Simpal vs. Praxedes

In falsification of a public document, intent to injure a third person is immaterial; a person's true name is the one registered at birth in the local civil registry, and the use of any other name without judicial authority violates Commonwealth Act No. 142 even absent proof that the alias was used in trade or business.

Lina Mamaongpong Simpal and Amanda B. Praxedes were introduced through Dina Gatchalian in December 2017 in connection with a loan, after which their dealings expanded into a lending arrangement in which Lina would manage a group of borrowers and Amanda would provide the capital. Lina's common-law husband, Robert Mangligot, was also involved in the lending business. The dispute implicated the Revised Penal Code provisions on falsification, Commonwealth Act No. 142 as amended by Republic Act No. 6085 on illegal use of alias, Republic Act No. 8189 on voter registration, and Republic Act No. 9048 as amended by Republic Act No. 10172 on change or correction of names.

In December 2017, Dina Gatchalian introduced Amanda B. Praxedes to Lina Mamaongpong Simpal, who represented herself as "Beth Mangligot" at that time. Lina wanted to borrow money from Amanda, and their first lending transaction went smoothly. From then on, Lina frequently borrowed money from Amanda and also introduced other borrowers to her. Later, Lina proposed a business scheme wherein she would manage a group of borrowers, with Amanda providing the capital. Amanda agreed and gave PHP 1,459,010.00 to Lina and her common-law husband, Robert Mangligot, for the lending business.

In the course of their relationship, Amanda discovered that Lina was using several names. When Amanda attended the wedding of Lina's son, she noticed that the name of the mother indicated in the Certificate of Marriage was "Nenita Dawan Cagunan." When Amanda inquired why her name appeared different, Lina gave vague explanations. In one of their business dealings, Amanda asked Lina to remit PHP 9,860.00 to a certain Rochelle Trinidad. For the cash transfer transaction, Lina used the name "Lina M. Simpal" and provided her Voter's Identification Card as proof of identity.

Sometime in February 2019, Dina approached Amanda to borrow money. To Amanda's surprise, Dina did not appear to have any idea about the lending business with Lina. Amanda thus conducted further inquiries and discovered that Lina and Robert misappropriated the PHP 1,459,010.00 she gave them. Amanda demanded the return of the sum, but Lina and Robert could not immediately remit it. Instead, they offered to pay Amanda through other means, including an electric bicycle, a cellphone, the automated teller machine card of Robert, and monthly deductions from Robert's salary. Amanda filed a complaint for Estafa against Lina before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Santa Rosa, Laguna. The OCP Santa Rosa eventually filed an Information with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Santa Rosa City, charging Lina with Estafa through Misappropriation under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. The MTCC issued warrants of arrest against Lina.

In support of her application for bail in the Estafa Case, Lina submitted her Certificate of Live Birth, wherein her name appears as "Nenita Dawan Cagunan," as well as a Barangay Certification stating that "Nenita Dawan Cagunan," "Lina Mamaongpong Simpal," and "Beth Mangligot" are one and the same person. It was further revealed in the Estafa Case that Lina used the name "Lina Mamaongpong Simpal" in the Certificates of Live Birth of her two children registered with the civil registry in 2007 and 2008. Amanda then filed the subject criminal complaint for Perjury, Falsification of a Public Document, and Illegal Use of Alias before the OCP Santa Rosa. Amanda alleged that Lina used different names: (a) "Beth Mangligot" in her interactions with Amanda; (b) "Nenita Dawan Cagunan" in her Certificate of Live Birth and in her son's Certificate of Marriage; (c) "Lina Mamaongpong Simpal" in the Certificates of Live Birth of her children; (d) "Lina M. Simpal" in her Voter's ID; and (e) "Lina Mamaongpong Simpal" in her affidavits submitted to the OCP Santa Rosa in the Estafa Case.

