Sobejana-Condon vs. COMELEC

A natural-born Filipino who re-acquires Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 is ineligible to run for or hold any elective public office unless he or she executes a personal and sworn renunciation of all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath, as mandated by Section 5(2) of the Act. The requirement is mandatory and applies to all who re-acquire citizenship under the Act, irrespective of whether they still hold dual citizenship at the time of filing their certificate of candidacy.

Petitioner Teodora Sobejana-Condon is a natural-born Filipino citizen, born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944, who became a naturalized Australian citizen on December 13, 1984 by virtue of her marriage to Kevin Thomas Condon. Republic Act No. 9225, the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003," allows natural-born Filipinos who lost Philippine citizenship through naturalization abroad to re-acquire it by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic. Section 5(2) of the same law imposes an additional condition on those seeking elective public office: they must make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath at the time of filing their certificate of candidacy.

Petitioner Teodora Sobejana-Condon is a natural-born Filipino citizen, born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen by reason of her marriage to Kevin Thomas Condon. On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia, pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. The application was approved, and she took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005, thereby re-acquiring Filipino citizenship while retaining her Australian citizenship.

On September 18, 2006, approximately a year before she first sought elective office, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs in Canberra, Australia. That office issued an Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she had ceased to be an Australian citizen. The declaration, however, was not sworn before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

The petitioner first ran for Mayor of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections but lost. She again sought elective office in the May 10, 2010 elections, this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest number of votes, was proclaimed the winning candidate, and took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.

Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan, and Luis M. Bautista — all registered voters of Caba, La Union — filed separate petitions for quo warranto before the RTC questioning the petitioner's eligibility. The petitions sought her disqualification on the ground that she was a dual citizen who had failed to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath, as required by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225. The petitioner denied being a dual citizen, contending that she had ceased to be an Australian citizen as of September 27, 2006, and that her Declaration of Renunciation executed in Australia sufficiently complied with the law. She also argued that her act of running for public office constituted a clear abandonment of her Australian citizenship.

The RTC, in its consolidated decision dated October 22, 2010, found that the petitioner's renunciation was admittedly not under oath, contrary to the express mandate of Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225, and declared her disqualified and ineligible to hold the office of Vice-Mayor. The COMELEC en banc, in its resolution dated September 6, 2011, concurred with the RTC's findings and conclusions and granted the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. Both lower tribunals uniformly observed that the petitioner had failed to present proof of the existence of the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948 during trial and that the letter from the Australian government showing she had renounced her citizenship was unauthenticated.

• Applicability of Section 5(2): Petitioner contended that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen on September 27, 2006, she no longer held dual citizenship and was only a Filipino citizen when she filed her certificate of candidacy as early as the 2007 elections; hence, the "personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 does not apply to her.
• Nature of the Requirement: Petitioner argued that a sworn renunciation is a mere formal and not a mandatory requirement, citing portions of the Journal of the House of Representatives dated June 2 to 5, 2003 containing the sponsorship speech for House Bill No. 4720, the precursor of R.A. No. 9225.
• Estoppel: Petitioner claimed that the private respondents are estopped from questioning her eligibility since they failed to do so when she filed certificates of candidacy for the 2007 and 2010 elections.
• COMELEC En Banc Authority — Adjudication of Merits: Petitioner disputed the power of the COMELEC en banc to take cognizance of the substantive merits of her appeal instead of remanding the same to the COMELEC Second Division for continuation of the appeal proceedings.
• COMELEC En Banc Authority — Execution Pending Appeal: Petitioner disputed the power of the COMELEC en banc to allow execution pending appeal of the RTC's judgment.

• Ineligibility Due to Non-Compliance with Section 5(2): Private respondents argued that the petitioner was a dual citizen who failed to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath, as mandated by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225, rendering her ineligible to hold her elective post.

• COMELEC En Banc Authority to Resolve Merits: Whether the COMELEC en banc may resolve the merits of an appeal after ruling on its reinstatement.
• COMELEC En Banc Authority to Order Execution: Whether the COMELEC en banc may order the execution of a judgment rendered by a trial court in an election case.
• Estoppel: Whether the private respondents are barred from questioning the qualifications of the petitioner.
• Nature of Sworn Renunciation Requirement: Whether the "sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" in Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is a mere pro forma requirement for purposes of determining the petitioner's eligibility to run for public office.

• COMELEC En Banc Authority to Resolve Merits: Yes. The COMELEC en banc may simultaneously reinstate and definitively resolve an appeal in a single resolution disposing of a motion for reconsideration, as neither the Constitution nor the COMELEC Rules of Procedure imposes any limit on the en banc's prerogative in resolving such motions.
• COMELEC En Banc Authority to Order Execution: Yes. The COMELEC possesses the authority to order discretionary execution of judgment in election cases, pursuant to the suppletory application of the Rules of Court sanctioned by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
• Estoppel: No. Private respondents are not estopped from questioning petitioner's eligibility, as the failure to file a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code before the election does not bar a quo warranto petition under Section 253 after proclamation.
• Nature of Sworn Renunciation Requirement: No. The sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is a mandatory requirement, not a mere pro forma one, and must be executed as an affidavit duly sworn before a public officer authorized to administer an oath.

