Sitaca vs. Palomares, Jr.

A lawyer who falsifies court documents and presents them in court to secure an unlawful advantage is disbarred for violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as such acts constitute unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct that exhibits moral unfitness and inability to discharge the duties of a member of the bar.

Judge Nimfa P. Sitaca was the Acting Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 35, Ozamiz City, while respondent Atty. Diego M. Palomares, Jr. served as counsel of record for his son, Dunhill Palomares, who was charged with murder—a non-bailable offense—in Criminal Case No. RTC-1503, raffled to Branch 35 in September 1997. At the time, Dunhill Palomares was detained at the Cagayan de Oro City jail. The administrative complaint for falsification/disbarment/discipline was filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines by complaint affidavit dated April 5, 2000.

In September 1997, Criminal Case No. RTC-1503, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Dunhill Palomares," a murder charge, was raffled to RTC Branch 35, Ozamiz City, presided over by Judge Nimfa P. Sitaca. The accused, Dunhill Palomares, was represented by his father, respondent Atty. Diego M. Palomares, Jr., as counsel of record. At that time, Dunhill Palomares was detained at the Cagayan de Oro City jail.

Thereafter, Branch Clerk of Court Atty. Roy Murallon reported to Judge Sitaca that respondent was present in court to secure approval of a bail bond for his son's temporary release. The bail bond, in the amount of P200,000.00, was accompanied by an order of release signed by Atty. Glenn Peter Baldado, Branch Clerk of Court of RTC Branch 18, Cagayan de Oro City. The bail bond itself bore the signature of Hon. Nazar Chavez, Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 18. Judge Sitaca approved the order of release and the bail bond after seeing Judge Chavez's signature thereon.

Not long after, Atty. Murallon received a letter from Atty. Baldado advising that the supposed bail bond was actually inexistent and that Branch 18 had never processed it. This prompted Judge Sitaca to file a complaint affidavit dated April 5, 2000 charging respondent with falsification/disbarment/discipline before the IBP. In her reply, Judge Sitaca took notice of respondent's convenient imputation of liability on innocent third parties like herself and Atty. Murallon.

In his Comment dated September 19, 2000, respondent claimed that when his son was allowed to post bail, he sought help from his client Bentley House International Corporation (BHIC) through its CEO Jonathon Bentley Stevenz and Operations Manager Cristina Romarate. BHIC referred him to one William Guialani, who allegedly secured the bail bond carrying Judge Chavez's signature and the release order signed by Atty. Baldado. Respondent claimed his BHIC clients obtained these documents and turned them over to him. He argued that Atty. Murallon should have inquired about the documents' authenticity and denied any hand in producing the alleged spurious bail bond, asserting he could easily secure one from other insurance companies that were his clients.

After the case was remanded by the Supreme Court to the IBP for further proceedings, the IBP-CBD set the case for hearing on several dates. Judge Sitaca did not attend a single hearing and manifested via letter dated June 22, 2007 that she was submitting the case on the basis of the records. Respondent moved to dismiss for alleged lack of evidence but, as proof of his innocence, relied on the affidavits of Stevenz and Romarate on how Guialani came into the picture. The IBP-CBD denied the motion to dismiss and resolved the case on the evidence on record. The investigating commissioners found that as counsel of record, respondent knew there were no bail proceedings in his son's murder case; that he failed to present any "Petition for Approval of Bond" or order approving bail supposedly issued by Branch 18; and that he was presumed to have furnished the required documents to Guialani. The IBP Board of Governors ultimately recommended increasing the penalty from eighteen months to three years suspension.

• Falsification of Court Documents: Complainant alleged that respondent presented a falsified bail bond and release order bearing forged signatures of Judge Chavez and Atty. Baldado, when no bail proceedings had ever been conducted in the murder case before Branch 35.
• Convenient Imputation on Innocent Third Parties: Complainant took notice of respondent's convenient imputation of liability on innocent third parties like herself and Atty. Murallon, who had merely processed the documents respondent presented.

• Third-Party Procurement: Respondent argued that the bail bond and release order were procured by one William Guialani, who was referred to him by his clients at BHIC through its CEO Jonathon Bentley Stevenz and Operations Manager Cristina Romarate, and that he had no hand in the production of the alleged spurious bail bond.
• Lack of Verification by Clerk of Court: Respondent maintained that Atty. Murallon ought to have been in the best position to inquire whether the bail bond and release order were authentic, and that Murallon never mentioned any irregularity about the documents nor inquired about their authenticity.
• Capacity to Secure Legitimate Bail Bond: Respondent argued he never had a hand in producing the alleged spurious bail bond because he could easily secure one from other insurance companies that were his clients.

• Falsification of Court Documents: Whether respondent is guilty of conceptualizing, planning, and implementing the falsification of the bail bond and release order to secure his son's temporary release.
• Violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1: Whether respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR.
• Violation of Rule 10.01, Canon 10: Whether respondent committed falsehood before the court in violation of Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the CPR.
• Proper Penalty: Whether disbarment is the appropriate penalty for respondent's infractions.

• Falsification of Court Documents: Yes. The combination of all circumstances on record produced the indubitable conclusion that respondent, no other, conceptualized, planned, and implemented the falsified bail bond and release order for his son's temporary release.
• Violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1: Yes. Respondent's acts of falsifying court documents and presenting them in court constitute unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR.
• Violation of Rule 10.01, Canon 10: Yes. Respondent indulged in deliberate falsehood by causing the falsification of the bail bond and release order and presenting these falsified documents in court, in violation of Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the CPR.
• Proper Penalty: Yes. Disbarment is the appropriate penalty given the gravity of respondent's infractions, following prevailing jurisprudence on lawyers who falsify court documents.

