Siton vs. Court of Appeals

In a free-for-all, conspiracy is not established by joint or simultaneous action alone; it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt by clear and convincing evidence of a preconceived agreement or common purpose, and absent such proof each participant is liable only for the injuries he personally inflicted.

Roberto Siton y Ensalada was implicated in the death of Roylan Holgado following a free-for-all near the Hair Works Beauty Salon at the corner of A. Francisco and Chromium Streets, Sta. Ana, Manila, between the group of Norberto Notar and the group of Holgado. The Revised Penal Code governed the charges, with Article 8 defining conspiracy and Article 265 defining less serious physical injuries.

At around 11:00 o’clock in the evening of February 9, 1985, Norberto Notar, a barangay tanod, was outside the Hair Works Beauty Salon located near the corner of A. Francisco and Chromium Streets, Sta. Ana, Manila. Also in the vicinity were Roberto Siton, Joey Calip, Notar’s nephew, and Andres Borbon, a resident of the area. A group of seven to eight young men, including Roylan Holgado, passed by, walking toward Chromium Street. A brief exchange of words occurred between Notar and Holgado. A free-for-all then ensued between Holgado’s group and Notar, Calip, Borbon, and Siton. At the end, both Holgado and Notar suffered stab wounds. Holgado suffered two stab wounds, one fatal, and expired later at the Philippine General Hospital. Notar was confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital for a stab wound on his left chest but was later released after recovering.

Prosecution witness Bernardo Ferrer testified that at around 10:30 o’clock on the night of February 9, 1985, he was with Gerry Flores at the corner of Aqua Marina and A. Francisco Streets when their friends from Tondo, numbering about seven, arrived and invited them to a Valentine’s party. When they declined, the group, led by Roylan Holgado, proceeded toward Chromium Street. After five minutes, they heard shouts coming from the direction of Chromium Street, so Ferrer and Flores proceeded there. The trial court summarized that while approaching, Ferrer saw Andres Borbon hit Roylan with a piece of wood on the head; Roberto Siton, alias “Berting Tura,” who was behind Roylan, stabbed Roylan with an icepick on the right hip once; thereafter Joey Calip also stabbed Roylan on the right side of the waistline with a kitchen knife once. Roylan fell and was taken to the Philippine General Hospital by his companions and Bernardo, but died despite treatment.

Defense witness Mario Pahita, a cashier at the Hair Works Beauty Salon, testified that at around 11:00 o’clock on the night of February 9, 1985, he was in front of his beauty parlor with two beauticians, Joy and Rolly, and Notar was also with them. They saw a group of around seven to eight young men, including Roylan Holgado, walk past them toward Chromium Street. After a while, they heard sounds of what seemed to be stones being hurled at the roofs of houses. They then saw the same group retreating toward their direction. Notar asked Holgado what the noise was about, and the latter replied: “Wala yon.” The group, which appeared drunk and heavy-eyed, was advised by Notar to go home as the police might pass by. The lower court summed up the ensuing events: Roylan’s group resented Notar’s advice, Notar was suddenly boxed by one of Roylan’s companions, and all of them ganged up on him; Roylan stabbed Norberto with an icepick, while Joey Calip, Notar’s nephew, stabbed Roylan two times at the right side of his stomach with a bladed weapon.

The defense presented Mario Baul, a member of Holgado’s group, who testified that he, together with Roylan Holgado and some five others, were on their way to his house on Chromium Street when they were met by Norberto Notar. After Notar uttered some words which Baul did not understand, Notar stood up and boxed Holgado, and a free-for-all ensued. Baul did not see Siton. For his part, Siton gave an alibi, claiming that in the evening of February 9, 1985, he was in Cainta, Rizal, in the house of his sister, Miguela Siton Soliman, a public school teacher, from February 8, 1986 until February 15, 1986, to borrow money. The trial court gave credence to the positive identification made by Bernardo Ferrer and disregarded Siton’s alibi. The medico-legal officer of the Western Police District confirmed that wound No. 1, the penetrating stab wound slashing the right lobe of the liver, piercing the right kidney and grazing the first lumbar vertebra, could be the cause of death, while wound No. 2, a stab wound on the right hip region inflicted by Siton, was non-fatal.

