Silva vs. Cabrera

The findings of fact of the Public Service Commission are conclusive upon the Supreme Court as long as there is evidence reasonably supporting such findings, and an oppositor's own prior applications for increased plant capacity — premised on the existence of unmet public demand — estop him from denying the necessity for an additional plant to serve the same area.

Eliseo Silva operated a 5-ton ice plant in Lipa City, authorized to sell ice in Lipa and the municipalities of Malvar, Tanauan, Talisay, and Sto. Tomas, Batangas. Belen Cabrera sought a certificate of public convenience to install and operate her own ice plant in Lipa City and to sell ice in Lipa and the municipalities of Cuenca, Alitagtag, and Ibaan, Batangas. The dispute was governed by the Public Service Act, which regulated the grant of certificates of public convenience for public utilities, including ice plants, and required the Public Service Commission to determine whether public necessity and convenience warranted the authorization of a new operator in a given territory.

Eliseo Silva operated a 5-ton ice plant in Lipa City, with authority to sell his ice in Lipa and the municipalities of Malvar, Tanauan, Talisay, and Sto. Tomas, Batangas. On June 1, 1949, Belen Cabrera filed an application with the Public Service Commission for a certificate of public convenience to install and operate a 15-ton ice plant, covering the municipalities of Sto. Tomas, Tanauan, Cuenca, Rosario, Alitagtag, San Juan de Bolbok, and Ibaan, Batangas. Oppositions were filed by Silva, by Antonio Zaragosa (who operated a 10-ton ice plant in San Juan de Bolbok), and by Leoncio S. Opulencia and Leonor Lat (who were authorized to operate a 5-ton ice plant in Tanauan). On July 14, 1949, Cabrera excluded San Juan de Bolbok and Rosario from her application, whereupon Zaragosa withdrew his opposition. The remaining parties presented their evidence before Atty. Antonio Aspillera, Chief of the Legal Division of the Public Service Commission, who had been delegated to hear the case by Commissioner Feliciano Ocampo. On January 7, 1950, a decision was rendered authorizing Cabrera to operate a 10-ton ice plant in Lipa City.

Silva appealed to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-3629), which on March 19, 1951 annulled the decision on the ground that the Public Service Act did not permit delegation of the hearing function to the Chief, Legal Division, and ordered a rehearing before the Commission en banc or a duly delegated Public Service Commissioner. During the pendency of the appeal, Cabrera had installed her 10-ton ice plant and commenced operations on March 15, 1950. On April 11, 1951, she applied for a provisional permit to continue operating, to which Silva objected. On May 31, 1951, at the hearing of the provisional permit incident and the rehearing, Commissioner Ocampo allowed Cabrera, over Silva's objection, to re-submit the evidence formerly introduced before Atty. Aspillera. On July 26, 1951, Commissioner Ocampo granted the provisional permit, subject to cancellation or revocation at any time. Silva sought certiorari in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-5162), which on January 31, 1952 denied the petition and ordered a trial de novo, holding that the admission of the prior evidence for the provisional permit did not violate law but could not be used for the determination on the merits.

A trial de novo was thereafter conducted, with both parties introducing their respective evidence. In the meantime, Cabrera further excluded Tanauan and Sto. Tomas from her application, addressing the opposition of Opulencia and Lat. On September 20, 1956, the Commission rendered a decision granting Cabrera a certificate of public convenience to operate a 10-ton ice plant in Lipa City and sell ice in Lipa, Cuenca, Alitagtag, and Ibaan for 15 years from January 7, 1950. On Silva's motion for reconsideration and new trial, the Commission denied new trial but modified its decision on June 5, 1957, reducing the authorized capacity from 10 tons to 5 tons daily. The Commission found that Lipa City and the towns of Tanauan, Cuenca, Alitagtag, and Ibaan had a combined population exceeding 125,000, with Lipa alone having over 50,000, and concluded that the existing 5-ton production was grossly inadequate for public needs. Silva's evidence, by contrast, asserted that he had never been able to sell the total output of his 5-ton plant, that there were no businesses in Lipa requiring ice, and that the 10-ton plant in Tanauan operated by Opulencia and Lat, together with his own plant, already provided all the ice the public needed.

