So vs. Lee

The pendency of civil cases for collection of sum of money does not, by itself, bar a successful Bar examinee from taking the Lawyer's Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, unless the cases involve acts or omissions previously determined by the Court to be tainted with moral turpitude; good moral character is both a condition precedent to and a continuing requirement for the practice of law.

Ma. Lucille P. Lee was one of the successful examinees of the 2016 Bar Examinations. Before she could take the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys, Mercuria D. So, a creditor who had filed a collection case against Lee, wrote to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) opposing Lee's admission on the ground of her alleged irresponsible attitude toward her monetary obligations. Separately, Lee had also declared in her Bar application the pendency of another civil case for collection of sum of money filed by Joseph "Nonoy" Bolos. The OBC investigated and reported on both matters, and the Court held Lee's admission in abeyance pending resolution of the cases.

Ma. Lucille P. Lee was a successful examinee of the 2016 Bar Examinations. She had incurred several loans from different creditors, which later became the subject of civil collection cases. Among her creditors was Mercuria D. So, from whom Lee had obtained a ₱200,000 loan. Lee paid a total of ₱140,000 over 10 months but subsequently defaulted on the remaining balance due to losses her business suffered. She maintained that she did not intend to evade her obligation and had asked So for ample time to settle it. So, however, filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money against Lee, docketed as Civil Case No. 740.

On May 19, 2017, the Office of the Bar Confidant received a letter from So alleging that Lee was a defendant in Civil Case No. 740 and was not fit for admission to the Bar given her irresponsible attitude toward her monetary obligations. Attached to the letter was a copy of the complaint So had filed. In her Comment, Lee claimed she was unaware of the pendency of Civil Case No. 740 and learned of it only when she registered for the oath-taking. She admitted the loan but explained that business losses caused her to default, and that she had no intention to evade payment.

The OBC's July 11, 2017 Report revealed that Lee, in her Bar application, had declared that a civil case had been filed against her on January 29, 2014, docketed as Civil Case No. 1436, titled "Nonoy Bolos vs. Ma Lucille Lee Jao," for collection of sum of money. This case pertained to several loans Lee had incurred with Joseph "Nonoy" Bolos in the aggregate amount of ₱1,450,000. On August 1, 2017, the Court held in abeyance Lee's request to sign the Roll of Attorneys in view of the pendency of both Civil Case Nos. 740 and 1436, and required her to manifest the status of the cases.

In her October 2017 petition, Lee manifested that Civil Case No. 740 had been dismissed in view of a Compromise Agreement she had entered into with So, and that she had already paid So in accordance with its terms and conditions. In her March 2019 petition, Lee reiterated the dismissal of Civil Case No. 740 and reported that a Judgment by Compromise had been issued dismissing Civil Case No. 1436, pursuant to a Compromise Agreement she had executed with Bolos. Under that agreement, Lee would pay Bolos at least ₱15,000 monthly starting one month after she signs the Roll of Attorneys. The OBC, in its March 28, 2019 Report, recommended that Lee be allowed to retake the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys, subject to the condition that she inform the Court within one month from making her first payment to Bolos and upon full payment of the debt in accordance with the compromise terms.

• Admission to the Bar: Whether Lee should be allowed to retake the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys despite the pendency (now dismissal) of civil cases for collection of sum of money filed against her.

• Admission to the Bar: Yes. Lee was allowed to retake the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys, the pendency of civil collection cases not constituting moral turpitude, and both cases having been dismissed by virtue of compromise agreements — subject to the condition that she notify the Court of her payments to Bolos and upon full satisfaction of her monetary obligation.

• Admission to the Bar: The practice of law is a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law. Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court requires that an applicant for admission to the Bar must be of good moral character and that no charges involving moral turpitude have been filed or are pending against him or her in any court in the Philippines. Moral turpitude has been defined as an act of baselessness, vileness, or the depravity of private and social duties that man owes to his fellow man or society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. While certain crimes have been deemed to involve moral turpitude, not every criminal act does so, and the determination is ultimately a question of fact depending on all the circumstances. By the same token, not all civil cases pertain to acts involving moral turpitude; acts so tainted are of such gravity as to manifest an individual's depravity or lack of moral fiber. The mere pendency of a civil case — particularly a collection suit — should not deter a successful Bar examinee from taking the Lawyer's Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, because if it were otherwise, one's entitlement to membership in the legal profession would be jeopardized by the expedient filing of civil cases that do not necessarily reflect moral character. The facts and circumstances of each case must be considered to establish that the applicant's actions tarnished his or her moral fitness. In Lee's case, the existence of Civil Case Nos. 740 and 1436 alone did not establish that she committed acts tainted with moral turpitude. Moreover, both cases had been dismissed by virtue of compromise agreements with her creditors, removing any obstacle to her admission. Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that the deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross misconduct for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one year suspension from the practice of law. Upon taking the oath and signing the Roll, Lee would become a full-fledged member of the legal profession subject to the Court's disciplinary jurisdiction, even without complainants, as the Court may motu proprio initiate disciplinary proceedings. Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission but a continuing requirement for membership in the profession. Accordingly, Lee was allowed to take the oath subject to conditions ensuring her compliance with the compromise agreement with Bolos.