• COMELEC En Banc Authority to Resolve Merits: Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution provides that motions for reconsideration of decisions of a Division shall be decided by the Commission en banc. Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure complements this provision. Neither proviso sets any limits on the en banc's prerogative in resolving a motion for reconsideration, so nothing prevents the body from directly adjudicating the substantive merits of an appeal after ruling for its reinstatement rather than remanding it to the Division. Moreover, the petitioner herself proffered arguments on the issue of her eligibility in her motion for reconsideration before the en banc and even filed a supplemental motion with supporting documents; having invoked the en banc's exercise of discretion on the merits, she cannot disavow it after receiving an unfavorable decision. Remand to the Second Division would also be unnecessarily circuitous and repugnant to the rule on preferential disposition of quo warranto cases under Rule 36, Section 15 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

• COMELEC En Banc Authority to Order Execution: The suppletory application of the Rules of Court is expressly sanctioned by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution pending appeal may be issued by an appellate court after the trial court has lost jurisdiction. In Batul vs. Bayron, the Court stressed that judgments in election cases which may be executed pending appeal include those decided by trial courts and those rendered by the COMELEC, whether in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction.

• Estoppel: Under the Omnibus Election Code, there are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a registered candidate may be raised: before election, pursuant to Section 78 (a verified petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed within twenty-five days from the filing of the COC); and after election, pursuant to Section 253 (a sworn petition for quo warranto filed within ten days after proclamation). These remedies are cumulative, not alternative. The failure of private respondents to utilize Section 78 cannot bar them from filing a quo warranto petition under Section 253. The election laws do not leave a voter helpless if he fails to file within the Section 78 period.

• Nature of Sworn Renunciation Requirement: Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is clear and free from ambiguity. It requires those seeking elective public office who have retained or re-acquired Philippine citizenship under the Act to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. The language of the provision is plain and unambiguous, expressing a single, definite, and sensible meaning that must be read literally. In Lopez vs. COMELEC, the Court declared that a dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship, and that the renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of the law authorized to administer an oath. In Jacot vs. Dal, the Court held that the law categorically requires a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy. In De Guzman vs. COMELEC, a candidate was declared disqualified for failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his American citizenship. The Court found no reason to depart from the mandatory nature infused by these rulings. The petitioner's reliance on Representative Javier's statement during legislative deliberations was misplaced; the statement was made in the context of whether re-acquiring citizens revert to natural-born status, and his suggestion that the sworn renunciation be considered pro forma was intended only to reconcile the renunciation requirement with the principle that natural-born citizens need not perform any act to perfect their citizenship — not to give candidates the option of executing an unsworn affidavit. Section 5 was intended to complement Section 18, Article XI of the Constitution on public officers' primary accountability of allegiance and loyalty. An oath is a solemn declaration that subjects the person to penalties for perjury if the testimony is false; to hold it a mere pro forma requirement would accommodate only qualified or temporary allegiance when the Constitution and the legislature demand absolute allegiance. Foreign laws, including the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948, are not matters of judicial notice and must be alleged and proven; the petitioner failed to prove the Australian law through any of the accepted methods. Even assuming the Australian letter were admitted, the framers of R.A. No. 9225 did not intend the law to concern itself with the actual status of the other citizenship. The requirement applies to all who have re-acquired Filipino citizenship under the Act, without regard to whether they are still dual citizens or not; it is a prerequisite and an additional qualification for elective office specific to those who re-acquire citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. The petitioner's act of running for public office does not suffice as an effective renunciation, as the prior rule that filing a COC constitutes renunciation was superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 9225. Garnering the most votes cannot cure the defect of a disqualified candidate's candidacy.

• Mandatory Sworn Renunciation Under R.A. No. 9225 — Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 requires natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire or retain Philippine citizenship under the Act and who seek elective public office to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath, prior or simultaneous to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of the law authorized to administer an oath, stating in clear and unequivocal terms that the affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship. This requirement is mandatory, not pro forma, and applies to all who re-acquire citizenship under the Act regardless of whether they remain dual citizens. It is an additional qualification for elective office specific to those who re-acquire citizenship under Section 3 of the Act, and is the operative act that restores their right to run for public office.

• Plain Meaning Rule in Statutory Construction — When the law is clear and free from any doubt, there is no occasion for construction or interpretation; there is only room for application. A statute is ambiguous only if it admits of two or more possible meanings. Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is unambiguous and must be read literally.

• Foreign Laws Not Subject to Judicial Notice — Foreign laws are not matters of judicial notice and must be alleged and proven like any other fact. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. Exceptions exist: (1) testimony under oath of an expert witness such as an attorney-at-law in the country where the foreign law operates, quoting verbatim a section of the law and stating it was in force at the material time; and (2) in naturalization cases, evidence of foreign law on reciprocity regarding citizenship may be allowed if the Court is satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof offered.

