Sinag vs. Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Batangas

An ordinance that repeals a prior ordinance abolishing a barangay and merging it with another, thereby effectively dividing an existing barangay and creating anew a separate barangay, must comply with the constitutional and statutory requirements for the creation and division of local government units, including the minimum population requirement certified by the National Statistics Office and approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. The validity and effectivity of a law is not dependent on its actual implementation; a valid ordinance abolishing a barangay, approved by a majority in a plebiscite, takes effect upon its enactment and approval, notwithstanding the deferral of the implementation of its effects.

The petitioners are former officials and residents of Barangay Dacanlao, Calaca, Batangas, while the respondents are the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas, the Offices of the Provincial Assessor and Provincial Treasurer of Batangas, the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Calaca, Batangas, and Barangay San Rafael, Calaca, Batangas. The dispute concerns the division of barangay shares in real property taxes collected from FELS Energy Living Stone, Incorporated, with Barangay San Rafael purportedly requesting the Municipal Treasurer to withhold its share, while the petitioners argued that the collected RPT rightfully belongs to Barangay Dacanlao because Barangay San Rafael had been abolished and merged with Barangay Dacanlao. The constitutional and statutory framework governing the creation, division, merger, and abolition of local government units is found in Article X, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution and Sections 6, 7, 8, 385, and 386 of the Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160).

The controversy traces its roots from a dispute over barangay shares in real property taxes. Barangay San Rafael, Calaca, Batangas purportedly issued a resolution requesting the Municipal Treasurer of Calaca, Batangas to withhold the amount of PHP 41,435,765.19 representing its share in the RPT collected from FELS Energy Living Stone, Incorporated. The petitioners, former officials and residents of Barangay Dacanlao, argued that the collected RPT rightfully belongs to Barangay Dacanlao, as Barangay San Rafael was already abolished and had been merged with Barangay Dacanlao.

On June 23, 1997, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas enacted Ordinance No. 05, series of 1997, titled "Declaring the Abolition of Barangay San Rafael and its Merger with Barangay Dacanlao, Municipality of Calaca and Instructing the COMELEC and All Other Concerned Agencies as Mentioned in Sections 9 & 10 of the Local Government Code to Effect the Mandatory Requirements to Complete the Said Abolition in the Period Set Forth in the Mentioned Section of the Local Government Code." In connection thereto, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2987, providing the rules and regulations for the conduct of a plebiscite on February 28, 1998 for the implementation of Ordinance No. 5. In opposition, the residents and officials of Barangay San Rafael filed a petition for the annulment of Ordinance No. 5 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2987, with prayer for the issuance of a TRO, before Branch 11, RTC of Balayan, Batangas, docketed as Civil Case No. 3442. On February 25, 1998, RTC Branch 11 denied the prayer for a TRO on the ground that it had no jurisdiction over the case, opining that actions questioning an act, resolution, or decision of the COMELEC must be brought before the Supreme Court. The case was elevated via a petition for review on certiorari filed before the Court on February 27, 1998, docketed as G.R. No. 132603.

Meanwhile, the COMELEC conducted a plebiscite on February 28, 1998, and the majority of the voters ratified the abolition of Barangay San Rafael and its merger with Barangay Dacanlao. In its Resolution dated March 10, 1998 issued in G.R. No. 132603, the Court directed the parties to maintain the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of the petition. On September 18, 2000, the Court rendered a Decision in G.R. No. 132603 upholding the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 2987, ruling that the issuance of the resolution was a ministerial duty of the COMELEC that was enjoined by law and was part of its administrative functions; hence, the same could be questioned in an ordinary civil action before the RTC. Consequently, RTC Branch 11 was directed to proceed in resolving Civil Case No. 3442 as to the validity of Ordinance No. 5, and the Court ordered that the execution of the result of the February 28, 1998 plebiscite be deferred depending on the outcome of Civil Case No. 3442.

