Sim, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence but may be inferred from the acts of the perpetrators before, during, and after the commission of the crime that are indicative of a common design, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments; and false pretenses or fraudulent acts employed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, upon which the offended party relied and suffered damage, constitute estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.

Private complainant Jay Byron Ilagan operated Marfi Tire Supply, a tire store along the highway in San Pablo City, Laguna, and had been dealing with co-accused Elison Villaflor for twenty years, as Villaflor was engaged in the same business of selling tires and rims in Caloocan City. Petitioner Augusto Sim, Jr. was Villaflor's friend in Dagupan City from whom the vehicle at the center of the dispute was sourced. The case arises from the sale of a 1997 Nissan Pathfinder that was later discovered to have been stolen, giving rise to criminal liability for estafa under the Revised Penal Code.

Private complainant Jay Byron Ilagan, a tire supplier whose store Marfi Tire Supply was located along the highway in San Pablo City, Laguna, had been dealing with accused Elison Villaflor for twenty years, as the latter was engaged in the same business of selling tires and rims in Caloocan City. In March 1998, Ilagan talked to Villaflor in Tondo, Manila, and expressed interest in buying a vehicle. Villaflor told him that he knew someone who sells vehicles at a cheap price, and that he himself had bought a Toyota Tamaraw FX at lower than the market price. Ilagan asked Villaflor to inquire whether an Isuzu pick-up was for sale. A month later, Villaflor called Ilagan to inform him that he had found a 1997 Nissan Pathfinder, and they agreed to inspect the vehicle together, as Ilagan wanted to buy it before his birthday on May 31, 1998.

On April 30, 1998, only Villaflor went to Dagupan City to get the Nissan Pathfinder from his friend, petitioner Augusto Sim, Jr. Petitioner told Villaflor that the Nissan Pathfinder had been given to him by a customer in payment of a debt and had been used only for a year. Villaflor brought the vehicle to San Pablo City. Ilagan at first did not like the vehicle since it was not the brand he was looking for, but Villaflor said that his kumpadre would look at the vehicle as the latter was also interested in it. Ilagan decided to buy the 1997 Nissan Pathfinder at the agreed price of P480,000.00, paid in five checks issued by Fe Ilagan under her account at Solidbank-San Pablo Branch: one check dated May 6, 1998 in the sum of P350,000.00, and four checks in the sum of P32,500.00 each dated June 6, July 6, August 6, and September 6, all in 1998.

Villaflor gave Ilagan photocopies of the Certificate of Registration and Official Receipt issued by the Land Transportation Office showing the name of the owner as one Henry Austria. While waiting for the processing of the papers, the vehicle was parked at Ilagan's place. After a week, Villaflor brought the deed of sale, which Ilagan signed without the signature of the owner, Henry Austria. Ilagan gave the deed back to Villaflor to be brought to Dagupan City for signing by the owner/vendor and for transfer of registration in Ilagan's name. On June 7, 1998, Villaflor returned and delivered to Ilagan the deed of sale signed by the owner/vendor, together with the new Certificate of Registration and Official Receipt issued by the LTO of Lingayen, Pangasinan, in Ilagan's name. The checks given by Ilagan in payment of the vehicle were deposited by petitioner in his name at Solidbank-Dagupan Branch, and all five checks were debited in favor of petitioner. After receiving the registration papers, Ilagan was eventually able to use the Nissan Pathfinder.

On October 28, 1998, Ilagan's vehicle was apprehended by Anti-Carnapping operatives of the Philippine National Police (ANCAR NCRTMO). The vehicle and its registration papers were inspected and brought to Camp Crame. It turned out that the vehicle was a "hot car," as it had been reported stolen on November 29, 1997 by its real owner, Golf Construction of the Philippines, Inc., pursuant to the Alarm Sheet issued by the PNP Traffic Management Group. Ilagan accompanied the ANCAR operatives to Villaflor's residence, went with them to Camp Crame, and named petitioner as the owner of the vehicle. The investigation revealed that the vehicle's original motor and chassis numbers were replaced and/or tampered, but its Production Number remained intact, and the real description of the vehicle was fully established and identified by the manufacturer/assembler of the unit, Universal Motors Corporation. Ilagan spoke with Villaflor about the possible recovery of the money paid for the confiscated vehicle. On November 30, 1998, Ilagan met petitioner for the first time. Petitioner signed a Promissory Note with Deed of Undertaking whereby he obligated himself to pay Ilagan the amount of P480,000.00 plus attorney's fees of P50,000.00 in scheduled installments. Petitioner issued a check in the amount of P75,000.00, but Ilagan did not encash it, thinking that if he did, petitioner would not pay him anymore. Ilagan was unable to recover the money paid to petitioner. Thereafter, Villaflor and petitioner were charged with estafa under a criminal information dated September 6, 1999.

