Social Security System vs. Commission on Audit

Government-owned or controlled corporations like the SSS are always subject to the supervision and control of the President, and the grant of authority to fix reasonable compensation, allowances, and other benefits in the SSS's charter does not conflict with the exercise by the President, through the DBM, of the power to review how reasonable such compensation is and whether it complies with relevant laws and rules. The disallowance of allowances and benefits paid in excess of the DBM-approved Corporate Operating Budget was proper where the SSS failed to secure presidential approval through the DBM.

The Social Security System (SSS) is a government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC) created under Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by RA No. 8282 or the Social Security Act of 1997. The Social Security Commission (SSC) is granted authority under Section 25 of the Social Security Act to fix the compensation, allowances, and benefits of SSS officials and employees, subject to a limitation that not more than twelve percent (12%) of total yearly contributions plus three percent (3%) of other revenues shall be disbursed for administrative and operational expenses. The Commission on Audit (COA) exercises audit jurisdiction over the SSS, and the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) approves the SSS's Corporate Operating Budget (COB) pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1597, Memorandum Order No. 20, Joint Resolution No. 4, and Executive Order No. 7, which collectively require presidential approval for the grant of new or increased allowances and benefits to government personnel.

The Social Security System (SSS) Western Mindanao Division (SSS-WMD) in Zamboanga City paid its officials and employees various allowances totaling ₱7,198,182.96, which the Commission on Audit (COA) disallowed as excessive and irregular payments for being in excess of the 2010 Corporate Operating Budget (COB) approved by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM). The COA issued Notices of Disallowance (ND) No. 2012-01 dated March 19, 2012 covering Special Counsel Allowance of ₱144,000.00, and ND No. 2012-02 dated March 22, 2012 covering Short Term Variable Pay of ₱3,153,888.00, Bank/Christmas Gift Certificates of ₱3,885,000.00, and Rice Subsidy of ₱15,294.96. The SSS received both NDs on March 28, 2012.

On September 21, 2012, the SSS filed separate appeals before the COA Regional Director, COA Regional Office No. IX, arguing that Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by RA No. 8282 or the Social Security Act of 1997, grants the Social Security Commission (SSC) the power to fix the compensation, allowances, and benefits of SSS officials and employees, and that the only valid measure in determining whether such allowances and benefits were excessive was the measure set by the Social Security Act itself. The appeals were stamped received by COA Zamboanga City on October 5, 2012. In its Answer dated December 13, 2012, the COA recommended denial of the appeals on the ground that the SSS exceeded its authority when it granted and paid the subject allowances and benefits without complying with PD No. 1597, MO No. 20, JR No. 4, s. 2008, and EO No. 7.

The COA-RD, in its Decision No. 2013-28 dated October 16, 2013, denied the appeals on both NDs, citing PD No. 1597, RA No. 6758, JR No. 4 s. 2008, AO No. 103 s. 2004, and prior jurisprudence, and required the persons liable thereunder to refund the disallowed benefits. A copy of the decision was received by the Accounting Section of SSS-WMD on December 23, 2013. On January 9, 2014, the SSS's Legal Services Division received a copy of the COA-RD Decision, which was turned over to the Corporate Legal Department on January 10, 2014, and finally to the handling counsel on January 13, 2014. On January 17, 2014, the SSS filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Leave to File and Admit Attached Petition for Review and the actual Petition for Review before the COA Commission Proper.

The COA Proper, in its Decision No. 2015-051 dated February 24, 2015, dismissed the Petition for Review for having been filed beyond the 180-day reglementary period and declared the COA-RD decision final and executory. The SSS filed a motion for reconsideration, which the COA Proper denied in its Resolution dated October 22, 2015 on the ground that the COA-RD Decision had long attained finality. The SSS then filed the present petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.

