Solid Builders, Inc. and Medina Foods Industries, Inc. vs. China Banking Corporation

A debtor-mortgagor has no clear legal right to enjoin a creditor-mortgagee from foreclosing on mortgaged properties merely on the allegation that the stipulated interest rate and penalties are usurious, exorbitant, or confiscatory, where the fairness of those charges remains disputed and unresolved by the trial court; the nullity of a usurious interest stipulation does not affect the lender's right to recover the principal nor its right to foreclose upon default. A writ of preliminary injunction requires, among others, that the right to be protected exist prima facie and be clear and unmistakable; where the complainant's right is doubtful or disputed, the injunctive writ is improper.

China Banking Corporation extended a series of loans to Solid Builders, Inc. between September 4, 1992 and March 27, 1996, aggregating ₱139,999,234.34, exclusive of interests and other charges. Medina Foods Industries, Inc., an affiliate, stood as surety and accommodation mortgagor, executing several surety agreements and contracts of real estate mortgage over parcels of land in Loyola Grand Villas, Quezon City and New Cubao Central, Cainta, Rizal. The loans were subsequently restructured effective March 1, 1999, with SBI issuing ten promissory notes in favor of CBC. The dispute implicated the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas regulations on past due accounts and the Court's guidelines on foreclosure proceedings under A.M. No. 99-10-05-0.

China Banking Corporation (CBC) granted several loans to Solid Builders, Inc. (SBI) during the period from September 4, 1992 to March 27, 1996, in the total amount of ₱139,999,234.34, exclusive of interests and other charges. To secure the loans, Medina Foods Industries, Inc. (MFII) executed in CBC's favor several surety agreements and contracts of real estate mortgage over parcels of land in Loyola Grand Villas in Quezon City and New Cubao Central in Cainta, Rizal.

SBI thereafter proposed to CBC a scheme through which SBI would sell the mortgaged properties and share the proceeds with CBC on a 50-50 basis until the whole obligation would be fully paid. SBI also proposed partial releases of the certificates of title of the mortgaged properties without the burden of updating interests on all loans. In a letter dated March 20, 2000 addressed to CBC, SBI requested the restructuring of its loans, a reduction of interests and penalties, and the implementation of a dacion en pago of the New Cubao Central property, describing the penalties as onerous considering the loan of ₱218,540,648.00 and the total interest and penalties of about 4.5% per month.

CBC replied in a letter dated April 17, 2000, stating that the loans had been completely restructured effective March 1, 1999 in the amount of ₱218,540,646.00, that the restructuring had been finalized and completed, and that only two Amendments of Real Estate Mortgages remained to be registered. CBC advised SBI to update its obligations to avoid penalty charges and suggested that SBI exhaust all possibilities to sell the New Cubao Central properties itself. This was followed by another letter dated May 19, 2000, in which CBC reiterated that the loan restructuring had been finalized and completed on March 1, 1999 with the booking of the restructured loan of ₱231,716,646.00, effective upon the signing of the new promissory notes on that date, and that no change or re-pricing in interest rates was possible since interest payments had not yet been paid.

Subsequently, in a letter dated September 18, 2000, CBC demanded that SBI settle its outstanding account within ten days from receipt thereof, listing ten promissory notes with a total outstanding balance of ₱218,540,646.00, exclusive of interest, penalties, and other charges, and warning that otherwise the matter would be referred to its lawyers for collection. The letter enclosed a Statement of Account as of September 30, 2000.

On October 5, 2000, claiming that the interests, penalties, and charges imposed by CBC were iniquitous and unconscionable, and to enjoin CBC from initiating foreclosure proceedings, SBI and MFII filed a Complaint "To Compel Execution of Contract and for Performance and Damages, With Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Ex-Parte Temporary Restraining Order" in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, docketed as Civil Case No. 68105 and assigned to Branch 264. In its Answer and Opposition, CBC alleged that to implement the agreed restructuring, SBI executed ten promissory notes stipulating an interest rate of 18.5% per annum, and that MFII executed a third party real estate mortgage over its properties to secure the restructured loan; because SBI was delinquent in the payment of principal and interest, CBC demanded settlement.

