Sia vs. People of the Philippines

A subdivision project partitioned primarily for residential purposes falls within the coverage of P.D. No. 957 even if the land is situated in a commercially zoned district, and the owner's failure to register Contracts to Sell with the Register of Deeds constitutes a violation of Section 17 of the decree; prosecution for such violation remains within the authority of the City Prosecutors' Office, as it is not among the functions devolved to local government enforcement officers under E.O. No. 71; and the right to counsel of choice is not so absolute as to permit an accused to indefinitely delay arraignment through dilatory motions.

Petitioners Ruben and Josephine Sia were the registered owners and developers of a subdivision project in Naga City. Respondent Teresita Lee purchased several subdivision lots from the petitioners, for which Contracts to Sell were executed in her favor. The dispute arose from petitioners' alleged failure to register those Contracts to Sell with the Register of Deeds of Naga City, as required under Section 17 of P.D. No. 957, otherwise known as the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree. The case also involves the interplay between P.D. No. 957 and E.O. No. 71, which devolved certain powers of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to local government units pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991.

Petitioners Ruben and Josephine Sia were the registered owners and developers of a subdivision project in Naga City. Respondent Teresita Lee purchased several subdivision lots from the petitioners, for which Contracts to Sell were executed in her favor. The subdivision project was covered by Development Permit No. 92-0415, which classified the project as socialized housing. A Zoning Administrator's Certification dated May 14, 1992 indicated that the project was situated in a residential zone in accordance with the Zoning Ordinance of Naga City. Petitioners, however, pointed to City Ordinance No. 93-041 and Resolution No. 93-261 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Naga City, which classified the property as commercial and industrial.

On August 7, 2000, three informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 27, charging petitioners with violation of Section 17 of P.D. No. 957 for failing to register with the Register of Deeds of Naga City the Contracts to Sell they executed in favor of respondent Lee. The informations alleged that the acts complained of were within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction, and the penalty provided by law for the violation was imprisonment of not more than ten years.

On October 15, 2001, petitioners filed a Consolidated Motion to Quash, alleging that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the offense charged and that the City Prosecutors' Office of Naga City had no authority to file the informations. The trial court denied the motion on October 18, 2001, holding that it had jurisdiction. When petitioners sought resolution of the ground regarding the city prosecutor's authority, the trial court likewise denied this on October 24, 2001. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied, and their Motion for Postponement of arraignment was also denied.

On November 21, 2001, the trial court noted that although the informations had been filed on August 7, 2000, petitioners had not yet been arraigned. The court appointed a counsel de oficio for petitioner Ruben S. Sia and proceeded with the arraignment. Petitioners thereafter filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition and affirmed the trial court's orders in toto. The appellate court upheld the trial court's jurisdiction, sustained the city prosecutor's authority to file the informations under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, and ruled that the right to counsel of choice under Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution does not preclude appointment of a competent counsel de oficio. The petitioners then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via a petition for review under Rule 45.

• Applicability of P.D. No. 957: Petitioners contended that P.D. No. 957 applies only to residential subdivision and condominium projects, not to commercial subdivision projects as in this case, and that the property involved had been classified commercial and industrial under City Ordinance No. 93-041 and Resolution No. 93-261 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Naga City. They further argued that the documents required to be registered under Section 17 refer only to lands converted into subdivision projects for residential purposes.
• Authority to File Informations: Petitioners maintained that the City Prosecutors' Office had no power or authority to institute and prosecute the case for alleged violation of P.D. No. 957 without a prior determination by the enforcement officers of the HLURB, arguing that only enforcement officers under E.O. No. 71 are authorized to investigate and enforce laws pertaining to subdivisions.
• Right to Counsel: Petitioners asserted that Ruben Sia was deprived of his constitutional right to due process and to counsel, having been assisted only by a counsel de oficio during his arraignment despite his insistence on being assisted by their newly hired counsel de parte.

• Classification of the Project: Respondent Lee maintained that petitioners' Development Permit (DP No. 92-0415) showed the project was classified as socialized housing, and the Zoning Administrator's Certification dated May 14, 1992 indicated the project was situated in a residential zone. Thus, the subdivision was residential and within the ambit of P.D. No. 957.
• Registration Requirement: Respondent Lee asserted that under Section 17 of P.D. No. 957, the registration of the subdivision plan by the owner is distinct from the subsequent registration of contracts to sell, deeds of sale, and other similar instruments required by the same provision, and that petitioners were required to register the Contracts to Sell in her favor.
• Right to Counsel: Respondent Lee argued that petitioners were given ample time by the trial court to obtain counsel of their choice but failed to do so, and that the preference in the choice of counsel does not preclude other equally competent and independent lawyers from handling the defense.