• Conspiracy in a Free-for-All: Accused-appellant argued that the Court of Appeals erred in finding conspiracy in a free-for-all; in such a fight, the protagonists do not have the sole objective of mauling or killing a particular individual, but are moved by reflexes to face opponents as the exigency of fighting demands.
• No Agreement or Common Design: He maintained that under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, conspiracy exists only when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it; here, the deceased was stabbed by Joey Calip not through concerted action but in retaliation for the deceased’s stabbing of Calip’s relative, Norberto Notar, and there was no indication of a common purpose or design.
• Joint or Simultaneous Action: He asserted that even assuming he joined in attacking the victim, such act alone does not satisfy conspiracy because neither joint nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient proof of conspiracy; it must be shown as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself.
• Individual Liability: He submitted that absent conspiracy, his liability should be limited to his own participation, assuming he indeed participated.

• Conspiracy Through Concerted Action: The Solicitor-General maintained that conspiracy was present because the malefactors, including Roberto Siton, acted in concert pursuant to the same objective, the killing of Roylan Holgado, which they attained.
• Proof of Agreement: Respondent argued that evidence need not establish the actual agreement showing a pre-conceived plan, motive, interest, or purpose in the commission of the crime.
• Inference from Acts: Respondent contended that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence and may be inferred from the acts of the conspirators showing that at the time the offense was committed the participants had the same purpose and were united in its execution.
• Common Object and Concerted Acts: Respondent argued that when defendants by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and another performing another part to complete it, with a view to attaining the same object, and their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments, conspiracy is present.

• Conspiracy in a Free-for-All: Whether conspiracy may be found in a free-for-all fight.
• Proof of Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy was established beyond reasonable doubt.
• Criminal Liability: Whether Roberto Siton should be held liable for homicide or only for the injuries he personally inflicted.
• Alibi: Whether Siton’s alibi can prevail over the prosecution’s positive identification.

• Conspiracy in a Free-for-All: No. Conspiracy was absent; the meeting between the groups was casual and unarranged, and the aggression ensued at the spur of the moment, without a previous agreement to commit the crime.
• Proof of Conspiracy: No. Conspiracy must be proved beyond reasonable doubt by clear and convincing evidence; joint or simultaneous attack alone does not establish it.
• Criminal Liability: Siton is liable only for less serious physical injuries. Absent conspiracy, responsibility is individual, and the stab wound he inflicted on the victim’s right hip was non-fatal.
• Alibi: No. Alibi cannot prevail over positive identification by clear, explicit, and convincing evidence; Siton’s presence in the free-for-all was affirmed.

• Conspiracy in a Free-for-All: Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The records showed no previous agreement relating to the commission of the crime; the meeting between the group of Notar and the group of Holgado was casual and unarranged, and the aggression ensued at the spur of the moment. Although proof of the agreement may be inferred from the acts and conduct of the conspirators disclosing a common understanding, conspiracy, like the offense itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt and by clear and convincing evidence. The attack on Holgado was not agreed upon beforehand; the meeting between the two groups was not planned in advance, and the fracas was instantaneous, perhaps caused by the arrogance of Notar and the intoxication of Holgado, since the three alleged eyewitnesses gave conflicting testimonies on what exactly precipitated the free-for-all. Prosecution witness Bernardo Ferrer testified that there was a free-for-all, “Naglabu-labo,” and that Holgado’s six companions engaged in a fistfight with Notar’s group. The attack on Holgado could not have been pre-planned because Holgado had six other men while Notar’s company consisted only of Siton, Calip, and Borbon; singling out Holgado would have been dangerous and exposed them to the probable assault of Holgado’s companions. The attack was therefore a spontaneous reaction. People of the Philippine Islands vs. Caballero, et al. held that it is not enough that the attack be joint and simultaneous; the assailants must be animated by one and the same purpose, and conspiracy must be shown as clearly and convincingly as the crime itself. This ruling was reiterated in People vs. Bartolay and People vs. Dorico.
• Proof of Conspiracy: Conspiracy, like any other ingredient of the offense, must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. It cannot be presumed from joint or simultaneous action. In this case, the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that Siton and the others had a common design or purpose to kill Holgado; the evidence showed an unplanned free-for-all rather than a concerted plan.
• Criminal Liability: Since conspiracy was not proven, the responsibility of the accused is individual, and he must be dealt with individually. Prosecution witness Bernardo Ferrer’s testimony showed that Siton stabbed the victim on the right hip. The medico-legal officer confirmed that the fatal wound was wound No. 1, which slashed the right lobe of the liver, pierced the right kidney, and grazed the first lumbar vertebra, while wound No. 2, the stab wound on the right hip region inflicted by Siton, was non-fatal. Absent evidence proving conspiracy, Siton cannot be held liable for homicide but merely for less serious physical injuries, considering the extent of the stab wound he inflicted. It was safe to presume that the offended party would have been incapacitated for labor for ten days or more, or would have required medical attendance of the same period, by reason of the stab wound on his hip had he not suffered any other injury, under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Alibi: When an accused has been positively identified by clear, explicit, and convincing evidence, his defense of alibi cannot be given weight. Alibi must yield to and cannot prevail over the positive identification made by the prosecution’s witness. Siton’s presence in the free-for-all was thus affirmed. The testimony of defense witness Mario Baul as to Siton’s absence could not be given credence because he testified that he was somewhat drunk during the incident.

