Singson vs. Singson

Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability, and mere difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations—including pathological gambling—does not constitute psychological incapacity unless there is incontrovertible proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness.

Petitioner Maria Concepcion N. Singson and respondent Benjamin L. Singson were married on July 6, 1974, before Rev. Fr. Alfonso L. Casteig at St. Francis Church, Mandaluyong, Rizal, and the marriage produced four children, all of legal age. The parties did not enter into any ante-nuptial agreement to govern their property relations. The constitutional policy protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family, forms the backdrop against which Article 36 petitions are examined, with any doubt resolved in favor of the continuance and validity of the marriage.

Petitioner Maria Concepcion N. Singson and respondent Benjamin L. Singson were married on July 6, 1974, and the marriage produced four children, all of whom are now of legal age. On February 27, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code, alleging that respondent was "dishonest, unreasonably extravagant at the expense of the family's welfare, extremely vain physically and spiritually," a compulsive gambler, immature, irresponsible, and guilty of infidelity. Petitioner alleged that respondent's abnormal behavior made him completely unable to render help, support, or assistance to her, compelling her to work as the sole breadwinner. At the time of filing, respondent was confined at Metro Psych Facility, a rehabilitation institution in Pasig City, where his attending psychiatrist, Dr. Benita Sta. Ana-Ponio, diagnosed him as suffering from Pathological Gambling and Personality Disorder, manifested by preoccupation with gambling, stealing and pawning jewelries and appliances, lying to conceal the extent of his gambling, committing illegal acts such as forging his wife's signature and issuing bouncing checks, and jeopardizing his relationship with his wife and children. Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio noted that respondent's pattern of behavior was inflexible and pervasive, persisted for several years, and could be traced back to his adolescence since he started gambling while in high school.

Respondent filed his Answer on June 19, 2007, claiming that psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability, which were not present because petitioner's allegations were not supported by facts. Respondent averred that the family home where petitioner and their children lived was his own capital property, that his shortcomings did not pertain to the most grave or serious cases of personality disorders, and that it was money problems, not his alleged personality disorder, that divided them. Respondent also claimed that he and petitioner had conjugal assets and debts, including a house and lot in Tagaytay City, bank accounts in petitioner's name, and investments in shares of stocks, cars, household appliances, furniture, and jewelry.

Trial ensued, with petitioner presenting herself, her son Jose Angelo Singson, and Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio as witnesses. Petitioner's formal offer of evidence included the marriage contract, birth certificates of the four children, judicial affidavits, the Clinical Summary issued by Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio dated February 11, 2007, TCT No. 179751 registered in the names of the parties' four children, and a notarized document entitled "Summary of Sources and Uses of Funds for the period November 1999 to March 31, 2008." On September 30, 2010, respondent's counsel waived the right to present countervailing evidence and moved that the petition be submitted for decision.

The RTC granted the petition on November 12, 2010, declaring the marriage void ab initio on the ground of respondent's psychological incapacity, finding that the totality of evidence showed respondent suffered from a psychological condition that was grave, incurable, and had juridical antecedence. The RTC relied heavily on Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's findings that respondent suffered from Personality Disorder known as Pathological Gambling, which was present at the time of the celebration of marriage but became manifest only later. The CA reversed, holding that the evidence showed respondent was capable of carrying out the ordinary duties of a married man because he had a job, provided money for the family from the sale of his own property, provided the land on which the family home was built, and lived in the family home with petitioner and their children. The CA also noted that petitioner admitted she was not aware of any gambling by respondent before they got married, that respondent was kind and caring when courting her, and that respondent brought her to the hospital during all four instances when she gave birth.

• Gravity of Psychological Incapacity: Petitioner maintained that respondent failed to perform the marital duties of mutual love, respect, and support; that Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's expert findings were corroborated by the testimonies of petitioner and her son Jose, demonstrating that respondent's psychological incapacity was grave or serious; that respondent adduced no proof that he was capable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; and that respondent's confinement at the rehabilitation facility was itself proof of the gravity of his psychological incapacity.

• Juridical Antecedence: Petitioner contended that respondent's psychological incapacity preceded the marriage, as shown in Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's Clinical Summary, which pointed out that such incapacity, including pathological gambling, could be traced back to when respondent was already betting on jai alai even in high school; that the Clinical Summary was based on information provided not only by petitioner but by respondent's sister and respondent himself; and that the root cause could be traced to respondent's flawed relationship with his parents which developed into a psychological disorder that existed before the marriage.