In her Counter-Affidavit, Lina denied the allegations. She argued that the Falsification Case was merely retaliatory and a form of forum shopping on the part of Amanda, given that the Estafa Case was already pending with the MTCC. She added that Amanda was not an injured party who could file the suit for Perjury and Falsification against her. Lina further insisted that she cannot be held liable for Perjury because the name she used in subscribing to the documents and affidavits before the OCP Santa Rosa is not a material matter in the Estafa Case. Lina also contended that she acted in good faith in using several names. She explained that she was born a Muslim in Mati, Davao Oriental. When their family transferred to Lupon, Davao Oriental, the people there referred to her as "Lina," but when they returned to Mati, Lina used the name "Nenita Dawan Cagunan" until she finished high school. As to the name "Beth," Lina asserted that it was her nickname, while "Mangligot" was the surname being used by her children. As to the name "Lina Mamaongpong Simpal," Lina asserted that she started using it in 2005, after she decided to go abroad to help her family. Supposedly, a certain "Ate Amina Simpal" advised her to revert to her Muslim name and to use her mother's maiden name because it would be advantageous to her in the event that she secures a job in a Muslim State. The Muslim Affairs Office even helped Lina to secure a passport bearing the name "Lina Mamaongpong Simpal," but she ultimately could not travel abroad because of health issues. Thus, for more than 13 years, Lina had been using the name "Lina M. Simpal" in her dealings and transactions and for identification purposes, considering that she has a passport to support it. In her Reply-Affidavit, Amanda asserted that proof of damage on her part was not necessary because the crime charged against Lina was Falsification of a Public Document. She denied the allegation of forum shopping because the charges of Falsification, Perjury, and Illegal Use of Alias against Lina were not included in the Estafa Case.

The CA found that Lina's Voter's ID was signed and issued during the tenure of former Commission on Elections Commissioner Sixto Brillantes, Jr., whose term of office ran from January 16, 2011 until 2015, and that Lina did not dispute this. It also found that Lina's registered name in her Certificate of Live Birth is "Nenita Dawan Cagunan," that there was no judicial decree authorizing her to use "Lina Mamaongpong Simpal" or "Beth Mangligot," and that Lina admitted using "Lina Mamaongpong Simpal" for at least 13 years.

• Falsification — Absence of Falsity and Intent: Lina argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that her assertions in her Voter's ID were absolutely false and were made with the wrongful intent to injure a third person; she was able to obtain government-issued IDs wherein her name appears as "Lina Mamaongpong Simpal," and Amanda merely alleged that Lina used a different name to induce her to enter into lending transactions without corroborating evidence.
• Prescription: Lina maintained that the charge of Falsification of a Public Document had already prescribed because the Certificates of Live Birth of her children were registered in 2007 and 2008, more than 10 years before the complaint in the Falsification Case was filed in 2019.
• Illegal Use of Alias — Trade or Business: Lina argued that Amanda did not present evidence to prove that Lina used an alias, other than her registered name, in trade or business, and therefore Lina cannot be made liable for a violation of Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended.
• Executive Determination of Probable Cause: Lina contended that the executive determination of probable cause is made by the DOJ and not by a judge, and that courts are not empowered to substitute their judgment over the Executive Branch of the government in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, which was not established in the case.

