Sibuma vs. COMELEC

A petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy requires proof that the candidate made a false material representation with deliberate intent to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would render him or her ineligible; absent a finding of such intent to deceive, the CoC cannot be cancelled, and the candidate's declaration in the CoC is presumed made in good faith.

Sibuma and private respondent Stefanie Ann Eriguel Calongcagon vied for the mayoralty of the Municipality of Agoo, La Union in the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections. Private respondent Alma L. Panelo sought the cancellation of Sibuma's CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, alleging that he falsely declared his residency in Brgy. Sta. Barbara, Agoo, La Union when he was in truth a resident of Aringay, La Union. The Local Government Code, under Section 39(a) of Republic Act No. 7160, requires that an elective local official be a resident of the locality for at least one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

Frank Ong Sibuma and Stefanie Ann Eriguel Calongcagon were rival candidates for the mayoralty of the Municipality of Agoo, La Union in the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections. Sibuma filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position on October 7, 2021, declaring therein that he would be a resident of Brgy. Sta. Barbara, Agoo, La Union for one year and three months on the day before the elections. On November 2, 2021, Alma L. Panelo filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Sibuma's CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, alleging that Sibuma committed a material misrepresentation because he was in truth a resident of Zone 2, Purok 9, San Eugenio, Aringay, La Union, not of Brgy. Sta. Barbara, Agoo.

To support her petition, Panelo submitted two Certifications dated October 29, 2021 issued by Punong Barangay Erwina C. Eriguel of Brgy. Sta. Barbara, Agoo, stating that Sibuma was not a resident of that barangay. Panelo also presented a Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 025-2020001551, and applications for building permits covering a certain property, asserting that the address Sibuma claimed in his CoC belonged to a different person, one Eric Ong Sibuma. A Certification from the Municipal Engineer of Agoo was likewise submitted, attesting that no certificate of occupancy had been issued over the property. Sibuma, for his part, maintained that he had established his residency in Agoo since birth and that, while he may have been absent for some time, his intention to return had always been present. He submitted his Certificate of Live Birth showing he was born in Agoo, La Union; his Secondary Student's Record from Don Mariano Marcos Memorial State University of Agoo; telephone bills and a Ledger Inquiry from the La Union Electric Company issued in his name indicating Sta. Barbara, Agoo as his address; a Tax Declaration of Real Property issued in his and his spouse's names covering property in Sta. Barbara, Agoo; and an Affidavit of Residency dated November 29, 2021 signed by 41 residents of Brgy. Sta. Barbara attesting that he had resided in Agoo from January 2021.

Panelo countered with supplementary affidavits dated December 3 and 4, 2021, individually executed by eight of the original 41 affiants, who recanted their participation in Sibuma's Affidavit of Residency, claiming they did not read or understand its contents. During the pendency of the petition, the May 9, 2022 Elections proceeded with Sibuma's name on the ballots. On May 10, 2022, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Sibuma as duly elected Mayor, he having garnered 21,364 votes against Eriguel's 16,603. Three days later, on May 13, 2022, the COMELEC Second Division granted Panelo's petition, cancelling Sibuma's CoC and declaring all votes cast for him as stray, finding that he failed to establish actual physical presence in Agoo and that his evidence of domicile was insufficient. The COMELEC Second Division found Sibuma's Affidavit of Residency doubtful, gave weight to the recanting affidavits, noted that his utility bills showed consumption only from February 2021 onwards, and rejected his reliance on his birth certificate and school records to prove animus revertendi, observing that his school records indicated an address in Aringay, not Agoo.

On May 24, 2022, the OCOC issued a Certificate of Finality and Entry of Judgment, declaring the May 13, 2022 Resolution final and executory on the ground that Sibuma had not filed a motion for reconsideration within five days from electronic service on May 16, 2022. Sibuma asserted that his counsel only received, saw, and read the e-mail on May 22, 2022, and filed his Motion for Reconsideration on May 27, 2022. The COMELEC Special Second Division, however, did not act on his motion or other pending filings and instead issued a Writ of Execution on June 29, 2022, ordering the Municipal Board of Canvassers to reconvene, annul Sibuma's proclamation, and proclaim Eriguel in his stead. The Board reconvened on July 5, 2022 and carried out the writ, annulling Sibuma's proclamation and proclaiming Eriguel as Mayor. On the same day, the Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order and Status Quo Ante Order enjoining the implementation of the assailed COMELEC issuances.

