Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. How

A trial court may suspend the arraignment of an accused pending resolution of a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice without violating the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, because the thirty-day period prescribed by Section 7 of the Act is not absolute and the delay caused by such suspension falls within the exclusions under Section 10(f) thereof, provided the court sets forth its reasons in the record.

Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. filed a complaint for estafa against Ma. Fe Barreiro with the City Prosecutor of Parañaque, which resulted in the filing of an Information before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 257, presided by Judge Rolando G. How. Before arraignment could proceed, Barreiro sought review of the prosecutor's resolution before the Department of Justice, invoking the established administrative remedy available to an accused under DOJ Order No. 223, which precludes appeal to the Secretary of Justice once the accused has been arraigned. The Speedy Trial Act of 1998 (Republic Act No. 8493), a law of recent vintage at the time, prescribed mandatory time limits for arraignment and trial, creating tension between the accused's right to exhaust administrative remedies and the statutory mandate for speedy proceedings.

On May 28, 1999, the City Prosecutor of Parañaque filed an Information for estafa against Ma. Fe Barreiro before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 257, presided by Judge Rolando G. How. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-536, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Ma. Fe F. Barreiro," and was based on a complaint filed by Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. Before the scheduled arraignment of Barreiro on August 5, 1999 could take place, the respondent court issued an Order dated June 29, 1999 resetting the arraignment to September 2, 1999 on the ground that Barreiro had filed an appeal with the Department of Justice. Barreiro manifested that she would submit a certification from the DOJ granting due course to her appeal on or before the second scheduled arraignment.

On September 24, 1999, the respondent court issued an Order denying Solar Team's motion for reconsideration of the order that had reset the arraignment, and further rescheduled the arraignment to November 18, 1999. On November 10, 1999, Barreiro filed another "Motion to Defer Arraignment." Before the scheduled date of arraignment and before the hearing on the motion to defer could be conducted, the respondent court issued an Order on November 15, 1999 further deferring the arraignment "until such time that the appeal with the said office (SOJ) is resolved." Solar Team's motion for reconsideration of this order was denied on November 22, 1999.

Six months had elapsed since Barreiro appeared and submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court, yet she remained unarraigned. Solar Team bewailed this delay and questioned the respondent court's issuance of the assailed order before it received a copy of Barreiro's "Motion to Defer Arraignment" and before the hearing on the motion could be conducted. Solar Team also pointed out that despite the respondent court's own order dated September 26, 1999 stating that the November 18, 1999 arraignment was "intransferable," the court disregarded its own order by indefinitely suspending the arraignment. Solar Team filed the present petition for certiorari and mandamus to nullify the November 15, 1999 order, arguing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

• Violation of the Speedy Trial Act: Petitioner argued that the respondent court erred in refusing to arraign the private respondent despite the lapse of the thirty-day time limit mandatorily imposed by Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, and submitted that the Secretary of Justice must review the appeal and rule thereon within thirty days from the filing of the information or from the date the accused appeared in court to give meaning to the Act.
• Violation of Section 12, Rule 116: Petitioner maintained that the suspension of arraignment defied Section 12, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which enumerates only two grounds for suspending arraignment — unsound mental condition and valid prejudicial question.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner contended that the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by issuing the assailed order before petitioner received a copy of the "Motion to Defer Arraignment" and before the hearing on the motion could be conducted, and by disregarding its own prior order declaring the November 18, 1999 arraignment "intransferable."
• Pure Question of Law of First Impression: Petitioner characterized the petition as raising a pure question of law of first impression involving the application and interpretation of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, a law of very recent vintage.

• Suspension of Arraignment under the Speedy Trial Act: Whether the trial court can indefinitely suspend the arraignment of the accused until the petition for review with the Secretary of Justice has been resolved, notwithstanding the thirty-day period prescribed by Section 7 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998.
• Scope of Section 12, Rule 116: Whether the suspension of arraignment is limited to the two grounds enumerated in Section 12, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — unsound mental condition and valid prejudicial question.

