. The police also learned that Jun's laptop was missing. Their investigation led them to tricycle driver Noel Garcia, who stated that at around 2:30 a.m. on March 3, 2017, he had boarded four teenagers who rushed toward his vehicle, one of whom wore a blood-stained shirt and another carried a black bag. The four alighted at the back of the market.

With the assistance of the Mangaldan PNP, the police located Ian's residence and informed his parents that their son was a suspect, imploring them to surrender him. Ian surrendered and identified ZZZ and YYY as his companions at Jun's house. The police, accompanied by Ian and his family, proceeded to ZZZ's house, where ZZZ's father initially said he was not home. During an ocular inspection, PO2 Rufino III found a black bag containing Jun's identification card and an invitation addressed to Jun. ZZZ then appeared and surrendered Jun's laptop. The police next proceeded to YYY's house, where YYY was found in front of the market. It was at this point that the police learned XXX was also at the crime scene, but he had already left. The police returned to Ian's house and requested his mother to surrender XXX. The following morning, Garcia was invited to the police station, where he identified Ian, ZZZ, XXX, and YYY as the four teenagers he had driven earlier. On cross-examination, PO2 Zarate admitted that the recovered evidence was not submitted to the crime laboratory for fingerprinting, and PO2 Rufino III acknowledged that he could not confirm whether someone had entered Jun's house and planted Ian's cellphone between the time of the incident and the police's arrival.

The Medico-Legal Certificate, the existence of which was stipulated on without testimony from the attending physician, documented seven stab wounds injuring Jun's liver and kidney, with approximately 400 ml of hemoperitoneum. Jun's total hospital billing was PHP 288,993.65, but after deductions the final amount was PHP 201,478.65, of which Jun paid PHP 92,000.00. The RTC credited the prosecution's version, convicted Ian and his co-accused of frustrated homicide, and the CA affirmed with an increased penalty. Ian then filed the present petition.

• Insufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Petitioner argued that the circumstances relied upon by the lower courts—his presence at Jun's house, his having ridden the tricycle with his co-accused, and his cellphone being found at the scene—do not constitute an unbroken chain producing a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
• Alternative Explanation for Cellphone: Petitioner maintained that he was drunk and could have simply forgotten his phone at Jun's house.
• Acquittal for Theft Negates Motive: Petitioner argued that the trial court acquitted him of theft, which was the alleged motivation for stabbing Jun.
• Lack of Fingerprinting: Petitioner contended that the bloodied scissors were never subjected to fingerprinting and thus cannot be directly linked to him or his companions.
• Presence at Time of Crime Not Established: Petitioner asserted that it was not established that he was still at Jun's house at the time of the commission of the crime, rendering the evidence insufficient to meet the test of moral certainty.

• Procedural Bar — Questions of Fact: Respondent countered that petitioner raised questions of fact beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition, as the matters raised require recalibration, review, or examination of the records and evidence, and that no exception warranting factual review was shown.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Respondent argued that adequate circumstantial evidence pointed to petitioner and his co-accused as the perpetrators, enumerating eight circumstances including their presence at the crime scene, the drinking spree, the division of tasks during the attack, the tricycle driver's observations of their hurried and fearful demeanor, the blood-stained clothing, and the recovery of petitioner's cellphone at the scene.
• Inapplicability of Teehankee Totality Test: Respondent posited that the totality test for out-of-court identifications laid down in People vs. Teehankee, Jr. is inapplicable because that case was based on direct evidence, whereas the present conviction rests on circumstantial evidence.

• Identity of Perpetrator: Whether the CA erred in affirming petitioner's conviction despite the prosecution's alleged failure to prove his identity as one of the perpetrators.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Whether the CA erred in affirming the conviction based purely on circumstantial evidence.
• Fatalness of Wounds: Whether the prosecution sufficiently proved that the victim's wounds were fatal to sustain a conviction for frustrated homicide.
• Voluntary Surrender: Whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was properly appreciated.
• Treachery: Whether treachery attended the commission of the crime and its effect on the qualification of the offense.

• Identity of Perpetrator: No error. The circumstantial evidence formed an unbroken chain leading to the fair and reasonable conclusion that petitioner was one of the perpetrators, to the exclusion of all others.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: No error. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules of Court when there is more than one circumstance, the facts from which inferences are derived are proven, and the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
• Fatalness of Wounds: Not proven. Absent testimony from the attending physician that the wounds would have caused the victim's death without timely medical assistance, the character of the wounds is doubtful and must be resolved in favor of the accused, warranting conviction only for attempted homicide.
• Voluntary Surrender: Not appreciated. Petitioner surrendered only after the police had arrived at his house and identified him as a suspect, and only after the police implored his parents to surrender him, negating the spontaneity and unconditional intent required.
• Treachery: Present but unavailing. Treachery attended the crime because the victim was stabbed while asleep and unable to defend himself, but it could not qualify the offense to murder because the prosecution failed to allege ultimate facts constituting treachery in the Information.