In compliance with the directive, RTC Branch 9 rendered its November 15, 2006 Decision in Civil Case No. 3442, dismissing the petition for annulment for failure to overcome, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption of constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 5. Aggrieved, the residents and officials of Barangay San Rafael elevated the case to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 88994. During the pendency of the appeal, the Sangguniang Pambarangay of San Rafael passed Resolution No. 29-09 dated June 13, 2009, requesting the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to reinstate San Rafael as a barangay. The Sanggunian referred the resolution to its committees, and a joint committee hearing was held on August 4, 2009, during which a Certification from the National Barangay Operations Office was presented explaining that Barangay San Rafael was listed in the master list of barangays as of March 31, 2001; that it was abolished per Ordinance No. 5, but it was reinstated per Supreme Court decision in G.R. No. 132603 and Memorandum issued by the DILG on February 12, 2001. The committees submitted their Committee Report recommending the passage of an ordinance to repeal Ordinance No. 5, considering that the condition for its enactment—the reduction in the number of residents of Barangay San Rafael below the minimum prescribed in the LGC—was no longer present.

During the 27th Regular Session of the Sanggunian on August 6, 2009, two Provincial Board Members took up the Committee Report during the privilege hour even though the same was not calendared for consideration on such session date. Citing time constraints, they moved for the suspension of the rules of the Sanggunian to exempt the proposed ordinance from the three-reading rule. Upon such motion, the Sanggunian suspended its own rules and expressly exempted the proposed ordinance from the three-reading rule. On the same day, the Sanggunian enacted Provincial Ordinance No. 002, series of 2009, titled "An Ordinance Repealing Sangguniang Panlalawigan Ordinance No. 05, Year 1997 Abolishing Barangay San Rafael, Calaca, Batangas, and Merging it with Barangay Dacanlao of Said Municipality."

On September 8, 2009, Sinag et al. filed a Petition to nullify Ordinance No. 2 with prayer for a TRO before RTC Branch 9 against the Sanggunian, the Offices of the Provincial Assessor and Provincial Treasurer of Batangas, the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Calaca, Batangas, and Barangay San Rafael, docketed as Civil Case No. 4877. Sinag et al. argued, among others, that Ordinance No. 2 is void and unconstitutional because: (1) its enactment disregarded the three-reading rule and publication requirements; (2) it was not approved by a majority vote in a plebiscite; (3) it was intended to circumvent a possible adverse decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 88994; and (4) the revival of Barangay San Rafael was not supported by data from the NSO. Respondents filed their respective Answers, alleging that the enactment of Ordinance No. 2 was an exercise of the plenary and legislative powers of the Sanggunian, which can repeal or modify its own ordinances, and that since the issue on the validity of Ordinance No. 5 was still pending before the CA, Barangay San Rafael was not yet abolished, and thus, the plebiscite held was not necessary. On September 9, 2009, Executive Judge Cristino E. Judit of Branch 10, RTC, Balayan, Batangas issued a TRO against the implementation of Ordinance No. 2.

Meanwhile, the CA, in its March 9, 2010 Resolution, dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. CV No. 88994 for being moot and academic in view of the enactment of Ordinance No. 2, stating that the enactment "virtually repealed" Ordinance No. 5, thereby reinstating San Rafael as a separate barangay. RTC Branch 9 issued its December 2, 2010 Order granting the prayer of Sinag et al. for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and later issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated January 26, 2011, against the implementation of Ordinance No. 2, particularly restraining the alteration or modification of RPT records and the release to Barangay San Rafael of its supposed share in RPT. Subsequently, Sinag et al. filed their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, alleging that the Sanggunian et al. failed to tender any issue and even admitted the material allegations of the Petition. In its October 14, 2013 Order, RTC Branch 9 granted the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, ratiocinating that since the material allegations in the Petition were not specifically denied as required under the Rules, they were deemed admitted. Nevertheless, RTC Branch 9 dismissed the Petition for nullity of Ordinance No. 2 on the ground that Ordinance No. 5 was never implemented, i.e., the abolition of Barangay San Rafael and its merger with Barangay Dacanlao never materialized, as Barangay San Rafael had continuously maintained its corporate existence, having a complete set of duly elected barangay officials. Accordingly, the requirements of plebiscite and publication were not applicable to Ordinance No. 2 because it neither created a new entity nor divided Barangay Dacanlao. RTC Branch 9 denied the Motion for Reconsideration in its December 10, 2014 Order.