• Applicability of P.D. No. 957: Whether the charges in the informations constitute violations of P.D. No. 957, specifically whether the decree applies to a subdivision project located in a commercially zoned district.
• Authority to Prosecute: Whether the City Prosecutors' Office of Naga City has authority to file the informations for violation of Section 17 of P.D. No. 957 without prior determination by HLURB enforcement officers.
• Right to Counsel: Whether petitioner Ruben S. Sia was deprived of his right to counsel when only a counsel de oficio assisted him during his arraignment.

• Applicability of P.D. No. 957: Yes. The charges constitute violations of P.D. No. 957. Section 2 of the decree defines a subdivision project as one partitioned primarily for residential purposes, and expressly includes commercial, industrial, and recreational areas within the project. The crucial requirement is that the subdivision is partitioned primarily for residential purposes, even if situated in a commercial district.
• Authority to Prosecute: Yes. The City Prosecutors' Office of Naga City had authority to file the informations. Prosecution for violation of Section 17 of P.D. No. 957 is not among the functions devolved to local government enforcement officers under E.O. No. 71, and Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court vests prosecution of criminal actions under the direction and control of the prosecutor.
• Right to Counsel: No. Petitioner Ruben S. Sia was not deprived of his right to counsel. The right to counsel of choice under Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution is not so absolute as to permit an accused to indefinitely delay proceedings, and the appointment of a competent counsel de oficio after ample opportunity to retain private counsel did not constitute a violation.

• Applicability of P.D. No. 957: Section 2 of P.D. No. 957 defines a "subdivision project" as a tract or parcel of land partitioned primarily for residential purposes into individual lots, and expressly states that it "shall include all residential, commercial, industrial and recreational areas, as well as open spaces and other community and public areas in the project." The provision does not confine the meaning of "subdivision project" to parcels classified as residential. The crucial requirement is that the subdivision project is partitioned primarily for residential purposes, even if situated in a commercial district. In this case, the petitioners' own Development Permit (DP No. 92-0415) showed the project was for socialized housing, and the Zoning Administrator's Certification indicated it was in a residential zone. Although the location was classified as a commercial district under city ordinances, the subdivision project continued to be for residential purposes and remained within the ambit of P.D. No. 957. Sections 4 and 17 of the decree require the registered owner to register the subdivision plan with the HLURB and the Register of Deeds, and upon sale of lots, to register the contracts to sell, deeds of sale, and other similar instruments with the Register of Deeds. Petitioners' failure to register the Contracts to Sell in favor of respondent Lee thus constituted a violation of Section 17.

• Authority to Prosecute: Section 3 of E.O. No. 71 grants enforcement officers of local government units full power to monitor, investigate, and enforce compliance only with respect to provisions of national laws and standards whose implementation have been devolved to the local government. Section 1 of E.O. No. 71 enumerates the devolved functions: (a) approval of subdivision schemes and development plans; (b) approval of economic and socialized housing project plans; (c) evaluation and resolution of opposition to development permits; (d) monitoring of land development and housing construction; and (e) assessment and collection of fees. Prosecution for violation of Section 17 of P.D. No. 957 is not included among these devolved functions. It follows logically that the authority to prosecute remained with the City Prosecutors' Office. Moreover, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that all criminal actions commenced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor. Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, not by the defenses raised by the accused. The informations rested the cause of action on petitioners' failure to register the Contracts to Sell, with a penalty of a fine of not more than Twenty Thousand Pesos and/or imprisonment of not more than ten years, well within the trial court's jurisdiction.

• Right to Counsel: Petitioners were given ample time by the trial court to obtain counsel of their choice but did not. Through the course of the proceedings, petitioners filed several motions. The trial court's Order dated November 21, 2001 noted that although the informations were filed on August 7, 2000, petitioners had not yet been arraigned as of that date, and the delay could no longer be countenanced. Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, assuring an accused of counsel of his choice, pertains specifically to a person under investigation. Even if extended to an accused in a criminal prosecution, the choice of counsel cannot be so absolute and arbitrary as to refer exclusively to the predilection of the accused. As held in Amion vs. Chiongson, the word "preferably" does not convey that the choice of lawyer is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense. Petitioners' dilatory tactics could not be allowed to trump the progress of the judicial process.

• Scope of P.D. No. 957 — A "subdivision project" under Section 2 of P.D. No. 957 is defined as a tract or parcel of land partitioned primarily for residential purposes into individual lots, and expressly includes all residential, commercial, industrial, and recreational areas, as well as open spaces and other community and public areas in the project. The decisive criterion is whether the subdivision is partitioned primarily for residential purposes, not the zoning classification of the land where it is situated. The Court applied this by finding that the petitioners' project, classified as socialized housing in their own Development Permit, remained within the coverage of P.D. No. 957 despite its location in a commercially zoned district.

