Simpao vs. Dizon

In a summary proceeding to recover possession, the only issues cognizable are (1) that the claimant was in actual possession or tenancy of the property, and (2) that the claimant was molested or disturbed in that possession by the defendant or by another at the defendant's instance; the owner-lessor may institute the action to avoid losing civil possession, and the action lies against both the actual trespasser and the person under whose direction the trespasser acted.

Gaudencio Simpao acquired two parcels of land in Porac, Pampanga, from Gaudencio de Mesa on 18 June 1889 by sale with right of repurchase ( venta con pacto de retro ). Simpao thereafter leased the lands to Cecilio Lacsamana. In September of an unspecified year, Joaquin Dizon took possession of the lands and began cultivating them despite Lacsamana's opposition. Simpao commenced a summary possessory proceeding to recover possession.

• The Claim of Ownership and Possession: Simpao alleged sole ownership of two parcels of land acquired from Gaudencio de Mesa in June 1888 by sale with right of repurchase, a title never questioned. He claimed continuous possession since acquisition and had leased the lands to Cecilio Lacsamana, who cultivated them for the two preceding years. A possessory information was filed and judicial possession awarded to Simpao on 18 October 1895, and the property was re-registered on 12 October 1896 after the document repository was destroyed by fire.

• The Alleged Dispossession: In September of an unspecified year, Dizon took possession of the land and began cultivating it despite the opposition of tenant Lacsamana. Simpao sought restoration of possession.

• Defendant's Version: Dizon answered that he took charge of cultivation by express order of the owner, Miguel de Mesa; that Lacsamana held the land as tenant of Miguel de Mesa and had refused to pay rent; that the captain commanding the post at Porac directed the land be turned over to Miguel de Mesa; that Lacsamana was the person actually ejected and the only one who could sue for recovery; and that the action could not be maintained against Dizon because he acted merely as agent of Miguel de Mesa pursuant to the latter's instructions.

• Evidence Adduced: Simpao presented: (a) the 18 June 1889 deed of sale with right of repurchase from Gaudencio de Mesa acknowledging Simpao's tenancy; (b) the certificate of possessory information and judicial possession; (c) a lease dated 25 September 1898 to Lacsamana. Dizon presented a lease executed by Anastasio de Mesa and Ariston Jaime to Ciriaco Austria for the years 1897–1898. Both parties offered witness testimony on possession. Lacsamana testified he leased from Simpao, not from Miguel de Mesa. Defense witnesses testified that upon Gaudencio de Mesa's death, Miguel de Mesa remained in possession, leased to Lacsamana, and that Dizon entered and cultivated the land by Miguel de Mesa's order. The trial court found the documentary evidence corroborated plaintiff's witnesses and held that Simpao was in possession through Lacsamana and that Dizon had dispossessed them.

• Capacity to Sue: Dizon maintained that the action could not be maintained by the owner-lessor Simpao; only the tenant Lacsamana, as the person actually ejected, could bring suit for recovery of possession.

• Agency Defense: Dizon argued the action could not be maintained against him because he was merely the agent of Miguel de Mesa, acting under Mesa's instructions, and not acting on his own behalf.

• Right of Owner-Lessor to Sue: Simpao argued that as owner and lessor in prior possession through his tenant, he had the right to institute the summary proceeding to recover possession and protect his civil possession from loss through the running of the prescriptive period.

• Liability of the Actual Trespasser: Simpao contended that Dizon, as the person who physically committed the acts of dispossession, was properly named as defendant regardless of whether he acted under another's direction.

• Standing of Owner-Lessor: Whether the owner-lessor may maintain the summary action for recovery of possession, or whether only the tenant who was physically ejected has standing to sue.

• Liability of Agent-Trespasser: Whether the summary action lies against the person who physically committed the trespass when that person claims to have acted as agent under the orders of another.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the evidence adduced was sufficient to establish the two material issues required in a summary possessory proceeding — prior actual possession by the claimant and disturbance by the defendant.

• Standing of Owner-Lessor: The owner-lessor unquestionably has the right to maintain the summary proceeding. Possession may be exercised by the possessor personally or through another in his behalf under Article 431 of the Civil Code. If possession were not protected by allowing the owner to sue, the owner might lose civil possession through the lapse of one year under Article 460 and suffer serious inconvenience. Article 446 guarantees every possessor the right to be protected in his possession or restored to it through the means established by the laws of procedure. Further, Article 1554 imposes on the lessor the duty to maintain the lessee in peaceable enjoyment, and Article 1559 requires the lessee to give prompt notice of any usurpation precisely to enable the owner to maintain his civil possession by suit if necessary. Thus, the owner-lessor's right to institute the action is firmly grounded in the Civil Code.

