Soledad vs. People

An Information is sufficient if the preamble and accusatory portion, read together as one whole document, apprise the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, even if the specific statutory term describing the gravamen of the offense appears only in the preamble. Possession under R.A. No. 8484 is defined by Article 523 of the Civil Code as "the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right," requiring both corpus (material holding) and animus possidendi (intent to possess), which may be inferred from the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused and surrounding circumstances.

Petitioner Mark Soledad y Cristobal was charged with violation of Section 9(e) of Republic Act No. 8484, the Access Devices Regulation Act of 1998, which declares unlawful the possession of counterfeit access devices or access devices fraudulently applied for. The case arose from a scheme wherein petitioner and his co-conspirators obtained personal documents from private complainant Henry C. Yu under the pretense of offering a loan assistance, then used those documents to fraudulently apply for a Metrobank credit card in Yu's name. The statute does not define the term "possession," necessitating the Court's reference to the Civil Code definition.

Sometime in June 2004, private complainant Henry C. Yu received a call on his mobile phone from a certain "Tess" or "Juliet Villar" (later identified as Rochelle Bagaporo), a credit card agent who offered a Citifinancing loan assistance at a low interest rate. Enticed by the offer, Yu invited Bagaporo to his office in Quezon City, where she indorsed him to her immediate boss, a certain "Arthur" (later identified as petitioner Mark Soledad). In their telephone conversation, petitioner told Yu to submit documents to a certain "Carlo" (later identified as Ronald Gobenchiong). Yu submitted various documents, including his Globe handyphone original platinum gold card, identification cards, and statements of accounts. Subsequently, Yu followed up on his loan status but failed to get in touch with either petitioner or Gobenchiong.

During the first week of August 2004, Yu received his Globe handyphone statement of account wherein he was charged for two mobile phone numbers which were not his. Upon verification with the phone company, Yu learned that he had five additional mobile numbers in his name, and the application for said cellular phone lines bore the picture of petitioner and his forged signature. Yu also checked with credit card companies and learned that his Citibank Credit Card database information was altered and that he had a credit card application with Metrobank Card Corporation.

Thereafter, Yu and Metrobank's junior assistant manager Jefferson Devilleres lodged a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation, which conducted an entrapment operation. During the operation, NBI Special Investigator Salvador Arteche, together with other NBI operatives, arrived in Las Piñas around 5:00 P.M. Arteche posed as the delivery boy of the Metrobank credit card. Upon reaching the address written on the delivery receipt, Arteche asked for Henry Yu. Petitioner responded that he was Henry Yu and presented to Arteche two identification cards which bore the name and signature of Yu, while the picture showed the face of petitioner. Petitioner signed the delivery receipt. Thereupon, Arteche introduced himself as an NBI operative and apprehended petitioner, recovering from him the two identification cards he had presented.

Petitioner was charged with Violation of Section 9(e), R.A. No. 8484 for "possessing a counterfeit access device or access device fraudulently applied for." The Information alleged that petitioner, conspiring with Rochelle Bagaporo and Ronald Gobenchiong, defrauded Henry Yu by applying for a credit card from Metrobank Card Corporation using Yu's name and personal documents fraudulently obtained from him, and which credit card was successfully issued and delivered to petitioner using a fictitious identity and addresses of Yu. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. After the prosecution presented its evidence, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence, alleging that he was not in physical and legal possession of the credit card presented and marked in evidence. The RTC denied the demurrer and thereafter rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty as charged.

• Invalidity of the Information: Petitioner argued that the Information was invalid because although he was charged with "possession of an access device fraudulently applied for," the act of "possession," which is the gravamen of the offense, was not alleged in the Information.
• Lack of Sufficient Notice: Petitioner claimed that he was not sufficiently informed of the nature of the accusations against him because the accusatory portion of the Information did not contain the word "possession."
• Absence of Possession: Petitioner averred that he was never in possession of the subject credit card because he was arrested immediately after signing the acknowledgment receipt, and thus he did not yet know the contents of the envelope delivered and had no control over the subject credit card.