The SSS argued that the authority of the SSC to fix reasonable compensation, allowances, or other benefits of its officials and employees is limited only by the Social Security Act, and that the Special Counsel Allowance, Short Term Variable Pay, Bank/Christmas Gift Certificate, and Rice Subsidy were neither new nor increased benefits. The COA countered that the SSS must comply with the limitations set by other existing laws, rules, and regulations, and that the subject allowances and benefits comprised new or increased benefits since any benefit appropriate in a preceding year may not be the same in the succeeding year. The Office of the Solicitor General, as Tribune of the People, agreed that the Petition for Review was filed beyond the reglementary period but submitted that the strict application of procedural rules may be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice.

The Court found that the SSS belatedly filed its Petition for Review before the COA-Proper, but relaxed the rules in the interest of substantial justice. On the merits, the Court held that GOCCs like the SSS are always subject to the supervision and control of the President, and the grant of authority to fix reasonable compensation in the SSS's charter does not conflict with the exercise by the President, through the DBM, of the power to review how reasonable such compensation is. The Court noted that the SSS not only failed to secure approval from the President, but made payments out of various items in its 2010 COB which the DBM had disapproved: Special Counsel Allowance was disapproved in its entirety; Short Term Variable Pay was disapproved for payments made in excess of one month salary; Bank/Christmas Gift Certificate was disapproved for payments made in excess of ₱10,000.00 per employee; and Rice Subsidy was disapproved for payments made in excess of what was pegged at the level for Calendar Year 2009.

• Authority of the SSC: Petitioner argued that Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by RA No. 8282 or the Social Security Act of 1997, grants the Social Security Commission the power to fix the compensation, allowances, and benefits of petitioner's officials and employees, and that the only valid measure in determining whether such allowances and benefits were excessive was the measure set by the Social Security Act itself.

• Inapplicability of PD No. 1597: Petitioner contended that Section 6 of PD No. 1597 is not applicable because there is no indication therein that the President's prior approval must be secured in order for the SSC to grant allowances and benefits.

• Not New or Increased Benefits: Petitioner argued that Sections 1-3 of MO No. 20, s. 2001, Section 9 of JR No. 4, and Sections 8-10 of EO No. 7, s. 2010 are inapplicable since they only speak of new allowances or benefits, or an increase in the rates thereof, whereas the Special Counsel Allowance, Short Term Variable Pay, Bank/Christmas Gift Certificate, and Rice Subsidy are neither new nor increased benefits, considering that petitioner's officials and employees have been enjoying Bank/Christmas Gift Certificates since 1994 by virtue of SSC Resolution No. 1031 dated November 29, 1994.

• Relaxation of Procedural Rules: Petitioner argued that the strict application of the rules of procedure may be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice, considering the circumstances by which its Petition for Review was belatedly filed before the COA Proper.

• Excess of Authority: Respondent argued that petitioner exceeded its authority when it granted and paid the subject allowances and benefits without complying with PD No. 1597, MO No. 20, JR No. 4, s. 2008, and EO No. 7, and that while the Social Security Act sets a limit on the disbursement of funds for administrative and operational expenses, it must still conform with the limitations set by other existing laws, rules, and regulations.

• New or Increased Benefits: Respondent contended that the subject allowances and benefits comprise new or increased benefits since any benefit appropriate in a preceding year may not be the same, both in nature or type of disbursement and amount, as in the succeeding year due to several factors which might affect the estimate of revenues and expenses.

• Late Filing: Respondent argued that petitioner should have filed its Petition for Review before the Commission Proper not later than the next working day from receipt of the COA Regional Director's decision, considering that the six-month period to appeal had already been exhausted, and that it is not bound to serve a copy of decisions to petitioner's counsel since its rules of procedure permit personal service to the persons named under the NDs.

• Reckoning Point of Appeal Filing: Whether the date of mailing or the date of receipt by the COA should be considered the date of filing of the appeal memorandum for purposes of computing the 180-day reglementary period.

• Reckoning Point of Receipt of COA-RD Decision: Whether the date of receipt of the COA-RD Decision should be reckoned from the date of receipt by the SSS-WMD or from the date of receipt by the SSS's Legal Services Division or handling lawyer.

• Relaxation of Procedural Rules: Whether the circumstances of the case warrant a relaxation of the rules so as to excuse petitioner's belated filing of its Petition for Review before the COA-Proper.