• Timeliness of Panelo's Petition: Sibuma argued that Panelo's petition should have been dismissed for having been belatedly filed, contending that under Section 2, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure as amended by Resolution No. 9523, the petition must be filed within five days from the last day for filing CoCs, which fell on October 8, 2021, making Panelo's November 2, 2021 filing out of time.
• Denial of Right to Appeal to the En Banc: Sibuma maintained that he timely filed his Motion for Reconsideration on May 27, 2022, reckoning the five-day reglementary period from May 22, 2022, when his counsel allegedly received, saw, and read the e-mail sent by the OCOC on May 16, 2022, and that the COMELEC denied him the right to have his motion resolved by the En Banc.
• Premature Issuance of Writ of Execution: Sibuma argued that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it prematurely issued the Writ of Execution on June 29, 2022, more than a month after the assailed Resolution, during which period he had filed multiple pleadings including his Motion for Reconsideration, Opposition to Motion for Execution, and Motion to Quash and/or Recall Certificate of Finality.
• Residency and Domicile: Sibuma maintained that his domicile remained in Agoo, La Union, and that he was a bona fide resident thereof, citing his birth in Agoo, property ownership and tax declarations, secondary education in Agoo, utility bills in his name, the Affidavit of Residency signed by 41 neighbors, and his registration as a voter of Agoo, La Union.
• Will of the Electorate: Sibuma invoked the will of the electorate of Agoo, arguing that the COMELEC's failure to resolve the petition prior to the elections and his proclamation rendered the cancellation of his CoC no longer justified, and that the petition should have been dismissed.

• Finality of the Assailed Resolution: Respondents maintained that the Resolution dated May 13, 2022 cancelling Sibuma's CoC had already attained finality and could no longer be disturbed, as Sibuma failed to file a timely motion for reconsideration within five days from receipt of the Resolution via e-mail on May 16, 2022.
• Factual and Legal Bases for Cancellation: Respondents insisted that the cancellation of Sibuma's CoC had factual and legal bases, asserting that he committed material misrepresentation regarding his residency qualification.
• Fait Accompli: Respondents prayed that the TRO and SQA Order be lifted on the ground that the acts sought to be enjoined had already become fait accompli, as the Municipal Board of Canvassers had already reconvened on July 5, 2022, annulled Sibuma's proclamation, and proclaimed Eriguel in his stead.

• Timeliness of Section 78 Petition: Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in giving due course to Panelo's petition to cancel Sibuma's CoC despite its allegedly having been filed beyond the reglementary period.
• Finality and Right to Appeal: Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying Sibuma's right to appeal to the En Banc by treating his Motion for Reconsideration as untimely filed and issuing a Certificate of Finality and Entry of Judgment.
• Premature Execution: Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in prematurely issuing the Writ of Execution while Sibuma's motions remained pending and unresolved.
• Cancellation of CoC and Nullification of Proclamation: Whether the COMELEC Second Division gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the cancellation of Sibuma's CoC and the nullification of his proclamation as duly elected Mayor of Agoo, La Union.

• Timeliness of Section 78 Petition: No. Panelo's petition was timely filed within 25 days from the filing of Sibuma's CoC on October 7, 2021, as Section 78 of the OEC and Section 2, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure both allow filing not later than 25 days from the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
• Finality and Right to Appeal: Yes, grave abuse of discretion. The COMELEC reckoned the five-day reglementary period from May 16, 2022, treating electronic transmission as complete service without proof that Sibuma's counsel actually received or opened the e-mail, and without the affidavit of service required under Section 9, Rule 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 10673; the COMELEC should have liberally applied its own rules given the public interest involved.
• Premature Execution: Yes, grave abuse of discretion. The Writ of Execution was issued on June 29, 2022, more than a month after the assailed Resolution, during which period Sibuma had filed multiple pleadings that the COMELEC Special Second Division simply noted without action, warranting certification to the En Banc under Sections 5 and 6, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
• Cancellation of CoC and Nullification of Proclamation: Yes, grave abuse of discretion. The COMELEC Second Division cancelled Sibuma's CoC without any finding of deliberate intent to deceive the electorate—an indispensable element under Section 78 of the OEC—and committed grossly unreasonable appreciation and evaluation of the evidence, shifting the burden of proof to Sibuma and relying on trivial discrepancies and suspect recantations.

