Silva vs. Lo

Certiorari does not lie to assail final orders decreeing partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, which are appealable under Section 2 thereof in relation to Rule 41; moreover, a partition agreement involving co-owned property is valid and binding upon non-signatory co-heirs where (1) the transferring co-owners' shares are sufficient to cover the portion alienated, (2) non-signatory heirs acquiesced through manifestation or conduct, and (3) the agent possessed apparent authority due to the principal's failure to give notice of revocation and subsequent ratification by silence.

Carlos Sandico, Jr. died intestate on May 20, 1975, survived by his spouse Concepcion Lim-Sandico and seven legitimate children: Ma. Enrica Sandico-Pascual, Carlos L. Sandico III, Guillerma Sandico-Silva (petitioner), Lily Sandico-Brown, Pamela S. Zapanta, Conchita S. Lo (respondent), and Teodoro L. Sandico. In 1976, the heirs executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate providing for pro indiviso ownership of the decedent's properties. In September 1988, they executed a Memorandum of Agreement for physical division, but neither agreement was implemented, leaving the heirs as pro indiviso co-owners. In August 1989, Enrica filed an action for partition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. During the protracted litigation, the heirs engaged in court-supervised negotiations and raffles to partition the estate's numerous properties, including a 103,024-square meter agricultural land in Magalang, Pampanga covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 377745-R.

• The Decedent and His Estate: Carlos Sandico, Jr. died intestate on May 20, 1975, leaving a sizeable estate consisting of conjugal properties with his surviving spouse Concepcion Lim-Sandico. The compulsory heirs included Concepcion and their seven children: Ma. Enrica Sandico-Pascual, Carlos L. Sandico III, Guillerma Sandico-Silva (petitioner), Lily Sandico-Brown, Pamela S. Zapanta, Conchita S. Lo (respondent), and Teodoro L. Sandico.
• Prior Settlement Attempts: In 1976, the heirs executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate providing for pro indiviso ownership of all properties. In September 1988, they executed a Memorandum of Agreement for physical division. Neither agreement was implemented, and the heirs remained pro indiviso co-owners.
• The Partition Action: On August 3, 1989, Enrica filed Civil Case No. Q-89-3137 for partition, accounting, delivery of shares and damages. Teodoro later withdrew as defendant and joined as plaintiff-in-intervention. Defendants asserted Concepcion's usufructuary rights and alleged diminished value upon physical division. Conchita, Lily, and Pamela, residing abroad, executed Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs) in favor of their mother Concepcion and sister Guillerma.
• Stipulations and Raffle Proceedings: At pre-trial, the parties stipulated to their status as compulsory heirs, the conjugal nature of properties, and Concepcion's administration of the estate. The RTC conducted numerous hearings and supervised raffles for property distribution. In one raffle conducted on March 30, 2007, lots were drawn for the subject property covered by TCT No. 377745-R, with counsel or attorneys-in-fact drawing for absent heirs including Conchita.
• The 2006 Kasunduan: Sometime in 2006, Concepcion (representing herself, Carlos III, Guillerma, Lily, Pamela, and Conchita as attorney-in-fact), executed a "Kasunduan sa Pagwawakas/Pagtatapos ng Relasyon bilang May-ari ng Lupa at mga Ortilano/Kasama ng Lupa" with the tenants of the subject property. This 2006 Kasunduan provided for a 50-50 sharing of the 103,024-square meter agricultural land, with half transferred to eight qualified tenant-beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) and half retained by the heirs. Notably, Enrica, Teodoro, and Conchita did not personally sign this agreement.
• Revocation of SPA: On June 26, 2000, Conchita executed a Revocation of the SPA granted to her mother Concepcion, filing a copy with the RTC but failing to furnish Concepcion a copy. Despite this revocation, Conchita continued to retain the same counsel (Atty. Danilo Tuason) as the other defendants until 2009.
• RTC Approval and Issuance of Titles: On April 13, 2007, the RTC approved the 2006 Kasunduan and ordered Enrica and Teodoro to sign the document. On February 9, 2010, the RTC granted Concepcion's motion and ordered the Register of Deeds to enter new titles in the names of the tenants and heirs pursuant to the approved partition. The Register of Deeds cancelled TCT No. 377745-R and issued new titles (TCT Nos. 1105, 1107, 1108, 1109, 1111, and 1112) in the names of the tenants.
• Conchita's Opposition: On November 6, 2009, through new counsel, Conchita opposed the motion to order new titles, arguing that the 2006 Kasunduan was void because she had revoked her mother's authority and the tenants were not real parties in interest. She did not question the April 13, 2007 Order approving the Kasunduan until after the new titles were issued.