• Procedural Errors of the ORSP: Amanda argued before the CA that the ORSP San Pablo committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied her Motion for Reconsideration on technicalities even though it was timely filed and was substantially compliant with the NPS Rule on Appeal.
• Disregard of Affidavits: Amanda argued before the CA that the ORSP San Pablo disregarded the affidavits attached to the Motion for Reconsideration even when they supported a finding of probable cause to indict Lina for Perjury, Falsification, and Illegal Use of Alias.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Falsification of a Public Document: Whether the CA committed reversible error in holding that the OCP Santa Rosa gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the charge of Falsification of a Public Document for lack of probable cause.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Illegal Use of Alias: Whether the CA committed reversible error in holding that the OCP Santa Rosa gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the charge of Illegal Use of Alias for lack of probable cause.
• Prescription of Falsification: Whether the Falsification charge based on Lina's Voter's ID had prescribed.
• Intent to Injure and Good Faith in Falsification: Whether intent to injure a third person is an element of Falsification of a Public Document and whether Lina's defense of good faith should be resolved during preliminary investigation.
• Trade or Business Element in Illegal Use of Alias: Whether use of an alias in trade or business is an element of Illegal Use of Alias under Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended.
• Review of Executive Probable Cause: Whether courts may review the public prosecutor's determination of probable cause.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Falsification of a Public Document: No. The CA correctly found grave abuse because the OCP dismissed the charge on the immaterial ground of lack of intent to injure and on the mistaken view that the Voter's ID statement was not absolutely false.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Illegal Use of Alias: No. The CA correctly found grave abuse because Commonwealth Act No. 142 prohibits use of a name different from the registered birth name absent judicial authority, and does not require use of the alias in trade or business.
• Prescription of Falsification: No as to the Voter's ID. The ID was issued between 2011 and 2015, and the 2019 complaint was filed within the 10-year prescriptive period; the charge based on the children's Certificates of Live Birth remained prescribed.
• Intent to Injure and Good Faith in Falsification: No. Intent to injure is not an element of Falsification of a Public Document, and good faith is a defense best resolved at trial, not at preliminary investigation.
• Trade or Business Element in Illegal Use of Alias: No. Commonwealth Act No. 142 does not make use of an alias in trade or business an element of the offense.
• Review of Executive Probable Cause: Yes, but only for grave abuse of discretion. The CA properly issued certiorari because the OCP's dismissal was tainted with grave abuse.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Falsification of a Public Document: The general rule is non-interference with the executive determination of probable cause, rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers; courts may review only when the findings are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion includes palpable errors of jurisdiction, violation of the Constitution, laws, jurisprudence, or basic and established rules of procedure, gross misapprehension of facts, ignoring evidence adduced by the parties, or appreciating evidence that is patently illogical and unnatural. In probable cause, grave abuse exists when the public prosecutor blatantly disregards the parameters of probable cause, applies a standard of evidence higher than probable cause during preliminary investigation, or bases dismissal on a matter irrelevant or immaterial to the crime charged. Here, the OCP dismissed the Falsification charge for lack of proof of intent to injure and because it concluded that the statement in the Voter's ID was not absolutely false. Under Article 172, paragraph 1 in relation to Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements are: (1) the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of official position; (2) the offender committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171; and (3) the falsification was committed in a public, official, or commercial document. Article 171, paragraph 4 requires: (1) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (2) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; and (3) the facts narrated are absolutely false. Under Typoco, Jr. vs. People and Liwanag, Sr. vs. People, intent to gain or injure a third person is immaterial in falsification of public or official documents; the controlling consideration is the violation of public faith and the destruction of truth in public documents. A Voter's ID is a public document issued under Section 25 of Republic Act No. 8189, and the information contained therein, such as name, birth date, and address, is a narration of facts. A false statement of the registrant's true name in the ID may amount to falsification regardless of malicious or wrongful intent. Lina's true name is the one appearing in her Certificate of Live Birth, "Nenita Dawan Cagunan," and she did not present any judicial authority allowing her to use a different name. Thus, the OCP's dismissal was contrary to law and jurisprudence and constituted grave abuse of discretion.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Illegal Use of Alias: Sections 1, 3, and 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended by Republic Act No. 6085, prohibit Filipinos from using a name other than the one registered for them at birth in the office of the local civil registry, or with which they were baptized for the first time, except with judicial authority. Lina's true name is "Nenita Dawan Cagunan," and the names "Beth Mangligot" and "Lina Mamaongpong Simpal" are manifestly different from the name appearing in her Certificate of Live Birth. The OCP dismissed the Illegal Use of Alias charge supposedly because there was insufficient proof that Lina used her aliases for trade or business. However, nothing in Commonwealth Act No. 142 states that the alias must be used in trade or business to make a person liable. Although Limson vs. Gonzales, citing Ursua vs. Court of Appeals, stated that Commonwealth Act No. 142 was enacted primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade, Limson did not introduce the use of the alias in trade or business as an element of the offense; the discussion was made only in relation to the origins and history of the statute. In fact, Limson explained that Commonwealth Act No. 142 penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register. Lina herself admitted in her Counter-Affidavit that for more than 13 years she had been using a name other than "Nenita Dawan Cagunan," yet she did not produce any judicial authority allowing her to do so. The OCP's dismissal notwithstanding these admissions was a manifest and palpable error amounting to grave abuse of discretion.