• Conspiracy under Article 8, Revised Penal Code — Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It may be inferred from acts and conduct disclosing a common understanding, but it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt by clear and convincing evidence. In a free-for-all, joint or simultaneous attack is not enough; the assailants must be animated by one and the same purpose. The Court applied this doctrine by finding no conspiracy because the meeting was casual and unarranged and the aggression was spontaneous.
• Individual Criminal Responsibility Absent Conspiracy — When conspiracy is not established, the accused is responsible only for his own acts and must be dealt with individually. The Court applied this by holding Siton liable only for the non-fatal stab wound he inflicted, not for the homicide caused by another.
• Alibi vis-à-vis Positive Identification — Alibi cannot prevail over positive identification by clear, explicit, and convincing evidence. The Court applied this by rejecting Siton’s alibi and affirming his presence in the free-for-all based on Ferrer’s testimony.
• Less Serious Physical Injuries under Article 265, Revised Penal Code — Where the injury inflicted is non-fatal and there is no conspiracy, the accused may be held liable for less serious physical injuries if the offended party would have been incapacitated for labor for ten days or more, or would have required medical attendance for the same period, by reason of that injury alone. The Court applied this by convicting Siton of less serious physical injuries for the non-fatal hip stab wound.

• "A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." — This states the Article 8 definition of conspiracy that the Court applied in determining whether the free-for-all involved a common criminal design.
• "In the present case, there is no showing that there was a previous agreement relating to the commission of the crime, it appearing that the meeting between the group of Notar and the group of Holgado was casual and unarranged, and the aggression ensued at the spur of the moment." — This is the core factual finding supporting the reversal of the conspiracy finding.
• "As early as 1929, this Court has ruled in People of the Philippine Islands v. Caballero, et al. that it is not enough that the attack be joint and simultaneous; it is necessary that the assailants be animated by one and the same purpose. A conspiracy must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the crime itself." — This is the canonical formulation of the conspiracy standard in free-for-all situations.
• "Absent any evidence proving conspiracy, accused-appellant Roberto Siton can not be held liable for homicide but merely for less serious physical injuries, considering the extent of the stab wound he inflicted on the victim." — This states the ratio for modifying the conviction and limiting liability to Siton’s individual act.

• People of the Philippine Islands vs. Caballero, et al., 53 Phil. 585 (1929) — Controlling precedent cited by the Court for the rule that a joint and simultaneous attack is not enough to establish conspiracy; the assailants must be animated by one and the same purpose, and conspiracy must be shown as clearly and convincingly as the crime itself.
• People vs. Bartolay, 42 SCRA 1 (1971) — Cited as reiterating the Caballero doctrine on conspiracy in joint attacks.
• People vs. Dorico, 54 SCRA 172 (1973) — Cited as another reiteration of the Caballero doctrine.
• People vs. Saavedra, 149 SCRA 610 (1987) — Cited for the rule that conspiracy must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, although proof of agreement may be inferred from the acts and conduct of the conspirators.
• People vs. Agda, 111 SCRA 331 (1982) — Cited for the rule that conspiracy, like any other ingredient of the offense, must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.
• People vs. Mandal, 188 SCRA 526 (1990) — Cited for the rule that alibi cannot prevail over positive identification.
• People vs. Resayaga, 159 SCRA 426 (1988) — Cited for the rule that proof of agreement may be inferred from the acts and conduct of the conspirators disclosing a common understanding.
• People vs. Elizaga, 167 SCRA 516; People vs. Laurio, G.R. No. 95351, August 9, 1991 — Cited for the rule that absent conspiracy, the accused’s responsibility is individual.

• Article 8, Revised Penal Code — Defines conspiracy as existing when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The Court applied this provision by holding that no such agreement was shown; the meeting was casual and the aggression spontaneous.
• Article 265, Revised Penal Code — Defines less serious physical injuries. The Court applied this provision by holding that, absent conspiracy, Siton was liable only for the non-fatal stab wound he inflicted, with the presumption that the victim would have been incapacitated for labor for ten days or more, or would have required medical attendance for the same period, from that wound alone.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, and Regalado, JJ.