So vs. Valera

A declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code requires proof of psychological incapacity characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability, as defined by the guidelines in Republic vs. Court of Appeals (the Molina case). The incapacity must be a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants, confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Mere difficulty, refusal, neglect, or ill will in the performance of marital obligations does not constitute psychological incapacity.

The petitioner and respondent met in 1973 when the petitioner was a 17-year-old high school student and the respondent was a 21-year-old college student. Their meeting led to courtship and a 19-year common-law relationship that culminated in marriage at the Caloocan City Hall on December 10, 1991. They had three children (Jeffrey, Renelee, and Loni) during their relationship and subsequent marriage. The case involves the application of Article 36 of the Family Code, which provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage shall be void, even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The petitioner and respondent first met at a party in 1973 after being introduced by a common friend. The petitioner was then a 17-year-old high school student, while the respondent was a 21-year-old college student. Their meeting led to courtship and to a 19-year common-law relationship, culminating in the exchange of marital vows at the Caloocan City Hall on December 10, 1991. They had three children — Jeffrey, Renelee, and Loni — in their relationship and subsequent marriage.

The petitioner testified that he and the respondent eloped two months after meeting at a party. Thereafter, they lived at the house of his mother's friend in Bulacan, then transferred to his parents' house in Caloocan City, and later to Muntinlupa City. The petitioner related that the respondent asked him to sign a blank marriage application form and marriage contract sometime in 1986, which he signed on the condition that these documents would only be used if they decided to get married. He admitted not knowing what happened to these documents and maintained that no marriage ceremony took place in 1991. However, he submitted a certified true copy of their marriage contract as part of his documentary evidence.

The petitioner further alleged that the respondent did not want to practice her profession after passing the dental board exam and that she sold the dental equipment he bought for her. He claimed that when he started his own communication company, the respondent disagreed with many of his business decisions, and her interference eventually led to many failed transactions with prospective clients. He narrated that he often slept in the car because the respondent locked him out of the house when he came home late, and that she did not care for their children and was very strict with clients. Sometime in 1990, he found all his things outside their house when he came home late after closing a deal with a client. He left their house and stayed at a friend's house for two months. When he tried to go back, the respondent prevented him from entering and told him she did not love him anymore. He attempted to reconcile for the sake of their children, but she refused to accept him back.

Summons was served on the respondent on July 17, 1996, but she failed to file an answer. The RTC ordered the public prosecutor to investigate if there had been collusion between the parties and to intervene for the State. Prosecutor Andres N. Marcos manifested that he was unable to make a ruling on the issue of collusion since the respondent failed to appear before him. The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary evidence, including certified true copies of the birth certificates of their three children, the marriage contract, and the testimony and psychological report of clinical psychologist Dr. Cristina Rosello-Gates. Dr. Gates concluded that the respondent was plagued with an Adjustment Disorder as manifested in her impulsiveness, lack of restraint, lack of civility, and a sense of decency in the conduct of her life, with Compulsive Behavior Patterns evident in her marijuana habit, gambling, and habitual squandering of the petitioner's money. Dr. Gates opined that the disorder existed prior to the marriage and appeared to be irreversible.

• Error in Reversing RTC Decision: Petitioner argued that the CA seriously erred in reversing the RTC decision without ruling on the trial court's factual and conclusive finding that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was null and void ab initio.
• Departure from Judicial Proceedings: Petitioner maintained that the CA departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings because factual findings of the trial courts are entitled to great weight and respect and are not disturbed on appeal.
• Psychological Incapacity: Petitioner argued that the CA totally disregarded the undisputed fact that the respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.

• Lack of Definitive Ruling: The Republic, as intervenor-appellee, alleged that the trial court never made a definitive ruling on the issue of the absence of the formal and essential requisites of the parties' marriage.
• Failure to Discharge Burden: The Republic argued that the petitioner was not able to discharge the burden of evidence required in Molina.

• Essential and Formal Requisites: Whether the CA erred in not ruling on the alleged lack of the essential and formal requisites of marriage.
• Psychological Incapacity: Whether there exists sufficient ground to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

• Essential and Formal Requisites: No. The CA did not err in not ruling on the alleged lack of the essential and formal requisites of marriage because the RTC never definitively ruled on this ground, and the petitioner's uncorroborated testimony could not overcome the prima facie evidentiary value of the registered marriage contract as a public document.
• Psychological Incapacity: No. The totality of evidence presented by the petitioner failed to establish the respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations, as the psychologist's testimony and report did not sufficiently prove the gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability of the alleged disorder as required by Santos and Molina.

• Essential and Formal Requisites: The Court found the petitioner's argument baseless and misplaced for three basic reasons. First, a careful examination of the RTC decision showed that the trial court did not discuss, much less rule on, the absence of the formal and essential requisites of marriage; it simply recited the claim that the petitioner was induced to sign a blank Marriage Contract and application for marriage license. The RTC decision did not even mention the certified true copy of the Marriage Contract signed by the officiating minister and registered in the Civil Registry of Kalookan City. Second, the RTC decision concerned itself wholly with the declaration of nullity based on Article 36, and the dispositive portion declaring the marriage null and void must be based on psychological incapacity as found by the trial court, not on the absence of the essential and formal requisites. Third, the petitioner himself offered the Marriage Contract as evidence that it is registered with the Civil Registry of Kalookan City. As a duly registered document, it is a public document and is prima facie evidence of the facts it contains. To contradict these facts and the presumption of regularity in the document's favor, the petitioner's contrary evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant. The Court emphasized that a married couple cannot simply nullify their marriage through the non-appearance of one spouse and the uncorroborated declaration by the other spouse that the marriage did not really take place, as this would establish a dangerous doctrine that would throw the door wide open to fraud. At the very least, the declaration that the marriage did not take place must be supported by independent evidence showing a physical impossibility, a forgery, or the disavowal by the supposed participants.