• Impropriety of Certiorari: Petitioner Guillerma argued that Conchita improperly availed of certiorari under Rule 65 to assail the February 9 and August 27, 2010 Orders of the RTC, which were actually final orders decreeing partition under Rule 69. The proper remedy was an ordinary appeal under Section 2 of Rule 69 in relation to Rule 41, not an extraordinary writ.
• Finality of the April 13, 2007 Order: Petitioner maintained that the April 13, 2007 Order approving the 2006 Kasunduan had long become final and executory because Conchita failed to appeal it within the reglementary period. The subsequent orders merely implemented this final order.
• Validity of the 2006 Kasunduan: Petitioner contended that the 2006 Kasunduan was valid despite lacking signatures of all heirs because (1) Enrica and Teodoro acquiesced to the partition as evidenced by their manifestation that they would not object provided they received their preferred portions; (2) Concepcion had apparent authority to represent Conchita because Conchita failed to give notice of the SPA revocation and continued to be represented by the same counsel in the proceedings; and (3) the transfer to tenants was a valid voluntary land transfer under Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6657 (CARL).
• Indispensable Parties: Petitioner argued that Conchita should have impleaded the tenants as indispensable or necessary parties to the certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals, as they were real parties-in-interest who had already been issued new titles over half of the subject property.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Respondent Conchita argued that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the February 9 and August 27, 2010 Orders because these effectively partitioned the estate to non-heirs (the tenants) in violation of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
• Voidness of the 2006 Kasunduan: Respondent maintained that the 2006 Kasunduan was void ab initio for lack of conformity by all compulsory heirs, citing Dadizon v. Bernadas for the proposition that partition requires assent by all parties. She emphasized that she had revoked the SPA granted to her mother in 2000, rendering her mother's signature on the 2006 Kasunduan unauthorized and ineffective as to her share.
• Improper Remedy Not Applicable: Respondent countered that certiorari was the proper remedy because the assailed orders were void, having been issued pursuant to a void partition agreement that failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Rule 69.
• Tenants Not Indispensable Parties: Respondent argued that the tenants were not indispensable parties to the certiorari petition because the validity of the partition could be determined without their participation, and they were merely transferees of title whose rights were derivative of the heirs.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Whether the petition for certiorari filed by Conchita before the Court of Appeals was the proper remedy to assail the February 9 and August 27, 2010 Orders of the RTC.
• Indispensable Parties: Whether the tenants of the subject property should have been impleaded as indispensable or necessary parties to the petition for certiorari.
• Finality of Partition Order: Whether the RTC's April 13, 2007 Order approving the 2006 Kasunduan had already attained finality.
• Voidness of Partition Agreement: Whether the 2006 Kasunduan partitioning the subject property was void because it was not signed by all the heirs of the decedent.
• Effect of CARL Compliance: Whether the RTC effectively distributed the estate to persons who are not heirs of the decedent by approving the transfer of, and title to, half of the subject property to the tenants pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Certiorari was an improper remedy. The February 9 and August 27, 2010 Orders were final orders decreeing partition under Section 2, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, which specifically provides that "a final order decreeing partition and accounting may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby." These orders completely disposed of the partition of the specific subject property, leaving nothing more to be done regarding that property except the recording of the partition. Conchita should have filed an ordinary appeal under Rule 41, not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
• Indispensable Parties: The tenants should have been impleaded as necessary parties to the petition for certiorari. While not indispensable parties to the estate partition, they were real parties-in-interest as qualified beneficiaries under the CARL to whom new titles had already been issued. Complete relief could not be afforded without their participation, as the validity of their titles and possession was directly put in issue.
• Finality of Partition Order: The April 13, 2007 Order had attained finality. Conchita failed to file an appeal therefrom within the reglementary period. The subsequent orders of February 9 and August 27, 2010 merely implemented this final order by directing the registration of the partition, as contemplated by Section 2, Rule 69 which requires that "such partition, together with the order of the court confirming the same, shall be recorded in the registry of deeds."
• Voidness of Partition Agreement: The 2006 Kasunduan was not void despite lacking signatures of all heirs. First, Concepcion's share (9/16 of the property as conjugal owner of half plus 1/8 inheritance) was sufficient to cover the half transferred to tenants. Second, Enrica and Teodoro acquiesced to the partition through their manifestation that they would not object provided they received their preferred portions, and they never questioned the 2006 Kasunduan. Third, Concepcion possessed apparent authority to represent Conchita because Conchita failed to give actual notice of the SPA revocation to her mother, continued to be represented by the same counsel (Atty. Tuason) who participated in the proceedings, and impliedly ratified the partition by her silence and failure to assail the April 13, 2007 Order and the raffle proceedings despite having knowledge thereof.
• Effect of CARL Compliance: The transfer to tenants was valid. The 2006 Kasunduan constituted a voluntary land transfer arrangement under Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6657 (CARL), which the heirs could not ignore. The tenants were qualified beneficiaries, and the transfer was supervised by the Department of Agrarian Reform. The partition and transfer were binding on all heirs, including Conchita, as the transfer fell within the shares of the co-owners who executed the agreement.