• Identity of Perpetrator: The Court found that the prosecution established eight circumstances through the testimony of the victim, the tricycle driver, and the police: (1) petitioner and his companions were at the crime scene prior to the attack; (2) they had a drinking spree until Jun decided to sleep; (3) Jun woke to a pair of scissors planted in his body; (4) Jun was attacked by several persons performing different tasks; (5) tricycle driver Garcia testified that he drove the four accused at around 2:30 a.m., close to the time the crime was reported, contradicting their claim of leaving at 11:00 p.m.; (6) Garcia observed they were in a hurry and appeared frightened; (7) Garcia saw one passenger wearing a blood-stained shirt; and (8) petitioner's cellphone was found at the crime scene. Garcia positively identified petitioner in open court as the passenger wearing the bloodied shirt, and only approximately five hours had elapsed between the tricycle ride and the identification, dispelling doubt as to accuracy. The stark contrast between Garcia's testimony and the accused's claim that they left at 11:00 p.m. further undermined the defense, and the RTC's credibility assessment, affirmed by the CA, was binding. Applying People vs. Casitas, where the accused was seen leaving the victim's house with blood-soaked clothes, the Court concluded that petitioner, being the only one wearing a bloodied shirt, was the one who stabbed Jun. The non-presentation of the bloodstained shirt was not fatal, as it was merely corroborative of other evidence on record.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules of Court permits conviction based on circumstantial evidence when: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. There is no requirement in Philippine jurisdiction that only direct evidence may convict, and the probative value of direct evidence is not inherently superior to circumstantial evidence. The test is that the series of circumstances must be consistent with one another, consistent with the accused's guilt, and inconsistent with his innocence. The eight circumstances here satisfied this test, as each was duly proven and collectively excluded the possibility that some other person committed the crime. The People vs. Teehankee, Jr. totality test for out-of-court identifications was correctly held inapplicable, as that doctrine pertained to direct evidence while the present conviction rested on circumstantial evidence.

• Fatalness of Wounds: The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill the victim, as manifested by the use of a deadly weapon; (2) the victim sustained fatal wounds but did not die due to timely medical assistance; and (3) no qualifying circumstance for murder is present. Intent to kill was properly inferred from the use of scissors—a deadly weapon—and the number and location of stab wounds. However, the second element was not proven. The Medico-Legal Certificate, documenting seven stab wounds with injuries to the liver and kidney and approximately 400 ml of hemoperitoneum, was admitted by stipulation without testimony from the attending physician. A medical certificate is merely the opinion of one who must first be established as an expert witness, and it cannot be given weight unless the issuing doctor is presented in court to show their qualifications. Failure to present the physician deprives the defense of the opportunity to cross-examine on the accuracy and veracity of the findings. Following Etino vs. People, where the medical certificate alone, absent physician testimony, was held insufficient proof of the nature and extent of injury, and Oliveros vs. People, where uncertainty as to the nature of the wounds warranted appreciation of a lesser crime, the Court held that the character of the wounds entered the realm of doubt. The Court cannot presume the wounds were fatal even if the medico-legal certificate shows vital organs were involved or significant blood loss occurred, since what may be fatal for one person may not be fatal for another. At most, petitioner could be held liable for attempted homicide.

• Voluntary Surrender: The three requisites for appreciating voluntary surrender are: (1) the accused must not have been arrested; (2) the accused surrenders to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary, requiring spontaneity and an intent to surrender unconditionally. Petitioner surrendered only when the police were already at his house and after being informed that he had been identified as a suspect, with the police having to implore his parents to surrender him. Following People vs. Ignacio, voluntary surrender may not be appreciated even if the accused surrenders to authorities whose presence at his house precluded his escape.

• Treachery: Since Jun was stabbed while asleep and therefore not in a position to defend himself, treachery was present. This should have qualified the crime to attempted murder, but the prosecution failed to allege ultimate facts constituting treachery in the Information. Consistent with People vs. Solar, the Court reiterated the need for prosecutors to state with sufficient particularity in the Information not only the acts constituting the offense but also aggravating circumstances, whether qualifying or generic, and other attendant circumstances affecting the penalty.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence for Conviction — Under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction when: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The series of circumstances must be consistent with one another, consistent with the accused's guilt, and inconsistent with his innocence, excluding the possibility that another person committed the crime. The Court applied this test to the eight circumstances proven by the prosecution, finding them sufficient to identify petitioner as one of the perpetrators.

• Necessity of Physician Testimony to Prove Fatalness of Wounds in Frustrated Homicide — In a prosecution for frustrated homicide, it is imperative that the victim's wounds be proven beyond reasonable doubt to be fatal through the testimony of the physician who attended to those wounds. A medical certificate is merely the opinion of one who must first be established as an expert witness and cannot be given weight unless the issuing doctor is presented in court. Absent such testimony, the character of the wounds is doubtful and must be resolved in favor of the accused, warranting conviction only for attempted homicide. The Court cannot presume wounds are fatal even if the medico-legal certificate shows involvement of vital organs or significant blood loss, since what may be fatal for one person may not be fatal for another.