• Sufficiency of the Information: Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that although the word "possession" was not used in the accusatory portion of the Information, the word "possessing" appeared in its preamble or first paragraph, thus apprising petitioner that he was being charged with violation of R.A. No. 8484, specifically Section 9(e) thereof, for possession of the credit card fraudulently applied for.

• Validity of the Information: Whether the Information is valid.
• Sufficiency of the Charge: Whether the Information charges an offense, or the offense petitioner was found guilty of.
• Adequacy of Notice: Whether petitioner was sufficiently informed of the nature of the accusations against him.
• Possession of the Credit Card: Whether petitioner was legally in "possession" of the credit card subject of the case.

• Validity of the Information: Yes. The Information was valid, containing all the necessary details of the offense committed, sufficient to apprise petitioner of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, as required by Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
• Sufficiency of the Charge: Yes. The Information charged the offense of violation of Section 9(e), R.A. No. 8484, with the acts constituting the offense clearly narrated in the accusatory portion.
• Adequacy of Notice: Yes. Although the word "possession" was not repeated in the accusatory portion, the acts constituting it were clearly described, and the word "possessing" appeared in the preamble, thus petitioner was apprised of the charge against him.
• Possession of the Credit Card: Yes. Petitioner was legally in possession of the credit card, having materially held the envelope containing it with the intent to possess, as shown by his active participation in presenting identification cards and signing the acknowledgment receipt.

• Validity of the Information: Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that a complaint or information state the name of the accused, the designation of the offense given by the statute, the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate date of the commission of the offense, and the place where the offense was committed. The Information in this case contained all these elements: it identified petitioner as "Mark Soledad y Cristobal a.k.a. Henry Yu/Arthur," specified that he was being charged with Violation of R.A. No. 8484, Section 9(e), narrated the acts constituting the offense, identified Henry Yu as the offended party, and stated that the crime was committed on or about August 13, 2004 in Las Piñas City.

• Sufficiency of the Charge: The Court quoted extensively from People vs. Villanueva to emphasize that the preamble or opening paragraph of an Information is as much an essential part of the Information as the accusatory paragraph itself. The preamble complements the accusatory paragraph, lays down the predicate for the charge in general terms, and together they form a complete whole that gives sense and meaning to the indictment. The Information must be considered not by sections or parts but as one whole document serving the purpose of informing the accused why the full panoply of state authority is being marshaled against him.

• Adequacy of Notice: Even if the word "possession" was not repeated in the accusatory portion, the acts constituting it were clearly described in the statement that the credit card in the name of Henry Yu was successfully issued and delivered to petitioner using a fictitious identity and addresses of Henry Yu. The Court stated that the task is not to determine whether allegations in an indictment could have been more artfully and exactly written, but solely to ensure that the constitutional requirement of notice has been fulfilled.

• Possession of the Credit Card: Since R.A. No. 8484 does not define "possession," the Court applied the definition in Article 523 of the Civil Code: "possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right." The acquisition of possession involves two elements: the corpus or the material holding of the thing, and the animus possidendi or the intent to possess it. Animus possidendi is a state of mind, the presence or determination of which is largely dependent on attendant events in each case, and may be inferred from the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused as well as the surrounding circumstances. In this case, prior to the commission of the crime, petitioner fraudulently obtained from Yu various documents showing the latter's identity, obtained cellular phones using Yu's identity, and fraudulently applied for a credit card under Yu's name. Upon delivery of the credit card, petitioner showed two identification cards with his picture but bearing Yu's name and forged signature, and signed the acknowledgment receipt indicating that the content of the envelope was the Metrobank credit card. The Court held that petitioner materially held the envelope containing the credit card with the intent to possess, and that his signature on the acknowledgment receipt indicated that there was delivery and that possession was transferred to him as the recipient.

• Sufficiency of the Information — Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the designation of the offense given by the statute, the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate date of the commission of the offense, and the place where the offense was committed. The Court applied this doctrine by examining the Information as a whole and finding that all requisites were present.