After hearing the parties, the trial court issued an Order dated December 14, 2000 granting the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, finding that SBI and MFII had sufficiently complied with the requisites for the issuance of an injunctive writ — that the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable, and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. The trial court found that the September 18, 2000 letter clearly conveyed that CBC would resort to foreclosure if the account was not settled, and that the actual or imminent damage to SBI and MFII was clear given the number of parcels of land and area involved. It noted, however, that CBC's explanation for the increase in interests and penalties was insufficient and that a more detailed rationalization was required, but that the explanation could probably be heard only during trial on the merits. The trial court's Order dated December 10, 2001 denying reconsideration stated that SBI and MFII had the clear right and urgency to ask for injunction because of the issue of validity of the increase in the amount of the loan obligation.

• Judicial Admissions: SBI and MFII asserted that the Court of Appeals' Decision was legally infirm because its conclusions were contrary to the judicial admissions of CBC; in its Answer, CBC admitted paragraphs 25 and 26 of the Complaint regarding interests and charges amounting to ₱35,093,980.14 and ₱80,614,525.15, respectively, which constituted more than 50% of the total obligation of ₱334,249,151.29 as of February 15, 2000, and this admission was an admission that the interest rate imposed by CBC was usurious, exorbitant, and confiscatory.
• Overlooked Admitted Facts: SBI and MFII claimed that the Court of Appeals either overlooked or disregarded undisputed and admitted facts which, if properly considered, would have called for the maintenance and preservation of the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court.
• Article 1229, Civil Code: SBI and MFII argued that the Court of Appeals did not consider Article 1229 of the Civil Code, which authorizes the equitable reduction of a penalty when the principal obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with, or even without performance if the penalty is iniquitous or unconscionable.
• Premature Disposition and Foreclosure: SBI and MFII maintained that the lifting of the preliminary injunction would pave the way for CBC's unbridled imposition of illegal rates of interest and immediate foreclosure of their properties without the benefit of a full-blown trial, effectively disposing of the main case without trial on the merits.

• Improper Recourse under Rule 45: CBC contended that the petition is not allowed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because it simply raises issues of fact and not issues of law.
• Sound Judicial Discretion: CBC asserted that the Decision of the Court of Appeals is an exercise of sound judicial discretion as it is in accord with the law and the applicable provisions of this Court.

• Propriety of the Petition: Whether the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 improperly raises questions of fact rather than questions of law.
• Clear Legal Right: Whether SBI and MFII possess a clear and unmistakable legal right to enjoin CBC from foreclosing on the mortgaged properties on the ground that the interest rates and penalties are usurious, exorbitant, and confiscatory.
• Article 1229, Civil Code: Whether Article 1229 of the Civil Code entitles SBI and MFII to the injunctive relief they seek.
• Irreparable Injury: Whether the threatened foreclosure of the mortgaged properties constitutes an irreparable injury warranting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
• A.M. No. 99-10-05-0 Guidelines: Whether the reinstatement of the writ of preliminary injunction would circumvent the guidelines and conditions prescribed by the Court's En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 99-10-05-0 on foreclosure proceedings.