• Requirement of Presidential Approval: Whether the SSS is required to secure presidential approval through the DBM before granting allowances and benefits to its officials and employees, notwithstanding the authority granted to the SSC under the Social Security Act.

• Liability for Disallowed Amounts: Whether the approving and certifying officers and the recipients of the disallowed amounts are liable to return the amounts respectively received.

• Reckoning Point of Appeal Filing: The date of mailing, September 21, 2012, was considered the date of filing, the appeal having been filed within the 180-day reglementary period. Under Section 3, Rule IX of the COA Rules and Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, if filing is by registered mail, the date of mailing as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt shall be considered the date of filing.

• Reckoning Point of Receipt of COA-RD Decision: Receipt by the SSS's Legal Services Division on January 9, 2014 was considered receipt by counsel, and the 180-day reglementary period commenced to run again upon such receipt. When a party is represented by counsel, notices of all kinds, including court orders and decisions, must be served on said counsel, and notice to counsel is considered notice to client.

• Relaxation of Procedural Rules: Yes. The Court relaxed the rules in the interest of substantial justice, noting that there was no intent on the part of petitioner to delay the proceedings, and that the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid and technical sense, for they have been adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice.

• Requirement of Presidential Approval: Yes. GOCCs like the SSS are always subject to the supervision and control of the President, and the grant of authority to fix reasonable compensation in the SSS's charter does not conflict with the exercise by the President, through the DBM, of the power to review how reasonable such compensation is and whether it complies with relevant laws and rules.

• Liability for Disallowed Amounts: The approving and certifying officers were absolved from solidary liability on account of good faith, but the recipients of the disallowed amounts, whether approving or certifying officers or mere passive recipients, were each held individually liable for the return of the disallowed amounts they respectively received, pursuant to the Rules on Return in Madera vs. Commission on Audit as clarified by Abellanosa vs. Commission on Audit.

• Reckoning Point of Appeal Filing: The Court found that the SSS filed its appeal memoranda via registered mail on September 21, 2012, or one hundred seventy-seven (177) days from receipt of the NDs, well within the six-month reglementary period. The Court noted that the SSS was well aware of the six-month reglementary period from receipt of the NDs to file an appeal pursuant to Section 48 of PD No. 1445, Section 8, Rule IV of the COA Rules, and Section 17.1 of the 2009 Rules and Regulations on the Settlement of Accounts. The Court found it contrary to human experience for the SSS to personally file its pleadings in Zamboanga City, considering that its counsel is located in Luzon, and noted that the COA's own Answer and the COA-RD Decision did not attribute late filing to the SSS. The Court also observed that to treat the date on which an appeal memorandum is "stamped received" by the COA as the date on which said appeal is deemed filed may create an odd situation where the timeliness of an appeal filed through registered mail would be made to depend upon external factors beyond the control of said party.

• Reckoning Point of Receipt of COA-RD Decision: The Court held that when a party is represented by counsel, the reckoning point of the receipt of a judgment, final order, or resolution shall be the date of receipt thereof by the party's counsel. The Court rejected respondent's contention that Section 7, Rule IV of the COA Rules is the applicable rule in the service of the COA-RD Decision, ruling that Rule IV is entitled "Proceedings before the Auditor" and pertains to decisions issued by the Auditor and not by the COA Regional Director. Since Rule V of the COA Rules, which governs proceedings before the Regional Director, does not specifically provide for the procedure by which a decision of the Regional Director shall be served on a party who is represented by counsel, the Rules of Court will apply. The Court considered receipt by the Legal Services Division on January 9, 2014 as receipt by counsel, noting that the structure of petitioner's legal department appears to be akin to that of a private law firm, and the law firm itself is the counsel such that notice to it is tantamount to notice to its client notwithstanding belated receipt by the handling department or associate.