• Cumulative Remedies for Questioning Candidate Qualifications — Under the Omnibus Election Code, a petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 (before election) and a petition for quo warranto under Section 253 (after proclamation) are cumulative remedies. Failure to avail of the pre-election remedy does not bar a voter from filing a quo warranto petition within ten days after proclamation.

• "Failure to renounce foreign citizenship in accordance with the exact tenor of Section 5(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 renders a dual citizen ineligible to run for and thus hold any elective public office." — This is the opening pronouncement of the decision, stating the core ratio decidendi in a single sentence.

• "The rule applies to all those who have re-acquired their Filipino citizenship, like petitioner, without regard as to whether they are still dual citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for the exercise of the right to run for public office." — This passage defines the scope of Section 5(2), establishing that the sworn renunciation requirement applies irrespective of whether the candidate still holds dual citizenship at the time of filing the COC.

• "To hold the oath to be a mere pro forma requirement is to say that it is only for ceremonial purposes; it would also accommodate a mere qualified or temporary allegiance from government officers when the Constitution and the legislature clearly demand otherwise." — This passage articulates why the sworn renunciation cannot be treated as a mere formality, tying the requirement to the constitutional demand for absolute allegiance from public officers under Section 18, Article XI of the Constitution.

• "Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity." — This statement establishes that popular vote cannot cure a candidate's disqualification, a principle frequently cited in election law jurisprudence.

• Lopez vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008 — Controlling precedent on the meaning of Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225. The Court declared that a dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the COC, and that the renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer authorized to administer an oath.

• Jacot vs. Dal, G.R. No. 179848, November 29, 2008 — Followed. The Court held that the law categorically requires a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer simultaneous with or before the filing of the COC, and that the oath of allegiance under Section 3 is different from the renunciation of foreign citizenship under Section 5(2).

• De Guzman vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180048, June 19, 2009 — Followed. A candidate was declared disqualified from running for vice-mayor for failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his American citizenship, directly analogous to the present case.

• Batul vs. Bayron, 468 Phil. 130 (2004) — Followed on the issue of execution pending appeal in election cases. The Court held that judgments in election cases which may be executed pending appeal include those decided by trial courts and those rendered by the COMELEC.

• Valles vs. COMELEC, 392 Phil. 327 (2000) and Mercado vs. Manzano, 367 Phil. 132 (1999) — Distinguished and superseded. These cases held that the filing of a COC by a person with dual citizenship constitutes a renunciation of foreign citizenship; the Court held this ruling was superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 9225, which added the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation.

• AASJS Member vs. Datumanong, G.R. No. 160869, May 11, 2007 — Cited for the proposition that the framers of R.A. No. 9225 did not intend the law to concern itself with the actual status of the other citizenship.

• Section 5(2), Republic Act No. 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003) — Requires those seeking elective public office who have retained or re-acquired Philippine citizenship under the Act to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. Applied as the controlling provision rendering the petitioner ineligible for her unsworn renunciation.

• Section 3, R.A. No. 9225 — Provides for the retention and re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship by natural-born citizens who lost it through naturalization abroad, upon taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic. The petitioner validly re-acquired Filipino citizenship under this provision on December 5, 2005.

• Section 3, Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution — Provides that motions for reconsideration of decisions of a COMELEC Division shall be decided by the Commission en banc. Applied to uphold the COMELEC en banc's authority to resolve the petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the merits.

• Section 5(c), Rule 3, COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Complements the constitutional provision by providing that motions to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be resolved by the Commission en banc.

• Section 1, Rule 41, COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Sanctions the suppletory application of the Rules of Court in the absence of any applicable provision in the COMELEC Rules, thereby providing the basis for the COMELEC's authority to order execution pending appeal.

• Section 2, Rule 39, Rules of Court — Provides that execution pending appeal may be issued by an appellate court after the trial court has lost jurisdiction. Applied suppletorily to uphold the COMELEC en banc's power to order discretionary execution.

• Section 78, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) — Provides for a verified petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy, filed within twenty-five days from the filing of the COC. Discussed as a pre-election remedy available to private respondents.

• Section 253, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) — Provides for a petition for quo warranto filed within ten days after proclamation of the results of the election. Applied as the basis for the private respondents' quo warranto petitions before the RTC.

• Section 18, Article XI, 1987 Constitution — Provides that public officers and employees owe the State and the Constitution allegiance at all times. Cited as the constitutional basis complemented by Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225 in requiring sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship.

• Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132, Revised Rules of Court — Govern the proof of official records and the attestation of copies of documents kept in foreign countries. Applied in holding that the petitioner failed to properly prove the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948.

Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco Jr., Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad, Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama Jr., Associate Justice Jose Portugal Perez, Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (on official leave), and Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (on official leave). No separate concurring opinions were noted.