• Prescription of Falsification: The constructive notice rule applies to charges of Falsification of a Public Document; the prescriptive period begins to run from the moment of the registration of the public document. Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of Falsification by Private Individuals, which carries a correctional penalty, prescribes in 10 years. The CA found probable cause against Lina for Falsification of a Public Document only with regard to her Voter's ID, and it affirmed the dismissal of the Falsification charge concerning the Certificates of Live Birth of Lina's children on the ground of prescription. As to the Voter's ID, Lina does not dispute the CA's finding that the ID was issued sometime during the term of office of COMELEC Commissioner Sixto Brillantes, Jr., from January 16, 2011 until 2015. Thus, the Voter's ID was registered sometime between 2011 and 2015. When the complaint for Falsification of the Voter's ID was filed in 2019, prescription had not yet set in.

• Intent to Injure and Good Faith in Falsification: Good faith is a valid defense in a charge of falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. Lina averred that she acted in good faith because she was issued a passport where her name appears as "Lina Mamaongpong Simpal," and that her other names were used by her since childhood, or were her Muslim name, nickname, or the surname of her children. Still, the records show that Lina's name in her Certificate of Live Birth is "Nenita Dawan Cagunan," not "Lina Mamaongpong Simpal" or "Beth Mangligot," and there is no judicial decree authorizing her to use those aliases. Good faith, being a matter of defense, is best determined during the trial proper and not during the preliminary investigation, where the task of the public prosecutor is not to ascertain guilt beyond reasonable doubt but simply to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. Lina's defense of good faith is better resolved in a full-blown trial on the merits.

• Trade or Business Element in Illegal Use of Alias: The clear language of Sections 1, 3, and 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended by Republic Act No. 6085, prohibits Filipinos from using a name other than the one registered at birth in the local civil registry, or with which they were baptized for the first time, except with judicial authority. The law does not require that the alias be used in trade or business. The OCP's holding that the names "Beth Mangligot" and "Lina Mamaongpong Simpal" are the registered names of Lina under Commonwealth Act No. 142 was an egregious error, because those aliases are manifestly different from the name appearing in Lina's Certificate of Live Birth. Lina admitted using a name other than "Nenita Dawan Cagunan" for more than 13 years without judicial authority, and Commonwealth Act No. 142 prohibits the use of an alias except with judicial authority. The OCP's dismissal was therefore a manifest and palpable error.

• Review of Executive Probable Cause: Courts are generally not empowered to review the public prosecutor's determination of probable cause to warrant an indictment or the filing of an Information, unless the findings are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The CA properly exercised its jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari against the final ruling of the ORSP San Pablo in an appeal from the resolution of the OCP Santa Rosa over criminal charges within the jurisdiction of first level courts. The OCP's findings were contrary to law, jurisprudence, the evidence on record, and the parties' admissions, warranting the issuance of a writ of certiorari to correct such jurisdictional errors. Additionally, Lina did not impute any error to the CA when it held that her Motion for Reconsideration of the ORSP San Pablo Resolution dated August 18, 2022 was timely filed and should have been considered as substantial compliance with the NPS Rule on Appeal. Under Rule 51, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, the Court shall not consider any matter not assigned as an error on appeal, save for well-recognized exceptions not present in the case. The CA's procedural conclusions are therefore final and can no longer be disturbed.

• Non-interference with Executive Determination of Probable Cause — Courts generally do not review the public prosecutor's determination of probable cause to indict; review is limited to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse includes palpable errors of jurisdiction, violation of the Constitution, laws, jurisprudence, or basic and established rules of procedure, gross misapprehension of facts, ignoring evidence adduced by the parties, or appreciating evidence that is patently illogical and unnatural. In probable cause, grave abuse exists when the prosecutor blatantly disregards the parameters of probable cause, applies a higher standard of evidence, or bases dismissal on an irrelevant or immaterial matter. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that the OCP Santa Rosa gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the Falsification and Illegal Use of Alias charges.