Sinag et al. elevated the case to the CA by way of notice of appeal, in accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The CA dismissed the appeal on the ground that Sinag et al. availed of the wrong remedy, determining that the proper recourse was to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the Court as the appeal involved only questions of law. The CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration, prompting the appeal to the Supreme Court.

• Improper Remedy: Sinag et al. argued that the CA committed grievous and reversible error in ruling that their appeal under Rule 41 was improper and the wrong remedy, as they sufficiently raised questions of fact before the CA.
• Effect of Ordinance No. 5: Sinag et al. posited that the fact that the abolition and merger did not materialize is irrelevant because it is the ordinance which causes the abolition of a LGU and not the actual implementation which brings about the abolition; the effectivity of the law brings about its legal effects.
• Finality of RTC Decision: Sinag et al. argued that the November 15, 2006 Decision of RTC Branch 9 in Civil Case No. 3442 sustained the validity of Ordinance No. 5, and such ruling attained finality with the dismissal of CA-G.R. CV No. 88994.
• Population Requirement: Sinag et al. contended that Barangay San Rafael cannot be re-created because it failed to meet the required population, as it had a population of 611 persons only, based on the NSO Certification dated August 27, 2009.
• Legislative Irregularities: Sinag et al. put forth that the enactment of Ordinance No. 2 is replete with irregularities: no quorum was achieved during the joint committee hearing; the Committee Report was not calendared and was merely considered during the privilege hour; and the Sanggunian had no power to suspend the three-reading rule because such power lies with the provincial governor.
• LGC Violations: Sinag et al. claimed that the Sanggunian failed to comply with the provisions of the LGC, particularly: Section 59 which requires posting and publication; Section 385 which requires the conduct of a plebiscite and the recommendation of the Sangguniang Bayan concerned; and Sections 7 and 386 which require a minimum population as certified by the statistics office.
• Question of Fact: Sinag et al. pointed out that the trial court made a factual finding that the abolition of Barangay San Rafael and its merger with Barangay Dacanlao never actually materialized, despite not being covered by the judicial admissions, making the issue a question of fact.

• Dismissal for Being Filed Out of Time: The Sanggunian et al. contended that the petition should be dismissed because it was filed out of time, citing Banting vs. Spouses Maglapuz, arguing that the erroneous or defective appeal filed by Sinag et al. will not toll the running of the reglementary period to file the correct remedy.
• Improper Remedy: The Sanggunian et al. argued that Sinag et al. availed of an improper remedy by filing a recourse to the CA instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 directly with the Supreme Court.
• Plenary Legislative Power: The Sanggunian et al. alleged that the enactment of Ordinance No. 2 was an exercise of the plenary and legislative powers of the Sanggunian, which can repeal or modify its own ordinances.
• No Plebiscite Required: The Sanggunian et al. argued that since the issue on the validity of Ordinance No. 5 was still pending before the CA, it could be said that Barangay San Rafael is not yet abolished, and thus, the plebiscite held was not necessary; there was no division of barangays because the merger did not actually materialize.
• Presumption of Regularity: The Sanggunian et al. raised special defenses, arguing that the Sanggunian and its members enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duties, and that Barangay San Rafael had the minimum number of inhabitants required by law to support its establishment as a separate LGU.

• Propriety of the Appeal: Whether Sinag et al. availed of the proper remedy by filing a notice of appeal before the CA under Rule 41, or whether the appeal should have been a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 directly with the Supreme Court.
• Compliance with Population Requirement: Whether the enactment of Ordinance No. 2 complied with the constitutional and statutory requirements for the creation of a barangay, particularly the minimum population requirement under Section 386 of the LGC.
• Conduct of Plebiscite: Whether the enactment of Ordinance No. 2 complied with the constitutional and statutory requirement of approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
• Observance of Legislative Processes: Whether the Sanggunian committed grave abuse of discretion in dispensing with the three-reading rule without authority to do so.