• Practice of Law as a Privilege — The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law. It is extended only to the few who possess high standards of intellectual and moral qualifications, and the Court is duty-bound to prevent the entry of undeserving aspirants and to exclude those who have become a disgrace to the profession. The Court applied this principle to justify its scrutiny of Lee's moral fitness before allowing her admission.

• Good Moral Character as a Continuing Requirement — The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law but a continuing requirement for membership in the legal profession. A lawyer who fails to maintain this standard may be subjected to administrative sanctions, and the Court may motu proprio initiate disciplinary proceedings even without complainants. The Court relied on this doctrine to warn Lee that her obligation to pay her debts under the compromise agreement would be monitored and that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross misconduct warranting suspension.

• Moral Turpitude — Moral turpitude has been defined as an act of baselessness, vileness, or the depravity of private and social duties that man owes to his fellow man or society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. The determination of whether an act constitutes moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances. The Court applied this definition to conclude that the mere pendency of civil collection cases against Lee did not constitute moral turpitude and thus did not bar her admission.

• Pendency of Civil Cases Not Per Se a Bar to Admission — The pendency of a civil case alone should not be a deterrent for successful Bar examinees to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys, especially since not all charges or cases involve acts evincing moral turpitude. The facts and circumstances of each case must be taken into account to establish that the applicant's actions tarnished his or her moral fitness. If it were otherwise, one's entitlement to be a member of the legal profession would be seriously jeopardized by the expedient filing of civil cases, which do not necessarily reflect one's moral character. The Court established this principle to resolve Lee's situation and to provide guidance for future cases.

• "The pendency of a civil case alone should not be a deterrent for successful Bar examinees to take their Lawyer's Oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys especially since not all charges or cases involve acts evincing moral turpitude." — This passage articulates the central ratio decidendi: that civil cases, by their mere existence, do not reflect on an applicant's moral character unless the underlying acts are tainted with moral turpitude.

• "If it were otherwise, one's entitlement to be a member of the legal profession would be seriously jeopardized by the expedient filing of civil cases, which do not necessarily reflect one's moral character." — This passage explains the policy rationale behind the ruling, warning against the abuse of civil filings to block Bar admission.

• "The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, but a continuing requirement for membership in the legal profession." — This passage states the doctrine of continuing moral fitness, underscoring that the Court's oversight of a lawyer's moral character does not end at admission.

• Atty. Alcantara vs. Atty. De Vera, 650 Phil. 214 (2010) — Cited for the proposition that the practice of law is a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who possess, and continue to possess, the required qualifications.

• In Re: Petition to take the Lawyer's Oath by Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., 348 Phil. 841 (1998) — Cited for the principle that the privilege of practicing law is extended only to the few who possess high standards of intellectual and moral qualifications, and that the Court is duty-bound to prevent the entry of undeserving aspirants.

• Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Alinea, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-05-1574, November 7, 2017, 844 SCRA 143 — Cited for the definition of moral turpitude.

• Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Ruiz, 780 Phil. 133 (2016) — Cited for the enumeration of crimes that have been deemed to involve moral turpitude.

• Pagaduan vs. Civil Service Commission, 747 Phil. 590 (2014) — Cited for the proposition that not every criminal act involves moral turpitude.

• Dungo vs. People, 762 Phil. 630 (2015) — Cited for the principle that the determination of moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances.

• Teves vs. Commission on Elections, 604 Phil. 717 (2009) — Cited for the principle that it is for the Court to ultimately resolve whether an act constitutes moral turpitude.

• Yap vs. Atty. Buri, A.C. No. 11156, March 19, 2018 — Cited for the rule that the deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one year suspension from the practice of law.

• Sebastian vs. Atty. Bajar, 559 Phil. 211 (2007) — Cited for the principle that the Court may motu proprio initiate disciplinary proceedings against lawyers even without complainants.

• Leda vs. Atty. Tabang, 283 Phil. 316 (1992) — Cited for the doctrine that good moral character is a continuing requirement for membership in the legal profession, not merely a condition precedent to admission.

• Section 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court — Provides the minimum requirements for admission to the Bar, including citizenship, age, residency, and good moral character, and requires that no charges involving moral turpitude have been filed or are pending against the applicant in any court in the Philippines. The Court applied this provision to assess whether the civil collection cases against Lee involved moral turpitude, concluding they did not, and thus the provision did not bar her admission.

Bersamin (C.J.), Carpio, Peralta, Leonen, Caguioa, A. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Del Castillo, and Jardeleza, JJ., concurred. Perlas-Bernabe, J., was on leave.