• Timeliness of Section 78 Petition: Section 78 of the OEC provides that a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC may be filed "at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy." Section 2, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by Resolution No. 9523, similarly provides that the petition must be filed "not later than twenty-five (25) days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy subject of the Petition." Sibuma filed his CoC on October 7, 2021; counting 25 days therefrom, Panelo's filing on November 2, 2021 was within the prescribed period. Sibuma's reliance on the five-day period from the last day for filing CoCs was misplaced, as the controlling outer limit is 25 days from the actual filing of the CoC.

• Finality and Right to Appeal: The COMELEC Second Division reckoned the five-day reglementary period from May 16, 2022, the date it sent the assailed Resolution via e-mail to the parties, including Sibuma's counsel. However, the records lacked any proof of service by way of an affidavit of service executed by the COMELEC Clerk of Court, as required under Section 9, Rule 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 10673, which provides that electronic service is complete at the time of electronic transmission or when the electronic notification is sent, but is not effective if the serving party learns it did not reach the addressee. The COMELEC made no inquiry whether Sibuma's counsel actually acknowledged receipt or opened the attached Resolution. Given the highly technical nature of electronic service and the public interest involved—especially since the people of Agoo had already elected Sibuma as their Mayor—the COMELEC should have liberally applied its own rules pursuant to Section 4, Rule 1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which authorizes suspension of the rules in the interest of justice and speedy disposition. The OCOC in fact received Sibuma's Motion for Reconsideration via e-mail on May 27, 2022, and he paid the corresponding filing fee. Under Sections 5 and 6, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the Clerk of Court should have certified the case to the En Banc for resolution of the motion. The Court declined to remand the case, however, proceeding to resolve the merits given the urgency inherent in election cases.

• Premature Execution: The Writ of Execution was issued on June 29, 2022, more than a month after the assailed Resolution of May 13, 2022. During that interval, Sibuma had filed numerous pleadings, including his Motion for Reconsideration on May 27, 2022, Opposition to Motion for Execution on May 27, 2022, Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration received May 30, 2022, Motion to Quash and/or Recall Certificate of Finality received May 31, 2022, and Omnibus Motion and Extremely Urgent Ex-Parte Motion dated June 14, 2022. The COMELEC Special Second Division could have reasonably acted on these filings but instead contented itself with the supposed failure to timely file the Motion for Reconsideration and conveniently noted his filings without action. This constituted grave abuse of discretion, particularly in light of the jurisprudential directive that utmost efforts be exerted to resolve election cases in a manner that gives effect to the will of the electorate.

• Cancellation of CoC and Nullification of Proclamation: Section 78 of the OEC allows cancellation of a CoC exclusively on the ground that any material representation required under Section 74 is false. While the provisions are silent on the element of deceit, jurisprudence—particularly Mayor Hayudini vs. Commission on Elections—established that a false representation under Section 78 must be committed with a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. The false material representation must be made with malicious intent to deceive the electorate as to the candidate's qualifications. A thorough reading of the assailed Resolution revealed the paucity of any such finding of intent to deceive. Section 74 requires only that the facts stated in the CoC be true "to the best of his knowledge," meaning a candidate who makes a representation subsequently found false remains compliant if the representation was made in good faith. The absence of a finding of intent to deceive gives rise to a presumption of good faith in favor of the candidate's declaration. On the merits of residency, the Court found that Sibuma more than sufficiently proved by substantial evidence both his actual physical presence in Agoo, La Union for at least one year prior to the elections and the intentions of animus manendi and animus revertendi to establish Agoo as his domicile. He was born in Agoo, obtained his secondary education there, owned real properties with his wife, paid utility bills in his name at Sta. Barbara, Agoo, was confirmed as a resident by 41 neighbors, and was a registered voter of Agoo. Domicile is not lost by mere residence elsewhere; absence from legal residence to pursue a profession, study, or engage in business of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. There being no positive proof of abandonment of his Agoo domicile for another, his domicile therein could not be doubted. The COMELEC Second Division's appreciation of evidence was grossly unreasonable in three respects: first, it gave conclusive weight to the Certification of the Punong Barangay—who was the paternal aunt of respondent Eriguel—despite such certifications being merely presumptive and not conclusive, and despite the absence of any statement from the barangay secretary; second, it favored the affidavits of recantation of eight affiants over the original Affidavit of Residency signed by 41 affiants, without examining the suspicious circumstances of the recantations (executed on the same days before the same notary, with general statements of repudiation, barely a week after the original affidavits, and in close proximity to the elections); and third, it treated the discrepancy between Sibuma's declaration of residency from January 2021 and his utility bills showing consumption from February 2021 as material, when the discrepancy was trivial and inconsequential and did not render him unable to fulfill the one-year residence requirement. The burden under Section 78 rests on the petitioner to prove the false representation and malice, and the COMELEC improperly shifted this burden to Sibuma. Doubts should have been resolved in favor of Sibuma's residence qualification to give fullest effect to the manifest will of the people of Agoo, who elected him with an overwhelming margin of 21,364 votes against Eriguel's 16,603.