• Propriety of the Appeal: Yes. The appeal under Rule 41 was proper because Sinag et al. sufficiently raised questions of fact before the CA, which had to ascertain the truthfulness of the facts alleged regarding the circumstances surrounding the enactment of Ordinance No. 2.
• Compliance with Population Requirement: No. Ordinance No. 2 failed to comply with the population requirement under Section 386 of the LGC, as it was not supported by an NSO certification establishing compliance with the minimum required population at the time of its enactment.
• Conduct of Plebiscite: No. Ordinance No. 2 failed to adhere to the requirements of the Constitution and the LGC as it lacked any provision regarding a plebiscite, and the Sanggunian cannot ignore the statutory requirements for creation and division of barangays by claiming it was merely exercising its power to repeal ordinances.
• Observance of Legislative Processes: Not necessary to resolve. The Court found it no longer necessary to go into further detail regarding the alleged failure of the Sanggunian to observe proper legislative procedures, given the disquisition on the failure of Ordinance No. 2 to comply with the constitutional and statutory requirements.

• Propriety of the Appeal: The Court explained the difference between a question of fact and a question of law, citing Olave vs. Mistas: "It is axiomatic that there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. On the other hand, a question of law exists when there is a doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts." Sinag et al. made several factual allegations regarding supposed irregularities surrounding the legislative process of passing Ordinance No. 2, including that it was not included in the calendar of business, the Committee Report was merely recited during the privilege hour, it did not undergo three readings, there was no plebiscite conducted, and that Barangay San Rafael had a population of 611 persons only. Whether or not these factual allegations were disputed by the opposing party, RTC Branch 9 swept them aside, broadly citing the presumption of regularity and the presumption of validity of ordinances. As the case hinged on the state of facts alleged, the appeal to the CA insisted on the truthfulness of their factual allegations, in opposition to the ruling of the RTC that these remained unsubstantiated. Before the CA could determine what the law is on a certain set of facts, it first had to determine, through an examination of the records of the case, what that set of facts was. The Court found the circumstances on all fours with Shimizu Philippines Contractors, Inc. vs. Magsalin, where the Court ruled that although the facts presented in the appeal were admitted and undisputed, it does not immediately follow that the case necessarily involved only pure questions of law. The CA, therefore, erred in dismissing the appeal. However, considering that the records were already before the Court, and in the interest of justice, the Court resolved to determine the case on the merits.

• Compliance with Population Requirement: The Court noted that for the creation of barangays, Section 386 of the LGC requires at least 2,000 inhabitants, except in Metro Manila and other metropolitan political subdivisions or highly urbanized cities where the requirement is at least 5,000 inhabitants, as certified by the NSO, now PSA. The records of the case failed to disclose the number of inhabitants of Barangay San Rafael at the time Ordinance No. 2 was enacted. Ordinance No. 2 simply provided that "records show that Barangay San Rafael has the requisite minimum number of inhabitants provided for by R.A. 7160." The Committee Report proposing Ordinance No. 2 was likewise opaque as it merely stated that the condition that the number of inhabitants had been reduced beyond the minimum prescribed by the LGC "no longer applies to this date." Sinag et al. contended that such a conclusion was merely based on a List of Inhabitants, the veracity of which had not been attested to, and the Sanggunian et al. did not adequately contest this assertion. In fact, the Sanggunian et al. even admitted in their Answer that hundreds of barangays in Batangas and other provinces did not meet the population requirement, yet they have not been abolished. The Court held that a determination of Barangay San Rafael's population based on this List of Inhabitants falls short of the requirement that the population threshold be certified by the NSO/PSA. In contrast, Sinag et al. presented an NSO Certification dated August 27, 2009—less than a month after Ordinance No. 2 was enacted—certifying that based on the 2007 Census of Population, the total population of Barangay San Rafael as of August 1, 2007 was 611 persons. The Court concluded that there were not enough residents of the area to support the creation of a separate LGU, and crucially, Ordinance No. 2 was not supported by an NSO certification to establish compliance with the minimum required population under Section 386 of the LGC at the time of its enactment.