• Propriety of the Petition: Not passed upon. The Court resolved the petition on the merits without expressly ruling on CBC's procedural objection, denying the petition on the substantive ground that the injunctive writ was properly dissolved.
• Clear Legal Right: No. As debtor-mortgagors, SBI and MFII have no right to prevent the creditor-mortgagee from foreclosing merely on the basis of alleged usurious, exorbitant, and confiscatory interest rates; the claimed right remained doubtful and disputed, and the nullity of a usurious stipulation does not affect the lender's right to foreclose.
• Article 1229, Civil Code: No. Any claim under Article 1229 is premature, the equitable reduction of a penalty being contingent on a judicial finding, after hearing, that the penalty is iniquitous or unconscionable — a finding the trial court had not yet made.
• Irreparable Injury: No. Any injury from foreclosure is purely monetary and compensable by an appropriate judgment; foreclosure of mortgaged property is not the kind of irreparable damage that merits the extraordinary provisional remedy of preliminary injunction.
• A.M. No. 99-10-05-0 Guidelines: No. Reinstating the writ would allow SBI and MFII to circumvent the strict exceptions and conditions in A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, which limits the instances when a writ against foreclosure may issue.

• Propriety of the Petition: CBC contended that the petition was barred under Rule 45 for raising questions of fact rather than questions of law. The Court did not expressly resolve this procedural objection; it proceeded to the merits and denied the petition, resolving the substantive question of whether the Court of Appeals correctly dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court.

• Clear Legal Right: A writ of preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to judgment, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a particular act, and is a preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a party's substantive rights or interests pending final judgment in the principal action. It is issued to preserve the status quo ante, upon the applicant's showing of two important requisite conditions: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right; it must also be proven that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injury. SBI and MFII claimed a right to have their mortgaged properties shielded from foreclosure on the ground that the interest rate and penalty charges imposed by CBC were iniquitous and unconscionable. As debtor-mortgagors, however, they do not have a right to prevent the creditor-mortgagee from foreclosing simply on the basis of alleged usurious, exorbitant, and confiscatory interest rates. First, assuming the interest rate agreed upon is usurious, the nullity of the stipulation of usurious interest does not affect the lender's right to recover the principal loan, nor affect the other terms thereof; thus, in a usurious loan with mortgage, the right to foreclose the mortgage subsists and can be exercised by the creditor upon failure by the debtor to pay the debt due. Second, the trial court's own Order dated December 14, 2000 recognized that the parties still had to be heard on the alleged lack of fairness of the increase in interests and penalties during trial on the merits; the basis of the claimed right therefore remained controversial or disputable, and could not be considered clear, actual, and subsisting. The Order dated December 10, 2001 likewise showed that the grant of the injunction was not based on a clear legal right, the trial court having stated that SBI and MFII had a clear right and urgency because of the issue of validity of the increase in the amount of the loan obligation — a finding that at most amounted to a recognition that the rights of the parties were disputed and debatable. Where the complainant-movant's right is doubtful or disputed, the issuance of an injunctive writ is not proper. Even assuming SBI and MFII were correct in claiming their supposed right, it nonetheless disintegrated in the face of the ten promissory notes in the total amount of ₱218,540,648.00, exclusive of interest and penalties, issued by SBI in favor of CBC on March 1, 1999, which remained unpaid despite maturity on March 1, 2004 and CBC's repeated demands. Foreclosure is but a necessary consequence of nonpayment of mortgage indebtedness; where the parties stipulated in their credit agreements, mortgage contracts, and promissory notes that the mortgagee is authorized to foreclose the mortgaged properties in case of default, the mortgagee has a clear right to foreclosure, making the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction improper. In addition, the default of SBI and MFII disqualified them from availing of the equitable relief of the injunctive writ; their various and constant requests for deferment of payment and restructuring of the loan, without actually paying the amount due, were clear indications that they were unable to settle their obligation, and this breach tainted their hands. As SBI was not entitled to the writ, neither was MFII, because the accessory follows the principal — MFII's accessory obligation as accommodation mortgagor and surety was tied to SBI's principal obligation and arose only in the event of SBI's default, so MFII's interest in the writ was necessarily prejudiced by SBI's wrongful conduct and breach of contract.