• Absence of Conspiracy: Petitioner argued that there was no conspiracy between him and co-accused Elison Villaflor, pointing out that it was only Villaflor who dealt with private complainant, whom petitioner had not even met before he was allegedly forced to sign the amicable agreement. Petitioner further alleged that there was no convincing evidence showing that he performed any previous or simultaneous act with Villaflor in committing the offense, and that the prosecution's witnesses did not prove that petitioner directly participated in the commission of the offense or performed an act showing community of purpose with Villaflor.

• Insufficiency of Evidence for Estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a): Petitioner contended that the evidence was not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.

• Conspiracy: Whether there was conspiracy between petitioner Augusto Sim, Jr. and co-accused Elison Villaflor in defrauding private complainant Jay Byron Ilagan.
• Guilt under Article 315, par. 2(a): Whether petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.

• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was established notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of prior agreement, as petitioner's acts before, during, and after the fraudulent sale — including his knowledge that the vehicle was not his, his misrepresentation of authority to sell, and his receipt of the proceeds — clearly showed a common design and active cooperation with co-accused Villaflor in perpetrating the fraud.

• Guilt under Article 315, par. 2(a): Yes. All four elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code — false pretense, execution prior to or simultaneous with the fraud, reliance by the offended party, and resulting damage — were proven beyond reasonable doubt, and the conviction was affirmed with modification as to the penalty imposed.

• Conspiracy: Even in the absence of direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime, conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of the perpetrators before, during, and after the commission of the crime, which are indicative of a common design, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments. Conspiracy is deemed implied when the malefactors have a common purpose and were united in its execution; spontaneous agreement or active cooperation by all perpetrators at the moment of the commission of the crime is sufficient to create joint criminal responsibility. Citing Erquiaga vs. Court of Appeals, the Court noted that conspiracy, as a rule, has to be established with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself, but need not be shown by direct evidence — it may take the form of circumstances which, if taken together, would conclusively show that the accused came to an agreement to commit a crime and decided to carry it out with their full cooperation and participation. Applying these principles, the Court found that petitioner's actions in relation to the fraudulent sale clearly established conspiracy: both petitioner and Villaflor knew that petitioner was the person selling the vehicle under the false pretense that a certain Henry Austria was the registered owner; petitioner deliberately misrepresented himself as having the necessary authority to possess and sell the vehicle so that he could collect P480,000.00 from private complainant; and petitioner reneged on his promise and failed to reimburse the amount collected despite demand. The trial court's finding that petitioner from the very beginning was aware that the subject vehicle was not his nor given to him in payment of debt, as he made Villaflor believe, further supported the conclusion that the totality of the evidence indicated a common or joint design, purpose, and objective to defraud private complainant.

• Guilt under Article 315, par. 2(a): The Court held that regardless of whether petitioner was charged or convicted under either paragraph 1(b) or paragraph 2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, he would still be guilty of estafa because damage and deceit, which are essential elements of the crime, were established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. False pretenses or fraudulent acts were committed prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud by falsely pretending to possess the 1997 Nissan Pathfinder. The Court enumerated the four elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a): (1) there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means; (2) such false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of it; and (4) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. All four elements were present: false pretenses were employed to deceive private complainant into purchasing the stolen Nissan Pathfinder; the false pretenses were employed prior to and simultaneously with the fraudulent sale; private complainant relied on the false pretenses, inducing him to part with his money; and private complainant suffered damages in the amount of P480,000.00. The Court also declined to disturb the trial court's findings on witness credibility, as the trial court was in the best position to assess the witnesses' truthfulness, honesty, and candor, and its factual findings, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are entitled to great weight and respect. Against the positive and categorical testimonies of the complainant, petitioner's mere denial could not prevail.