• Conduct of Plebiscite: The Court reiterated that Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution requires that no province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. This is echoed in Section 385 of the LGC, which in addition requires that the period within which to conduct such a plebiscite be provided in the ordinance itself. Here, Ordinance No. 2 failed to adhere to these requirements as it lacked any provision regarding a plebiscite, instead providing that it shall take effect immediately upon signing by the Governor. The Sanggunian et al. contended that a plebiscite is not required because the Sanggunian merely exercised its power to repeal its earlier ordinance. However, the Court held that by repealing Ordinance No. 5, the Sanggunian sought the legal division of Barangay Dacanlao and the creation anew of Barangay San Rafael as a body corporate. The Sanggunian cannot turn a blind eye to these effects and ignore the statutory requirements for creation and division of barangays by the mere expedient of claiming that it was merely exercising its power to repeal ordinances. The Court also addressed the dissent's view that the abolition of an LGU has two components: (1) a law or ordinance abolishing an LGU or merging it with another, and (2) that the law or ordinance be approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected, with the dissent contending that the second component was missing. The Court disagreed, reiterating that the September 18, 2000 Decision in G.R. No. 132603 ordered "[t]he execution of the result of the plebiscite held on February 28, 1998 shall be deferred depending on the outcome of Civil Case No. 3442." Such deferral thus admits: (1) the conduct of a plebiscite, and (2) the results thereof. The deferral merely affected the implementation of the ordinance and cannot in any way be taken as to nullify the conduct of the plebiscite or the results thereof. Thus, on February 28, 1998, both constitutional requirements for the abolition of Barangay San Rafael were satisfied. There was a valid ordinance, which had already been approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. On even date, Barangay San Rafael was already abolished by valid legislation. It was just that the implementation of the effects of such abolition was put on hold by virtue of the March 10, 1998 status quo order, and later the September 18, 2000 Decision of the Court in G.R. No. 132603. To allow Ordinance No. 2 to simply repeal Ordinance No. 5 by reasoning that the latter lacked the requirement of a plebiscite, would be to turn a blind eye to the existence of the February 28, 1998 plebiscite—and by extension, ignoring the will of the people, which had already been made known through such plebiscite.

• Observance of Legislative Processes: The Court noted that for ordinances enacted by local government units, the manner in which ordinances may be enacted depends on the internal rules of procedure of the sanggunian. Section 50 of the LGC grants the sanggunian the authority to adopt its own parliamentary procedure and legislative process. Sinag et al. made references to certain internal rules—for instance, Sections 3 and 9 of Rule VIII—alleging that based on these provisions, the Sanggunian did not have the authority to dispense with the three-reading rule. However, upon review of the records, the Court found that Sinag et al. failed to allege and prove the contents of the internal rules of procedure of the Sanggunian, and even failed to at least cite verbatim the provisions relied upon. Citing Social Justice Society vs. Atienza, Jr., the Court held that courts are not required to take judicial notice of local ordinances, and the party asking the court to take judicial notice is obligated to supply the court with the full text of the rules the party desires it to have notice of. In any case, with the disquisition on the failure of Ordinance No. 2 to comply with the constitutional and statutory requirements, it was no longer necessary to go into further detail regarding the alleged failure of the Sanggunian to observe proper legislative procedures.

• Question of Fact vs. Question of Law — A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts; a question of law exists when there is a doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. The Court applied this distinction to determine that the appeal under Rule 41 was proper because the CA still had to ascertain the truthfulness of the facts alleged by Sinag et al. regarding the circumstances surrounding the enactment of Ordinance No. 2, notwithstanding that the opposing party did not dispute the allegations.