• Relaxation of Procedural Rules: The Court found that even if the decision was brought to the attention of the handling lawyer on January 13, 2014, and the Petition for Review was filed on January 17, 2014, it took only a relatively short period of four (4) days for said counsel to draft such a major pleading, and there was no intent on the part of petitioner to delay the proceedings. The Court cited Aguam vs. Court of Appeals, which excused a delay of nine (9) days in the filing of a motion for extension due to counsel's mistake in counting the period, and Tiangco vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, which justified a five (5)-day delay due to reorganization of the legal department. The Court also noted that in SSS vs. COA, which contains a similar backdrop, the COA-Proper initially dismissed SSS's Petition for Review for being filed out of time but, upon motion for reconsideration, gave due course thereto to "serve the broader interests of justice and substantial rights," and wondered why it chose to apply its rules strictly in the present case, which involves a disallowance of only a tenth of that amount.

• Requirement of Presidential Approval: The Court applied the doctrine in SSS vs. COA (G.R. No. 243278, November 3, 2020), which involved the same issuances cited in the case at bench. The Court explained that GOCCs like the SSS are always subject to the supervision and control of the President, and that the grant of authority to fix reasonable compensation for its personnel, as well as an exemption from the SSL, does not excuse the SSS from complying with the requirement to obtain Presidential approval before granting benefits and allowances to its personnel. The Court found that nothing in the SSS's charter explicitly repeals PD No. 1597, MO No. 20, JR No. 4, and EO No. 7, and there is no irreconcilable conflict between the provisions of these laws on the one hand, and the SSS's charter on the other, hence, no implied repeal can be gleaned therefrom. The Court noted that the SSS not only failed to secure approval from the President, but made payments out of various items in its 2010 COB which the DBM had disapproved: Special Counsel Allowance was disapproved in its entirety; Short Term Variable Pay was disapproved for payments made in excess of one month salary; Bank/Christmas Gift Certificate was disapproved for payments made in excess of ₱10,000.00 per employee; and Rice Subsidy was disapproved for payments made in excess of what was pegged at the level for Calendar Year 2009. The Court found that nowhere in the records did the SSS dispute said allegations, and neither did it present any evidence to prove that the board resolutions granting said allowances and benefits were submitted to the President for approval, through the DBM.

• Liability for Disallowed Amounts: The Court found that the approving and certifying officers may be exempt from returning the subject amounts on account of good faith, considering that at the time the subject benefits and allowances were disbursed by the SSS, there was no prevailing ruling by this Court specifically on the exemption of the SSS from the SSL as well as its authority to determine the reasonable compensation for its personnel, vis-à-vis the requirement of approval by the President or the DBM prior to the grant of additional or increased benefits. However, on the part of the recipients of the disallowed amounts, whether approving or certifying officers or mere passive recipients, the Court held that pursuant to the Rules on Return in Madera vs. Commission on Audit, as further clarified by Abellanosa vs. Commission on Audit, they are liable to return said amounts respectively received by them regardless of whether said amounts were genuinely given in consideration of services rendered, considering that the disallowed allowances or benefits were granted without legal basis. The Court distinguished SSS vs. COA, where the passive payees were ultimately excused from returning the disallowed amounts only because the COA-Proper had earlier excused them on account of good faith and because the SSS no longer raised the matter as an issue in its petition, resulting in the COA-Proper's decision becoming final and immutable — circumstances not present in the case at bench.

• Presidential Supervision and Control over GOCCs — GOCCs like the SSS are always subject to the supervision and control of the President. The grant of authority to fix reasonable compensation for its personnel, as well as an exemption from the SSL, does not excuse the SSS from complying with the requirement to obtain Presidential approval before granting benefits and allowances to its personnel. This doctrine was affirmed in SSS vs. COA (G.R. No. 243278, November 3, 2020) and applied in the case at bench.

• No Implied Repeal — Nothing in the SSS's charter explicitly repeals PD No. 1597, MO No. 20, s. 2001, JR No. 4, s. 2009, and EO No. 7, s. 2010, and there is no irreconcilable conflict between the provisions of these laws on the one hand, and the SSS's charter on the other. Hence, no implied repeal can be gleaned therefrom.