• Falsification of Public Document — Intent to Injure Immaterial — In falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officers or private persons, intent to gain or injure a third person is not an essential element; the controlling consideration is the violation of public faith and the destruction of truth in public documents. Article 172, paragraph 1 in relation to Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code requires: (1) the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of official position; (2) the offender committed any of the acts of falsification under Article 171; and (3) the falsification was committed in a public, official, or commercial document. Article 171, paragraph 4 requires: (1) untruthful statements in a narration of facts in a public document; (2) legal obligation to disclose the truth; and (3) the facts narrated are absolutely false. The Court applied this doctrine to Lina's Voter's ID, a public document, holding that a false statement of her true name may constitute falsification regardless of intent to injure.

• True Name and Change of Name — Under Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended, a person's true name is the one appearing in their birth certificate, registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals for purposes of identification, and changing one's name is a privilege and not a right. Under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 9048, as amended by Republic Act No. 10172, a person's name may be changed only through a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and the change of first name or nickname, which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general. Substantial changes to a person's name appearing in their birth certificate may be allowed only with judicial approval and based on very narrow grounds. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that Lina's true name is "Nenita Dawan Cagunan" and that she had no judicial authority to use "Lina Mamaongpong Simpal."

• Illegal Use of Alias — No Trade or Business Element — Commonwealth Act No. 142 prohibits the use of any name different from the one with which a person was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry, or with which they were baptized for the first time, or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court. The law does not make the use of the alias in trade or business an element of the offense. The Court applied this doctrine in finding probable cause against Lina, who admitted using a name other than "Nenita Dawan Cagunan" for more than 13 years without judicial authority.

• Prescription of Falsification of Public Document — The constructive notice rule applies to charges of Falsification of a Public Document; the prescriptive period begins to run from the moment of the registration of the public document. Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, Falsification by Private Individuals, which carries a correctional penalty, prescribes in 10 years. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the Falsification charge based on Lina's Voter's ID had not prescribed because the ID was issued between 2011 and 2015 and the complaint was filed in 2019, while the charge based on the children's Certificates of Live Birth, registered in 2007 and 2008, had prescribed.

• Good Faith as Defense in Falsification — Good faith is a valid defense in a charge of falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. However, it is a matter of defense best determined during the trial proper and not during the preliminary investigation, where the task of the public prosecutor is not to ascertain guilt beyond reasonable doubt but simply to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that Lina's defense of good faith should be resolved in a full-blown trial.

• Probable Cause in Preliminary Investigation — Preliminary investigation determines whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. It does not require guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court applied this standard in rejecting the OCP's dismissal of the charges based on defenses that should be resolved at trial.

• "There is grave abuse of discretion if the public prosecutor blatantly disregards the parameters of probable cause" — This passage states the standard for reviewing executive determinations of probable cause and serves as the basis for finding that the OCP Santa Rosa gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the charges.
• "in the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officers or private persons, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed." — This is the ratio decidendi on the immateriality of intent to injure in falsification of public documents, which the Court applied to Lina's Voter's ID.
• "a person's true name is the one appearing in their birth certificate—their name registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry." — This passage defines a person's true name under Commonwealth Act No. 142 and supports the finding that Lina's true name is "Nenita Dawan Cagunan."
• "Commonwealth Act No. 142 prohibits the use of an alias except with judicial authority." — This passage states the core rule for Illegal Use of Alias and supports the finding of probable cause against Lina, who had no judicial authority to use "Lina Mamaongpong Simpal" or "Beth Mangligot."

