Solis vs. Court of Appeals

A judgment is void if promulgated after the judge who rendered it has permanently ceased to be a judge of the court where he sat in judgment, whether by abolition of the position, expiration of term, acceptance of another office, or termination of temporary assignment; Section 6 of Rule 116 of the old Rules of Court, dispensing with the judge's presence at promulgation, applies only to physical absence, not to the judge's loss of incumbency.

Gregorio Solis and several co-accused were charged with malversation of public funds before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. The case was tried before Judge Jose N. Leuterio, a Judge-at-Large assigned to Camarines Sur — a category of judicial position that existed under the then-prevailing court system. On 20 June 1954, Republic Act No. 1186 took effect without Executive approval, abolishing all existing positions of Judges-at-Large. This statutory abolition is the statutory backdrop central to the dispute, as it occurred between the signing of the judgment and its scheduled promulgation.

Gregorio Solis and several co-accused were indicted, tried, and found guilty of malversation of public funds in Criminal Cases Nos. 2510–2516 before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. The case was tried before Judge Jose N. Leuterio, then a Judge-at-Large assigned to Camarines Sur. Judge Leuterio penned and signed the judgment of conviction on 19 June 1954. All the accused were summoned to appear for promulgation on that same day, but no court proceeding was held because the President of the Philippines had declared 19 June 1954 a special public holiday.

On 20 June 1954, Republic Act No. 1186 took effect without Executive approval, abolishing all existing positions of Judges-at-Large. On 21 June 1954, the defendants appeared before the court, which was now presided over by Judge Perfecto R. Palacio of another sala of the same court. Judge Palacio promulgated the judgment of Judge Leuterio over the objection of petitioner Solis.

Solis appealed to the Court of Appeals, where the cases were docketed as CA-G.R. Nos. 14811-R to 14817-R. He attacked the validity of the promulgation, arguing that it was made by another judge after the incumbency of the rendering judge had ceased. The Solicitor General's brief in the Court of Appeals agreed that the promulgation was illegal and void. Nevertheless, on 20 November 1965, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, modifying Solis's sentence in one case, acquitting him in two others, and affirming the lower court's decision in the remaining four. Petitioner's new counsel was not served a copy of the appellate court's decision.

Nearly three years later, on 25 August 1968, counsel received notification from the bondsman that the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur had issued an order for Solis to appear for execution of judgment. It was only on 5 September 1968 that counsel received a copy of the Court of Appeals' decision. On 29 August 1968, Solis filed an urgent motion with the Court of Appeals seeking to restrain the lower court from executing the decision, to recall the records, and to cause service of the decision on his counsel. The Court of Appeals directed its Deputy Clerk of Court to telegram the lower court to suspend execution and required its Judgment Section to serve a copy and explain the non-service, but it did not order the recall of records. On 21 September 1968, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for recall but granted Solis twenty days to file a motion for reconsideration, which he submitted notwithstanding the absence of the records. The motion for reconsideration was denied on 28 October 1968. Solis then elevated the case to the Supreme Court via petition for review on certiorari. The Office of the Solicitor General manifested that "the only consistent stand that the People can adopt is to agree with petitioner's posture," and the case was submitted for decision without respondents' brief.

• Invalidity of Promulgation: Petitioner maintained that the promulgation of Judge Leuterio's judgment by Judge Palacio was void, because Judge Leuterio had permanently ceased to be a judge of the court when Republic Act No. 1186 abolished his position as Judge-at-Large on 20 June 1954, one day before promulgation on 21 June 1954.
• Premature Remand and Refusal to Recall Records: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in prematurely remanding the records to the court of origin before serving a copy of its decision on his counsel, and in arbitrarily refusing to have the records recalled while the case was still pending before it.

• De Facto Judge Doctrine: The Court of Appeals held the contested judgment valid on the ground that, since the approval of Republic Act No. 1186 was not yet publicly or generally known on 21 June 1954, Judge Leuterio should be considered a judge de facto of the court, making the promulgation of his decision on that date valid and legally effective.