• Requisites for Creation of a Barangay — Under Section 386 of the LGC, a barangay may be created out of a contiguous territory which has a population of at least 2,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO, except in cities and municipalities within Metro Manila and other metropolitan political subdivisions or in highly urbanized cities where such territory shall have a certified population of at least 5,000 inhabitants. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that Ordinance No. 2 was void because it was not supported by an NSO certification establishing compliance with the minimum required population at the time of its enactment.

• Plebiscite Requirement for Creation, Division, Merger, or Abolition of LGUs — Under Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution and Section 385 of the LGC, no province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that Ordinance No. 2 was void for lacking any provision regarding a plebiscite, as the Sanggunian cannot ignore the statutory requirements for creation and division of barangays by claiming it was merely exercising its power to repeal ordinances.

• Effectivity of a Law Not Dependent on Actual Implementation — The validity and effectivity of a law is not dependent on its actual implementation; Article 7 of the Civil Code provides that the violation or non-observance of laws shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that Barangay San Rafael was already abolished on February 28, 1998, when both constitutional requirements for abolition were satisfied—a valid ordinance approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite—and it was just that the implementation of the effects of such abolition was put on hold by virtue of the status quo order and the September 18, 2000 Decision.

• Judicial Notice of Local Ordinances — Courts are not required to take judicial notice of local ordinances; the party asking the court to take judicial notice is obligated to supply the court with the full text of the rules the party desires it to have notice of. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that Sinag et al. failed to allege and prove the contents of the internal rules of procedure of the Sanggunian, as they even failed to at least cite verbatim the provisions relied upon.

• "It is axiomatic that there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. On the other hand, a question of law exists when there is a doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts." — This passage from Olave vs. Mistas defines the controlling distinction between questions of fact and questions of law, which the Court applied to determine that the appeal under Rule 41 was proper.

• "Such deferral thus admits: (1) the conduct of a plebiscite, and (2) the results thereof. The deferral merely affected the implementation of the ordinance and cannot in any way be taken as to nullify the conduct of the plebiscite or the results thereof." — This passage articulates the Court's reasoning that the deferral of the execution of the plebiscite results did not nullify the conduct of the plebiscite or its results, and that both constitutional requirements for the abolition of Barangay San Rafael were satisfied on February 28, 1998.

• "To allow Ordinance No. 2 to simply repeal Ordinance No. 5 by reasoning that the latter lacked the requirement of a plebiscite, would be to turn a blind eye to the existence of the February 28, 1998 plebiscite – and by extension, ignoring the will of the people, which had already been made known through such plebiscite." — This passage states the Court's conclusion that the Sanggunian cannot ignore the statutory requirements for creation and division of barangays by claiming it was merely exercising its power to repeal ordinances, as doing so would disregard the will of the people expressed through the plebiscite.

• Olave vs. Mistas, 486 Phil. 708 (2004) — Cited as controlling authority for the distinction between a question of fact and a question of law, which the Court applied to determine that the appeal under Rule 41 was proper.
• Shimizu Philippines Contractors, Inc. vs. Magsalin, 688 Phil. 384 (2012) — Followed as a controlling precedent on all fours with the present case, holding that although the facts presented in the appeal were admitted and undisputed, it does not immediately follow that the case necessarily involved only pure questions of law.
• Salva vs. Makalintal, 394 Phil. 855 (2000) — Referenced as the case in G.R. No. 132603, which upheld the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 and directed the RTC to proceed with Civil Case No. 3442, deferring execution of the plebiscite results.
• Social Justice Society vs. Atienza, Jr., 568 Phil. 658 (2008) — Cited for the doctrine that courts are not required to take judicial notice of local ordinances, and the party asking the court to take judicial notice is obligated to supply the court with the full text of the rules.
• Banting vs. Spouses Maglapuz, 531 Phil. 101 (2006) — Cited by the respondents for the proposition that the erroneous or defective appeal filed by Sinag et al. will not toll the running of the reglementary period to file the correct remedy.
• Bagabuyo vs. Commission on Elections, 593 Phil. 678 (2008) — Cited for the nature of LGUs as political and corporate units that are instrumentalities of the state in carrying out the functions of government.
• Sarangani vs. Commission on Elections, 389 Phil. 719 (2000) — Cited for the proposition that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of boundaries of LGUs may be done by the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned through the passage of an ordinance, subject to the mandatory requirement of a plebiscite.
• Fernando vs. St. Scholastica's College, 706 Phil. 138 (2013) — Cited for the test of validity of an ordinance, which requires that it must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, must not be unfair or oppressive, must not be partial or discriminatory, must not prohibit but may regulate trade, must be general and consistent with public policy, and must not be unreasonable.