• Suspension of Arraignment under the Speedy Trial Act: Yes. The trial court may suspend arraignment pending resolution of a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice, as the thirty-day period under Section 7 is not absolute and the delay falls within the exclusions under Section 10(f) of the Speedy Trial Act, provided the court sets forth its reasons in the record.
• Scope of Section 12, Rule 116: No. The suspension of arraignment is not strictly limited to the two situations enumerated in Section 12, Rule 116; jurisprudence has established that suspension may be granted on other grounds.

• Suspension of Arraignment under the Speedy Trial Act: The power of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of subordinate prosecutors even after an information has been filed in court is well settled, rooted in the Revised Administrative Code's grant of supervision and control over prosecutors and in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. After the filing of the information, the court is in complete control of the case, and the decision to suspend arraignment to await the resolution of an appeal with the Secretary of Justice is an exercise of sound discretion consistent with the ruling in Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals and subsequent cases. The thirty-day period prescribed by Section 7 of the Speedy Trial Act is not absolute; Section 10(f) of the same law excludes periods of delay resulting from continuances granted by the court on the basis of findings that the ends of justice outweigh the best interest of the public and the accused in a speedy trial, provided the court sets forth its reasons in the record. SC Circular No. 38-98 likewise excludes the period of pendency of "other causes justifying suspension of arraignment." The respondent court substantially complied with Section 10(f) by stating its reasons in its orders dated September 24, 1999 and November 22, 1999 — to allow the accused to exhaust procedural remedies and to permit the Secretary of Justice to review the prosecutor's resolution. The concept of "speedy trial" is a relative and flexible concept; determining whether delay is unreasonable requires balancing the duration of delay, the reason therefor, the assertion of the right, and the prejudice caused. Moreover, immediate arraignment would have proscribed Barreiro's right to appeal the prosecutor's resolution, since Section 4 of DOJ Order No. 223 precludes appeal once the accused has been arraigned. The subsequent issuance of DOJ Memorandum Order No. 12, mandating disposition of appeals within seventy-five days, further ensures that indefinite suspension is unlikely.

• Scope of Section 12, Rule 116: Nothing in Section 12, Rule 116 expressly or impliedly mandates that the suspension of arraignment shall be limited to the cases enumerated therein — unsound mental condition and valid prejudicial question. Jurisprudence, including Bonifacio vs. Tolentino and Dimatulac vs. Villon, has clearly established that suspension of arraignment is not strictly limited to those two situations. The respondent court's suspension was therefore a valid exercise of discretion.

• Review Authority of the Secretary of Justice — The Secretary of Justice, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises power of supervision and control over prosecutors and may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify their rulings even after an information has been filed in court. This authority finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, which holds that mistakes, abuses, or negligence committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity should be corrected by higher administrative authorities, not directly by courts. The Court applied this doctrine to uphold the trial court's suspension of arraignment pending the Secretary of Justice's resolution of the accused's petition for review.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies — Mistakes, abuses, or negligence committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency should be corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by courts; only after administrative remedies are exhausted may judicial recourse be allowed. The Court relied on this doctrine to justify deferring arraignment until the Secretary of Justice resolves the petition for review, as immediate arraignment would foreclose the accused's right to appeal under DOJ Order No. 223.
• Flexible Concept of Speedy Trial — The concept of "speedy trial" is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. The determination of whether delay is unreasonable cannot be reduced to a mathematical process; the factors to consider and balance are the duration of the delay, the reason thereof, the assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and the prejudice caused by such delay. The Court applied this principle to hold that the thirty-day arraignment period under Section 7 of the Speedy Trial Act is not absolute and must be read in light of the exclusions under Section 10.
• Trial Court's Independent Evaluation — While a court may defer to the Secretary of Justice's review, it is not bound to adopt the Secretary's resolution; the court is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case and may agree or disagree with the recommendation. Reliance alone on the Secretary's resolution would be an abdication of the trial court's duty and jurisdiction to determine prima facie case.