• Validity of Promulgation: Whether a judgment rendered by a judge whose position was abolished by statute before the date of promulgation is void when promulgated by another judge of the same court.
• De Facto Judge Doctrine: Whether the doctrine of de facto judge applies to validate the promulgation of a decision by a judge whose position had already been abolished, on the theory that the abolition was not yet publicly known.
• Premature Remand of Records: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in remanding the records to the lower court before serving a copy of its decision on petitioner's counsel and in refusing to recall the same.

• Validity of Promulgation: Yes, the judgment is void. A decision is null if promulgated after the judge who rendered it has permanently ceased to be a judge of the court where he sat, as by abolition of his position under Republic Act No. 1186.
• De Facto Judge Doctrine: No, the doctrine does not apply. Judge Leuterio did not actually act or perform judicial duties at the time of promulgation, which is essential to the validity of acts of a de facto judge; the cases cited by the Court of Appeals refer to acts of a de facto judge, not to a situation where he did not act.
• Premature Remand of Records: Rendered moot. Because the Court of Appeals' decision cannot stand, there being no validly promulgated judgment from which an appeal could be taken, it became unnecessary to pass upon the alleged error in prematurely remanding the records.

• Validity of Promulgation: The Court anchored its ruling on firmly established jurisprudence that a judgment is void if promulgated after the judge who rendered it has permanently ceased to be a judge of the court where he sat in judgment. This principle applies across multiple scenarios: when the judge has vacated office and accepted another, when the term of office has ended, when the judge has left the Bench, when the position has been abolished, or when incumbency has otherwise terminated. Judge Leuterio penned and signed the judgment on 19 June 1954, but promulgation was set for 21 June 1954 — one day after Republic Act No. 1186 abolished all Judges-at-Large positions effective 20 June 1954. Because Judge Leuterio had permanently ceased to be a judge of the court by the time of promulgation, the judgment is a nullity. Section 6 of Rule 116 of the old Rules of Court, which allows dispensing with the presence of the judge in the reading of a sentence, was construed to apply only to the physical absence of the judge — meaning the decision may be promulgated even without his presence, as long as he is still a judge of that court. It does not cover the situation where the judge has lost his incumbency altogether.
• De Facto Judge Doctrine: The Court of Appeals relied on Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez to justify treating Judge Leuterio as a de facto judge, reasoning that the abolition of his position under Republic Act No. 1186 was not yet publicly or generally known on 21 June 1954. The Supreme Court found this a misapplication. In Lino Luna, a de facto judge was defined as one who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes to be but is not a good officer in point of law due to some defect in his appointment or right to exercise judicial functions; however, it is essential to the validity of the acts of a de facto judge that he is actually acting under some color of right. In the present case, Judge Leuterio did not actually act, perform, or exercise the duties of judge when his decision was promulgated — he had ceased to be one, and the promulgation was carried out under another presiding judge. The other cases cited by the Court of Appeals (Regala vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bataan and U.S. vs. Abalos) were similarly misapplied, as they refer to the acts of a de facto judge, not to a case where he did not act.
• Premature Remand of Records: Because the Court of Appeals' decision could not stand — there being no validly promulgated judgment of the trial court from which an appeal could be taken — the Court found it unnecessary to rule on whether the Court of Appeals erred in prematurely remanding the records and later refusing to recall them. The invalidity of the underlying judgment was dispositive of the entire appellate proceeding.