• Typoco, Jr. vs. People, 816 Phil. 914 (2017) — Controlling precedent; held that intent to gain or injure a third person is not an essential element of the crime of falsification of a public document.
• Liwanag, Sr. vs. People, 858 Phil. 38 (2019) — Followed Typoco; sustained a conviction for falsification under Article 171, paragraph 4 despite the absence of malicious or wrongful intent, and compared a Temporary Operator's Permit to a Voter's ID as a public document.
• Limson vs. Gonzales, 731 Phil. 17 (2014) — Cited for the history of Commonwealth Act No. 142; clarified that use of an alias in trade or business is not an element of the offense.
• Ursua vs. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 157 (1996) — Cited in Limson for the legislative purpose of Commonwealth Act No. 142, which was enacted primarily to curb the practice of adopting multiple names and aliases.
• Ben Line Agencies Philippines, Inc. vs. Madson, 823 Phil. 261 (2018) — Cited by the CA for the rule that a petition dismissed for lack of an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given due course or reinstated upon showing that the petitioner later submitted the required documents.
• Republic vs. Bolante, 528 Phil. 328 (2006) — Cited for the rule that the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals for purposes of identification and that changing one's name is a privilege, not a right; also listed justifying grounds for change of name.
• Tan vs. Republic, 122 Phil. 103 (1965) — Cited for the rule that a person's true name is the one appearing in the birth certificate registered with the local civil registry.
• Lim vs. People, 830 Phil. 669 (2018) — Cited for the constructive notice rule in falsification of a public document, under which the prescriptive period begins from the registration of the document.
• Deloso vs. Desierto, 372 Phil. 805 (1999) — Cited for the standard in preliminary investigation: probable cause requires sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime was committed and that the accused is probably guilty.
• Debuque vs. Nilson, 902 Phil. 324 (2021) — Cited for the general rule of non-interference with executive probable cause and for the definition of grave abuse of discretion.

• Article 172, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Defines falsification by a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of official position, committed in a public, official, or commercial document; applied to Lina as a private individual.
• Article 171, paragraph 4, Revised Penal Code — Defines making untruthful statements in a narration of facts; its elements were applied to Lina's Voter's ID.
• Article 90, Revised Penal Code — Provides that crimes punishable by a correctional penalty prescribe in 10 years; applied to the Falsification charge based on the Voter's ID.
• Commonwealth Act No. 142, Sections 1, 3, and 4, as amended by Republic Act No. 6085 — Regulates the use of aliases; prohibits use of a name different from the registered birth or baptismal name absent judicial authority; applied to Lina's use of "Beth Mangligot" and "Lina Mamaongpong Simpal."
• Republic Act No. 8189, Section 25 — Provides that the Voter's ID serves as a document for identification and is issued by the COMELEC; applied to classify Lina's Voter's ID as a public document.
• Republic Act No. 9048, Section 1, as amended by Republic Act No. 10172 — Provides that no entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname; applied to show Lina had no judicial authority to use another name.
• Rule 51, Section 8, Rules of Court — Provides that errors not assigned on appeal shall not be considered, save for exceptions; applied to render final the CA's procedural conclusions on the timeliness of Amanda's Motion for Reconsideration.
• DOJ Circular No. 70, Section 5 (NPS Rule on Appeal) — Requires a petition for review to be accompanied by copies of the complaint, affidavits, and evidence submitted during preliminary investigation; cited in the ORSP's denial.
• DOJ Rule on Electronic Filing of Petitions for Review, Sections 1, 2, and 4 — Requires electronic copies and a verified declaration of completeness; cited in the ORSP's denial.
• DOJ Circular No. 27, Section 2 — Provides that resolutions of provincial or city prosecutors in cases cognizable by first level courts are reviewed by the Regional State Prosecutor and are final; applied to allow certiorari against the ORSP ruling.
• Article 315, paragraph 1(b), Revised Penal Code — Defines Estafa through misappropriation; cited as the charge in the earlier Estafa Case.
• Section 13, NPS Rule on Appeal — Provides a non-extendible 10-day period to file a motion for reconsideration from receipt of the resolution; applied to find Amanda's motion timely.

Caguioa (Chairperson), Gaerlan, Dimaampao, and Singh, JJ., concur.