• Penalty: The Court applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law, holding that the maximum penalty should be taken from the maximum period of the penalty under Article 315, which is reclusión temporal, since the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, but the total penalty should not exceed twenty years. The minimum term should be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code, which is prisión correccional in its maximum period — from four years, two months and one day to six years. The determination of the minimum penalty is left to the sound discretion of the court, and the modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term. The Court found the appropriate penalty to range from four years, two months and one day of prisión correccional, as minimum, to twenty years of reclusión temporal, as maximum.

• Conspiracy inferred from concerted acts — Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence of prior agreement; it may be deduced from the acts of the perpetrators before, during, and after the commission of the crime that are indicative of a common design, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments. Spontaneous agreement or active cooperation by all perpetrators at the moment of the commission of the crime is sufficient to create joint criminal responsibility. The Court applied this doctrine to find that petitioner's knowledge of the vehicle's true status, his misrepresentation of authority to sell, and his receipt of the proceeds of the sale established his participation in a common design with co-accused Villaflor.

• Estafa by false pretenses under Article 315, par. 2(a) — The four elements of estafa under this provision are: (1) there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means; (2) such false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of it; and (4) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. The Court found all four elements satisfied where petitioner and co-accused falsely pretended to possess and sell a stolen vehicle as if owned by a certain Henry Austria, inducing private complainant to pay P480,000.00.

• Indeterminate Sentence Law application to estafa — Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, when the offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. The amount defrauded in excess of P22,000.00 should not be considered in the initial determination of the indeterminate penalty but should be taken as analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition of the maximum term, in accordance with the rule that penal laws should be construed in favor of the accused.

• "Even in the absence of direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime, conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of the perpetrators before, during and after the commission of the crime, which are indicative of a common design, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments." — This passage states the controlling doctrine on how conspiracy may be established circumstantially, forming the basis of the Court's finding of joint criminal responsibility.

• "The elements of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a) are: (1) There must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (2) Such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3) The offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (4) As a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage." — This is the canonical enumeration of the elements of estafa by false pretenses under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), which the Court applied to the facts of the case.

• "The maximum penalty to be imposed on petitioner should be taken from the maximum period of the penalty under Art. 315, which is reclusión temporal, since the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, but the total penalty which may be imposed should not exceed twenty (20) years." — This passage articulates the Court's computation of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence for estafa where the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00.

• Erquiaga vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124513, October 17, 2001, 367 SCRA 357 — Cited as controlling authority for the rule that conspiracy must be established with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself, but may be shown through circumstances that conclusively demonstrate an agreement to commit a crime and its execution with full cooperation and participation.

• People vs. Mendoza, G.R. No. 128890, May 31, 2000, 332 SCRA 485 — Cited for the proposition that conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of the perpetrators before, during, and after the commission of the crime, which are indicative of a common design, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments.

• Garcia vs. People, G.R. No. 144785, September 11, 1985 — Cited for the definition of fraud as comprising anything calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another; also cited for the rule that penal laws should be construed in favor of the accused in determining the indeterminate penalty.

• People vs. Cabais, G.R. No. 129070, March 16, 2001, 354 SCRA 553 — Cited for the principle that the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and appreciate the complainant's truthfulness, honesty, and candor.

• People vs. Gulion, G.R. No. 141183, January 18, 2001, 349 SCRA 610 — Cited for the rule that factual findings of trial courts, as well as their assessment of witness credibility, are entitled to great weight and respect, more so when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

• Montano vs. People, G.R. No. 141980, December 7, 2001, 371 SCRA 655 — Cited in support of the interpretation that the amount defrauded in excess of P22,000.00 should be treated as analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.

• Article 315, paragraph 2(a), Revised Penal Code — The provision defining and penalizing estafa by false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, specifically "[b]y using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by other similar deceits." The Court applied this provision in affirming petitioner's conviction.

• Article 315, paragraph 1(b), Revised Penal Code — The provision under which the trial court originally convicted the accused, which the Court of Appeals modified to paragraph 2(a). The Court held that regardless of which paragraph applied, petitioner would still be guilty of estafa because damage and deceit were established.

• Section 1, Indeterminate Sentence Law — The provision requiring courts to sentence an accused to an indeterminate penalty, with the maximum term properly imposable under the Revised Penal Code and the minimum term within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code. The Court applied this in computing petitioner's sentence.

• Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — The procedural rule under which the petition for review on certiorari was filed before the Supreme Court.

Davide, Jr. (on official leave), Panganiban (Working Chairman), Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concurred.