Si vs. Court of Appeals

The right of legal redemption under Article 1623 of the Civil Code does not apply when the property has already been extrajudicially partitioned and the respective portions of the co-owners are concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if covered by a single title. The Court ruled that the execution of deeds of sale with specific technical descriptions and the separate tax declarations of the portions effectively terminated the co-ownership.

Escolastica, wife of Severo Armada, Sr., originally owned a 340-square-meter lot in Pasay City. She executed three separate deeds of sale conveying specific portions of the property to her three sons, with each portion particularly described by metes and bounds. However, a single title (TCT No. 16007) was issued in the names of the three sons. Subsequently, Crisostomo, through his attorney-in-fact, sold his undivided 113.34-square-meter share to petitioners Spouses Si. Private respondents (the other brothers) sought to annul the sale and redeem the property.

• Origin and Transfer: Escolastica owned a 340-square-meter lot in Pasay City. On October 2, 1954, she executed three separate deeds of sale conveying specific portions to her sons—Crisostomo, Jose, and Severo, Jr.—with each portion particularly described by metes and bounds.
• Issuance of Title and Tax Declarations: TCT No. 16007 was issued in the names of the three sons, indicating their proportional allocations but not reflecting the technical descriptions of the individual portions. Each son declared his specific portion for taxation purposes with the Assessor's Office of Pasay City on September 21, 1970.
• Sale to Petitioners: On March 27, 1979, Crisostomo, through his attorney-in-fact and wife Cresenciana, sold his 113.34-square-meter share to petitioners Spouses Si. The deed of sale described the portion as "undivided." Petitioners inserted a phrase stating co-owners were not interested in buying despite notice, without actually providing written notice.
• Actual Notice: Jose Armada had actual knowledge of the impending sale, evidenced by a letter he wrote to Crisostomo stating, "Well you are the king of yourselves, and you can sell your share of Leveriza."
• Subsequent Title Cancellation: On January 9, 1995, the Registry of Deeds cancelled TCT 24751 and issued three new titles corresponding to the three distinct portions.

• Petitioners maintained that the property was no longer co-owned because the three deeds of sale from Escolastico technically described the specific portions conveyed to each son, effectively constituting an extrajudicial partition. They argued that the failure to secure separate titles was merely due to the lack of a subdivision plan submitted to the Register of Deeds. They also contested the denial of their motions for reconsideration and new trial, and the award of damages and attorney's fees.

• Respondents argued that a co-ownership existed because TCT No. 16007 did not reflect the specific areas sold to each brother and merely indicated their proportional square meter allocations. They pointed out that the deed of sale to the Sis referred to an "undivided" share, proving the property remained undivided. They asserted their right of redemption as co-owners, claiming they were not given written notice of the sale as required by Article 1623 of the Civil Code.

• Procedural Issues: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration and motion for new trial.
• Substantive Issues: Whether private respondents, as co-owners, are legally entitled to redeem the lot under Article 1623 of the Civil Code. Whether the award of moral damages, attorney's fees, and costs of suit was proper.

• Procedural: The Court did not rule on the procedural issues regarding the denial of the motions for reconsideration and new trial, holding that these became moot in light of the substantive ruling reversing the CA decision.
• Substantive: The Court held that private respondents were not entitled to the right of redemption under Article 1623 because the co-ownership had already been terminated by extrajudicial partition. The deeds of sale from Escolastica concretely determined and separately identified the portions of each son by metes and bounds, and they separately declared their portions for taxation. The fact that the portions were embraced in one certificate of title did not make them less determinable or identifiable. Furthermore, even assuming co-ownership existed, respondents were not entitled to written notice because they already had actual notice of the sale, as shown by Jose Armada's letter. Consequently, the award of damages and attorney's fees was deleted because petitioners acted in good faith.

• Extrajudicial Partition by Deed of Sale — When a parent executes separate deeds of sale conveying specific portions of property to children, with each portion definitely described and segregated by technical descriptions, an extrajudicial partition occurs, terminating the community ownership. The right of redemption among co-owners ceases to be available after such physical division.
• Actual Notice vs. Written Notice in Legal Redemption — While Article 1623 requires written notice to co-owners to trigger the 30-day redemption period, a written notice of a fact already known to the co-owners is superfluous. Co-owners with actual notice of the sale at the time thereof are not entitled to written notice, as the statute does not demand what is unnecessary.

• "There is no co-ownership when the different portions owned by different people are already concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet technically described."
• "The fact that the three portions are embraced in one certificate of title does not make said portions less determinable or identifiable or distinguishable, one from the other, nor that dominion over each portion less exclusive, in their respective owners. Hence, no right of redemption among co-owners exists."

• Ferrer v. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 302 (1993) — Cited for the principle that the Supreme Court will review evidence when the CA's factual findings are at variance with the trial court's or when the CA's inferences are manifestly mistaken.
• Del Rosario v. Bansil, 179 SCRA 662 (1989); Caro v. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 10 (1982); Caram v. Court of Appeals, 101 Phil. 315 (1957) — Followed for the doctrine that after the physical division of the lot among co-owners, the community ownership terminates, and the right of preemption or redemption is no longer available.
• De la Cruz v. Cruz, 32 SCRA 307 (1970) — Followed for the rule that there is no co-ownership when the different portions owned by different people are already concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet technically described.

• Article 1623, Civil Code — Governs the right of legal pre-emption or redemption among co-owners, requiring written notice and a 30-day period to exercise the right. The Court held this provision inapplicable because no co-ownership existed at the time of the sale.
• Article 484, Civil Code — Defines co-ownership as existing whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. The Court applied this to determine that co-ownership did not exist because the portions were already divided and identifiable.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena, De Leon, Jr.