• Liability of Agent-Trespasser: The acts of dispossession were committed by Dizon. He cannot avoid liability by pleading that he acted under the directions of another. The summary action lies both against the party who commits the trespass and against the person at whose instance the trespasser acted. Dizon, having physically effected the disturbance, was properly made defendant.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: In summary proceedings of this character, the only admissible evidence is that which bears on the two issues specified in Article 1634 of the old Code of Civil Procedure: (1) that the claimant was in actual possession or tenancy, and (2) that the claimant was molested or disturbed in that possession by the defendant or by another at the defendant's instance. The testimony of Lacsamana clearly established that Simpao was in possession through him and that Dizon dispossessed him. The documentary evidence — the pacto de retro, the possessory information, and the lease to Lacsamana — corroborated this testimony. Although the witnesses were irreconcilable, plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to support the material issues. The judgment of the lower court was therefore affirmed.

• Scope of Summary Possessory Proceeding (Art. 1634, old Code of Civil Procedure) — The only issues triable in a summary proceeding to recover possession are: (1) whether the claimant was in actual possession or tenancy of the property, and (2) whether the claimant was molested or disturbed in that possession by the defendant or by another at the defendant's instance. Evidence on any other matter, including ownership, is inadmissible. The Court applied this rule to hold that the documentary and testimonial evidence properly addressed these two material issues and that the conflicting evidence on ownership was beside the point.

• Right of Owner-Lessor to Institute Possessory Action (Arts. 431, 446, 460, 1554, 1559, Civil Code) — The owner who possesses through a lessee has standing to bring a summary action for recovery of possession when the lessee is dispossessed. The Court derived this doctrine from several articles: (a) possession may be exercised by another in the possessor's behalf (Art. 431); (b) every possessor has the right to be protected or restored (Art. 446); (c) possession may be lost against the possessor's will if the new possession endures for more than one year (Art. 460), making it imperative that the owner act promptly; (d) the lessor is obligated to maintain the lessee in peaceable enjoyment (Art. 1554); and (e) the lessee must immediately notify the owner of any usurpation so the owner may take legal action (Art. 1559). The Court applied these provisions to affirm Simpao's standing to sue despite not being the person physically on the land at the moment of dispossession.

• Liability of Person Acting Under Direction of Another — In a summary possessory action, the defendant cannot escape liability by claiming he acted as an agent under the orders of a third party. The action lies against both the actual trespasser and the person at whose instance the trespass was committed. This principle prevented Dizon from using his claimed status as Miguel de Mesa's agent to defeat the action.

• "The only admissible evidence in summary proceedings of this character is that which has reference to the two issues referred to in article 1634 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, which are: (1) That the claimant was actually in possession or tenancy of the property, and (2) that he had been molested or disturbed in such possession or tenancy by the defendant, or some other person at the instance of said defendant." — This passage defines the strict evidentiary boundaries of the summary possessory proceeding, a rule frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on interdictos.

• "Unquestionably he has a right to maintain the action. Otherwise he might lose his civil possession, and suffer serious inconvenience." — The Court's succinct justification for the owner-lessor's standing, rooted in the risk that possession may be lost by prescription if the owner is denied a remedy.

• "The acts of dispossession were committed by the defendant. He can not avail himself of the plea that in committing the wrong he was acting under the directions of some other person. The action will lie both against the party who commits the trespass and against another person at the instance of whom the trespasser is acting." — The ratio decidendi rejecting the agency defense in possessory actions.

• Article 1634, old Code of Civil Procedure — Defined the two material issues for summary possessory proceedings. Applied to restrict the evidence to possession and disturbance, excluding extraneous matters.

• Article 431, Civil Code — Possession of things or rights is exercised either by the same person who holds and enjoys them, or by another in his behalf. Applied to recognize that Simpao possessed the land through his tenant Lacsamana.

• Article 446, Civil Code — Every possessor has the right to be protected in his possession and, if disturbed, to be protected or restored by the means established in the laws of procedure. Applied as the substantive basis for the possessory remedy.

• Article 460, Civil Code — Possession may be lost against the former possessor's will if the new possession has lasted more than one year. Applied to emphasize the urgency of the owner's right to sue to prevent loss of civil possession.

• Article 1554, Civil Code — The lessor is obligated to maintain the lessee in peaceable enjoyment during the lease. Applied to support the lessor's interest in seeking possession.

• Article 1559, Civil Code — The lessee must give notice to the owner of any usurpation with the least possible delay. Applied to infer that the purpose of such notice is to enable the owner to sue.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Willard, Ladd, Mapa, JJ.