• Requisites of Voluntary Surrender as a Mitigating Circumstance — Voluntary surrender requires: (1) the accused has not been arrested; (2) the accused surrenders to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary, showing spontaneity and an intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because the accused acknowledges guilt or wishes to spare the authorities the trouble and expense of capture. Surrender is not voluntary when the accused yields only after the police have arrived at his residence and identified him as a suspect, particularly where the police had to implore his parents to produce him.

• Allegation of Qualifying Circumstances in the Information — Qualifying circumstances such as treachery must be alleged in the Information with sufficient particularity; their presence during trial cannot qualify the crime if they were not pleaded. The Court reiterated the call in People vs. Solar for prosecutors to state in the Information not only the acts constituting the offense but also aggravating and attendant circumstances affecting the penalty.

• "Whether an injury is fatal is a question of fact. Absent testimony from the attending physician that the injury would have caused the victim's demise without timely medical assistance, the Court cannot presume that it is fatal even if the medico-legal certificate shows that vital organs were involved or that significant blood loss occurred since what may be fatal for one person may not be fatal for another." — This is the opening pronouncement of the decision and articulates the controlling principle that fatalness of wounds is a factual question requiring physician testimony, not a matter for judicial presumption from a medico-legal certificate alone.

• "There being no testimony from the attending physician as to the injuries sustained by the victim, there is doubt as to their character, which this Court must resolve in favor of petitioner. At most, he could only be held liable for attempted homicide since it was not established that the wounds were fatal." — This passage states the ratio decidendi for downgrading the conviction from frustrated to attempted homicide, applying the constitutional presumption of innocence and the principle of in dubio pro reo to the element of fatalness.

• "To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the pieces of circumstantial evidence presented constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. The circumstantial evidence must exclude the possibility that some other person committed the crime." — This is the canonical formulation of the unbroken chain test for circumstantial evidence, frequently cited in Philippine criminal jurisprudence.

• People vs. Casitas, 445 Phil. 407 (2003) — Followed. The Court applied the principle that an accused seen leaving the crime scene with blood-soaked clothes, coupled with the discovery of the victim's body, constitutes sufficient circumstantial evidence of guilt. The Court distinguished the factual setting (one accused in Casitas versus four here) but found the principle applicable, noting that only petitioner wore a bloodied shirt, identifying him as the stabber.

• Etino vs. People, 826 Phil. 32 (2018) — Followed. The Court relied on Etino's holding that a medical certificate alone, absent the testimony of the attending physician, is insufficient proof of the nature and extent of injuries, and that where there is nothing in the evidence to show the wound would be fatal without medical attention, the character of the wound is doubtful and must be resolved in favor of the accused.

• Oliveros vs. People, 897 Phil. 916 (2021) — Followed. The Court applied the principle that circumstances qualifying criminal responsibility cannot rest on mere conjectures, and that uncertainty as to the nature of wounds warrants appreciation of a lesser gravity of crime, consistent with the principle that all doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused.

• People vs. Teehankee, Jr., 319 Phil. 128 (1995) — Distinguished. Petitioner invoked the totality test for out-of-court identifications laid down in Teehankee, but the Court held it inapplicable because Teehankee was based on direct evidence, whereas the present conviction rests on circumstantial evidence.

• People vs. Solar, 858 Phil. 884 (2019) — Followed and reiterated. The Court cited Solar for the proposition that prosecutors must state with sufficient particularity in the Information not only the acts constituting the offense but also aggravating and attendant circumstances affecting the penalty, including qualifying circumstances such as treachery.

• People vs. Ignacio, 382 Phil. 257 (2000) — Followed. The Court applied the rule that voluntary surrender may not be appreciated when the accused surrenders to authorities whose presence at his house precluded his escape.

• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the crime of homicide. The Information charged the accused under Article 249 in relation to Article 6 and Article 250, alleging that the accused performed all acts of execution which would produce homicide as a consequence but which did not produce it by reason of timely and adequate medical attendance, thus framing the charge as frustrated homicide.

• Article 6, Revised Penal Code — Defines consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. The Court applied the distinction between frustrated and attempted felony: a felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution that would produce the felony as a consequence but which nevertheless do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator; it is attempted when the offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution. Because fatalness of the wounds was not proven, the crime was reclassified as attempted homicide.

• Article 250, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the penalty for frustrated homicide, which is the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed for consummated homicide.

• Rule 133, Section 4, Rules of Court — Governs the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence for conviction, requiring: (a) more than one circumstance; (b) proven facts from which inferences are derived; and (c) a combination of circumstances producing conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The Court applied this provision to sustain the conviction based on the eight circumstances established by the prosecution.

• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Governs Petition for Review on Certiorari, limiting review to questions of law. The Court noted that petitioner's arguments raised questions of fact, which are beyond the ambit of Rule 45, but proceeded to review the merits nonetheless.

Gesmundo, C.J. (Chairperson), Hernando, J., Zalameda, J., and Marquez, J., concurred.