Primary Holding
An unqualified affirmance affirms the whole of the appealed judgment's dispositive part, even as to portions not quoted or discussed in the affirming opinion. Because the prior decision decreed affirmance without words of modification or limitation, the directive allowing round-up of buffaloes upon posting bond remained executory notwithstanding its omission from the opinion's quotation.
Background
Siari Valley Estates, Inc. and Filemon Lucasan were the plaintiff and defendant in Civil Case No. 134 of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, concerning cattle entrusted to Lucasan as receiver or trustee and buffaloes found roaming on his cattle ranch. Judge Patricio Ceniza rendered judgment adjudicating cattle and damages to the Estate, authorizing round-up of buffaloes upon a bond, finding Lucasan guilty of contempt, and dismissing his counterclaim. That judgment became the subject of appeal decided in G.R. No. L-7046, Siari Valley Estate Inc. vs. Filemon Lucasan, which affirmed on appeal and thereafter became final and was remanded for execution.
History
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Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, Judge Patricio Ceniza, Civil Case No. 134 — adjudicated cattle to Siari Valley Estate, awarded damages and interest, authorized round-up of buffaloes upon P5,000 bond, found Lucasan guilty of contempt and fined him P500, and dismissed his counterclaim and the intervention.
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Supreme Court, G.R. No. L-7046 — affirmed the appealed judgment, finding it substantially in accordance with facts and law, which decision became final.
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Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte, respondent Judge W. M. Ortega, on remand for execution — sustained Lucasan's contention that affirmance excluded the buffalo directive because that paragraph had been omitted from the Supreme Court opinion's quotation, and declined to permit the round-up.
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Supreme Court — issued a preliminary injunction to protect petitioner's interests and heard the present petition for mandamus and auxiliary remedies.
Facts
Siari Valley Estates, Inc. claimed cattle kept on the cattle ranch of Filemon Lucasan, particularly 321 heads entrusted to Lucasan's care as receiver or trustee of the court. The Estate further sought damages for 400 heads of cattle allegedly sold by Lucasan from 1946 up to the date of trial, and authority to round up buffaloes found on the ranch. Lucasan, for his part, had complained of such buffaloes grazing on his land, resisted delivery and liability, interposed a counterclaim with three causes of action, and was also subjected to contempt proceedings; intervenors likewise sought relief.
After trial in January 1951, Judge Ceniza adjudicated to the Estate all cattle found in Lucasan's ranch, especially the 321 heads held as receiver or trustee, and ordered delivery of said cattle or their value of P40,000, payment of P40,000 as damages for the 400 heads sold at P100 per head plus 6 per cent interest from the January 1951 trial, and costs. The judgment additionally ordered Lucasan to allow the Estate to round up all buffaloes found in his ranch after posting a P5,000 bond to answer for damages the operation might cause, found Lucasan guilty of contempt and sentenced him to a P500 fine pursuant to section 6, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court or subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at one day for every P2.50 unpaid, dismissed Lucasan's three counterclaim causes for lack of merit, and noted prior dismissal of the intervention without prejudice to an independent action.
On appeal in G.R. No. L-7046, the judgment was affirmed after being found substantially in accordance with the facts and the law. The affirming opinion, in its opening statement, quoted the dispositive part but omitted the paragraph concerning buffaloes, using elliptical marks, and made no other reference to buffaloes, as appellant's brief had not debated that aspect. After finality and remand for execution, Lucasan pointed to the omission and argued the affirmance did not include the buffalo directive. Respondent Judge Ortega sustained that contention and declined enforcement as to the buffaloes, prompting the Estate to file the present petition, upon which a preliminary injunction was issued to preserve its interests.
Arguments of the Petitioners
- Scope of Affirmance and Execution: Petitioner maintained that the prior affirmance upheld the appealed judgment in full, including the authority to round up buffaloes upon bond, and therefore sought mandamus to compel enforcement and obedience thereto.
- Contempt: Petitioner contended that Lucasan's resistance to the round-up warranted a declaration that he had committed contempt of court.
Arguments of the Respondents
- Omission from Quoted Judgment: Respondents argued that because the Supreme Court's decision quoted the dispositive paragraphs without the underlined buffalo portion, affirmance did not include the directive about buffaloes.
- Relief Not Prayed: Respondents argued that plaintiff never claimed the buffaloes in its amended complaint, so the lower court could not have granted what was not prayed, and the Supreme Court most probably excluded the matter from its confirmatory order.
- Propriety of Affirmance: Respondents argued in effect that the Court should not have and could not have affirmed that phase of the judgment.
Issues
- Scope of Affirmance: Whether the Supreme Court's unqualified affirmance in G.R. No. L-7046 included the paragraph authorizing round-up of buffaloes, although that paragraph was omitted from the opinion's quotation of the appealed judgment.
- Relief Beyond Pleadings: Whether the buffalo directive could stand although allegedly not specifically claimed in the amended complaint.
- Mandamus and Contempt: Whether mandamus should issue to enforce the full affirmed judgment and whether Lucasan's resistance constituted contempt of court.
Ruling
- Scope of Affirmance: Yes. The unqualified affirmance upheld the entire appealed judgment, the omission in quotation with elliptical marks evincing no intent to modify.
- Relief Beyond Pleadings: Yes. After trial where defendant was not in default, any relief supported by evidence may be granted although not specified in pleadings, pursuant to section 9, Rule 35.
- Mandamus and Contempt: Mandamus granted; contempt denied. Enforcement of the full judgment was ordered, but resistance founded on a not-flimsy technical plea was not willful disobedience warranting contempt, which power is conservatively exercised.