• Insufficiency of Evidence: Petitioner maintained that the Public Service Commission erred in granting the certificate of public convenience to respondent because there was no evidence to reasonably support the decision and the order of June 5, 1957, and that the meager evidence adduced by respondent, as against the overwhelming evidence of the petitioner showing the lack of necessity for an additional plant of any capacity in Lipa City, constituted an abuse of discretion to the prejudice and detriment of petitioner's business.
• Protection Against Ruinous Competition: Petitioner argued that his business was entitled to reasonable protection against ruinous competition, and that the Commission's grant of the certificate ignored the newly discovered evidence he presented in his motion for reconsideration and new trial.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the findings of fact by the Public Service Commission, granting respondent a certificate of public convenience to operate an ice plant in Lipa City, are conclusive upon the Supreme Court when supported by evidence on record.
• Public Necessity: Whether the evidence on record reasonably supports the Commission's conclusion that the existing ice plant operators in Lipa City and the surrounding municipalities cannot sufficiently supply the needs of the public, justifying the grant of a certificate of public convenience to respondent.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Yes. The findings of fact made by the Public Service Commission are conclusive upon the Supreme Court as long as there is evidence reasonably supporting such findings, and the evidence on record was sufficient to bear out the Commission's conclusions.
• Public Necessity: Yes. The evidence reasonably established that the existing 5-ton plant was inadequate for the ice needs of Lipa City and surrounding municipalities with a combined population exceeding 125,000, and petitioner's own prior applications for increased plant capacity — premised on the same growing public demand — contradicted his opposition.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The issue raised by Silva was one of fact, hinging on the credibility and weight of the evidence introduced at the trial de novo. It is well settled that findings of fact made by the Public Service Commission are conclusive upon the Supreme Court as long as there is evidence reasonably supporting such findings. The Court reviewed the evidence on record and concluded that it was sufficient to bear out the Commission's conclusions. The Commission had more than the average opportunity and time to ascertain the facts, given the number of years the case had been pending and the multiple incidents decided in relation to it. That the Commission gave due consideration to Silva's opposition was attested by its modification of the decision — reducing the authorized capacity from 10 tons to 5 tons — in light of the new evidence Silva disclosed in his motion for reconsideration and new trial.

• Public Necessity: The Commission found that Lipa City alone had a population of over 50,000, and that the combined population of Lipa, Cuenca, Alitagtag, and Ibaan exceeded 125,000. The existing 5-ton production was grossly inadequate for the ice needs of the public. While ice was brought to Lipa by dealers from other towns, this resulted in higher prices and unreliable service, as dealers had no obligation to bring ice regularly. An additional plant in Lipa would be more beneficial and convenient than reliance on ice dealers. Crucially, Silva himself had applied in April 1947 (Case No. 24971) for authority to increase his plant capacity from 5 to 10 tons, alleging that increased production was demanded by the rapid rehabilitation of the fishing industry, increased agricultural products brought to Lipa as the province's commercial center, and the big increase in population in Lipa and surrounding municipalities. That application was dismissed for his failure to appear at the hearing. Soon after Cabrera docketed her application, Silva filed another application (Case No. 50513) on June 13, 1949 for authority to increase his capacity from 5 to 15 tons, on substantially identical grounds. Thus, the very petitioner had urged the Commission to believe that ice plant operators in Lipa and the surrounding municipalities could not sufficiently supply the needs of the public — the same proposition he now contested.

• Conclusiveness of Public Service Commission Findings of Fact — Findings of fact made by the Public Service Commission are conclusive upon the Supreme Court as long as there is evidence reasonably supporting such findings. The Court will not re-weigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the Commission on questions of fact; it is enough that the record contains evidence from which the Commission's conclusions may reasonably be drawn. Applied here to affirm the Commission's finding that public necessity warranted the grant of a certificate of public convenience to Cabrera.

• Estoppel by Prior Conduct in Public Utility Applications — While not formally denominated as estoppel, the Court applied the principle that an oppositor's own prior applications for increased plant capacity — premised on the existence of unmet public demand in the same area — undermine his opposition to a competitor's application covering the same territory. Silva's own applications in Case No. 24971 and Case No. 50513, alleging that existing ice production was inadequate for the growing population and commercial activity in Lipa and surrounding municipalities, contradicted his claim that no additional plant was necessary.

• "It is well settled, however, that the findings of fact made by the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, as long as there is evidence reasonably supporting such findings" — This passage states the controlling rule on the conclusiveness of the Public Service Commission's factual findings, which is the ratio decidendi of the decision and the basis for affirming the grant of the certificate.

• "In short, therefore, the very appellant had urged the Public Service Commission to believe that the ice plant operators in the City of Lipa and in the municipalities mentioned in the decision appealed from can not sufficiently supply the needs of the public therein." — This passage highlights the Court's use of Silva's own prior applications for increased capacity as contradictory of his opposition, effectively turning his own position against him.

• "We are convinced that the operation of applicant's 10-ton plant in Lipa will undoubtedly result in promoting public interests and convenience because thereby the ice requirements of the public which can not be met by the present plant will be adequately served." — This is the Commission's finding, quoted in the decision, articulating the standard of public interest and convenience that governs the grant of a certificate of public convenience.

• Javellana vs. La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., 37 Off. Gaz. 3110 — Cited as authority for the doctrine that findings of fact by the Public Service Commission are conclusive upon the Supreme Court when supported by evidence.
• Phil. Shipowners' Association vs. Public Utility Commissioner, 43 Phil. 328 — Cited in support of the same doctrine on conclusiveness of the Commission's factual findings.
• Ynchausti Steamship Co. vs. Public Utility Commissioner, 44 Phil. 362 — Cited in support of the same doctrine.
• San Miguel Brewery vs. Lapi, 53 Phil. 539 — Cited in support of the same doctrine.
• Ice and Cold Storage Industries of the Phil. vs. Valero, et al., 85 Phil. 7 — Cited in support of the same doctrine.
• Lopez vs. Batangas Trans. Co., et al., 105 Phil. 649 — Cited in support of the same doctrine.

• Public Service Act — The Court referenced the Public Service Act as the governing statute under which the Commission's authority to grant certificates of public convenience was derived, and noted that under the Act then in force, the hearing function could not be delegated to the Chief, Legal Division, which was the basis for the earlier annulment in G.R. No. L-3629.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concurred.