• Devolution of HLURB Functions Under E.O. No. 71 — E.O. No. 71 devolved only specific functions of the HLURB to local government units, namely: approval of subdivision schemes and development plans, approval of economic and socialized housing project plans, evaluation of opposition to development permits, monitoring of land development, and assessment and collection of fees. The prosecution of criminal violations of P.D. No. 957 was not among the devolved functions and thus remained with the City Prosecutors' Office. The Court applied this by holding that the city prosecutor retained authority to file the informations.

• Right to Counsel of Choice is Not Absolute — The preference in the choice of counsel under Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution does not mean the choice is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense. The word "preferably" does not confer an absolute right. The Court applied this by sustaining the trial court's appointment of a counsel de oficio after petitioners had been given ample time to retain private counsel but failed to do so, and by condemning petitioners' dilatory tactics.

• Jurisdiction Determined by Allegations in the Information — The jurisdiction of the court or agency is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, not by the defenses raised by the accused in an answer or motion to dismiss. The Court relied on this principle to uphold the trial court's jurisdiction over the offense charged.

• "Observe that the provision does not confine the meaning of 'subdivision project' to parcels of land classified as residential, contrary to what petitioners restrictively propose. A subdivision project also includes parcels of land classified as commercial. Indeed, the crucial requirement is that the subdivision project is partitioned primarily for residential purposes, even if it is situated in a commercial district." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on the scope of P.D. No. 957, establishing that the controlling criterion is the primary purpose of the subdivision, not the zoning classification of the land.

• "Withal, the word 'preferably' under Section 12(1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his defense." — This quotation, drawn from Amion vs. Chiongson and adopted by the Court, defines the canonical formulation of the doctrine that the right to counsel of choice is not absolute and cannot be wielded to obstruct proceedings.

• "Noteworthy, the prosecution for the violation of Section 17 of P.D. No. 957 is not included in the foregoing functions. Hence, it follows logically that it remained with the City Prosecutors' Office of Naga City." — This passage states the Court's reasoning on the second issue, clarifying the boundary between devolved and retained functions under E.O. No. 71.

• Amion vs. Chiongson, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1371, January 22, 1999, 301 SCRA 614 — Followed. The Court adopted its ruling that the word "preferably" in Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution does not make the choice of counsel exclusive, and that an accused cannot obstruct proceedings by selecting a lawyer who is unavailable.
• People vs. Larrañaga, G.R. Nos. 138874-75, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 530 — Cited in support of the proposition that the right to counsel of choice is not absolute.
• Dela Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 151298, November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 492 — Followed. The Court relied on its ruling that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, not by the defenses raised by the defendant.
• Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138955, October 29, 2002, 391 SCRA 351 — Cited in support of the principle that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint.

• Section 2, P.D. No. 957 — Defines "subdivision project" as a tract or parcel of land partitioned primarily for residential purposes, expressly including residential, commercial, industrial, and recreational areas, as well as open spaces and other community and public areas. Applied to determine that the petitioners' project fell within the coverage of the decree despite its commercial zoning classification.
• Section 4, P.D. No. 957 — Requires the registered owner to submit the subdivision plan to the Authority (HLURB) for approval, and thereafter to the Register of Deeds for registration. Applied to outline the registration framework for subdivision projects.
• Section 17, P.D. No. 957 — Requires the seller to register all contracts to sell, deeds of sale, and other similar instruments relative to the sale or conveyance of subdivision lots with the Register of Deeds. Applied as the basis for the criminal charge against petitioners for failure to register the Contracts to Sell.
• Section 39, P.D. No. 957 — Provides the penalty for violation of the decree: a fine of not more than Twenty Thousand Pesos and/or imprisonment of not more than ten years. Applied to confirm the trial court's jurisdiction over the offense.
• Section 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Provides that all criminal actions commenced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor. Applied to sustain the city prosecutor's authority to file the informations.
• Section 12(1), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the right of any person under investigation to competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice. Applied to determine that the right to counsel of choice is not absolute and does not preclude appointment of a counsel de oficio.
• Section 3, E.O. No. 71 — Grants enforcement officers of local government units full power to monitor, investigate, and enforce compliance with devolved provisions of national laws and standards. Applied to show that prosecution for violation of Section 17 of P.D. No. 957 was not among the devolved functions.
• Section 1, E.O. No. 71 — Enumerates the functions devolved to local government units. Applied to demonstrate that criminal prosecution for violations of P.D. No. 957 was excluded from the devolved functions.

Carpio, Carpio Morales, Tinga, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concurred.