• Incurability: Petitioner insisted that the Court can take judicial notice of the fact that personality disorders are generally incurable and permanent and must continuously be treated medically; that the Clinical Summary pointed out that respondent's understanding of his gambling problem was only at the surface level; and that Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio had affirmed that personality disorders are incurable.

• Failure to Prove Psychological Incapacity: Respondent countered that the grounds cited by petitioner were the self-same grounds raised before the RTC and the CA; that petitioner's evidence failed to prove convincingly that he was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations; and that there was no basis to declare the parties' marriage void ab initio.

• Gravity of Psychological Incapacity: Whether the CA erred in finding that petitioner failed to establish that respondent's alleged psychological incapacity was grave and serious.
• Juridical Antecedence: Whether the CA erred in finding that petitioner failed to establish that respondent's alleged psychological incapacity existed at the time of the marriage.
• Incurability: Whether the CA erred in finding that petitioner failed to establish that respondent's alleged psychological incapacity was incurable or permanent.

• Gravity of Psychological Incapacity: No. The evidence on record did not establish that respondent's psychological incapacity was grave and serious, since respondent had a job, provided money for the family from the sale of his property, provided the land where the family home was built, and lived in the family home with petitioner and their children.

• Juridical Antecedence: No. Petitioner failed to prove the root cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity antedating the marriage, as Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio did not point to a definite or definitive cause, and her testimony regarding respondent's alleged betting on jai alai in high school was essentially hearsay.

• Incurability: No. The Court cannot take judicial notice of petitioner's assertion that personality disorders are generally incurable, as this is not a matter courts are mandated to take judicial notice of under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.

• Gravity of Psychological Incapacity: The Court perused the records because of the conflicting findings between the trial court and the appellate court and was satisfied that the CA correctly found that respondent had the capability and ability to perform his duties as a husband and father. The evidence showed that respondent had a job, provided money for the family from the sale of his property, provided the land where the family home was built, and lived in the family home with petitioner and their children. Petitioner herself testified that respondent was working at a certain point, and she admitted that respondent brought her to the hospital during all four instances that she gave birth. The Court noted that petitioner did not proffer any convincing proof that respondent's confinement at the rehabilitation center confirmed the gravity of his psychological incapacity. It is settled that psychological incapacity contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. Habitual drunkenness, gambling, and failure to find a job, while undoubtedly negative traits, are nowhere nearly the equivalent of psychological incapacity in the absence of incontrovertible proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness.

• Juridical Antecedence: The Court agreed with the CA that the RTC did not clearly or correctly lay down the bases or premises for its finding relative to juridical antecedence. The medical basis or evidence adverted to by the RTC did not specifically identify the root cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity. Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio did not point to a definite or definitive cause, stating that "with his history of typhoid fever when he was younger, it is difficult to attribute the behavioral changes that he manifested in 2003 and 2006." Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio admitted that it was not she herself but another psychologist who conducted the tests, and this psychologist was not presented by petitioner. Her testimony regarding respondent's alleged admission that he was betting on jai alai in high school was essentially hearsay, as no witness having personal knowledge of that fact was called to the witness stand. Although Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio claimed to have interviewed respondent's sister, the latter did not testify in court. The Court also noted that petitioner's claim that respondent's incapacity could be attributed to his family or childhood was not substantiated by evidence, and that petitioner could not rely on her son Jose's testimony, as a child is not a very reliable witness in an Article 36 case since he could not have been there when the spouses were married and could not have been expected to know what was happening between his parents until long after his birth.

• Incurability: The Court cannot take judicial notice of petitioner's assertion that personality disorders are generally incurable, as this is not a matter that courts are mandated to take judicial notice of under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. The stringency by which the Court assesses the sufficiency of psychological evaluation reports is necessitated by the pronouncement in the Constitution that marriage is an inviolable institution protected by the State. Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties or one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing at the time the marriage was celebrated, was incapacitated to fulfill the obligations of marital life, the Court is compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.

• Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code — Refers to no less than a mental, not merely physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage, including the mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity, and render help and support. The intendment of the law is to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that petitioner's evidence failed to establish that respondent's pathological gambling and personality disorder constituted psychological incapacity, as the evidence showed respondent was capable of performing his duties as husband and father.

• Requisites of psychological incapacity (Santos vs. CA) — Psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity, meaning it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) juridical antecedence, meaning it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) incurability, meaning it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. The Court applied these requisites in affirming the CA's finding that petitioner failed to prove all three elements.

