Siena Realty Corporation vs. Hon. Lolita Gal-Lang

A court must take mandatory judicial notice of the official acts of the judicial department, including amendments to procedural rules, even without the parties raising the matter, and such procedural amendments apply retroactively to pending cases — but the availability of a favorable procedural rule does not cure the election of an improper remedy or the finality of the underlying order sought to be assailed.

Siena Realty Corporation, represented by Lydia Co Hao and Lilibeth Manlugon, was the plaintiff in a civil complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 44, presided over by Judge Lolita Gal-Lang. Private respondent Anita Co Ng, in trust for Rockefeller Ng, moved for dismissal of the complaint, which the trial court granted. The dispute centers on the proper appellate remedy and the reglementary period for challenging that dismissal through the appellate courts, complicated by an amendment to Section 4, Rule 65 that took effect while the matter was pending reconsideration before the Court of Appeals.

Siena Realty Corporation, represented by Lydia Co Hao and Lilibeth Manlugon, filed a civil complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 44, presided over by Judge Lolita Gal-Lang. Private respondent Anita Co Ng, in trust for Rockefeller Ng, moved for dismissal of the complaint, and the trial court granted the motion, issuing an order of dismissal.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the dismissal order. The trial court subsequently issued an Order dated October 20, 1999, which denied petitioners' counsel's Notice of Withdrawal and likewise denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal order. Petitioners received this October 20, 1999 Order on November 8, 1999. On November 17, 1999, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the October 20, 1999 Order. The trial court denied this motion by Order dated March 23, 2000, which petitioners received on April 8, 2000.

On June 7, 2000 — the 60th day from receipt of the March 23, 2000 Order — petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition by Resolution of June 20, 2000 for being filed out of time. The Court of Appeals computed the period from receipt of the October 20, 1999 Order (November 8, 1999), treating the filing of the motion for reconsideration on November 17, 1999 as merely interrupting the 60-day period, leaving only the balance of the original period after the motion was denied. Under this computation, petitioners had only until May 29, 2000 to file the petition, making the June 7, 2000 filing nine days late.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the June 20, 2000 Resolution on July 10, 2000. While that motion was pending, the Supreme Court issued a Resolution dated August 1, 2000 in A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, amending Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The amendment, which took effect on September 1, 2000, changed the rule so that when a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, the 60-day period is counted from notice of the denial of the motion, rather than being merely interrupted by it. The Court of Appeals, however, denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration by Resolution of September 13, 2000, applying the old rule and holding that the 60-day period was counted from receipt of the questioned order, not from receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration. The appellate court did not take judicial notice of the amendment, which had taken effect twelve days earlier.

• Judicial Notice and Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the September 13, 2000 Resolution without taking prior judicial notice of Supreme Court A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, which amended the second paragraph of Section 4, Rule 65 and took effect on September 1, 2000.

• Mootness of the Amendment: Respondent alleged that the matter was no longer pending and undetermined when the amendment took effect, implying that the retroactive application of the amended rule could not benefit petitioners.

• Proper Remedy: Whether a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the proper remedy to challenge a Court of Appeals resolution allegedly issued with grave abuse of discretion.
• Judicial Notice: Whether the Court of Appeals should have taken mandatory judicial notice of the Supreme Court's resolution in A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC amending Section 4, Rule 65, even without petitioner raising the matter.
• Retroactive Application: Whether the amendment to Section 4, Rule 65, a procedural rule, applies retroactively to a motion for reconsideration pending when the amendment took effect.
• Nature of the Dismissal Order: Whether the trial court's order dismissing the complaint was a final order subject to appeal rather than certiorari, and whether it had become final and executory.

• Proper Remedy: No. Because the petition attributes grave abuse of discretion to the Court of Appeals, the proper remedy was certiorari under Rule 65, not review on certiorari under Rule 45; on this ground alone, the petition must be denied due course.
• Judicial Notice: Yes. The Court of Appeals should have taken mandatory judicial notice of the Court's resolution in A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence, which requires courts to take judicial notice of the official acts of the judicial department without the introduction of evidence.
• Retroactive Application: Yes. The amendment pertains to a procedural matter and applies retroactively; the issue of whether the petition for certiorari was timely filed was still pending reconsideration when the amendment took effect on September 1, 2000, and was thus covered by its retroactive application.
• Nature of the Dismissal Order: The order granting the motion to dismiss was a final, not interlocutory, order, subject to appeal under Rule 41, not certiorari under Rule 65. The October 20, 1999 Order had become final and executory after the 15th day following petitioners' receipt thereof.