• Preamble and Accusatory Portion as One Whole — The preamble or opening paragraph of an Information is as much an essential part of the Information as the accusatory paragraph itself; the preamble complements the accusatory paragraph, lays down the predicate for the charge in general terms, and together they form a complete whole that gives sense and meaning to the indictment. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the word "possessing" in the preamble, read together with the accusatory portion, sufficiently apprised petitioner of the charge against him.

• Definition of Possession — Under Article 523 of the Civil Code, possession is "the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right." The acquisition of possession involves two elements: the corpus or the material holding of the thing, and the animus possidendi or the intent to possess it. Animus possidendi is a state of mind, the presence or determination of which is largely dependent on attendant events in each case, and may be inferred from the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused as well as the surrounding circumstances. The Court applied this doctrine to find that petitioner's active participation in receiving the credit card — presenting identification cards bearing his picture but Yu's name and signature, and signing the acknowledgment receipt — established both corpus and animus possidendi.

• "The preamble or opening paragraph should not be treated as a mere aggroupment of descriptive words and phrases. It is as much an essential part [of] the Information as the accusatory paragraph itself. The preamble in fact complements the accusatory paragraph which draws its strength from the preamble. It lays down the predicate for the charge in general terms; while the accusatory portion only provides the necessary details. The preamble and the accusatory paragraph, together, form a complete whole that gives sense and meaning to the indictment." — This passage, quoted from People vs. Villanueva, articulates the doctrine that the Information must be read as a whole document, not by sections or parts, and was central to the Court's ruling on the sufficiency of the Information.

• "The Information sheet must be considered, not by sections or parts, but as one whole document serving one purpose, i.e., to inform the accused why the full panoply of state authority is being marshaled against him. Our task is not to determine whether allegations in an indictment could have been more artfully and exactly written, but solely to ensure that the constitutional requirement of notice has been fulfilled." — This passage defines the standard for evaluating the sufficiency of an Information, emphasizing that the constitutional requirement of notice is the controlling consideration.

• "Animus possidendi is a state of mind, the presence or determination of which is largely dependent on attendant events in each case. It may be inferred from the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances." — This passage establishes the framework for determining intent to possess, which the Court applied to find that petitioner's prior fraudulent acts and contemporaneous conduct during the entrapment operation demonstrated his intent to possess the credit card.

• People vs. Villanueva, 459 Phil. 856 (2003) — Controlling precedent on the relationship between the preamble and the accusatory portion of an Information; the Court quoted extensively from this case to support its ruling that the Information must be considered as one whole document and that the preamble is an essential part thereof.
• People vs. Esparas, 354 Phil. 342 (1998) — Cited as authority for the proposition that animus possidendi may be inferred from the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused and the surrounding circumstances.
• People vs. Lian, 325 Phil. 881 (1996) — Cited alongside Esparas for the same proposition regarding the inference of animus possidendi from the acts and circumstances surrounding the accused.

• Section 9(e), Republic Act No. 8484 — The Access Devices Regulation Act of 1998; declares unlawful the possession of one or more counterfeit access devices or access devices fraudulently applied for. This is the provision under which petitioner was charged and convicted.
• Section 10, Republic Act No. 8484 — Prescribes the penalty for violation of Section 9(e): imprisonment of not less than six years and not more than ten years, and a fine of ₱10,000.00 or twice the value of the access device obtained, whichever is greater. The Court applied this provision to affirm the penalty imposed by the RTC as modified by the CA.
• Section 6, Rule 110, Rules of Criminal Procedure — Lays down the guidelines for determining the sufficiency of a complaint or information, requiring the statement of the name of the accused, the designation of the offense, the acts or omissions constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate date of commission, and the place of commission. The Court applied this provision to find the Information valid.
• Article 523, Civil Code — Defines possession as "the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right." The Court applied this definition to determine whether petitioner was legally in possession of the credit card, requiring both corpus and animus possidendi.

• Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson)
• Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (additional member per Special Order No. 949 dated February 11, 2011)
• Justice Roberto A. Abad
• Justice Jose Catral Mendoza