• "The power of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates even after the information has already been filed in court is well settled." — This passage states the foundational principle upholding the Secretary of Justice's continuing authority over prosecutors' resolutions despite the filing of an information, which is the ratio decidendi supporting the validity of the suspension of arraignment.

• "Contrary to the urgings of petitioner, Section 7 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 prescribing the thirty-day period for the arraignment of the accused is not absolute." — This passage articulates the Court's reconciliation of the Speedy Trial Act's mandatory language with the Secretary of Justice's review authority, establishing that statutory time limits yield to justifiable exclusions.

• "There is nothing in the above-quoted provision that expressly or impliedly mandates that the suspension of arraignment shall be limited to the cases enumerated therein." — This passage defines the scope of Section 12, Rule 116, clarifying that the enumeration of grounds for suspending arraignment is not exclusive, a point frequently relevant in criminal procedure analysis.

• Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 39 (1994) — Controlling precedent establishing that nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul forecloses the power of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of subordinates even after an information has been filed in court; followed and applied to uphold the suspension of arraignment.
• Roberts vs. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 307 (1996) — Reiterated the ruling in Marcelo regarding the Secretary of Justice's review authority; followed.
• Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462 (1987) — General pronouncement that courts cannot interfere with the prosecutor's discretion over criminal prosecution; distinguished, as it does not foreclose the Secretary of Justice's review authority.
• Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 656 (1997) — Explained the nature and scope of the Justice Secretary's power of supervision and control over prosecutors under the Revised Administrative Code; followed.
• Dimatulac vs. Villon, 297 SCRA 679 (1998) — Cautioned against precipitate arraignment pending DOJ appeal; followed and applied to uphold the trial court's prudence in suspending arraignment.
• Venus vs. Desierto, 298 SCRA 196 (1998) — Held that a court can defer to the prosecution arm's authority to resolve whether sufficient ground existed to file the information; followed.
• Bonifacio vs. Tolentino, 139 SCRA 307 (1985) — Established that suspension of arraignment is not strictly limited to the grounds enumerated in Section 12, Rule 116; followed.

• Section 7, Republic Act No. 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) — Prescribes that arraignment shall be held within thirty days from the filing of the information or from the date the accused appeared before the court, whichever date last occurs. The Court held this period is not absolute and must be read in conjunction with the exclusions under Section 10.
• Section 10(f), Republic Act No. 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) — Excludes from the computation of time within which trial must commence any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court on the basis of findings that the ends of justice outweigh the best interest of the public and the accused in a speedy trial, provided the court sets forth its reasons in the record. The Court applied this provision to justify the suspension of arraignment.
• Section 12, Rule 116, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — Enumerates two grounds for suspension of arraignment: unsound mental condition of the accused and existence of a valid prejudicial question. The Court held this enumeration is not exclusive.
• Section 2, SC Circular No. 38-98 — Provides that the period of pendency of a motion to quash, bill of particulars, or other causes justifying suspension of arraignment shall be excluded from the thirty-day period for arraignment. The Court relied on this implementing circular to reinforce that the thirty-day period admits of exclusions.
• Section 4, DOJ Order No. 223 (June 30, 1993) — Precludes appeal to the Secretary of Justice where the appellant has already been arraigned; if the appellant is arraigned during the pendency of the appeal, the appeal shall be dismissed motu proprio. The Court cited this provision to explain why suspension of arraignment was necessary to preserve the accused's right to exhaust administrative remedies.
• Sections 38 and 39, Chapter 7 and 8, Book IV, Revised Administrative Code (Executive Order No. 292) — Confer upon the Secretary of Justice supervision and control over the Office of the Chief Prosecutor and provincial and city prosecution offices, including authority to review, approve, reverse, or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials. The Court relied on these provisions as the statutory basis for the Secretary of Justice's review authority.
• Section 16, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Entitles the offended party to intervene in the criminal case if he has not waived the civil action or reserved the right to institute it separately, subject to the direction and control of the public prosecutor. The Court cited this provision to clarify the limited role of the private complainant in the prosecution.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concurred.