• Reckoning Point of Receipt When Party is Represented by Counsel — When a party is represented by counsel, notices of all kinds, including court orders and decisions, must be served on said counsel, and notice to counsel is considered notice to client. The reckoning point of the receipt of a judgment, final order, or resolution shall be the date of receipt thereof by the party's counsel. The structure of a legal department akin to a private law firm means the law firm itself is the counsel, such that notice to it is tantamount to notice to its client notwithstanding belated receipt by the handling department or associate.

• Date of Filing by Registered Mail — Under Section 3, Rule IX of the COA Rules and Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, if filing is by registered mail, the date of mailing as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt shall be considered the date of filing. The burden of proving the date of filing rests upon the party asserting such date.

• Relaxation of Procedural Rules — The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid and technical sense, for they have been adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice. When a rigid application of the rules tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their operation. A party-litigant should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor, or property on technicalities.

• Madera Rules on Return — Pursuant to the Rules on Return in Madera vs. Commission on Audit (G.R. No. 244128, September 8, 2020), as further clarified by Abellanosa vs. Commission on Audit (G.R. No. 185806, November 17, 2020), recipients of disallowed amounts, whether approving or certifying officers or mere passive recipients, are liable to return said amounts respectively received by them regardless of whether said amounts were genuinely given in consideration of services rendered, considering that the disallowed allowances or benefits were granted without legal basis. However, approving and certifying officers may be exempt from returning the subject amounts on account of good faith.

• "GOCCs like the SSS are always subject to the supervision and control of the President. That it is granted authority to fix reasonable compensation for its personnel, as well as an exemption from the SSL, does not excuse the SSS from complying with the requirement to obtain Presidential approval before granting benefits and allowances to its personnel. This is a doctrine which has been affirmed time and again in jurisprudence." — This passage states the core ratio decidendi on the substantive issue: the SSS's charter authority to fix compensation does not exempt it from the requirement of presidential approval through the DBM.

• "Verily, and contrary to the SSS' contentions, the grant of authority to fix reasonable compensation, allowances, and other benefits in the SSS' charter does not conflict with the exercise by the President, through the DBM, of its power to review precisely how reasonable such compensation is, and whether or not it complies with the relevant laws and rules." — This passage articulates the reconciliation between the SSS's charter authority and the President's supervisory power, rejecting the SSS's argument that its charter supersedes the cited issuances.

• "The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid and technical sense, for they have been adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice. Judicial action must be guided by the principle that a party-litigant should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities." — This passage states the doctrinal basis for relaxing procedural rules in the interest of substantial justice, which the Court applied to excuse the SSS's belated filing.

• "However, on the part of the recipients of the disallowed amounts, whether approving or certifying officers or mere passive recipients, We hold that pursuant to the Rules on Return in Madera v. Commission on Audit, as further clarified by Abellanosa v. Commission on Audit, they are liable to return said amounts respectively received by them regardless of whether said amounts were genuinely given in consideration of services rendered, considering that the disallowed allowances or benefits were granted without legal basis." — This passage articulates the application of the Madera Rules on Return to the recipients of the disallowed amounts, distinguishing the case from SSS vs. COA where the passive payees were excused.

• SSS vs. COA, G.R. No. 243278, November 3, 2020 — Controlling precedent on the substantive issue. The Court applied its ruling that GOCCs like the SSS are subject to presidential supervision and control, and the grant of authority to fix reasonable compensation does not excuse compliance with the requirement of presidential approval before granting benefits and allowances. The Court also relied on this case for the good faith exemption of approving and certifying officers.

• Madera vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 244128, September 8, 2020 — Controlling precedent establishing the Rules on Return, which the Court applied to hold recipients of disallowed amounts liable to return the amounts respectively received.

• Abellanosa vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 185806, November 17, 2020 (Resolution) — Clarifying precedent on the Madera Rules on Return, applied to the recipients of the disallowed amounts.

• Aguam vs. Court of Appeals, 388 Phil. 587 (2000) — Cited as authority for relaxing procedural rules, where the Court excused a delay of nine (9) days in the filing of a motion for extension due to counsel's mistake in counting the period.