• Proper Remedy: The petition was filed under Rule 45, which governs petitions for review on certiorari of judgments or final orders of the Court of Appeals. However, the gravamen of the petition is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals in issuing the challenged resolution. Grave abuse of discretion is the proper subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The election of the wrong remedy is fatal and, standing alone, warrants denial of due course.

• Judicial Notice: Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence mandates that a court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the Philippines. The Supreme Court's resolution in A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, amending Section 4, Rule 65, is an official act of the judicial department. The Court of Appeals was therefore duty-bound to take judicial notice of it even though petitioner did not raise or allege the amendment in their motion for reconsideration. The resolution did not need to specify retroactive effect because it pertains to a procedural matter, and procedural rules generally apply retroactively to pending cases.

• Retroactive Application: Contrary to private respondent's allegation that the matter was no longer pending and undetermined, the issue of whether the petition for certiorari was timely filed was still pending reconsideration before the Court of Appeals when the amendment took effect on September 1, 2000. The amended rule, which provides that the 60-day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of a timely filed motion for reconsideration or new trial, would have rendered petitioners' June 7, 2000 filing timely. However, this favorable procedural rule does not salvage the petition.

• Nature of the Dismissal Order: The trial court's order granting private respondent's motion to dismiss the complaint was a final order, not an interlocutory one. A final order is one which disposes of the subject matter or terminates the proceedings, leaving nothing to be judicially acted upon. As a final order, it was the proper subject of an appeal under Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, not of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. At the time petitioners filed their petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals on the 60th day following receipt of the October 20, 1999 Order, that order had already become final and executory after the 15th day following receipt. The remedy of appeal having been allowed to lapse, certiorari could not substitute for the lost appeal.

• Mandatory Judicial Notice of Official Acts of the Judicial Department — Under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence, courts must take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the Philippines. This duty is mandatory and does not require a party to raise or allege the matter. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the Court of Appeals should have taken judicial notice of the Supreme Court's resolution in A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC amending Section 4, Rule 65, even though petitioners did not cite the amendment in their motion for reconsideration.

• Retroactive Application of Procedural Rules — Amendments to procedural rules apply retroactively to pending cases, including those under reconsideration, without need for the amendatory rule to specify retroactive effect. The Court held that the issue of timeliness of the petition for certiorari was still pending reconsideration when the amendment to Section 4, Rule 65 took effect on September 1, 2000, and was thus covered by its retroactive application.

• Final vs. Interlocutory Orders and the Proper Remedy — An order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint is a final order, one that disposes of the subject matter or terminates the proceedings. A final order is the proper subject of an appeal under Rule 41, not of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Certiorari under Rule 65 is not a substitute for a lost appeal; where the period to appeal a final order has lapsed, certiorari will not lie.

• "Even if petitioner did not raise or allege the amendment in their motion for reconsideration before it, the Court of Appeals should have taken mandatory judicial notice of this Court's resolution in A.M. Matter No. 00-02-03 SC." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on judicial notice: the duty to take judicial notice of official acts of the judicial department is mandatory and independent of whether a party raises the matter.

• "The resolution did not have to specify that it had retroactive effect as it pertains to a procedural matter." — This defines the doctrine of retroactive application of procedural rules: procedural amendments apply retroactively to pending cases without need for express stipulation of retroactivity.

• "The order of the trial court granting private respondent's Motion to Dismiss the complaint was a final, not interlocutory, order and as such, it was subject to appeal, not a petition for certiorari." — This passage states the controlling distinction between final and interlocutory orders and the consequence for the availability of remedies: a final order is appealable, not subject to certiorari.

• Section 4, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC) — Governs the period and venue for filing a petition for certiorari. The original version provided that filing a motion for reconsideration interrupted the 60-day period, with the remaining balance available upon denial. The amended version, effective September 1, 2000, provides that when a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, the 60-day period is counted from notice of the denial of the motion. The Court held that the amendment applied retroactively to petitioners' pending motion for reconsideration.

• Section 1, Rule 129, Rules on Evidence (Judicial Notice) — Mandates that courts take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the Philippines. Applied to require the Court of Appeals to take judicial notice of the Supreme Court's resolution amending Rule 65.

• Section 1, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Governs appeals from final orders of the trial court. Cited to establish that the trial court's dismissal order, being final, was the proper subject of appeal rather than certiorari.

• A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC — The Supreme Court administrative matter approving the amendment to Section 4, Rule 65, approved by Resolution dated August 1, 2000, and taking effect on September 1, 2000. The amendment changed the computation of the 60-day period for filing certiorari petitions when a motion for reconsideration is filed.

Vitug (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concurred.