Ruling Rationale
- Scope of Affirmance: The concluding decree found the appealed judgment substantially in accordance with facts and law and adjudged affirmance without saying it was modified or that only the quoted portion was affirmed. Ordinarily the affirmed judgment is that contained in its dispositive part, here the four paragraphs including counterclaim and intervention dispositions likewise not quoted. Under Contreras vs. Felix, the final judgment as rendered prevails irrespective of seemingly contrary statements in the opinion, the judgment being distinguished from the opinion. Confirmatory decisions are construed to uphold the whole appealed judgment absent words to the contrary, even as to points not discussed, and affirmance makes conclusive all matters actually adjudicated although not mentioned; general expressions outside the matter before the court and unnecessary to decision do not control. The omission was immaterial to the appeal, the decision itself making no reference to buffaloes because appellant's brief did not debate that aspect, and modification without stated reason would have been unorthodox since litigants are entitled to know why modification was made.
- Relief Beyond Pleadings: Lucasan was not in default and there was trial, so plaintiff could be granted any relief supported by evidence although not specified in pleadings. The contention that the buffaloes were never claimed and therefore must have been excluded has no valid foundation in light of that rule. The further contention that the Court should not or could not have affirmed that phase was too late and impertinent, the unmodified affirmance being final, and the matter not being plain error calling for special consideration where ignored by appellant's counsel.
- Mandamus and Contempt: The respondent judge's refusal to permit the round-up was mistaken, and execution of Judge Ceniza's judgment as totally affirmed was required. Lucasan's resistance, despite knowledge from his complaint of buffaloes grazing on his land, was characterized as sharp practice transcending good faith. Nevertheless, contempt was denied because his ground appeared not so flimsy, having even convinced a superior court judge, as to constitute willful disregard or disobedience or clear and contumacious refusal to obey, and the contempt power is to be conservatively exercised.
Doctrines
- Affirmance of judgment in toto — An appellate decree of unqualified affirmance upholds the whole of the appealed judgment's dispositive part in the absence of words to the contrary, even if several points thereof were not discussed or touched upon in the confirmatory opinion. Applied here, the buffalo round-up paragraph, the counterclaim dismissal, and the intervention disposition were all deemed affirmed although not requoted.
- Judgment distinguished from opinion — The final judgment as rendered is the judgment of the court, irrespective of seemingly contrary statements in the decision; the decree prevails over the opinion. Applied here, the decretal affirmance controlled over the opinion's incomplete quotation marked by ellipses.
- Effect of confirmatory judgment as adjudication — Affirmance makes conclusive all matters actually adjudicated, even though not mentioned in the affirming opinion, and is not controlled by general expressions outside the matter before the court and unnecessary to decision. Applied here, silence on buffaloes did not exclude that adjudication where it was immaterial to the questions on appeal.
- Grant of relief supported by evidence — Where defendant is not in default and trial is held, plaintiff may be granted any relief supported by evidence although not specified in pleadings, pursuant to section 9, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court. Applied here, the buffalo directive was not defeated by the claim that it was not prayed in the amended complaint.
- Contempt — willfulness and conservative exercise — Contempt requires willful disregard or disobedience or clear and contumacious refusal to obey, and the power to punish therefor is to be conservatively exercised. Applied here, reliance on a technical ground credible enough to persuade the trial judge negated the willfulness required, as in People vs. Rivera and Gamboa vs. Teodoro.
Key Excerpts
- "the final judgment as rendered is the judgment of the court, irrespective of all seemingly contrary statements in the decision" — Restates the Contreras vs. Felix distinction between judgment and opinion, invoked to hold that the decretal affirmance prevailed over the incomplete quotation in the opinion.
- "The judgment, we decreed in concluding, "is hereby affirmed". We did not say, it is hereby modified." — Emphasizes the unqualified nature of the prior decree as proof that no portion, including the buffaloes paragraph, was excluded from affirmance.
- "The affirmance of a judgment makes it conclusive as to all matters actually adjudicated by it, even though not mentioned in the affirming opinion." — States the Freeman on Judgments rule relied upon to construe confirmatory decisions as upholding the whole appealed judgment.
- "the power to punish for contempt should be conservatively exercised." — States the limiting principle applied to deny contempt despite finding sharp practice in resisting execution.
Precedents Cited
- Contreras vs. Felix, 78 Phil. 570 — Controlling on the distinction between judgment and opinion; followed to hold the decretal affirmance prevails over seemingly contrary statements in the opinion.
- Iturralde vs. Magcauas, 9 Phil. 599; Santos vs. Macapinlac, 51 Phil. 224 — Cited with Moran's Comments as authority for section 9, Rule 35 that relief supported by evidence may be granted although not pleaded.
- People vs. Rivera, 91 Phil. 354 — Cited for the standard of willful disregard or disobedience required for contempt; applied to find Lucasan's conduct not contemptuous.
- Gamboa vs. Teodoro, 91 Phil. 270 — Cited for clear and contumacious refusal to obey and for conservative exercise of contempt power; applied to deny contempt.
Provisions
- Section 6, Rule 64, Rules of Court — Basis of the P500 contempt fine or subsidiary imprisonment at one day per P2.50 unpaid imposed by Judge Ceniza and affirmed.
- Section 9, Rule 35, Rules of Court — Allows grant of any relief supported by evidence although not specified in pleadings where defendant is not in default and trial is held; applied to sustain the buffalo round-up directive.
- Section 5, Rule 53 in relation to Section 1, Rule 58, Rules of Court — Invoked by analogy to reject belated attack on the affirmed buffalo portion, which was not plain error calling for special consideration although ignored in appellant's brief.
Notable Concurring Opinions
Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.