• Void Promulgation After Cessation of Incumbency — A judgment is void if promulgated after the judge who rendered it has permanently ceased to be a judge of the court where he sat in judgment. This applies when the judge has vacated office and accepted another office, when the term of office has ended, when the judge has left the Bench, when the position has been abolished by statute, or when incumbency has otherwise terminated. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that Judge Leuterio's judgment was void because his position as Judge-at-Large was abolished by Republic Act No. 1186 effective 20 June 1954, one day before promulgation on 21 June 1954.
• Physical Absence vs. Loss of Incumbency at Promulgation — Section 6 of Rule 116 of the old Rules of Court, allowing dispensing with the presence of the judge in the reading of a sentence, applies only to the physical absence of the judge. The decision may be promulgated even without the rendering judge's presence, provided he is still a judge of that court. The rule does not extend to a situation where the judge has permanently lost his incumbency.
• De Facto Judge — Requisite of Actual Acting — A de facto judge is one who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes to be but is not a good officer in point of law because of some defect in his appointment or right to exercise judicial functions. It is essential to the validity of the acts of a de facto judge that he is actually acting under some color of right. The doctrine cannot validate a promulgation where the judge did not act at all — as where he had ceased to be a judge and another judge promulgated the decision.

• "a decision is void if promulgated after the judge who rendered it had permanently ceased to be a judge of the court where he sat in judgment." — This is the ratio decidendi of the case, stating the controlling rule that loss of incumbency before promulgation renders the judgment void.
• "Section 6 of Rule 116 of the old Rules of Court, allowing the dispensing with the presence of the judge in the reading of a sentence, applies only to the physical absence of the judge, being construed to mean that the decision of the judge may be promulgated even without his presence, as long as he is still a judge of that court." — This passage distinguishes physical absence from loss of incumbency, clarifying the limited scope of the rule on promulgation without the rendering judge's presence.
• "it is 'essential to the validity of the acts of a de facto judge, that he is actually acting under some color of right'" — This defines the indispensable element of the de facto judge doctrine and explains why it could not validate the promulgation in this case, where Judge Leuterio did not act at all.

• Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 37 Phil. 186 — Defined the de facto judge doctrine; cited by the Court of Appeals to uphold the promulgation but distinguished and held misapplied by the Supreme Court, because the doctrine requires that the judge actually act under color of right, which Judge Leuterio did not.
• Garchitorena vs. Crescini, 37 Phil. 675 — Cited for the proposition that a judgment is void if promulgated after the judge's term of office has ended.
• People vs. CA and Domalaon, 99 Phil. 786 — Cited for the proposition that a judgment is void if promulgated after the judge has left the Bench.
• People vs. Bonifacio So, 101 Phil. 1257 — Cited for the proposition that a judgment is void if promulgated after the judge's position as Judge-at-Large was abolished under Republic Act No. 1186.
• Ong Siu vs. Paredes, 17 SCRA 661 — Cited for the interpretation of Section 6 of Rule 116 of the old Rules of Court, construing it to apply only to physical absence of the judge, not loss of incumbency.
• People vs. Soria, 22 SCRA 948 — Cited for the proposition that a sentence was set aside where the judge had qualified for another position before the judgment was filed with the Clerk of the former court.
• Siazon vs. CFI of Cotabato, 26 SCRA 664 — Cited for the proposition that nullity attaches to an order when the temporary assignment of the rendering judge had been terminated before the order was issued.
• Regala vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, 77 Phil. 684 — Cited by the Court of Appeals but held misapplied, as it refers to acts of a de facto judge, not to a case where the judge did not act.
• U.S. vs. Abalos, 1 Phil. 73 — Similarly cited by the Court of Appeals and held misapplied for the same reason as Regala.

• Section 6, Rule 116, Old Rules of Court — Allowed dispensing with the presence of the judge in the reading of a sentence. The Court construed this provision to apply only to the physical absence of the judge, meaning a decision may be promulgated without the rendering judge's presence as long as he is still a judge of that court. It does not cover loss of incumbency.
• Republic Act No. 1186 — Abolished all existing positions of Judges-at-Large, effective 20 June 1954, without Executive approval. The statute's effectivity date fell between the signing of the judgment (19 June 1954) and its promulgation (21 June 1954), causing Judge Leuterio to lose his incumbency before promulgation.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concurred.