• Molina guidelines — The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic of the Phils. vs. CA, also known as the Molina guidelines, which incorporate the basic requirements established in Santos. The Court applied these guidelines in evaluating the sufficiency of the psychological evaluation reports and the totality of evidence presented.

• Distinction between incapacity and difficulty/refusal/neglect — Psychological incapacity under Article 36 contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some psychological, not physical, illness. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that petitioner's bare claim that respondent was a pathological gambler, irresponsible, and unable to keep a job did not necessarily translate into unassailable proof of psychological incapacity.

• Judicial notice — Under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. The Court applied this doctrine in refusing to take judicial notice of petitioner's assertion that personality disorders are generally incurable, as this is not a matter covered by the rule.

• "'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental - not merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support." — This passage articulates the canonical definition of psychological incapacity under Article 36 and is the controlling doctrine applied in evaluating the sufficiency of petitioner's evidence.

• "It is settled that '[p]sychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will.'" — This passage states the distinction between psychological incapacity and mere difficulty or refusal in performing marital obligations, which was central to the Court's rejection of petitioner's claim based on respondent's pathological gambling.

• "Futhermore, '[h]abitual drunkenness, gambling and failure to find a job, [while undoubtedly negative traits are nowhere nearly the equivalent of "psychological incapacity"], in the absence of [incontrovertible] proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness.'" — This passage directly addresses the factual scenario in the case, holding that negative traits such as gambling do not constitute psychological incapacity without incontrovertible proof of an underlying psychological condition.

• "Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties or one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing at the time the marriage was celebrated, was incapacitated to fulfill the obligations of marital life (and thus could not then have validly entered into a marriage), then we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie." — This passage states the standard for declaring a marriage void under Article 36 and the presumption in favor of the validity and continuance of marriage.

• Santos vs. CA — Controlling precedent that first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. The Court applied these requisites in affirming the CA's reversal of the RTC decision.

• Republic of the Phils. vs. CA (Molina guidelines) — Controlling precedent that laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, incorporating the basic requirements established in Santos. The Court applied these guidelines in evaluating the sufficiency of the psychological evaluation reports.

• Suazo vs. Suazo, 629 Phil. 157 (2010) — Followed for the principle that the validity of marriage and the unity of the family are enshrined in the Constitution and statutory laws, and that any doubts are to be resolved in favor of the continuance and validity of the marriage. Also cited for the proposition that habitual drunkenness, gambling, and failure to find a job are not equivalent to psychological incapacity.

• Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 698 Phil. 257 (2012) — Followed for the rule that psychological incapacity contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will.

• Republic vs. Galang, 665 Phil. 658 (2011) — Followed for the rule that it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some psychological, not physical, illness, and that a cause has to be shown and linked with the manifestations of the psychological incapacity.

• Toring vs. Toring, 640 Phil. 434 (2010) — Followed for the rule that a party's child is not a very reliable witness in an Article 36 case, as the child could not have been there when the spouses were married and could not have been expected to know what was happening between his parents until long after his birth.

• Agraviador vs. Amparo-Agraviador, 652 Phil. 49 (2010) — Followed for the principle that unless the evidence clearly reveals a situation where a party, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing at the time of marriage, was incapacitated to fulfill the obligations of marital life, the Court is compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.

• Republic vs. Pangasinan, G.R. No. 214077, August 10, 2016 — Followed for the rule that the stringency by which the Court assesses the sufficiency of psychological evaluation reports is necessitated by the pronouncement in the Constitution that marriage is an inviolable institution protected by the State.

• Del Rosario vs. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 222541, February 15, 2017 — Cited for the principle that the policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family, and that the Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties.

• Article 36, Family Code (as amended by Executive Order 227) — Provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. The Court applied this provision in evaluating whether respondent's alleged psychological incapacity was sufficiently established.

• Article 1, Family Code — Describes marriage as "a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life" and as "the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution." The Court cited this provision in emphasizing the constitutional and statutory protection of marriage.

• Article 68, Family Code — Sets out the mutual obligations of spouses to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity, and render help and support. The Court cited this provision in defining the essential marital obligations that a psychologically incapacitated party would be unable to comply with.

• Section 1, Rule 129, Rules of Court — Provides for mandatory judicial notice of specified matters, including the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. The Court applied this provision in refusing to take judicial notice of petitioner's assertion that personality disorders are generally incurable.

Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, J., Jardeleza, J., and Tijam, J., concurred in the decision.