• Tiangco vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, 646 Phil. 554 (2010) — Cited as authority for relaxing procedural rules, where a five (5)-day delay in filing a motion for extension was justified by reorganization of the legal department.

• Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Panlilio-Luciano, G.R. No. 165428, July 13, 2005 (Resolution) — Cited for the rule that under the Administrative Code of 1987, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel acts as the principal law office of all GOCCs.

• Phividec Industrial Authority vs. Capitol Steel Corporation, 460 Phil. 493 (2003) — Cited for the rule that under exceptional circumstances, a GOCC may hire a private counsel with written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel.

• Pagdanganan, et al. vs. Sarmiento, 743 Phil. 457 (2014) — Cited for the well-settled rule that if a litigant is represented by counsel, notices of all kinds, including court orders and decisions, must be served on said counsel, and notice to counsel is considered notice to client.

• Heirs of Villagracia, et al. vs. Equitable Banking Corp., et al., 573 Phil. 212 (2008) — Cited for the principle that when a rigid application of the rules tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, the Court is empowered to suspend their operation.

• Section 25, RA No. 1161, as amended by RA No. 8282 — The Social Security Act provision granting the SSC authority to fix compensation, allowances, and benefits of SSS officials and employees, subject to the limitation that not more than twelve percent (12%) of total yearly contributions plus three percent (3%) of other revenues shall be disbursed for administrative and operational expenses. The Court held that this grant of authority does not conflict with the President's power of review through the DBM.

• Section 48, PD No. 1445 — Provides that any person aggrieved by the decision of an auditor of any government agency in the settlement of an account or claim may within six months from receipt of a copy of the decision appeal in writing to the Commission. Applied to determine the reglementary period for filing the appeal.

• Section 5, Rule V, 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA — Provides that the receipt by the Director of the Appeal Memorandum shall stop the running of the period to appeal which shall resume to run upon receipt by the appellant of the Director's decision. Applied to compute the remaining period for appeal.

• Section 3, Rule IX, COA Rules — Provides that if filing is by registered mail, the date of mailing shall be considered the date of filing. Applied to determine the timeliness of the SSS's appeal before the COA-RD.

• Section 3, Rule 13, Rules of Court — Provides that in the case of filing by registered mail, the date of mailing as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt shall be considered the date of filing. Applied in relation to the COA Rules.

• Section 2, Rule 13, Rules of Court — Applied to determine the proper service of the COA-RD Decision on the SSS as a party represented by counsel.

• Section 6, PD No. 1597 — Provides that agencies exempted from OCPC coverage shall observe guidelines and policies issued by the President governing position classification, salary rates, levels of allowances, and other forms of compensation and fringe benefits. Applied to hold the SSS subject to the requirement of presidential approval.

• Section 5, PD No. 1597 — Categorically states that allowances, honoraria, and other fringe benefits which may be granted to government employees shall be subject to the approval of the President upon recommendation of the Commissioner of the Budget. Applied to require presidential approval for the subject allowances and benefits.

• Sections 1-3, MO No. 20, s. 2001 — Suspends the grant of any salary increases and new or increased benefits, and requires that any increase in salary or compensation of GOCCs/GFIs not in accordance with the SSL shall be subject to the approval of the President. Applied to require presidential approval for the subject allowances and benefits.

• Section 9, JR No. 4, s. 2008 — Provides that exempt entities shall observe the policies, parameters, and guidelines governing position classification, salary rates, categories and rates of allowances, benefits, and incentives prescribed by the President, and that any increase in existing salary rates as well as the grant of new allowances, benefits, and incentives, or an increase in the rates thereof, shall be subject to the approval by the President upon recommendation of the DBM. Applied to require presidential approval.

• Sections 8-10, EO No. 7, s. 2010 — Imposes a moratorium on increases in the rates of salaries and the grant of new increases in the rates of allowances, incentives, and other benefits until specifically authorized by the President. Applied to require presidential approval for the subject allowances and benefits.

Gesmundo, C.J., Perlas-Bernabe (Senior Associate Justice), Leonen, Caguioa, Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, and J. Lopez, JJ., concurred.