• Article 1229, Civil Code: Under Article 1229, the judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor, and even if there has been no performance, the penalty may be reduced if it is iniquitous or unconscionable. The provision works against SBI and MFII rather than in their favor: the equitable reduction of the penalty stipulated by the parties will be based on a finding by the court that such penalty is iniquitous or unconscionable, and here the trial court had not yet made a ruling as to whether the penalty agreed upon was unconscionable. Such a finding will be made by the trial court only after it has heard both parties and weighed their respective evidence in light of all relevant circumstances. Hence, for SBI and MFII to claim any right or benefit under that provision at that point was premature.

• Irreparable Injury: An injury is considered irreparable if it is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law, or where there is no standard by which its amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy — that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation. The provisional remedy of preliminary injunction may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. Any injury that SBI and MFII might suffer in case of foreclosure of the mortgaged properties would be purely monetary and compensable by an appropriate judgment in a proper case against CBC. Where there is a valid cause to foreclose on the mortgages, it cannot be correctly claimed that the irreparable damage sought to be prevented is the loss of the mortgaged properties to auction sale. The alleged entitlement to the "protection of their properties put up as collateral" is not the kind of irreparable injury contemplated by law. Defaulting mortgagors are not deprived outrightly of their property, given the right of redemption granted to them under the law; moreover, in extrajudicial foreclosures, mortgagors have the right to receive any surplus in the selling price, and if the mortgagee retains more of the proceeds than it is entitled to, this gives the mortgagor a cause of action to recover such surplus.

• A.M. No. 99-10-05-0 Guidelines: The En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, Re: Procedure in Extrajudicial or Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgages, issued on February 20, 2007 — some two months before the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision — embodies additional guidelines intended to aid courts in foreclosure proceedings, limiting the instances and citing the conditions when a writ against foreclosure of a mortgage may be issued: (1) no temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction against extrajudicial foreclosure shall be issued on the allegation that the loan secured by the mortgage has been paid or is not delinquent unless the application is verified and supported by evidence of payment; (2) no such writ shall be issued on the allegation that the interest on the loan is unconscionable, unless the debtor pays the mortgagee at least twelve percent per annum interest on the principal obligation as stated in the application for foreclosure sale, which shall be updated monthly while the case is pending; (3) where a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against a foreclosure of mortgage, the disposition of the case shall be speedily resolved, with the court concerned submitting quarterly reports to the Supreme Court through the Office of the Court Administrator on the progress of cases involving ten million pesos and above; and (4) all requirements and restrictions prescribed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, such as the posting of a bond equal to the amount of the outstanding debt and the time limitation for its effectivity, shall apply as well to a status quo order. These guidelines speak of strict exceptions and conditions. To reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the writ would allow SBI and MFII to circumvent the guidelines and conditions and prevent CBC from foreclosing based simply on the allegation that the interest is unconscionable; what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.

• Requisites of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction — A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event granted only in the face of actual and existing substantial rights. It is issued to preserve the status quo ante upon the applicant's showing of two requisite conditions: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must also be proven that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injury. In this case, the Court found that SBI and MFII failed to satisfy the first requisite because their claimed right was not clear, actual, and subsisting, and likewise failed to show irreparable injury.

• Clear Legal Right Requirement — A writ of preliminary injunction should be extended only in cases of great injury where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages, in cases of extreme urgency, where the right is very clear, and where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of the plaintiff's right. Where the complainant-movant's right is doubtful or disputed, the issuance of an injunctive writ is not proper. The Court applied this doctrine because the trial court itself had acknowledged that the fairness of the interest and penalties still had to be heard at trial, rendering the claimed right debatable.

• Effect of Usurious Interest on the Right to Foreclose — The nullity of a stipulation of usurious interest does not affect the lender's right to recover the principal loan, nor affect the other terms thereof. In a usurious loan with mortgage, the right to foreclose the mortgage subsists, and this right can be exercised by the creditor upon failure by the debtor to pay the debt due. The Court relied on this doctrine to hold that the debtor-mortgagors had no right to prevent foreclosure merely on the basis of alleged usurious, exorbitant, and confiscatory interest rates.