• Falsification of Court Documents: As counsel of record for his son in a murder case, respondent knew there was no petition for bail, no hearing thereon, and no order granting or fixing bail at P200,000.00. Despite this knowledge, he personally presented the supposed bail bond and release order to secure his son's temporary liberty. Under the principle of presumption of authorship, the possessor and user of a falsified document is the author of the falsification, and whoever stands to benefit is the author thereof. Respondent held the falsified documents, utilized them, and his son benefited from them. His defense that a certain "Guialani" procured the documents was rejected as self-serving, with no proof that Guialani existed; respondent never filed any action against Guialani. The affidavits of Romarate and Stevenz did not shed light on Guialani's true identity or actual participation. Additionally, since Branch 35 had already acquired jurisdiction over the murder case, bail should have been processed with that court and nowhere else. Respondent's act of turning the table on Judge Sitaca and Atty. Murallon further demonstrated moral depravity.

• Violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1: The Court found respondent's acts so reprehensible that they warranted the extreme penalty of disbarment, following Billanes vs. Atty. Latido, Tan vs. Diamante, and Taday vs. Apoya, Jr., where lawyers were disbarred for falsifying court decisions and orders. Respondent's acts exhibited basic moral flaws that made him unfit to practice law, falling short of the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required of lawyers as officers of the court.

• Violation of Rule 10.01, Canon 10: Respondent indulged in deliberate falsehood by causing the falsification of the bail bond and release order and presenting these court documents to secure his son's temporary release. The Court relied on Sps. Umaguing vs. Atty. De Vera, which held that it is highly improbable for a lawyer to remain ignorant of the authenticity of documents he himself submitted to the court when his professional duty requires him to represent his client with zeal and within the bounds of the law. The Lawyer's Oath enjoins every lawyer to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court.

• Proper Penalty: Considering the gravity of respondent's infractions—conceptualizing, planning, and implementing the falsification of court documents, presenting them in court, and then blaming innocent parties—the Court imposed the extreme penalty of disbarment. Membership in the bar is bestowed only upon individuals of good moral character, and disbarment is resorted to in order to purge the law profession of unworthy members, no matter how harsh it may be.

• Presumption of Authorship — The possessor and user of a falsified document is the author of the falsification, and whoever stands to benefit from the falsification is the author thereof. Applied in this case because respondent himself held the falsified court documents, utilized them to secure his son's temporary liberty, and his son was the direct beneficiary of the falsification. The doctrine was previously applied in Spouses Villamar vs. People of the Philippines, where petitioners caused the registration of a falsified deed of sale, received the falsified document, and benefited from the spurious sale.

• Retention of Jurisdiction Over Criminal Cases — When a court has already obtained jurisdiction over a criminal case, such jurisdiction is retained until the end of the litigation. Applied here because Branch 35, Ozamiz City had already acquired jurisdiction over the murder case, and accordingly, bail should have been processed and applied for with that court and nowhere else.

• "Under the principle of presumption of authorship, the possessor and user of a falsified document is the author of the falsification and whoever stands to benefit from the falsification is the author thereof." — This passage states the controlling doctrine by which the Court established respondent's authorship of the falsified court documents, tying possession, use, and benefit to authorship.

• "From beginning to end, everything on its face looked wrong, smelled fishy, and revealed a despicable design to tamper with court processes and records, with impunity." — This passage captures the Court's assessment of the totality of circumstances surrounding the falsified bail bond and release order, underscoring the egregiousness of respondent's conduct.

• "it is highly improbable for Atty. De Vera to have remained in the dark about the authenticity of the documents he himself submitted to the court when his professional duty requires him to represent his client with zeal and within the bounds of the law" — Quoted from Sps. Umaguing vs. Atty. De Vera, this passage articulates the standard by which a lawyer's knowledge of documents he submits to court is assessed, rejecting feigned ignorance of falsification.

• Spouses Villamar vs. People of the Philippines, 652 Phil. 117 (2010) — Followed. The Court applied the same presumption of authorship after finding that the petitioners therein caused the registration of a falsified deed of sale, received the falsified document from the Assessor's Office, and benefited from the spurious sale.

• Billanes vs. Atty. Latido, A.C. No. 12066, August 28, 2018 — Followed. The Court imposed disbarment for a lawyer's act of falsifying a court decision, considering the act "so reprehensible" as to warrant the extreme penalty. Used as direct precedent for imposing disbarment on respondent.

• Tan vs. Diamante — Followed. A lawyer was disbarred for falsifying a court order in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, the Court deeming the acts "so reprehensible" as to exhibit moral unfitness.

• Taday vs. Apoya, Jr., July 3, 2018 — Followed. A lawyer was disbarred for authoring a fake court decision regarding a client's annulment case, the Court holding that the lawyer "became a perpetrator of injustice" and his reprehensible acts did not merit remaining in the rolls of the legal profession.

• Sps. Umaguing vs. Atty. De Vera, 753 Phil. 11 (2015) — Followed. A lawyer was found guilty of violating Rule 10.01, Canon 10 for submitting a falsified affidavit before the court. The principle that a lawyer cannot feign ignorance of documents he himself submitted was applied to respondent.

• Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility — Provides that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Applied to hold respondent liable for falsifying court documents and presenting them in court, acts constituting unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct that revealed basic moral flaws rendering him unfit to practice law.

• Rule 10.01, Canon 10, Code of Professional Responsibility — Provides that "a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice." Applied to hold respondent liable for causing the falsification of the bail bond and release order and presenting these falsified documents in court to secure his son's temporary release, constituting deliberate falsehood before the court.

Bersamin, C.J., Carpio, Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, Caguioa, A. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, J. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, and Zalameda, JJ.