• Psychological Incapacity: The Court applied the guidelines established in Santos vs. Court of Appeals and Republic vs. Court of Appeals (the Molina case). Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. It must refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants. The Molina guidelines require that: (1) the burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff, and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage; (2) the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) the incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage; (4) such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage; (6) the essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as well as Articles 220, 221, and 225; (7) interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church should be given great respect; and (8) the trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.

The Court examined the records itself and concluded that the psychologist's testimony and conclusions were not sufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed. The facts on which the psychologist based her conclusions were all derived from statements by the petitioner whose bias in favor of his cause cannot be doubted. The Court found the "Particulars" and the "Psychological Conclusions" in the psychologist's Report disproportionate with one another; the conclusions appeared to be exaggerated extrapolations derived from isolated incidents rather than from continuing patterns. The psychologist's statements about the parties' sexual relationship appeared rash, given that no parallel examination of the petitioner's own pattern of sexual behavior had been made. The psychologist failed to show that the respondent's behavioral disorder was medically or clinically permanent or incurable, and neither did she testify that the disorder was grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The psychologist could only trace the root of the alleged disorder to the time the respondent came to Manila and her separation from her parents, which the Court found insufficient given common human experience. In terms of incurability, the psychologist's convoluted statement suggested that the incapacity might be relative and reversible. The Court concluded that the case involved parties who have very human faults and frailties, who have been together for some time, and who are now tired of each other. To be tired and to give up on one's situation and on one's husband are not necessarily signs of psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled. The Court cited Navales vs. Navales for the proposition that Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and that mere "difficulty," "refusal," or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness.

• Psychological Incapacity (Article 36, Family Code) — Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. It must be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that the petitioner failed to establish the respondent's psychological incapacity, as the psychologist's testimony did not sufficiently prove the gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability of the alleged disorder.

• The Molina Guidelines — The Court applied the eight guidelines from Republic vs. Court of Appeals (the Molina case) for the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code. These guidelines require: (1) the burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff with any doubt resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage; (2) the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) the incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage; (4) such incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage; (6) the essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as well as Articles 220, 221, and 225; (7) interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church should be given great respect; and (8) the trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.

• Distinction Between Incapacity and Refusal — Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal," or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness. Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule.

• Prima Facie Evidentiary Value of Registered Marriage Contract — A duly registered marriage contract is a public document and is prima facie evidence of the facts it contains, namely, the marriage of the parties. To contradict these facts and the presumption of regularity in the document's favor, the contrary evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant. A married couple cannot simply nullify their marriage through the non-appearance of one spouse and the uncorroborated declaration by the other spouse that the marriage did not really take place.

• "Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere 'difficulty,' 'refusal' or 'neglect' in the performance of marital obligations or 'ill will' on the part of the spouse is different from 'incapacity' rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule." — This passage, quoted from Navales vs. Navales, articulates the controlling distinction between mere refusal or neglect and true psychological incapacity, and was central to the Court's denial of the petition.

• "To be sure, a married couple cannot simply nullify their marriage through the non-appearance of one spouse and the uncorroborated declaration by the other spouse that the marriage did not really take place. If the biased and interested testimony of a witness is deemed sufficient to overcome a public instrument, drawn up with all the formalities prescribed by the law, then there will have been established a very dangerous doctrine that would throw the door wide open to fraud." — This passage states the Court's reasoning for rejecting the petitioner's claim regarding the absence of essential and formal requisites, emphasizing the prima facie evidentiary value of the registered marriage contract.

• "Shorn of any reference to psychology, we conclude that we have a case here of parties who have very human faults and frailties; who have been together for some time; and who are now tired of each other. If in fact the respondent does not want to provide the support expected of a wife, the cause is not necessarily a grave and incurable psychological malady whose effects go as far as to affect her capacity to provide marital support promised and expected when the marital knot was tied. To be tired and to give up on one's situation and on one's husband are not necessarily signs of psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled." — This passage captures the Court's realistic assessment of the evidence and its conclusion that the respondent's behavior did not rise to the level of psychological incapacity under Article 36.

• Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20 — Controlling precedent that first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability, and that it must refer to a mental incapacity causing a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants.
• Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198 (the Molina case) — Controlling precedent that established the definitive guidelines for the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, which the Court applied in evaluating the sufficiency of the petitioner's evidence.
• Marcos vs. Marcos, G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755 — Followed for the clarification that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
• Navales vs. Navales, G.R. No. 167523, June 27, 2008 — Followed for the proposition that Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and that mere difficulty, refusal, or neglect is different from incapacity rooted on a debilitating psychological condition.
• Yturralde vs. Azurin, G.R. No. L-22158, May 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 407 — Cited for the principle that a public document is prima facie evidence of the facts it contains and that contrary evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant.

• Article 36, Family Code — The central provision of the case, which provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. The Court applied this provision in determining that the petitioner failed to establish the respondent's psychological incapacity.
• Article 68, Family Code — Cited by the RTC in its decision, providing that the husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect, and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. The Court referenced this provision in the context of the essential marital obligations.
• Article 230, Family Code — Cited by the RTC, providing that the giving of love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding are part of the essential marital obligations.
• Article VIII, Section 14, Constitution — Cited by the Court in noting that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, which the RTC decision would have violated had it ruled on the absence of essential and formal requisites without proper discussion.
• Articles 68-71, 220, 221, and 225, Family Code — Referenced in the Molina guidelines as the provisions defining the essential marital obligations that must be stated in the petition, proven by evidence, and included in the text of the decision.

• Quisumbing, J. (Chairperson)
• Ynares-Santiago, J.
• Velasco, Jr., J.
• Leonardo-De Castro, J.