• Irreparable Injury — An injury is considered irreparable if it is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law, or where there is no standard by which its amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy — that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation. The provisional remedy of preliminary injunction may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. Foreclosure of mortgaged property is not an irreparable damage, because the injury is purely monetary and compensable, and defaulting mortgagors retain the right of redemption and, in extrajudicial foreclosures, the right to any surplus in the selling price.

• Equitable Reduction of Penalty under Article 1229 — Under Article 1229 of the Civil Code, the judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor, and even if there has been no performance, the penalty may be reduced if it is iniquitous or unconscionable. The reduction is contingent on a finding by the court that the penalty is iniquitous or unconscionable, which finding is made only after hearing both parties and weighing their evidence in light of all relevant circumstances. The Court held that any claim under this provision was premature because the trial court had not yet made such a finding.

• Default as Disqualification from Equitable Relief — A debtor's various and constant requests for deferment of payment and restructuring of a loan, without actually paying the amount due, are clear indications that the debtor was unable to settle its obligation. Such default or failure to settle the obligation is a breach of contractual obligation which taints the debtor's hands and disqualifies it from availing of the equitable remedy of preliminary injunction. The Court applied this to SBI, whose default disqualified it from the injunctive writ.

• Accessory Follows the Principal — The accessory obligation of an accommodation mortgagor and surety is tied to the principal obligation of the debtor and arises only in the event of the debtor's default. Thus, the accommodation mortgagor's interest in the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is necessarily prejudiced by the principal debtor's wrongful conduct and breach of contract. The Court applied this to MFII, holding that as SBI was not entitled to the writ, neither was MFII.

• A.M. No. 99-10-05-0 Guidelines on Foreclosure Injunctions — The En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, issued on February 20, 2007, prescribes strict exceptions and conditions for the issuance of a writ against foreclosure of a mortgage: (1) no writ against extrajudicial foreclosure on the allegation that the loan has been paid or is not delinquent unless the application is verified and supported by evidence of payment; (2) no writ on the allegation that the interest is unconscionable unless the debtor pays at least twelve percent per annum interest on the principal obligation as stated in the application for foreclosure sale, updated monthly; (3) cases where a writ has been issued shall be speedily resolved, with quarterly reports to the Supreme Court through the Office of the Court Administrator for cases involving ten million pesos and above; and (4) all requirements and restrictions for a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, including the posting of a bond equal to the outstanding debt and the time limitation for effectivity, shall apply to a status quo order. The Court held that reinstating the writ would circumvent these guidelines.

• "A writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo ante, upon the applicant's showing of two important requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injury." — This passage states the controlling requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, which the Court used as the analytical framework for denying the petition; it is the canonical formulation of the two-condition test applied in this case.

• "As debtor-mortgagors, however, SBI and MFII do not have a right to prevent the creditor-mortgagee CBC from foreclosing on the mortgaged properties simply on the basis of alleged 'usurious, exorbitant and confiscatory rate of interest.'" — This is the ratio decidendi on the clear-legal-right issue, establishing that a claim of usurious interest does not, by itself, confer on a debtor-mortgagor a right to enjoin foreclosure.

• "In such a case where the complainant-movant's right is doubtful or disputed, the issuance of an injunctive writ is not proper." — This passage articulates the rule that a disputed or doubtful right cannot support injunctive relief, which the Court applied because the fairness of the interest and penalties remained unresolved by the trial court.

• "Foreclosure is but a necessary consequence of nonpayment of mortgage indebtedness." — This passage states the principle that a mortgagee's right to foreclose arises upon the debtor's default, supporting the Court's conclusion that CBC had a clear right to foreclose and that the injunctive writ was improper.