• Article X, Section 10, 1987 Constitution — Provides that no province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. The Court applied this provision to hold that Ordinance No. 2 was void for failing to comply with the mandatory plebiscite requirement.
• Section 6, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Grants the Congress or the sangguniang panlalawigan or panlungsod authority to create, divide, merge, abolish, or alter boundaries of LGUs, subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed in the Code. The Court applied this provision to establish the authority of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to enact Ordinance No. 2, subject to the requirements of the LGC.
• Section 7, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Provides statistical indicators that must be complied with for the creation or conversion of LGUs, including income, population, and land area, attested to by the DOF, NSO, and LMB. The Court applied this provision in relation to the population requirement for the creation of a barangay.
• Section 8, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Provides that division and merger of existing local government units shall comply with the same requirements prescribed for their creation. The Court applied this provision to hold that the division of Barangay Dacanlao through Ordinance No. 2 must comply with the requirements for creation.
• Section 50, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Enumerates the scope of the sanggunian's power in adopting its own parliamentary procedures through its internal rules of procedure. The Court applied this provision to determine that the manner of enactment of ordinances depends on the internal rules of procedure of the sanggunian.
• Section 385, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Provides the manner of creation of a barangay, which may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, by law or by an ordinance of the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod, subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. The Court applied this provision to hold that Ordinance No. 2 failed to adhere to the requirements as it lacked any provision regarding a plebiscite.
• Section 386, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Enumerates the requisites for creation of a barangay, including the requirement of at least 2,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO, except in Metro Manila and other metropolitan political subdivisions or highly urbanized cities where the requirement is at least 5,000 inhabitants. The Court applied this provision to hold that Ordinance No. 2 was void for failing to comply with the population requirement.
• Article 7, Civil Code — Provides that the violation or non-observance of laws shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary. The Court applied this provision to hold that the effectivity and validity of a law is not dependent on its actual implementation.

Leonen, SAJ., Lazaro-Javier, Inting, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, Kho, Jr., and Singh, JJ., concurred. Hernando, J., was on official leave. Zalameda, J., took no part due to prior participation in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals.

• Caguioa, J., dissenting — Justice Caguioa disagreed with the ponencia's conclusion that Ordinance No. 2 was void for failing to comply with the constitutional and statutory requirements for the creation of a barangay. He argued that the Assailed Ordinance did not need to comply with the LGC's requirements for the creation of an LGU because it did not create a barangay; Barangay San Rafael never ceased to exist as a legal entity, and the Assailed Ordinance merely repealed the ordinance which originally mandated its abolition. He posited that the abolition of an LGU has two components: (1) a law or ordinance abolishing an LGU or merging it with another, and (2) that the law or ordinance be approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. He contended that the second component was missing because the Court's Decision in G.R. No. 132603 made the termination of the court case a condition prerequisite to the execution of the result of the plebiscite, and before the case was terminated, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan already exercised its prerogative to repeal the First Ordinance. He further argued that legislative power includes the power to make, alter, and repeal laws, and that there is no such thing as an irrepealable law. He also argued that the LGC's requirements of income, land area, and population primarily apply to the "creation" and "conversion" of LGUs, and nothing in the provision can be used to say that the requirements shall be applied retroactively to LGUs already existing at the time of the LGC's enactment. He voted to DISMISS the Petition and AFFIRM the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.