• Two-Stage Partition Proceedings: An action for partition under Rule 69 consists of two phases: (1) the determination of the existence of co-ownership and the propriety of partition, culminating in a final order decreeing partition; and (2) the actual partition by agreement of the parties (confirmed by the court) or by commissioners appointed by the court. Both the order decreeing partition and the order confirming the partition agreement are final orders appealable under Section 2, Rule 69.
• Final vs. Interlocutory Orders: A final order is one that completely disposes of the case or a particular matter therein, leaving nothing more for the court to do regarding that matter. An interlocutory order leaves something to be done on the merits of the case. The test is whether the order leaves something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits.
• Apparent Authority and Estoppel: Apparent authority arises from the principal's acts or silence that lead third parties to reasonably believe another person has authority to act on the principal's behalf. Under Article 1869 of the Civil Code, agency may be implied from the principal's silence or lack of action, or failure to repudiate the agency knowing that another is acting on his behalf without authority. Revocation of an agency must be communicated to the agent to be effective; lack of notice to the agent renders the revocation ineffective as to third parties dealing with the agent in good faith.
• Ratification of Contracts: Under Article 1317 of the Civil Code, a contract entered into in the name of another without authority is unenforceable unless ratified expressly or impliedly by the person on whose behalf it was executed. Ratification may be implied from the principal's acceptance of benefits or failure to repudiate the contract within a reasonable time after learning of its execution.
• Rights of Co-Owners: Under Article 493 of the Civil Code, each co-owner has full ownership of his part and the fruits pertaining thereto, and may alienate, assign, or mortgage it. Under Article 494, no co-owner is obliged to remain in co-ownership; each may demand partition at any time. A co-owner may validly alienate his share even without the consent of other co-owners, and the alienation is limited to the portion allotted to him upon termination of co-ownership (Article 493, second paragraph).
• Voluntary Land Transfer under CARL: Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6657 allows landowners to enter into voluntary arrangements for direct transfer of agricultural lands to qualified beneficiaries, subject to Department of Agrarian Reform supervision and terms not less favorable than the government's standing offer.

• "In our jurisdiction, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court have laid down two phases of an action for partition: first, the trial court, after determining that a co-ownership in fact exists and that partition is proper, issues an order for partition; and, second, the trial court promulgates a decision confirming the sketch and subdivision of the properties submitted by the parties (if the parties reach an agreement) or by the appointed commissioners (if the parties fail to agree), as the case may be."
• "The February 9 and August 27, 2010 Orders are not interlocutory as there is nothing more to be done as regards the partition of the subject property. What remains to be done is the partition of the rest of the estate's properties and the accounting for the fruits, profits and rentals thereof."
• "Conchita failed to give her mother notice of the revocation and belatedly repudiated her assent to the 2006 Kasunduan which was signed by her mother on her behalf despite her full and complete knowledge that Civil Case No. Q-89-3137 was ongoing and that the partition of her father's estate's properties was underway."
• "The binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so. Quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest."
• "As a co-owner pro indiviso, Conchita exercises her right to the entire co-owned property. However, as we have previously discussed, Conchita's share pertains to only 1/8th of 1/2 of the subject property which belongs to the estate of the decedent, Carlos, Jr."

• Heirs of Marasigan v. Marasigan, 572 Phil. 190 (2008): Controlling precedent on the two-phase nature of partition proceedings under Rule 69 and the finality of orders decreeing partition.
• Dadizon v. Bernadas, 606 Phil. 687 (2009): Cited by the Court of Appeals for the proposition that partition requires assent of all parties; distinguished by the Supreme Court on the ground that the non-signatories in this case acquiesced or were bound by apparent authority and ratification.
• Quijano v. Amante, 745 Phil. 40 (2014): Applied for the principle that co-owners hold property pro indiviso and exercise rights over the entire property until actual division.
• Tabasondra v. Spouses Constantino, 802 Phil. 532 (2016): Followed for the rule that co-owners may alienate their pro indiviso shares without consent of other co-owners under Article 493 of the Civil Code.
• Heirs of the Late Gerry Ecarma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 193374, June 8, 2016: Cited for the principle that no co-owner can be compelled to remain in co-ownership and that absolute opposition to partition has no basis in law.

• Section 2, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court: Governs orders for partition and partition by agreement, providing that final orders decreeing partition are appealable and that confirmed partitions must be recorded in the registry of deeds.
• Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court: Defines subject of appeal as judgments or final orders completely disposing of the case.
• Article 493 of the Civil Code: Provides that each co-owner has full ownership of his part and may alienate, assign, or mortgage it, with the effect limited to the portion allotted to him upon termination of co-ownership.
• Article 494 of the Civil Code: States that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in co-ownership and each may demand partition at any time.
• Article 1317 of the Civil Code: Provides that contracts entered into in the name of another without authority are unenforceable unless ratified by the principal.
• Article 1869 of the Civil Code: Defines implied agency arising from silence, lack of action, or failure to repudiate the agency.
• Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law): Allows voluntary land transfer arrangements between landowners and qualified beneficiaries.

Inting, Delos Santos, and J. Lopez, JJ., concur. Leonen, J., was on wellness leave.