• Intent to Deceive in Section 78 Petitions — A petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code requires not only that the false representation be material but also that it was made with a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render the candidate ineligible. The false representation must be made with malicious intent to deceive the electorate as to the candidate's qualifications. Absent such finding, the CoC cannot be cancelled, and the candidate's declaration is presumed made in good faith, as Section 74 requires only that the facts stated be true to the best of the candidate's knowledge. Applied in this case: the COMELEC Second Division's Resolution cancelling Sibuma's CoC contained no finding of intent to deceive, rendering the cancellation void for grave abuse of discretion.

• Domicile Not Lost by Residence Elsewhere — An individual does not lose his or her domicile even if he or she has lived and maintained residences in different places. Absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study, or to engage in other activities of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. The strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another. Applied in this case: Sibuma's absence from Agoo for some time did not constitute abandonment of his domicile, there being no positive proof thereof, and his birth, education, property ownership, voter registration, and community ties in Agoo established his domicile.

• Liberal Construction of COMELEC Rules — The COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction. The COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even suspend its rules of procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all matters pending before it. Unlike an ordinary civil action, an election contest is imbued with public interest, involving not only the adjudication of private interests of rival candidates but also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the electorate. Applied in this case: the COMELEC should have liberally applied its rules on electronic service given the technical intricacies involved and the public interest at stake, rather than treating the May 16, 2022 e-mail as conclusive proof of service without verifying actual receipt.

• Will of the Electorate Paramount — In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, the Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to democratic institutions. Doubts should be resolved in favor of the winning candidate's qualifications. Applied in this case: the COMELEC should have resolved all doubts in favor of Sibuma's residence qualification, given his overwhelming electoral victory, and should not have cancelled his CoC on the basis of hasty conclusions, surmises, and trivial matters.

• "while the foregoing provisions are silent on the element of deceit, the Court in Hayudini underscored that aside from the requirement of materiality, it is essential that a false representation under Section 78 be committed with a 'deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.'" — This passage articulates the indispensable element of intent to deceive in Section 78 petitions, forming the core ratio decidendi of the decision.

• "Section 74 requires the inclusion in the CoC of a declaration that the facts stated therein are true to the best of the candidate's knowledge. Evidently, this declaration qualifies all of the information that Section 74 requires. In other words, the law does not demand from candidates perfect accuracy and absolute certainty in the information that they supply in a CoC, but only such facts which they believe to be true to the best of their knowledge." — This quotation, drawn from Justice Caguioa's dissenting opinion in Villamor vs. Commission on Elections and adopted by the majority, defines the scope of a candidate's obligation under Section 74 and explains why good faith compliance precludes cancellation under Section 78.

• "In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority." — This passage from Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, quoted and applied by the Court, establishes the governing principle that doubts in election cases must be resolved to preserve the electorate's choice.

• "the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy is 'not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he [or] she is running for.'" — This quotation from Fermin vs. Commission on Elections clarifies the distinction between lack of qualification and false material representation, underscoring that Section 78 targets deceptive declarations rather than mere ineligibility.

• Mayor Hayudini vs. Commission on Elections, 733 Phil. 822 (2014) — Controlling precedent on the element of intent to deceive in Section 78 petitions. The Court relied on Hayudini to hold that a false representation under Section 78 must be committed with a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact rendering the candidate ineligible, and that election statutes should be liberally construed to avoid defeating the will of the people by mere technical objections.

• Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, 636 Phil. 753 (2010) — Followed. The Court in Mitra set aside the cancellation of a CoC for the COMELEC's failure to consider whether the candidate deliberately attempted to mislead or hide a fact rendering him ineligible. The Court applied the same principle to find that the COMELEC Second Division's lack of any finding of intent to deceive tainted its cancellation of Sibuma's CoC. Also cited for the proposition that barangay certifications of residency are not conclusive.

• Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections, 318 Phil. 329 (1995) — Followed. Cited for the doctrine that an individual does not lose his or her domicile even if he or she has maintained residences in different places, and that absence from legal residence for temporary or semi-permanent purposes does not constitute loss of residence.

• Faypon vs. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 (1954) — Followed. Cited for the principle that a citizen who leaves his place of birth to improve his lot retains his animus revertendi to his domicile of origin, and that registration as a voter in another place has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of residence of origin.

• Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 327 Phil. 521 (1996) — Followed. Cited for the directive that in actions involving the possible reversal of the popular electoral choice, the Court must exert utmost effort to resolve issues in a manner that gives effect to the will of the majority, and that to successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding it would create greater prejudice to democratic institutions.

• Fermin vs. Commission on Elections, 595 Phil. 449 (2008) — Followed. Cited for the proposition that cancellation of a CoC under Section 78 is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a false material representation, which may relate to the qualifications required for the office sought.

• Villamor vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 250370 (Notice), October 5, 2021 — Cited for the dissenting opinion of Justice Caguioa, which the majority adopted as persuasive authority on the interplay between Sections 74 and 78 of the OEC, specifically the principle that Section 74 requires only facts true to the best of the candidate's knowledge and that Section 78 is limited to knowingly made false material representations.

• Aznar vs. Commission on Elections, 264 Phil. 307 (1990) — Cited for the interpretation of Section 78 of the OEC regarding the 25-day period for filing a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC.

• Section 78, Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) — Governs petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy, exclusively on the ground of false material representation as required under Section 74. Provides that the petition may be filed not later than 25 days from the filing of the CoC and shall be decided not later than 15 days before the election. Applied as the substantive basis for evaluating whether Sibuma's CoC was properly cancelled, with the Court finding the element of intent to deceive indispensable and absent.

• Section 74, Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) — Enumerates the required contents of a certificate of candidacy, including a declaration that the facts stated are true to the best of the candidate's knowledge. Applied to establish that a candidate's good faith belief in the truth of the information supplied satisfies Section 74, thereby limiting Section 78 to knowingly false representations.

• Section 39(a), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Prescribes the qualifications for elective local officials, including residency in the locality for at least one year immediately preceding the day of the election. Applied as the standard against which Sibuma's residency declaration was measured, with the Court finding he satisfied the requirement.

• Section 2, Rule 23, COMELEC Rules of Procedure (as amended by Resolution No. 9523) — Provides the period for filing a petition under Section 78: within five days from the last day for filing CoCs, but not later than 25 days from the filing of the CoC subject of the petition. Applied to uphold the timeliness of Panelo's petition filed on November 2, 2021, 25 days after Sibuma's October 7, 2021 filing.

• Sections 5 and 6, Rule 19, COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Outline the procedure for disposing of motions for reconsideration of Division decisions, requiring the Clerk of Court to notify the Presiding Commissioner, who shall certify the case to the En Banc within two days, and the En Banc to resolve the motion within 10 days from certification. Applied to show that the COMELEC should have certified Sibuma's Motion for Reconsideration to the En Banc rather than ignoring it.

• Section 4, Rule 1, COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Authorizes the COMELEC to suspend its rules in the interest of justice and speedy disposition. Applied to support the Court's finding that the COMELEC should have liberally applied its rules on electronic service given the public interest involved.

• Section 9, Rule 2, COMELEC Resolution No. 10673 — Governs proof and completeness of electronic service, requiring an affidavit of service executed by the person who sent the e-mail together with a printed proof of transmittal. Applied to show that the COMELEC's electronic service of the assailed Resolution was deficient, as no such affidavit of service was found in the records.

Gesmundo, C.J., Leonen, SAJ., Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Dimaampao, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concurred. Lazaro-Javier, J., filed a concurring opinion, the text of which is not included in the source material.

• Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa — Filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Hernando, J. Lopez, Marquez, and Singh, JJ. The text of the dissent is not included in the source material; the summary of its reasoning cannot be provided from the case text provided.