• Palm Tree Estates, Inc. vs. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 159370, October 3, 2012 — Cited as the source of the general principles governing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, including the characterization of the writ as a preservative remedy and the two requisite conditions; also cited for the rule that a debtor's constant requests for restructuring, without payment, indicate inability to settle the obligation.
• Philippine National Bank vs. Castalloy Technology Corporation, G.R. No. 178367, March 19, 2012, 668 SCRA 415 — Cited for the doctrine that foreclosure of mortgaged property is not an irreparable damage warranting injunctive relief, and that defaulting mortgagors retain the right of redemption and the right to any surplus in extrajudicial foreclosures.
• Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. vs. OJ-Mark Trading, Inc., G.R. No. 165950, August 11, 2010, 628 SCRA 79 — Cited for the rule that where the parties stipulated in their credit agreements, mortgage contracts, and promissory notes that the mortgagee is authorized to foreclose in case of default, the mortgagee has a clear right to foreclosure, making the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction improper.
• Selegna Management and Development Corporation vs. United Coconut Planters Bank, 522 Phil. 671 (2006) — Cited for the rule that preliminary injunction is not proper when the complainant's right is doubtful or disputed.
• First Metro Investment Corporation vs. Este Del Sol Mountain Reserve, Inc., 420 Phil. 902 (2001) — Cited for the rule that the nullity of a usurious interest stipulation does not affect the lender's right to recover the principal loan nor the other terms thereof.
• Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc. vs. Bangko Sentral Monetary Board, G.R. No. 192986, January 15, 2013 — Cited for the rule that in a usurious loan with mortgage, the right to foreclose the mortgage subsists and may be exercised by the creditor upon the debtor's failure to pay.
• Lotto Restaurant Corporation vs. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 177260, March 30, 2011, 646 SCRA 699 — Cited for the rule that foreclosure is a necessary consequence of nonpayment of mortgage indebtedness.
• G.G. Sportswear Manufacturing Corporation vs. Banco De Oro Unibank, Inc., G.R. No. 184434, February 8, 2010, 612 SCRA 47 — Cited for the rule that where there is a valid cause to foreclose, the loss of mortgaged properties to auction sale is not the irreparable damage contemplated by law.
• Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative vs. La Trinidad Water District, G.R. No. 166471, March 22, 2011, 646 SCRA 21 — Cited for the maxim that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly, invoked against the reinstatement of the writ as a circumvention of A.M. No. 99-10-05-0.
• Barbieto vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 184645, October 30, 2009, 604 SCRA 825 — Cited in Palm Tree Estates as authority for the general principles on the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

• Article 1229, Civil Code — Provides that the judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor, and even if there has been no performance, the penalty may be reduced if it is iniquitous or unconscionable. The Court held that the provision worked against SBI and MFII because the equitable reduction is contingent on a judicial finding, after hearing, that the penalty is iniquitous or unconscionable — a finding the trial court had not yet made, rendering any claim under the provision premature.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — The provision under which the petition for review on certiorari was filed. CBC invoked it to argue that the petition improperly raised questions of fact; the Court did not expressly resolve the objection, proceeding to deny the petition on the merits.
• Section 4, Rule 58, Rules of Court — Referenced in SBI and MFII's application for injunctive relief, which stated that they were exempt from filing a bond because the subject letters were a patent nullity, and that in the event they were not, they were willing to post such bond as the court may determine under the conditions required by the provision. The trial court ultimately required a ₱2,000,000.00 bond.
• A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, Re: Procedure in Extrajudicial or Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgages (En Banc Resolution, February 20, 2007) — Embodies the additional guidelines limiting the instances and conditions when a writ against foreclosure of a mortgage may be issued, including the requirement that a debtor alleging unconscionable interest pay at least twelve percent per annum interest on the principal obligation as stated in the application for foreclosure sale, updated monthly. The Court held that reinstating the writ would circumvent these guidelines.
• Section 13, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — The certification provision pursuant to which the Chief Justice certified that the conclusions in the Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

• Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Chairperson)
• Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin
• Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr.
• Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes